Common Weakness Enumeration
CWE-125
AllowedOut-of-bounds Read
Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft
The product reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.
12575 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
CVE-2026-102820 (GCVE-0-2026-102820)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-29 18:18 – Updated: 2026-09-29 18:18
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
pageant: Out-of-bounds read / oversized allocation in `pageant` MemoryMap::read via a malicious Pageant agent (Windows)
Summary
pageant provides a [PageantStream] type that implements [AsyncRead] and [AsyncWrite] traits and can be used to talk to a running Pageant instance. Prior to pageant 0.2.3, the Windows pageant crate's pageant/src/wmmessage.rs MemoryMap::read function trusts a peer-controlled u32 response length supplied through the 8192-byte Pageant shared-memory mapping reached by AgentClient::connect_pageant. A local process that impersonates the Pageant window can make query_pageant_direct allocate up to approximately 4 GiB and copy beyond the mapped view, reliably crashing a russh client and conditionally exposing adjacent committed memory. This issue is fixed in pageant 0.2.3.
Severity
6.2 (Medium)
Assigner
References
3 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/security/advisori… | x_refsource_CONFIRM |
| https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/commit/5d566989eb… | x_refsource_MISC |
| https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/releases/tag/v0.63.2 | x_refsource_MISC |
Impacted products
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"vendor": "Eugeny",
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},
{
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"vendor": "rust",
"versions": [
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}
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CVE-2026-102757 (GCVE-0-2026-102757)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-29 17:24 – Updated: 2026-09-29 17:24
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Summary
An unprivileged, memory-protected ThreadX module can have the kernel read and write memory at addresses of its choosing, in privileged mode, and can use that to clear the MPU enable bit and remove its own isolation boundary.
The Module Manager decided whether a privileged service could dereference an object address a module named by asking only whether that address fell outside the module. The manager's object pool is outside every module, so the test was satisfied by an address shifted into the interior of one of the module's own privileged allocations, which denotes no object at all. The bytes such an address presents as a control block are bytes the module put there through ordinary create and set services, so the control block ID at the front of them could be made to read as any type the module chose, and the `_txe_` layer's ID test then agreed. The reported chain uses that to reach a privileged `memset` across an attacker-chosen range.
Severity
CWE
Assigner
References
1 reference
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Eclipse Foundation | ThreadX |
Affected:
6.0.1 , ≤ 6.5.1.202602a
(semver)
Unaffected: 6.5.2.202603 |
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CVE-2026-102726 (GCVE-0-2026-102726)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-29 17:51 – Updated: 2026-09-29 18:31
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Summary
Unbounded PPP IPCP Option Parsing Causes a Worker Stall and Out-of-bounds Read
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-09-29 18:31 UTC
Assigner
References
1 reference
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Eclipse Foundation | NetX Duo |
Affected:
0 , ≤ 6.5.1.202602
(semver)
|
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CVE-2026-102725 (GCVE-0-2026-102725)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-29 17:51 – Updated: 2026-09-29 18:32
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Summary
Out-of-bounds Read from Unvalidated MSRP Attribute List Length
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-09-29 18:32 UTC
CWE
- CWE-125 - Out-of-bounds Read
Assigner
References
1 reference
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Eclipse Foundation | NetX Duo |
Affected:
0 , ≤ 6.5.1.202602
(semver)
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CVE-2026-102721 (GCVE-0-2026-102721)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-29 17:47 – Updated: 2026-09-29 18:36
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Summary
A TFTP server that answers with a short ERROR packet makes the client read up to 64 bytes past the
received datagram.
Each receive path checks only that the datagram is at least four bytes long (nxd_tftp_client.c:1229,
1521, 1984). When the opcode is NX_TFTP_CODE_ERROR the message string is copied with a loop whose
only limits are the destination buffer and a NUL byte:
```c
/* addons/tftp/nxd_tftp_client.c:1769 */
for (i = 0; (i < (sizeof(tftp_client_ptr -> nx_tftp_client_error_string) - 1)) && (*buffer_ptr); i++)
```
Nothing compares `buffer_ptr` against `nx_packet_append_ptr`. An ERROR packet that carries no
terminating NUL, which a server controls completely, walks the loop off the end of the packet until
it happens to meet a zero byte or fills the 64 byte destination.
```
ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow
READ of size 1 at 0x60d0000000c8 thread T4
#0 _nxd_tftp_client_file_read addons/tftp/nxd_tftp_client.c:1769
0x60d0000000c8 is 0 bytes to the right of 136-byte region
```
The open path has the same loop at :1327 and reports the same way. What is read lands in
`nx_tftp_client_error_string`, which the application is expected to display or log, so adjacent
packet pool memory ends up in whatever the device does with the error text.
