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disabling cert checks: "we have not learned much" from @bagder@mastodon.social

2025-03-24T16:59:40.982354+00:00

The article "Disabling cert checks: we have not learned much" by Daniel Stenberg, published on February 11, 2025, discusses the persistent issue of developers disabling SSL/TLS certificate verification in applications, despite the security risks involved. Stenberg reflects on the history of SSL/TLS usage, emphasizing that since 2002, curl has verified server certificates by default to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks. He highlights common challenges that lead developers to disable certificate verification, such as development environment mismatches, outdated CA stores, or expired certificates. Despite efforts to educate and design APIs that encourage secure practices, the problem persists, indicating a need for continued emphasis on the importance of proper certificate verification in software development. A quick CVE search immediately reveals security vulnerabilities for exactly this problem published only last year: * CVE-2024-32928 – The libcurl CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER option was disabled on a subset of requests made by Nest production devices. * CVE-2024-56521 – An issue was discovered in TCPDF before 6.8.0. If libcurl is used, CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYHOST and CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER are set unsafely. * CVE-2024-5261 – In affected versions of Collabora Online, in LibreOfficeKit, curl’s TLS certificate verification was disabled (CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER of false).

A Mirai botnet is attempting exploitation in the wild using a new (at least to us) set of CVEs

2025-03-24T16:59:40.982238+00:00

A Mirai botnet is attempting exploitation in the wild using a new set of CVEs, focusing mostly on IoT devices. Includes: - Tenda CVE-2024-41473 - Draytek CVE-2024-12987 - HuangDou UTCMS V9 CVE-2024-9916 - Totolink CVE-2024-2353 CVE-2024-24328 CVE-2024-24329 - (likely) Four-Faith CVE-2024-9644 Source: The Shadowserver Foundation

HP Universal Print Driver Series (PCL 6 and PostScript) - Potential Security Vulnerabilities

2025-03-24T16:59:40.982122+00:00

| CVE | CVSS | Level | CVSS String | library | | | ----------------------------------------------------------------- | --- | -------- | ----------------------------------------------- | ------- | ------------------------ | | [CVE-2017-12652](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-12652) | 9.8 | Critical | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | libpng | Arbitrary Code Execution | | [CVE-2022-2068](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-2068) | 9.8 | Critical | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | OpenSSL | Arbitrary Code Execution | | [CVE-2023-45853](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-45853) | 9.8 | Critical | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | zlib | Information Disclosure | | [CVE-2020-14152](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-14152) | 7.1 | High | CVSS:3.1/AF4AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H | libjpeg | Denial of Service | # Resolution Update your version of the HP Universal Print Driver Series. HP has provided updates to the HP Universal Print Driver Series. To obtain the updated version, go to www.hp.com/go/UPD. [https://support.hp.com/us-en/document/ish_11892982-11893015-16/hpsbpi03995](https://support.hp.com/us-en/document/ish_11892982-11893015-16/hpsbpi03995)

Potential privilege escalation in IDPKI (CVE-2024-39327, CVE-2024-39328, CVE-2024-51505)

2025-03-24T16:59:40.982002+00:00

A security assessment of IDPKI implementation revealed a weakness potentially allowing an operator to exceed its privileges. In the course of a pentest security assessment of IDPKI, some security measures protecting internal communications were found potentially compromised for an internal user with high privileges. None of these vulnerabilities put Certificate Authority (CA) private key at risk. Eviden analyzed the root cause of the weakness. It revealed two separate vulnerabilities. During validation of the fix, an additional vulnerability of similar nature was identified, leveraging some race condition to alter an internal automata state and achieve a system privilege escalation: * CVE-2024-39327: The vulnerability could allow the possibility to obtain CA signing in an illegitimate way. * CVE-2024-39328: Highly trusted role (Config Admin) could exceed their configuration privileges in a multi-partition environment and access some confidential data. Data integrity and availability is not at risk. * CVE-2024-51505: Highly trusted role (Config Admin) could leverage a race condition to escalate privileges. * CVE-2024-39327 correction has been validated and published. * CVE-2024-39328 correction has been validated and published. This vulnerability has no impact in mono-partition nor in SaaS environments. * CVE-2024-51505 risk is increased if the last fixes are not applied, as a lower privileged role is required. A fix is available and published.

Black Basta’s Leaked Chat Logs

2025-03-24T16:59:40.981870+00:00

Leaked ransomware chat logs reveal Black Basta’s targeted CVEs. On February 11, 2025, a major leak exposed BLACKBASTA's internal Matrix chat logs. The leaker claimed they released the data because the group was targeting Russian banks. This leak closely resembles the previous Conti leaks. Cybercrime group focused on Microsoft vulnerabilities as well as flaws in network edge devices and communications software. We have sightings from MISP and The Shadowserver fundation related to the rejected CVE: * CVE-2024-21683 * ghsa-vr88-2hv2-5jvf

