GHSA-JJ75-GVV3-WR54
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-29 18:32 – Updated: 2026-09-29 18:32_nx_icmpv6_validate_options() scans the option area with while (length > 2) (common/src/nx_icmpv6_validate_options.c:79). An area whose size leaves a one- or two-byte residue exits the loop with that tail unexamined; the residue is not negative, so the function returns NX_SUCCESS. Its zero-length rejection never sees those bytes.
Every consumer then re-walks the same area, reading a two-byte option header at the residue and subtracting nx_icmpv6_option_length << 3 with no zero check and no remaining-length check. Three outcomes follow, selected by bytes the attacker controls.
Zero length byte. The walker subtracts zero and advances zero. All four handlers loop forever — _nx_icmpv6_process_ra (nx_icmpv6_process_ra.c:245, :528), _nx_icmpv6_process_ns (:251, :329), _nx_icmpv6_process_na (:147, :156) and _nx_icmpv6_process_redirect (:247, :350). The walk runs in the IP thread, which is the highest-priority thread and does not yield inside the loop, so the system stops until a watchdog reset and the frame can be replayed after each one.
Non-zero length byte on a short residue. The three unsigned counters underflow — 2 - 8 becomes 0xFFFFFFFA — and the walk continues past the packet buffer, reading until it faults or meets a zero length byte and freezes. The Router Advertisement counter is signed and exits cleanly in this case.
One-byte residue. The walker reads a two-byte option header, over-reading one byte.
During a runaway walk, stray bytes parsing as a link-layer address option are copied into the neighbor cache (nx_icmpv6_process_ns.c:280, :293) and subsequently used as the destination MAC for frames to that neighbour, placing off-packet memory on the link. Confirmed by inspection, not reproduced.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-102714"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-125"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-29T18:17:10Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "`_nx_icmpv6_validate_options()` scans the option area with `while (length \u003e 2)` (`common/src/nx_icmpv6_validate_options.c:79`). An area whose size leaves a one- or two-byte residue exits the loop with that tail unexamined; the residue is not negative, so the function returns `NX_SUCCESS`. Its zero-length rejection never sees those bytes.\n\n\n\nEvery consumer then re-walks the same area, reading a two-byte option header at the residue and subtracting `nx_icmpv6_option_length \u003c\u003c 3` with no zero check and no remaining-length check. Three outcomes follow, selected by bytes the attacker controls.\n\n\n\n**Zero length byte.** The walker subtracts zero and advances zero. All four handlers loop forever \u2014 `_nx_icmpv6_process_ra` (`nx_icmpv6_process_ra.c:245, :528`), `_nx_icmpv6_process_ns` (`:251, :329`), `_nx_icmpv6_process_na` (`:147, :156`) and `_nx_icmpv6_process_redirect` (`:247, :350`). The walk runs in the IP thread, which is the highest-priority thread and does not yield inside the loop, so the system stops until a watchdog reset and the frame can be replayed after each one.\n\n\n\n**Non-zero length byte on a short residue.** The three unsigned counters underflow \u2014 `2 - 8` becomes `0xFFFFFFFA` \u2014 and the walk continues past the packet buffer, reading until it faults or meets a zero length byte and freezes. The Router Advertisement counter is signed and exits cleanly in this case.\n\n\n\n**One-byte residue.** The walker reads a two-byte option header, over-reading one byte.\n\n\n\nDuring a runaway walk, stray bytes parsing as a link-layer address option are copied into the neighbor cache (`nx_icmpv6_process_ns.c:280, :293`) and subsequently used as the destination MAC for frames to that neighbour, placing off-packet memory on the link. Confirmed by inspection, not reproduced.",
"id": "GHSA-jj75-gvv3-wr54",
"modified": "2026-09-29T18:32:00Z",
"published": "2026-09-29T18:32:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/eclipse-threadx/netxduo/security/advisories/GHSA-39p4-p83c-58hr"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-102714"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
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