Add `(buffer_ptr < packet_ptr -> nx_packet_append_ptr)` to the loop condition in all three paths.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: yes
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-09-29 18:35 UTC
CWE
- CWE-125 - Out-of-bounds Read
Assigner
References
1 reference
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Eclipse Foundation | NetX Duo |
Affected:
0 , ≤ 6.5.1
(semver)
|
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CVE-2026-102720 (GCVE-0-2026-102720)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-29 17:46 – Updated: 2026-09-29 18:37
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Summary
A DHCP server, or anyone on the LAN who answers a DISCOVER first, can make the client read about a
kilobyte past the end of the received message.
The option walk keeps a pointer and an offset in step, and the only bound check uses the offset:
```c
/* addons/dhcp/nxd_dhcp_client.c:7538, 7572 */
while (i < length - 1)
{
...
size = *(++data); /* data moves 1: type -> length byte */
data += size + 1; /* data moves size + 1 more */
i += size + 1; /* i moves only size + 1 */
}
```
A TLV option occupies size + 2 bytes. `data` is advanced by size + 2 in total, `i` by size + 1, so
the offset falls one byte behind the real read position for every option the walk skips. After
enough skipped options the check `i < length - 1` still holds while `data` is already past the end
of the message, and the subsequent read of the type and length bytes comes from whatever follows.
A single OFFER carrying a long run of skippable options is enough:
```
ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow
READ of size 1 at 0x61b000000794 thread T5
#0 _nx_dhcp_search_buffer addons/dhcp/nxd_dhcp_client.c:7541
#1 _nx_dhcp_get_option_value addons/dhcp/nxd_dhcp_client.c:7082
0x61b000000794 is located 164 bytes to the right of 1648-byte region
```
A well formed OFFER through the same path is handled normally, the client records the offer and
moves to REQUESTING, so the difference is the option layout rather than the harness.
The read runs in the DHCP client thread while the client is still unconfigured, so it happens on
every boot in reach of a hostile DHCP responder. The values read are used to configure the
interface, which is how the disclosed bytes become observable.
Advance `i` by size + 2, or derive the bound from `data` rather than keeping a second counter.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-09-29 18:36 UTC
CWE
- CWE-125 - Out-of-bounds Read
Assigner
References
1 reference
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Eclipse Foundation | eclipse-threadx/netxduo |
Affected:
0 , ≤ 6.5.1
(semver)
|
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CVE-2026-102718 (GCVE-0-2026-102718)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-29 17:44 – Updated: 2026-09-29 18:40
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Summary
hey,
`_nx_snmp_utility_object_id_get` in the NetX Duo SNMP addon does not validate the claimed OID data length against the actual buffer size when the OID uses BER multibyte length encoding, so a remote attacker can send a crafted SNMP packet with a multibyte OID length larger than the available buffer, causing the parser to read past the packet buffer boundary into adjacent heap memory. the OOB bytes are decoded as OID component values and written into the agents internal OID string buffer, corrupting agent state. on systems with memory protection the OOB read poses the risk of crashing the SNMP agent thread, causing denial of service. on bare metal embedded systems without memory protection the read silently succeeds and corrupts the agents internal state with heap data.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: yes
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-09-29 18:39 UTC
CWE
- CWE-125 - Out-of-bounds Read
Assigner
References
1 reference
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Eclipse Foundation | NetX Duo |
Affected:
0 , ≤ 6.5.1.202602
(semver)
|
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CVE-2026-102714 (GCVE-0-2026-102714)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-29 17:41 – Updated: 2026-09-29 18:43
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Summary
`_nx_icmpv6_validate_options()` scans the option area with `while (length > 2)` (`common/src/nx_icmpv6_validate_options.c:79`). An area whose size leaves a one- or two-byte residue exits the loop with that tail unexamined; the residue is not negative, so the function returns `NX_SUCCESS`. Its zero-length rejection never sees those bytes.
Every consumer then re-walks the same area, reading a two-byte option header at the residue and subtracting `nx_icmpv6_option_length << 3` with no zero check and no remaining-length check. Three outcomes follow, selected by bytes the attacker controls.
**Zero length byte.** The walker subtracts zero and advances zero. All four handlers loop forever — `_nx_icmpv6_process_ra` (`nx_icmpv6_process_ra.c:245, :528`), `_nx_icmpv6_process_ns` (`:251, :329`), `_nx_icmpv6_process_na` (`:147, :156`) and `_nx_icmpv6_process_redirect` (`:247, :350`). The walk runs in the IP thread, which is the highest-priority thread and does not yield inside the loop, so the system stops until a watchdog reset and the frame can be replayed after each one.
