CVE-2026-91048 (GCVE-0-2026-91048)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-29 08:34 – Updated: 2026-09-29 09:15
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Apache Karaf: Missing authorization on the jdbc:* shell command scope allows privilege escalation to remote code execution via jdbc:ds-create
Summary
The jdbc shell command scope shipped no org.apache.karaf.command.acl.jdbc.cfg. Karaf's command guard (SecuredSessionFactoryImpl) treats a command with no matching ACL rule as allowed, so any authenticated shell session (including one holding only the viewer role) could run every jdbc:* command. jdbc:ds-create stores a fully attacker-controlled JDBC URL into a pax-jdbc-config factory Configuration with no validation. pax-jdbc-config reactively turns that into a live DataSource. Several JDBC drivers run code or SQL at connection time based on URL parameters (e.g. H2 INIT=RUNSCRIPT), so a viewer-level shell user could reach arbitrary code execution, bypassing the admin-role gate that already protects shell:exec. This is a privilege-escalation-to-RCE chain, not merely an "admin misconfiguration".
The same applies to jms:* shell commands.
Severity
No CVSS data available.
CWE
Assigner
References
2 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apache Software Foundation | Apache Karaf |
Affected:
0 , < 4.4.12
(semver)
|
guessed |
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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