StopRansomware: Ghost (Cring) Ransomware | CISA

2025-03-24T16:59:40.981720+00:00

# StopRansomware: Ghost (Cring) Ransomware | CISA Cybersecurity Advisory Release Date February 19, 2025 Alert Code AA25-050A #### Actions for Organizations to Take Today to Mitigate Cyber Threats Related to Ghost (Cring) Ransomware Activity 1. Maintain regular system backups stored separately from the source systems which cannot be altered or encrypted by potentially compromised network devices \[CPG 2.R\]. 2. Patch known vulnerabilities by applying timely security updates to operating systems, software, and firmware within a risk-informed timeframe \[CPG 2.F\]. 3. Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE): CVE-2018-13379, CVE-2010-2861, CVE-2009-3960, CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207. 4. Segment networks to restrict lateral movement from initial infected devices and other devices in the same organization \[CPG 2.F\]. 5. Require Phishing-Resistant MFA for access to all privileged accounts and email services accounts. **Summary** ----------- _**Note:** This joint Cybersecurity Advisory is part of an ongoing #StopRansomware effort to publish advisories for network defenders that detail various ransomware variants and ransomware threat actors. These #StopRansomware advisories include recently and historically observed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help organizations protect against ransomware. Visit_ [_stopransomware.gov_](https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware "#StopRansomware") _to see all #StopRansomware advisories and to learn more about other ransomware threats and no-cost resources._ The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) are releasing this joint advisory to disseminate known Ghost (Cring)—(“Ghost”)—ransomware IOCs and TTPs identified through FBI investigation as recently as January 2025. Beginning early 2021, Ghost actors began attacking victims whose internet facing services ran outdated versions of software and firmware. This indiscriminate targeting of networks containing vulnerabilities has led to the compromise of organizations across more than 70 countries, including organizations in China. Ghost actors, located in China, conduct these widespread attacks for financial gain. Affected victims include critical infrastructure, schools and universities, healthcare, government networks, religious institutions, technology and manufacturing companies, and numerous small- and medium-sized businesses. Ghost actors rotate their ransomware executable payloads, switch file extensions for encrypted files, modify ransom note text, and use numerous ransom email addresses, which has led to variable attribution of this group over time. Names associated with this group include Ghost, Cring, Crypt3r, Phantom, Strike, Hello, Wickrme, HsHarada, and Rapture. Samples of ransomware files Ghost used during attacks are: Cring.exe, Ghost.exe, ElysiumO.exe, and Locker.exe. Ghost actors use publicly available code to exploit Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) and gain access to internet facing servers. Ghost actors exploit well known vulnerabilities and target networks where available patches have not been applied. The FBI, CISA, and MS-ISAC encourage organizations to implement the recommendations in the **Mitigations** section of this advisory to reduce the likelihood and impact of Ghost ransomware incidents. **Technical Details** --------------------- **Note:** This advisory uses the [MITRE ATT&CK® Matrix for Enterprise](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v16/ "MITRE ATT&CK® Matrix for Enterprise") framework, version 16.1. See the **MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques** section of this advisory for a table of the threat actors’ activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques. ### Initial Access The FBI has observed Ghost actors obtaining initial access to networks by exploiting public facing applications that are associated with multiple CVEs \[[T1190](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v16/techniques/T1190/ "Exploit Public-Facing Application")\]. Their methodology includes leveraging vulnerabilities in Fortinet FortiOS appliances ([CVE-2018-13379](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-13379 "CVE-2018-13379")), servers running Adobe ColdFusion ([CVE-2010-2861](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2010-2861 "CVE-2010-2861") and [CVE-2009-3960](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2009-3960 "CVE-2009-3960")), Microsoft SharePoint ([CVE-2019-0604](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-0604 "CVE-2019-0604")), and Microsoft Exchange ([CVE-2021-34473](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34473 "CVE-2021-34473"), [CVE-2021-34523](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34523 "CVE-2021-34523"), and [CVE-2021-31207](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-31207 "CVE-2021-31207")— commonly referred to as the ProxyShell attack chain). ### Execution Ghost actors have been observed uploading a web shell \[[T1505.003](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v16/techniques/T1505/003/ "Server Software Component: Web Shell")\] to a compromised server and leveraging Windows Command Prompt \[[T1059.003](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v16/techniques/T1059/003/ "Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell")\] and/or PowerShell \[[T1059.001](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v16/techniques/T1059/001/ "Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell")\] to download and execute [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154/ "Cobalt Strike") Beacon malware \[[T1105](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v16/techniques/T1105/ "Ingress Tool Transfer")\] that is then implanted on victim systems. Despite Ghost actors’ malicious implementation, Cobalt Strike is a commercially available adversary simulation tool often used for the purposes of testing an organization’s security controls. ### Persistence Persistence is not a major focus for Ghost actors, as they typically only spend a few days on victim networks. In multiple instances, they have been observed proceeding from initial compromise to the deployment of ransomware within the same day. However, Ghost actors sporadically create new local \[[T1136.001](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v16/techniques/T1136/001/ "Create Account: Local Account")\] and domain accounts \[[T1136.002](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v16/techniques/T1136/002/ "Create Account: Domain Account")\] and change passwords for existing accounts \[[T1098](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v16/techniques/T1098/ "Account Manipulation")\]. In 2024, Ghost actors were observed deploying web shells \[[T1505.003](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v16/techniques/T1505/003/ "Server Software Component: Web Shell")\] on victim web servers. ### Privilege Escalation Ghost actors often rely on built in Cobalt Strike functions to steal process tokens running under the SYSTEM user context to impersonate the SYSTEM user, often for the purpose of running Beacon a second time with elevated privileges \[[T1134.001](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v16/techniques/T1134/001/ "Access Token Manipulation: Token Impersonation/Theft")\]. Ghost actors have been observed using multiple open-source tools in an attempt at privilege escalation through exploitation \[[T1068](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v16/techniques/T1068/ "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation")\] such as “[SharpZeroLogon](https://github.com/leitosama/SharpZeroLogon "SharpZeroLogon"),” “SharpGPPPass,” “[BadPotato](https://github.com/BeichenDream/BadPotato "BadPotato"),” and “[GodPotato](https://github.com/BeichenDream/GodPotato "GodPotato").” These privilege escalation tools would not generally be used by individuals with legitimate access and credentials. See **Table 1** for a descriptive listing of tools. ### Credential Access Ghost actors use the built in Cobalt Strike function “hashdump” or [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v16/software/S0002/ "Mimikatz") \[[T1003](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v16/techniques/T1003/ "OS Credential Dumping")\] to collect passwords and/or password hashes to aid them with unauthorized logins and privilege escalation or to pivot to other victim devices. ### Defense Evasion Ghost actors used their access through Cobalt Strike to display a list of running processes \[[T1057](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v16/techniques/T1057/ "Process Discovery")\] to determine which antivirus software \[[T1518.001](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v16/techniques/T1518/001/ "Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery")\] is running so that it can be disabled \[[T1562.001](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v16/techniques/T1562/001/ "Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools")\]. Ghost frequently runs a command to disable Windows Defender on network connected devices. Options used in this command are: Set-MpPreference -DisableRealtimeMonitoring 1 -DisableIntrusionPreventionSystem 1 -DisableBehaviorMonitoring 1 -DisableScriptScanning 1 -DisableIOAVProtection 1 -EnableControlledFolderAccess Disabled -MAPSReporting Disabled -SubmitSamplesConsent NeverSend. ### Discovery Ghost actors have been observed using other built-in Cobalt Strike commands for domain account discovery \[[T1087.002](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v16/techniques/T1087/002/ "Account Discovery: Domain Account")\], open-source tools such as “[SharpShares](https://github.com/mitchmoser/SharpShares "SharpShares")” for network share discovery \[[T1135](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v16/techniques/T1135/ "Network Share Discovery")\], and “[Ladon 911](https://github.com/k8gege/Ladon)” and “[SharpNBTScan](https://github.com/BronzeTicket/SharpNBTScan "SharpNBTScan")” for remote systems discovery \[[T1018](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v16/techniques/T1018/ "Remote System Discovery")\]. Network administrators would be unlikely to use these tools for network share or remote systems discovery. ### Lateral Movement Ghost actors used elevated access and Windows Management Instrumentation Command-Line (WMIC) \[[T1047](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v16/techniques/T1047/ "Windows Management Instrumentation")\] to run PowerShell commands on additional systems on the victim network— often for the purpose of initiating additional Cobalt Strike Beacon infections. The associated encoded string is a base 64 PowerShell command that always begins with: powershell -nop -w hidden -encodedcommand JABzAD0ATgBlAHcALQBPAGIAagBlAGMAdAAgAEkATwAuAE0AZQBtAG8AcgB5AFMAdAByAGUAYQBtACgALABbAEMAbwBuAHYAZQByAHQAXQA6ADoARgByAG8AbQBCAGEAcwBlADYANABTAHQAcgBpAG4AZwAoACIA… \[[T1132.001](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v16/techniques/T1132/001/ "Data Encoding: Standard Encoding")\]\[[T1564.003](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v16/techniques/T1564/003/ "Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window")\]. This string decodes to “$s=New-Object IO.MemoryStream(,\[Convert\]::FromBase64String(“” and is involved with the execution of Cobalt Strike in memory on the target machine. **In cases where lateral movement attempts are unsuccessful, Ghost actors have been observed abandoning an attack on a victim.** ### Exfiltration Ghost ransom notes often claim exfiltrated data will be sold if a ransom is not paid. However, Ghost actors do not frequently exfiltrate a significant amount of information or files, such as intellectual property or personally identifiable information (PII), that would cause significant harm to victims if leaked. The FBI has observed limited downloading of data to Cobalt Strike Team Servers \[[T1041](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v16/techniques/T1041/ "Exfiltration Over C2 Channel")\]. Victims and other trusted third parties have reported limited uses of Mega.nz \[[T1567.002](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v16/techniques/T1567/002/ "Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage")\] and installed web shells for similar limited data exfiltration. **Note:** The typical data exfiltration is less than hundreds of gigabytes of data. ### Command and Control Ghost actors rely heavily on Cobalt Strike Beacon malware and Cobalt Strike Team Servers for command and control (C2) operations, which function using hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) and hypertext transfer protocol secure (HTTPS) \[[T1071.001](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v16/techniques/T1071/001/ "Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols")\]. Ghost rarely registers domains associated with their C2 servers. Instead, connections made to a uniform resource identifier (URI) of a C2 server, for the purpose of downloading and executing Beacon malware, directly reference the C2 server’s IP address. For example, http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx:80/Google.com where xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx represents the C2 server’s IP address. For email communication with victims, Ghost actors use legitimate email services that include traffic encryption features. \[[T1573](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v16/techniques/T1573/ "Encrypted Channel")\] Some examples of emails services that Ghost actors have been observed using are Tutanota, Skiff, ProtonMail, Onionmail, and Mailfence. **Note:** **Table 2** contains a list of Ghost ransom email addresses. ### Impact and Encryption Ghost actors use Cring.exe, Ghost.exe, ElysiumO.exe, and Locker.exe, which are all ransomware executables that share similar functionality. Ghost variants can be used to encrypt specific directories or the entire system’s storage \[[T1486](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v16/techniques/T1486/ "Data Encrypted for Impact")\]. The nature of executables’ operability is based on command line arguments used when executing the ransomware file. Various file extensions and system folders are excluded during the encryption process to avoid encrypting files that would render targeted devices inoperable. These ransomware payloads clear Windows Event Logs \[[T1070.001](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v16/techniques/T1070/001/ "Indicator Removal: Clear Windows Event Logs")\], disable the Volume Shadow Copy Service, and delete shadow copies to inhibit system recovery attempts \[[T1490](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v16/techniques/T1490/ "Inhibit System Recovery")\]. Data encrypted with Ghost ransomware variants cannot be recovered without the decryption key. Ghost actors hold the encrypted data for ransom and typically demand anywhere from tens to hundreds of thousands of dollars in cryptocurrency in exchange for decryption software \[[T1486](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v16/techniques/T1486/ "Data Encrypted for Impact")\]. The impact of Ghost ransomware activity varies widely on a victim-to-victim basis. Ghost actors tend to move to other targets when confronted with hardened systems, such as those where proper network segmentation prevents lateral moment to other devices. **Indicators of Compromise (IOC)** ---------------------------------- **Table 1** lists several tools and applications Ghost actors have used for their operations. The use of these tools and applications on a network should be investigated further. **Note:** Authors of these tools generally state that they should not be used in illegal activity. _Table 1: Tools Leveraged by Ghost Actors_ Name Description Source Cobalt Strike Cobalt Strike is penetration testing software. Ghost actors use an unauthorized version of Cobalt Strike. N/A IOX Open-source proxy, used to establish a reverse proxy to a Ghost C2 server from an internal victim device. github\[.