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UBUNTU-CVE-2026-44471 (CVE-2026-44471)

Vulnerability from osv_ubuntu – Published: 2026-05-13 22:16 – Updated: 2026-05-13 22:16 – Source website
VLAI
Details

gitoxide is an implementation of git written in Rust. Prior to 0.21.1, a malicious tree can be constructed that will, when checked out with gitoxide, permit writing an attacker-controlled symlink into any existing directory the user has write access to. During checkout, all symlink index entries are deferred and created after regular files using a single shared gix_worktree::Stack. Internally, this uses a gix_fs::Stack. gix_fs::Stack::make_relative_path_current() caches validated path prefixes: when the previously-processed leaf component exactly matches the leading component(s) of the next path, the leaf-to-directory transition at gix-fs/src/stack.rs invokes only delegate.push_directory(), never delegate.push(). In gix_worktree::stack::delegate::StackDelegate, when the state member is State::CreateDirectoryAndAttributesStack, Attributes::push_directory() only loads attributes (from the ODB, in the clone case), and does not perform any other checks. The on-disk symlink_metadata() check and unlink-on-collision live in StackDelegate::push()'s invocation of create_leading_directory(), which is therefore bypassed for the cached prefix. The final symlink is created with plain std::os::unix::fs::symlink, which follows symlinks in parent directories. Therefore, it's possible to provide a tree with duplicate symlink and directory entries that exploits this. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.21.1.


{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "librust-gix-fs-dev",
            "binary_version": "0.8.0-1"
          }
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Ubuntu:24.04:LTS",
        "name": "rust-gix-fs",
        "purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/rust-gix-fs@0.8.0-1?arch=source\u0026distro=noble"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "0.8.0-1"
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "librust-gix-fs-dev",
            "binary_version": "0.12.1-1"
          }
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Ubuntu:25.10",
        "name": "rust-gix-fs",
        "purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/rust-gix-fs@0.12.1-1?arch=source\u0026distro=questing"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "0.12.1-1"
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "librust-gix-fs-dev",
            "binary_version": "0.16.1-1"
          }
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Ubuntu:26.04:LTS",
        "name": "rust-gix-fs",
        "purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/rust-gix-fs@0.16.1-1?arch=source\u0026distro=resolute"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "0.12.1-1",
        "0.16.1-1"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "details": "gitoxide is an implementation of git written in Rust. Prior to 0.21.1, a malicious tree can be constructed that will, when checked out with gitoxide, permit writing an attacker-controlled symlink into any existing directory the user has write access to. During checkout, all symlink index entries are deferred and created after regular files using a single shared gix_worktree::Stack. Internally, this uses a gix_fs::Stack. gix_fs::Stack::make_relative_path_current() caches validated path prefixes: when the previously-processed leaf component exactly matches the leading component(s) of the next path, the leaf-to-directory transition at gix-fs/src/stack.rs invokes only delegate.push_directory(), never delegate.push(). In gix_worktree::stack::delegate::StackDelegate, when the state member is State::CreateDirectoryAndAttributesStack, Attributes::push_directory() only loads attributes (from the ODB, in the clone case), and does not perform any other checks. The on-disk symlink_metadata() check and unlink-on-collision live in StackDelegate::push()\u0027s invocation of create_leading_directory(), which is therefore bypassed for the cached prefix. The final symlink is created with plain std::os::unix::fs::symlink, which follows symlinks in parent directories. Therefore, it\u0027s possible to provide a tree with duplicate symlink and directory entries that exploits this. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.21.1.",
  "id": "UBUNTU-CVE-2026-44471",
  "modified": "2026-05-13T22:16:00Z",
  "published": "2026-05-13T22:16:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-44471"
    },
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-44471"
    },
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://github.com/GitoxideLabs/gitoxide/security/advisories/GHSA-f89h-2fjh-2r9q"
    }
  ],
  "related": [],
  "schema_version": "1.7.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "medium",
      "type": "Ubuntu"
    }
  ],
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-44471"
  ]
}



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