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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-91048</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-91048</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The jdbc shell command scope shipped no org.apache.karaf.command.acl.jdbc.cfg. Karaf&amp;#39;s command guard (SecuredSessionFactoryImpl) treats a command with no matching ACL rule as allowed, so any authenticated shell session (including one holding only the viewer role) could run every jdbc:* command. jdbc:ds-create stores a fully attacker-controlled JDBC URL into a pax-jdbc-config factory Configuration with no validation. pax-jdbc-config reactively turns that into a live DataSource. Several JDBC drivers run code or SQL at connection time based on URL parameters (e.g. H2 INIT=RUNSCRIPT), so a viewer-level shell user could reach arbitrary code execution, bypassing the admin-role gate that already protects shell:exec. This is a privilege-escalation-to-RCE chain, not merely an &amp;#34;admin misconfiguration&amp;#34;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The same applies to jms:* shell commands.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;The jdbc shell command scope shipped no org.apache.karaf.command.acl.jdbc.cfg. Karaf&amp;#39;s command guard (SecuredSessionFactoryImpl) treats a command with no matching ACL rule as allowed, so any authenticated shell session (including one holding only the viewer role) could run every jdbc:* command. jdbc:ds-create stores a fully attacker-controlled JDBC URL into a pax-jdbc-config factory Configuration with no validation. pax-jdbc-config reactively turns that into a live DataSource. Several JDBC drivers run code or SQL at connection time based on URL parameters (e.g. H2 INIT=RUNSCRIPT), so a viewer-level shell user could reach arbitrary code execution, bypassing the admin-role gate that already protects shell:exec. This is a privilege-escalation-to-RCE chain, not merely an &amp;#34;admin misconfiguration&amp;#34;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The same applies to jms:* shell commands.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-91048</guid>
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      <title>GHSA-pq4f-45cw-mm5m</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-pq4f-45cw-mm5m</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The jdbc shell command scope shipped no org.apache.karaf.command.acl.jdbc.cfg. Karaf&amp;#39;s command guard (SecuredSessionFactoryImpl) treats a command with no matching ACL rule as allowed, so any authenticated shell session (including one holding only the viewer role) could run every jdbc:* command. jdbc:ds-create stores a fully attacker-controlled JDBC URL into a pax-jdbc-config factory Configuration with no validation. pax-jdbc-config reactively turns that into a live DataSource. Several JDBC drivers run code or SQL at connection time based on URL parameters (e.g. H2 INIT=RUNSCRIPT), so a viewer-level shell user could reach arbitrary code execution, bypassing the admin-role gate that already protects shell:exec. This is a privilege-escalation-to-RCE chain, not merely an &amp;#34;admin misconfiguration&amp;#34;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The same applies to jms:* shell commands.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;The jdbc shell command scope shipped no org.apache.karaf.command.acl.jdbc.cfg. Karaf&amp;#39;s command guard (SecuredSessionFactoryImpl) treats a command with no matching ACL rule as allowed, so any authenticated shell session (including one holding only the viewer role) could run every jdbc:* command. jdbc:ds-create stores a fully attacker-controlled JDBC URL into a pax-jdbc-config factory Configuration with no validation. pax-jdbc-config reactively turns that into a live DataSource. Several JDBC drivers run code or SQL at connection time based on URL parameters (e.g. H2 INIT=RUNSCRIPT), so a viewer-level shell user could reach arbitrary code execution, bypassing the admin-role gate that already protects shell:exec. This is a privilege-escalation-to-RCE chain, not merely an &amp;#34;admin misconfiguration&amp;#34;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The same applies to jms:* shell commands.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-pq4f-45cw-mm5m</guid>
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