\]com/EddieIvan01/iox SharpShares.exe SharpShares.exe is used to enumerate accessible network shares in a domain. Ghost actors use this primarily for host discovery. github\[.\]com/mitchmoser/SharpShares SharpZeroLogon.exe SharpZeroLogon.exe attempts to exploit [CVE-2020-1472](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1472 "CVE-2020-1472") and is run against a target Domain Controller. github\[.\]com/leitosama/SharpZeroLogon SharpGPPPass.exe SharpGPPPass.exe attempts to exploit [CVE-2014-1812](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-1812 "CVE-2014-1812") and targets XML files created through Group Policy Preferences that may contain passwords. N/A SpnDump.exe SpnDump.exe is used to list service principal name identifiers, which Ghost actors use for service and hostname enumeration. N/A NBT.exe A compiled version of SharpNBTScan, a NetBIOS scanner. Ghost actors use this tool for hostname and IP address enumeration. github\[.\]com/BronzeTicket/SharpNBTScan BadPotato.exe BadPotato.exe is an exploitation tool used for privilege escalation. github\[.\]com/BeichenDream/BadPotato God.exe God.exe is a compiled version of GodPotato and is used for privilege escalation. github\[.\]com/BeichenDream/GodPotato HFS (HTTP File Server) A portable web server program that Ghost actors use to host files for remote access and exfiltration. rejitto\[.\]com/hfs Ladon 911 A multifunctional scanning and exploitation tool, often used by Ghost actors with the MS17010 option to scan for SMB vulnerabilities associated with [CVE-2017-0143](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-0143 "CVE-2017-0143") and [CVE-2017-0144](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-0144 "CVE-2017-0144"). github\[.\]com/k8gege/Ladon Web Shell A backdoor installed on a web server that allows for the execution of commands and facilitates persistent access. Slight variation of github\[.\]com/BeichenDream/Chunk-Proxy/blob/main/proxy.aspx _Table 2: MD5 File Hashes Associated with Ghost Ransomware Activity_ File name MD5 File Hash Cring.exe c5d712f82d5d37bb284acd4468ab3533 Ghost.exe 34b3009590ec2d361f07cac320671410 d9c019182d88290e5489cdf3b607f982 ElysiumO.exe 29e44e8994197bdb0c2be6fc5dfc15c2 c9e35b5c1dc8856da25965b385a26ec4 d1c5e7b8e937625891707f8b4b594314 Locker.exe ef6a213f59f3fbee2894bd6734bbaed2 iex.txt, pro.txt (IOX) ac58a214ce7deb3a578c10b97f93d9c3 x86.log (IOX) c3b8f6d102393b4542e9f951c9435255 0a5c4ad3ec240fbfd00bdc1d36bd54eb sp.txt (IOX) ff52fdf84448277b1bc121f592f753c5 main.txt (IOX) a2fd181f57548c215ac6891d000ec6b9 isx.txt (IOX) 625bd7275e1892eac50a22f8b4a6355d sock.txt (IOX) db38ef2e3d4d8cb785df48f458b35090 ### Ransom Email Addresses **Table 3** is a subset of ransom email addresses that have been included in Ghost ransom notes. _Table 3: Ransom Email Addresses_ Email Addresses [\[email protected\]](/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection) [\[email protected\]](/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection) [\[email protected\]](/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection) [\[email protected\]](/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection) [\[email protected\]](/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection) [\[email protected\]](/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection) [\[email protected\]](/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection) [\[email protected\]](/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection) [\[email protected\]](/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection) [\[email protected\]](/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection) [\[email protected\]](/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection) [\[email protected\]](/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection) [\[email protected\]](/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection) [\[email protected\]](/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection) [\[email protected\]](/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection) [\[email protected\]](/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection) [\[email protected\]](/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection) [\[email protected\]](/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection) [\[email protected\]](/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection) [\[email protected\]](/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection) [\[email protected\]](/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection) [\[email protected\]](/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection) [\[email protected\]](/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection) [\[email protected\]](/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection) [\[email protected\]](/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection) [\[email protected\]](/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection) [\[email protected\]](/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection) [\[email protected\]](/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection) [\[email protected\]](/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection) [\[email protected\]](/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection) [\[email protected\]](/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection) [\[email protected\]](/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection) [\[email protected\]](/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection) ### Ransom Notes Starting approximately in August 2024, Ghost actors began using TOX IDs in ransom notes as an alternative method for communicating with victims. For example: EFE31926F41889DBF6588F27A2EC3A2D7DEF7D2E9E0A1DEFD39B976A49C11F0E19E03998DBDA and E83CD54EAAB0F31040D855E1ED993E2AC92652FF8E8742D3901580339D135C6EBCD71002885B. **MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques** --------------------------------------- See **Table 4 to Table 13** for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques in this advisory. For assistance with mapping malicious cyber activity to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, version 16.1, see CISA and MITRE ATT&CK’s [Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/best-practices-mitre-attckr-mapping "Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping") and CISA’s [Decider Tool](https://github.com/cisagov/Decider/ "Decider Tool"). _Table 4: Initial Access_ Technique Title ID Use Exploit Public-Facing Application [T1190](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v16/techniques/T1190/ "Exploit Public-Facing Application") Ghost actors exploit multiple vulnerabilities in public-facing systems to gain initial access to servers. _Table 5: Execution_ Technique Title ID Use Windows Management Instrumentation [T1047](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v16/techniques/T1047/ "Windows Management Instrumentation") Ghost actors abuse WMI to run PowerShell scripts on other devices, resulting in their infection with Cobalt Strike Beacon malware. PowerShell [T1059.001](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v16/techniques/T1059/001/ "Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell") Ghost actors use PowerShell for various functions including to deploy Cobalt Strike. Windows Command Shell [T1059.003](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003/ "Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell") Ghost actors use the Windows Command Shell to download malicious content on to victim servers. _Table 6: Persistence_ Technique Title ID Use Account Manipulation [T1098](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v16/techniques/T1098/ "Account Manipulation") Ghost actors change passwords for already established accounts. Local Account [T1136.001](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v16/techniques/T1136/001/ "Create Account: Local Account") Ghost actors create new accounts or makes modifications to local accounts. Domain Account [T1136.002](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v16/techniques/T1136/002/ "Create Account: Domain Account") Ghost actors create new accounts or makes modifications to domain accounts. Web Shell [T1505.003](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v16/techniques/T1505/003/ "Server Software Component: Web Shell") Ghost actors upload web shells to victim servers to gain access and for persistence. _Table 7: Privilege Escalation_ Technique Title ID Use Exploitation for Privilege Escalation [T1068](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v16/techniques/T1068/ "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation") Ghost actors use a suite of open source tools in an attempt to gain elevated privileges through exploitation of vulnerabilities. Token Impersonation/Theft [T1134.001](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v16/techniques/T1134/001/ "Access Token Manipulation: Token Impersonation/Theft") Ghost actors use Cobalt Strike to steal process tokens of processes running at a higher privilege. _Table 8: Defense Evasion_ Technique Title ID Use Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols [T1071.001](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v16/techniques/T1071/001/ "Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols") Ghost actors use HTTP and HTTPS protocols while conducting C2 operations. Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools [T1562.001](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v16/techniques/T1562/001/ "Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools") Ghost actors disable antivirus products. Hidden Window [T1564.003](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v16/techniques/T1564/003/ "Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window") Ghost actors use PowerShell to conceal malicious content within legitimate appearing command windows. _Table 9: Credential Access_ Technique Title ID Use OS Credential Dumping [T1003](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v16/techniques/T1003/ "OS Credential Dumping") Ghost actors use Mimikatz and the Cobalt Strike “hashdump” command to collect passwords and password hashes. _Table 10: Discovery_ Technique Title ID Use Remote System Discovery [T1018](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v16/techniques/T1018/ "Remote System Discovery") Ghost actors use tools like Ladon 911 and ShapNBTScan for remote systems discovery. Process Discovery [T1057](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v16/techniques/T1057/ "Process Discovery") Ghost actors run a ps command to list running processes on an infected device. Domain Account Discovery [T1087.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002 "Account Discovery: Domain Account") Ghost actors run commands such as net group “Domain Admins” /domain to discover a list of domain administrator accounts. Network Share Discovery [T1135](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v16/techniques/T1135/ "Network Share Discovery") Ghost actors use various tools for network share discovery for the purpose of host enumeration. Software Discovery [T1518](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v16/techniques/T1518/ "Software Discovery") Ghost actors use their access to determine which antivirus software is running. Security Software Discovery [T1518.001](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v16/techniques/T1518/001/ "Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery") Ghost actors run Cobalt Strike to enumerate running antivirus software. _Table 11: Exfiltration_ Technique Title ID Use Exfiltration Over C2 Channel [T1041](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v16/techniques/T1041/ "Exfiltration Over C2 Channel") Ghost actors use both web shells and Cobalt Strike to exfiltrate limited data. Exfiltration to Cloud Storage [T1567.002](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v16/techniques/T1567/002/ "Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage") Ghost actors sometimes use legitimate cloud storage providers such as Mega.nz for malicious exfiltration operations. _Table 12: Command and Control_ Technique Title ID Use Web Protocols [T1071.001](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v16/techniques/T1071/001/ "Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols") Ghost actors use Cobalt Strike Beacon malware and Cobalt Strike Team Servers which communicate over HTTP and HTTPS. Ingress Tool Transfer [T1105](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v16/techniques/T1105/ "Ingress Tool Transfer") Ghost actors use Cobalt Strike Beacon malware to deliver ransomware payloads to victim servers. Standard Encoding [T1132.001](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v16/techniques/T1132/001/ "Data Encoding: Standard Encoding") Ghost actors use PowerShell commands to encode network traffic which reduces their likelihood of being detected during lateral movement. Encrypted Channel [T1573](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v16/techniques/T1573/ "Encrypted Channel") Ghost actors use encrypted email platforms to facilitate communications. _Table 13: Impact_ Technique Title ID Use Data Encrypted for Impact [T1486](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486 "Data Encrypted for Impact") Ghost actors use ransomware variants Cring.exe, Ghost.exe, ElysiumO.exe, and Locker.exe to encrypt victim files for ransom. Inhibit System Recovery [T1490](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v16/techniques/T1490/ "Inhibit System Recovery") Ghost actors delete volume shadow copies. **Mitigations** --------------- The FBI, CISA, and MS-ISAC recommend organizations reference their [#StopRansomware Guide](https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide "#StopRansomware Guide") and implement the mitigations below to improve cybersecurity posture on the basis of the Ghost ransomware activity. These mitigations align with the [Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs)](https://www.cisa.gov/cross-sector-cybersecurity-performance-goals "Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs)") developed by CISA and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The CPGs provide a minimum set of practices and protections that CISA and NIST recommend all organizations implement. CISA and NIST based the CPGs on existing cybersecurity frameworks and guidance to protect against the most common and impactful threats, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Visit CISA’s [CPGs webpage](https://www.cisa.gov/cpg "CPGs webpage") for more information on the CPGs, including additional recommended baseline protections. * **Maintain regular system backups** that are known-good and stored offline or are segmented from source systems \[[CPG 2.R](https://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-performance-goals-cpgs#SystemBackups2R "System Backups (2.R)")\]. Ghost ransomware victims whose backups were unaffected by the ransomware attack were often able to restore operations without needing to contact Ghost actors or pay a ransom. * **Patch known vulnerabilities by** applying timely security updates to operating systems, software, and firmware within a risk-informed timeframe \[[CPG 1.E](https://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-performance-goals-cpgs#MitigatingKnownVulnerabilities1E "Mitigating Known Vulnerabilities (1.E)")\]. * **Segment networks to restrict lateral movement from initial infected devices and other devices in the same organization \[**[CPG 2.F](https://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-performance-goals-cpgs#NetworkSegmentation2F "Network Segmentation (2.F)")**\].