**Non-zero length byte on a short residue.** The three unsigned counters underflow — `2 - 8` becomes `0xFFFFFFFA` — and the walk continues past the packet buffer, reading until it faults or meets a zero length byte and freezes. The Router Advertisement counter is signed and exits cleanly in this case.
**One-byte residue.** The walker reads a two-byte option header, over-reading one byte.
During a runaway walk, stray bytes parsing as a link-layer address option are copied into the neighbor cache (`nx_icmpv6_process_ns.c:280, :293`) and subsequently used as the destination MAC for frames to that neighbour, placing off-packet memory on the link. Confirmed by inspection, not reproduced.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-09-29 18:42 UTC
CWE
Assigner
References
1 reference
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Eclipse Foundation | NetX Duo |
Affected:
0 , ≤ 6.5.1.202602
(semver)
|
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CVE-2026-102713 (GCVE-0-2026-102713)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-29 17:40 – Updated: 2026-09-29 18:44
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Summary
The TFTP server accepts a DATA datagram of any size. The dispatcher rejects datagrams shorter than
four bytes (nxd_tftp_server.c:1037) and nothing anywhere checks an upper bound, in particular not
against the protocol maximum of 4 + NX_TFTP_FILE_TRANSFER_MAX. Two things follow from that one
missing check, both reachable before any authentication because TFTP has none.
The handler passes `nx_packet_length - 4` straight to FileX:
```c
/* addons/tftp/nxd_tftp_server.c:1863, 1889 */
status = nx_packet_copy(packet_ptr, &temp_ptr,
server_ptr -> nx_tftp_server_packet_pool_ptr, NX_WAIT_FOREVER);
...
fx_file_write(&(client_request_ptr -> nx_tftp_client_request_file),
packet_ptr -> nx_packet_prepend_ptr + 4,
packet_ptr -> nx_packet_length - 4);
```
`nx_packet_length` is the length of a chain, not of one contiguous buffer, so FileX copies past the
end of the first packet:
```
ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow
READ of size 1280 at 0x621000001108 thread T5
#0 __interceptor_memcpy
#1 _fx_utility_memory_copy filex/common/src/fx_utility_memory_copy.c:78
0x621000001108 is 0 bytes to the right of 4104-byte region
```
Those bytes are written into the file the attacker is uploading, and a TFTP read request hands them
back, so this is a memory disclosure with a convenient retrieval channel.
The same datagram also wedges the server. `nx_packet_copy` at :1863 needs
ceil(nx_packet_length / pool_payload) packets and asks for them with NX_WAIT_FOREVER, so when the
attacker sizes the datagram beyond what the pool holds, the server thread suspends and never
returns. A liveness probe after one such datagram times out with the pool at 0 of 12 packets and
the server thread suspended, and no later client is served.
Reject `nx_packet_length > 4 + NX_TFTP_FILE_TRANSFER_MAX` in the DATA branch before either call,
and use a bounded wait rather than NX_WAIT_FOREVER for the copy.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: yes
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-09-29 18:44 UTC
Assigner
References
1 reference
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Eclipse Foundation | NetX Duo |
Affected:
0 , ≤ 6.5.1.202602
(semver)
|
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CVE-2026-102712 (GCVE-0-2026-102712)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-29 17:39 – Updated: 2026-09-29 21:01
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Summary
On the first DTLS ClientHello, the parser copies a device-claimed session_id length and validates the
ciphersuite-list length against the total record length instead of the remaining bytes. An unauthenticated
peer drives an OOB source read of up to 255 bytes, and those bytes are echoed verbatim into the outgoing
ServerHello, disclosing adjacent process memory over the network. The crash variant fires on the first
packet.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: yes
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-09-29 20:57 UTC
CWE
- CWE-125 - Out-of-bounds Read
Assigner
References
1 reference
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Eclipse Foundation | NetX Duo |
Affected:
0 , ≤ 6.5.1.202602
(semver)
|
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Mitigation MIT-5
Implementation
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- To reduce the likelihood of introducing an out-of-bounds read, ensure that you validate and ensure correct calculations for any length argument, buffer size calculation, or offset. Be especially careful of relying on a sentinel (i.e. special character such as NUL) in untrusted inputs.
Mitigation
Architecture and Design
Strategy: Language Selection
Use a language that provides appropriate memory abstractions.
CAPEC-540: Overread Buffers
An adversary attacks a target by providing input that causes an application to read beyond the boundary of a defined buffer. This typically occurs when a value influencing where to start or stop reading is set to reflect positions outside of the valid memory location of the buffer. This type of attack may result in exposure of sensitive information, a system crash, or arbitrary code execution.