FKIE_CVE-2026-91048

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-29 09:17 - Updated: 2026-09-29 14:56
Severity
Summary
The jdbc shell command scope shipped no org.apache.karaf.command.acl.jdbc.cfg. Karaf's command guard (SecuredSessionFactoryImpl) treats a command with no matching ACL rule as allowed, so any authenticated shell session (including one holding only the viewer role) could run every jdbc:* command. jdbc:ds-create stores a fully attacker-controlled JDBC URL into a pax-jdbc-config factory Configuration with no validation. pax-jdbc-config reactively turns that into a live DataSource. Several JDBC drivers run code or SQL at connection time based on URL parameters (e.g. H2 INIT=RUNSCRIPT), so a viewer-level shell user could reach arbitrary code execution, bypassing the admin-role gate that already protects shell:exec. This is a privilege-escalation-to-RCE chain, not merely an "admin misconfiguration". The same applies to jms:* shell commands.
References
security@apache.orghttps://lists.apache.org/thread/ph3867mxh2tft75w0o1hpn10f5mbmw32
af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/28/9
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Apache Karaf",
          "vendor": "Apache Software Foundation",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "4.4.12",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security@apache.org"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "The\u00a0jdbc\u00a0shell command scope shipped no\u00a0org.apache.karaf.command.acl.jdbc.cfg. Karaf\u0027s command guard (SecuredSessionFactoryImpl) treats a command with no matching ACL rule as allowed, so any authenticated shell session (including one holding only the\u00a0viewer\u00a0role) could run every\u00a0jdbc:*\u00a0command.\u00a0jdbc:ds-create\u00a0stores a fully attacker-controlled JDBC URL into a\u00a0pax-jdbc-config\u00a0factory\u00a0Configuration\u00a0with no validation.\u00a0pax-jdbc-config\u00a0reactively turns that into a live\u00a0DataSource. Several JDBC drivers run code or SQL at connection time based on URL parameters (e.g. H2\u00a0INIT=RUNSCRIPT), so a\u00a0viewer-level shell user could reach arbitrary code execution, bypassing the\u00a0admin-role gate that already protects\u00a0shell:exec. This is a privilege-escalation-to-RCE chain, not merely an \"admin misconfiguration\".\n\n\nThe same applies to\u00a0jms:*\u00a0shell commands."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-91048",
  "lastModified": "2026-09-29T14:56:12.013",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2026-09-29T09:17:10.193",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security@apache.org",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/ph3867mxh2tft75w0o1hpn10f5mbmw32"
    },
    {
      "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/28/9"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security@apache.org",
  "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-862"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security@apache.org",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.





Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.



Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.