** * **Require** [**Phishing-Resistant MFA**](https://www.cisa.gov/MFA "Phishing-Resistant MFA") **for access to all privileged accounts and email services accounts.** * **Train users to recognize phishing attempts.** * **Monitor for unauthorized use of PowerShell. Ghost actors leverage PowerShell for malicious purposes, although it is often a helpful tool that is used by administrators and defenders to manage system resources. For more information, visit NSA and CISA’s** [joint guidance](https://media.defense.gov/2022/Jun/22/2003021689/-1/-1/1/CSI_KEEPING_POWERSHELL_SECURITY_MEASURES_TO_USE_AND_EMBRACE_20220622.PDF "joint guidance") **on PowerShell best practices.** * Implement the principle of least privilege when granting permissions so that employees who require access to PowerShell are aligned with organizational business requirements. * **Implement allowlisting** for applications, scripts, and network traffic to prevent unauthorized execution and access \[[CPG 3.A](https://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-performance-goals-cpgs#DetectingRelevantThreatsandTTPs3A "Detecting Relevant Threats and TTPs (3.A)")\]. * **Identify, alert on, and investigate abnormal network activity. Ransomware activity generates unusual network traffic across all phases of the attack chain. This includes running scans to discover other network connected devices, running commands to list, add, or alter administrator accounts, using PowerShell to download and execute remote programs, and running scripts not usually seen on a network. Organizations that can successfully identify and investigate this activity are better able to interrupt malicious activity before ransomware is executed \[**[CPG 3.A](https://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-performance-goals-cpgs#DetectingRelevantThreatsandTTPs3A "Detecting Relevant Threats and TTPs (3.A)")**\].** * Ghost actors run a significant number of commands, scripts, and programs that IT administrators would have no legitimate reason for running. Victims who have identified and responded to this unusual behavior have successfully prevented Ghost ransomware attacks. * **Limit exposure of services by disabling unused ports** such as, RDP 3398, FTP 21, and SMB 445, and restricting access to essential services through securely configured VPNs or firewalls. * **Enhance email security** by implementing advanced filtering, blocking malicious attachments, and enabling DMARC, DKIM, and SPF to prevent spoofing \[[CPG 2.M](https://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-performance-goals-cpgs#EmailSecurity2M "Email Security (2.M)")\]. **Validate Security Controls** ------------------------------ In addition to applying mitigations, the FBI, CISA, and MS-ISAC recommend exercising, testing, and validating your organization’s security program against the threat behaviors mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework in this advisory. To get started: 1. Select an ATT&CK technique described in this advisory (see **Table 3** to **Table 13**). 2. Align your security technologies against the technique. 3. Test your technologies against the technique. 4. Analyze your detection and prevention technologies’ performance. 5. Repeat the process for all security technologies to obtain a set of comprehensive performance data. 6. Tune your security program, including people, processes, and technologies, based on the data generated by this process. **Reporting** ------------- Your organization has no obligation to respond or provide information back to the FBI in response to this joint advisory. If, after reviewing the information provided, your organization decides to provide information to the FBI, reporting must be consistent with applicable state and federal laws. The FBI is interested in any information that can be shared, to include logs showing communication to and from foreign IP addresses, a sample ransom note, communications with threat actors, Bitcoin wallet information, and/or decryptor files. Additional details of interest include a targeted company point of contact, status and scope of infection, estimated loss, operational impact, date of infection, date detected, initial attack vector, and host and network-based indicators. The FBI, CISA, and MS-ISAC do not encourage paying ransom as payment does not guarantee victim files will be recovered. Furthermore, payment may also embolden adversaries to target additional organizations, encourage other criminal actors to engage in the distribution of ransomware, and/or fund illicit activities. Regardless of whether you or your organization have decided to pay the ransom, the FBI and CISA urge you to promptly report ransomware incidents to FBI’s [Internet Crime Complain Center (IC3)](https://www.ic3.gov/Home/ComplaintChoice "Internet Crime Complain Center (IC3)"), a [local FBI Field Office](https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices "local FBI Field Office"), or CISA via the agency’s [Incident Reporting System](https://www.cisa.gov/report "Incident Reporting System") or its 24/7 Operations Center ([\[email protected\]](/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#ea988f9a85989eaa8983998bc48d859cc38598 "Report to CISA")) or by calling 1-844-Say-CISA (1-844-729-2472). **Disclaimer** -------------- The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. The FBI, CISA, and MS-ISAC do not endorse any commercial entity, product, company, or service, including any entities, products, or services linked within this document. Any reference to specific commercial entities, products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the FBI, CISA, and the MS-ISAC. **Version History** ------------------- **February 19, 2025:** Initial version. This product is provided subject to this [Notification](/notification "Follow link") and this [Privacy & Use](/privacy-policy "Follow link") policy. ### Tags **Advisory CVE**: [CVE-2009-3960](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2009-3960), [CVE-2010-2861](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2010-2861), [CVE-2018-13379](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-13379), [CVE-2019-0604](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-0604), [CVE-2021-31207](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-31207), [CVE-2021-34473](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34473), [CVE-2021-34523](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34523) **Audience**: Educational Institutions, Faith-Based Community, Industry, Small and Medium Businesses **Co-Sealers and Partners**: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center **MITRE ATT&CK TTP**: Command and Control (TA0011), Credential Access (TA0006), Defense Evasion (TA0005), Discovery (TA0007), Execution (TA0002), Exfiltration (TA0010), Impact (TA0040), Initial Access (TA0001), Lateral Movement (TA0008), Persistence (TA0003), Privilege Escalation (TA0004)

