GHSA-V7PH-R5R6-4JCJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-03 22:48 – Updated: 2026-09-03 22:48CVE: This vulnerability corresponds to CVE-2026-72808.
Summary
The /api/asset/getFileAnnotation endpoint returns the content of .sya PDF-annotation files with no publish-access check. It is gated by CheckAuth only, so it is reachable by the publish RoleReader token and by the anonymous account when Publish.Auth.Enable is false. Its sibling, the /assets/* asset route does enforce publish access, including the publish password. An anonymous reader who knows an asset path can therefore read the private PDF annotations (highlights, notes) attached to assets in publish-forbidden, password-protected, or unpublished documents.
Details
getFileAnnotation resolves the annotation file via GetAssetAbsPathInBox (no path traversal) and returns the .sya content. Unlike the /assets/* route, which applies the publish-access filter including password enforcement before serving asset bytes, getFileAnnotation applies no publish-access, publish-ignore, or password check. The guarded-sibling asymmetry indicates the boundary is meant to apply to this data and was omitted here.
.sya files for encrypted-box assets are fail-closed and not exposed. The gap is limited to non-encrypted assets.
Route / auth tier. getFileAnnotation is registered CheckAuth-only. CheckAuth admits RoleReader; the publish proxy forwards port-6808 traffic with a Reader JWT (anonymous when publish auth is disabled).
Proof of Concept
Reproduced on a local instance (publish mode on 6808, Basic Auth off).
Setup (admin, 6806):
1. createNotebook{name:"AnnotPoc"} → box
2. createDocWithMd{notebook, path:"/annot-victim", markdown:"doc with a pdf"} → doc
3. POST /api/asset/upload (multipart id=<doc>, file[]=@secret.pdf) → assets/secret-...pdf
4. setFileAnnotation{path:"<asset>.sya", data:"{annotSecret:ANNOT_SECRET_4471,note:private highlight}"}
5. setPublishAccess{id:<doc>, visible:false, password:"", disable:true} → doc forbidden
Exploit (anonymous reader, 6808, no token):
POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/asset/getFileAnnotation
{"path":"assets/secret-...pdf.sya"}
Returns:
{"code":0,"data":{"data":"{\"annotSecret\":\"ANNOT_SECRET_4471\",\"note\":\"private highlight\"}"}}
The annotation content of a publish-forbidden document is returned to an anonymous reader with no publish-access check, while the /assets/* route serving the same asset class enforces publish access and password.
Impact
An anonymous reader (publish mode with auth disabled) or any publish RoleReader can read the private PDF annotations (highlights and notes) of assets belonging to publish-forbidden, password-protected, or unpublished documents, given the asset path. This defeats the publish-access/password boundary for annotation data. Scope is limited to annotated PDFs in non-encrypted notebooks; encrypted-box annotations are not exposed. Confidentiality-only.
Suggested fix
Apply the same publish-access check the /assets/* route uses to getFileAnnotation resolve the asset's owning document and enforce the publish-access/publish-ignore / password check before returning .sya content.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.0-20260723031702-509b35055940"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-72808"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-03T22:48:22Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "**CVE:** This vulnerability corresponds to [CVE-2026-72808](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72808).\n\n### Summary\n\nThe `/api/asset/getFileAnnotation` endpoint returns the content of `.sya` PDF-annotation files with no publish-access check. It is gated by `CheckAuth` only, so it is reachable by the publish `RoleReader` token and by the anonymous account when `Publish.Auth.Enable` is `false`. Its sibling, the `/assets/*` asset route does enforce publish access, including the publish password. An anonymous reader who knows an asset path can therefore read the private PDF annotations (highlights, notes) attached to assets in publish-forbidden, password-protected, or unpublished documents.\n\n### Details\n\n`getFileAnnotation` resolves the annotation file via `GetAssetAbsPathInBox` (no path traversal) and returns the `.sya` content. Unlike the `/assets/*` route, which applies the publish-access filter including password enforcement before serving asset bytes, `getFileAnnotation` applies no publish-access, publish-ignore, or password check. The guarded-sibling asymmetry indicates the boundary is meant to apply to this data and was omitted here.\n\n`.sya` files for encrypted-box assets are fail-closed and not exposed. The gap is limited to non-encrypted assets.\n\n**Route / auth tier.** `getFileAnnotation` is registered `CheckAuth`-only. `CheckAuth` admits `RoleReader`; the publish proxy forwards port-6808 traffic with a Reader JWT (anonymous when publish auth is disabled).\n\n### Proof of Concept\n\nReproduced on a local instance (publish mode on 6808, Basic Auth off).\n\n**Setup (admin, 6806):**\n1. `createNotebook{name:\"AnnotPoc\"}` \u2192 box\n2. `createDocWithMd{notebook, path:\"/annot-victim\", markdown:\"doc with a pdf\"}` \u2192 doc\n3. `POST /api/asset/upload` (multipart `id=\u003cdoc\u003e`, `file[]=@secret.pdf`) \u2192 `assets/secret-...pdf`\n4. `setFileAnnotation{path:\"\u003casset\u003e.sya\", data:\"{annotSecret:ANNOT_SECRET_4471,note:private highlight}\"}`\n5. `setPublishAccess{id:\u003cdoc\u003e, visible:false, password:\"\", disable:true}` \u2192 doc forbidden\n\n**Exploit (anonymous reader, 6808, no token):**\n```\nPOST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/asset/getFileAnnotation\n{\"path\":\"assets/secret-...pdf.sya\"}\n```\nReturns:\n```\n{\"code\":0,\"data\":{\"data\":\"{\\\"annotSecret\\\":\\\"ANNOT_SECRET_4471\\\",\\\"note\\\":\\\"private highlight\\\"}\"}}\n```\nThe annotation content of a publish-forbidden document is returned to an anonymous reader with no publish-access check, while the `/assets/*` route serving the same asset class enforces publish access and password.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn anonymous reader (publish mode with auth disabled) or any publish `RoleReader` can read the private PDF annotations (highlights and notes) of assets belonging to publish-forbidden, password-protected, or unpublished documents, given the asset path. This defeats the publish-access/password boundary for annotation data. Scope is limited to annotated PDFs in non-encrypted notebooks; encrypted-box annotations are not exposed. Confidentiality-only.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nApply the same publish-access check the `/assets/*` route uses to `getFileAnnotation` resolve the asset\u0027s owning document and enforce the publish-access/publish-ignore / password check before returning `.sya` content.",
"id": "GHSA-v7ph-r5r6-4jcj",
"modified": "2026-09-03T22:48:22Z",
"published": "2026-09-03T22:48:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-v7ph-r5r6-4jcj"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72808"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/commit/509b35055940856ec1c89cb4888723c4660b776a"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/siyuan-before-information-disclosure-via-getfileannotation"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "SiYuan: Missing publish-access filter on getFileAnnotation discloses private PDF annotations of forbidden/protected documents (publish mode)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.