VMSA-2025-0004: VMware ESXi, Workstation, and Fusion updates address multiple vulnerabilities (CVE-2025-22224, CVE-2025-22225, CVE-2025-22226)

2025-03-24T16:59:40.981548+00:00

Ref: [https://support.broadcom.com/web/ecx/support-content-notification/-/external/content/SecurityAdvisories/0/25390](https://support.broadcom.com/web/ecx/support-content-notification/-/external/content/SecurityAdvisories/0/25390) # Impacted Products VMware ESXi VMware Workstation Pro / Player (Workstation) VMware Fusion VMware Cloud Foundation VMware Telco Cloud Platform ## Introduction Multiple vulnerabilities in VMware ESXi, Workstation, and Fusion were privately reported to VMware. Updates are available to remediate these vulnerabilities in affected VMware products. 3a. VMCI heap-overflow vulnerability (CVE-2025-22224) Description: VMware ESXi, and Workstation contain a TOCTOU (Time-of-Check Time-of-Use) vulnerability that leads to an out-of-bounds write. VMware has evaluated the severity of this issue to be in the Critical severity range with a maximum CVSSv3 base score of 9.3. Known Attack Vectors: A malicious actor with local administrative privileges on a virtual machine may exploit this issue to execute code as the virtual machine's VMX process running on the host. Resolution: To remediate CVE-2025-22224 apply the patches listed in the 'Fixed Version' column of the 'Response Matrix' found below. Workarounds: None. Additional Documentation: A supplemental FAQ was created for clarification. Please see: https://brcm.tech/vmsa-2025-0004 Acknowledgements: VMware would like to thank Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center for reporting this issue to us. Notes: VMware by Broadcom has information to suggest that exploitation of CVE-2025-22224 has occurred in the wild. 3b. VMware ESXi arbitrary write vulnerability (CVE-2025-22225) Description: VMware ESXi contains an arbitrary write vulnerability. VMware has evaluated the severity of this issue to be in the Important severity range with a maximum CVSSv3 base score of 8.2. Known Attack Vectors: A malicious actor with privileges within the VMX process may trigger an arbitrary kernel write leading to an escape of the sandbox. Resolution: To remediate CVE-2025-22225 apply the patches listed in the 'Fixed Version' column of the 'Response Matrix' found below. Workarounds: None. Additional Documentation: A supplemental FAQ was created for clarification. Please see: https://brcm.tech/vmsa-2025-0004 Acknowledgements: VMware would like to thank Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center for reporting this issue to us. Notes: VMware by Broadcom has information to suggest that exploitation of CVE-2025-22225 has occurred in the wild. 3c. HGFS information-disclosure vulnerability (CVE-2025-22226) Description: VMware ESXi, Workstation, and Fusion contain an information disclosure vulnerability due to an out-of-bounds read in HGFS. VMware has evaluated the severity of this issue to be in the Important severity range with a maximum CVSSv3 base score of 7.1. Known Attack Vectors: A malicious actor with administrative privileges to a virtual machine may be able to exploit this issue to leak memory from the vmx process. Resolution: To remediate CVE-2025-22226 apply the patches listed in the 'Fixed Version' column of the 'Response Matrix' found below. Workarounds: None. Additional Documentation: A supplemental FAQ was created for clarification. Please see: https://brcm.tech/vmsa-2025-0004 Acknowledgements: VMware would like to thank Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center for reporting this issue to us. Notes: VMware by Broadcom has information to suggest that exploitation of CVE-2025-22226 has occurred in the wild.

Cyber Threat Overview 2024 from CERT-FR

2025-03-24T16:59:40.981327+00:00

> In this fourth edition of the Cyber Threat Overview, The French Cybersecurity Agency (ANSSI) addresses prevalent cybersecurity threats and the pivotal incidents which occurred in 2024. In line with the previous years, ANSSI estimates that attackers associated with the cybercriminal ecosystem and reputedly linked to China and Russia are three of the main threats facing both critical information systems and the national ecosystem as a whole. > > This past year was also marked by the hosting of the Paris Olympic and Paralympic Games and by the number and the impact of vulnerabilities affecting information systems’ security edge devices. | CVE | SCORE CVSS3.x | ÉDITEUR | RISQUE | RÉFÉRENCE CERT-FR | |-----------------|--------------|--------------|------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------| | CVE-2024-21887 | 9.1 | IVANTI | Remote execution of arbitrary code, security policy and authentication bypass, access to restricted resources on different security and VPN gateways | CERTFR-2024-ALE-001, CERTFR-2024-AVI-0109, CERTFR-2024-AVI-0085 | | CVE-2023-46805 | 8.2 | IVANTI | Remote execution of arbitrary code, security policy and authentication bypass on different security and VPN gateways | CERTFR-2024-ALE-0097 | | CVE-2024-21893 | 8.2 |IVANTI | | | | CVE-2024-3400 | 10.0 | PALO ALTO NETWORKS | Remote execution of arbitrary code on different security devices | CERTFR-2024-ALE-006, CERTFR-2024-AVI-0307 | | CVE-2022-42475 | 9.8 | FORTINET | Remote execution of arbitrary code on different SSL VPN gateways | CERTFR-2022-ALE-012, CERTFR-2022-AVI-1090 | | CVE-2024-8963 | 9.4 | IVANTI | Remote execution of arbitrary code and security policy bypass on different security and VPN gateways | CERTFR-2024-ALE-013, CERTFR-2024-AVI-0796, CERTFR-2024-AVI-0917 | | CVE-2024-8190 | 7.2 | IVANTI | | CERTFR-2024-ALE-014, CERTFR-2024-AVI-0917 | | CVE-2024-47575 | 9.8 | FORTINET | Remote execution of arbitrary code on different security devices | CERTFR-2024-ALE-014, CERTFR-2024-AVI-0917 | | CVE-2024-21762 | 9.8 | FORTINET | Remote execution of arbitrary code on different security devices | CERTFR-2024-ALE-004, CERTFR-2024-AVI-0108 | | CVE-2021-44228 | 10.0 | APACHE | Remote execution of arbitrary code | CERTFR-2021-ALE-022 | | CVE-2024-24919 | 8.6 | CHECK POINT | Breach of data confidentiality | CERTFR-2024-ALE-008, CERTFR-2024-AVI-0449 |

Critical authentication bypass vulnerabilities (CVE-2025-25291 + CVE-2025-25292) were discovered in ruby-saml up to version 1.17.0

2025-03-24T16:59:40.978604+00:00

Critical authentication bypass vulnerabilities (CVE-2025-25291 + CVE-2025-25292) were discovered in ruby-saml up to version 1.17.0. More information: https://github.blog/security/sign-in-as-anyone-bypassing-saml-sso-authentication-with-parser-differentials/

Pre-authentication SQL injection to RCE in GLPI (CVE-2025-24799/CVE-2025-24801)

2025-03-24T16:59:40.973170+00:00

Ref: [https://blog.lexfo.fr/glpi-sql-to-rce.html](https://blog.lexfo.fr/glpi-sql-to-rce.html) Several GLPI instances have been identified during Red Team engagements. The software is popular with French-speaking companies, some of those even expose their instances directly on the Internet. GLPI has been historically known to harbor multiple easy-to-find vulnerabilities, and because it is often connected to an Active Directory, finding a vulnerability on this application for Red Team engagements or internal infrastructure audits could lead to initial access to the internal network and the recovery of an active directory account. - 2024-12-25 - Discovery of the vulnerability - 2025-01-28 - Report of the vulnerability through Github Advisories - 2025-01-28 - GLPI validates the report and assigns CVE-2025-24801 (exécution de code à distance) - 2025-01-28 - GLPI validates the report and assigns CVE-2025-24799 (injection SQL) - 2025-02-12 - Release patched version 10.0.18 - 2025-03-12 - Article released