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GHSA-67X2-MQ63-V9VM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-03 22:52 – Updated: 2026-09-03 22:52
VLAI
Summary
SiYuan: Missing publish-access check on getBlockBreadcrumb, getRefText, and getBlockTreeInfos discloses content and metadata of protected/forbidden documents
Details

CVE: This vulnerability corresponds to CVE-2026-72805.

Summary

Three block endpoints return document content snippets and metadata without any publish-access check, while their sibling getBlockInfo which returns comparable data does enforce one. All three are CheckAuth-only, so they are reachable by the publish RoleReader token and by the anonymous account when Publish.Auth.Enable is false. An anonymous reader supplying a block ID receives content and metadata belonging to publish-forbidden and password-protected documents.

Details

getBlockInfo (kernel/api/block.go) gates on the publish boundary:

if !checkBlockPublishAccess(c, id, ret) {
    return
}

The following siblings in the same file perform no equivalent check:

Endpoint Returns Publish check
getBlockInfo root/title/path metadata checkBlockPublishAccess: present
getBlockBreadcrumb BlockPath.Name : root document title plus every ancestor block's content snippet none
getRefText the block's reference/anchor text (document content) none
getBlockTreeInfos root/title/path metadata for arbitrary block IDs none

getBlockBreadcrumb returns the full ancestor chain including each ancestor block's content snippet, and getRefText returns block anchor text both are document content, not just metadata. getBlockTreeInfos returns root/title/path for any caller-supplied ID set via model.GetBlockTreeInfosInBox(...) with no gate.

getBlockBreadcrumb and getRefText additionally accept a client-supplied notebook argument that routes to the *InBox variants, so the same unguarded path applies to encrypted-notebook reads while the notebook is unlocked.

The correct primitive already exists in the codebase and is used by getBlockInfo; these three handlers simply do not call it.

Proof of Concept

Precondition: publish mode enabled (default port 6808); anonymous when Publish.Auth.Enable is false, otherwise any publish reader account. A document D is marked publish-forbidden (or password-protected) and contains a block BLOCK_ID under a heading with distinctive content.

Control: the gated sibling correctly refuses:

POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/block/getBlockInfo
{"id":"BLOCK_ID"}

Blocked by checkBlockPublishAccess.

Disclosure: the ungated siblings return the data anyway:

POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/block/getBlockBreadcrumb
{"id":"BLOCK_ID"}
→ ancestor chain including the forbidden document's title and ancestor block content snippets

POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/block/getRefText
{"id":"BLOCK_ID"}
→ the block's reference/anchor text (content of the forbidden document)

POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/block/getBlockTreeInfos
{"ids":["BLOCK_ID"]}
→ root ID, title, and path for the forbidden document

Verified by code inspection at origin/master (eef10568): getBlockInfo contains the checkBlockPublishAccess call; getBlockBreadcrumb, getRefText, and getBlockTreeInfos contain no publish-access, publish-ignore, or readonly-role check in their bodies.

Impact

An anonymous reader (publish mode with auth disabled) or any publish RoleReader can read, for documents explicitly excluded from publishing or protected by a publish password: - the document title and full ancestor chain, including ancestor block content snippets (getBlockBreadcrumb); - block reference/anchor text, i.e. document content (getRefText); - root ID, title, and path metadata for arbitrary block IDs (getBlockTreeInfos).

Because getBlockBreadcrumb and getRefText accept a notebook argument routing to the *InBox variants, the same disclosure applies to encrypted notebooks while unlocked. Confidentiality-only; the precondition is a block ID, obtainable from other reader-reachable endpoints.

Suggested fix

Call checkBlockPublishAccess (as getBlockInfo does) in getBlockBreadcrumb, getRefText, and getBlockTreeInfos before returning data for getBlockTreeInfos, apply it per ID and drop unauthorized entries. Confirm the *InBox variants (GetBlockRefTextInBox, BuildBlockBreadcrumbInBox) enforce the same boundary so the notebook-argument path is covered.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.0.0-20260723163028-931ba693375e"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-72805"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-03T22:52:12Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "**CVE:** This vulnerability corresponds to [CVE-2026-72805](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72805).\n\n### Summary\n\nThree block endpoints return document content snippets and metadata without any publish-access check, while their sibling `getBlockInfo` which returns comparable data does enforce one. All three are `CheckAuth`-only, so they are reachable by the publish `RoleReader` token and by the anonymous account when `Publish.Auth.Enable` is `false`. An anonymous reader supplying a block ID receives content and metadata belonging to publish-forbidden and password-protected documents.\n\n### Details\n\n`getBlockInfo` (`kernel/api/block.go`) gates on the publish boundary:\n```go\nif !checkBlockPublishAccess(c, id, ret) {\n    return\n}\n```\n\nThe following siblings in the same file perform no equivalent check:\n\n| Endpoint | Returns | Publish check |\n|---|---|---|\n| `getBlockInfo` | root/title/path metadata | `checkBlockPublishAccess`: present |\n| `getBlockBreadcrumb` | `BlockPath.Name` : root document title plus every ancestor block\u0027s content snippet | none |\n| `getRefText` | the block\u0027s reference/anchor text (document content) | none |\n| `getBlockTreeInfos` | root/title/path metadata for arbitrary block IDs | none |\n\n`getBlockBreadcrumb` returns the full ancestor chain including each ancestor block\u0027s content snippet, and `getRefText` returns block anchor text both are document content, not just metadata. `getBlockTreeInfos` returns root/title/path for any caller-supplied ID set via `model.GetBlockTreeInfosInBox(...)` with no gate.\n\n`getBlockBreadcrumb` and `getRefText` additionally accept a client-supplied notebook argument that routes to the `*InBox` variants, so the same unguarded path applies to encrypted-notebook reads while the notebook is unlocked.\n\nThe correct primitive already exists in the codebase and is used by `getBlockInfo`; these three handlers simply do not call it.\n\n### Proof of Concept\n\nPrecondition: publish mode enabled (default port 6808); anonymous when `Publish.Auth.Enable` is `false`, otherwise any publish reader account. A document `D` is marked publish-forbidden (or password-protected) and contains a block `BLOCK_ID` under a heading with distinctive content.\n\n**Control: the gated sibling correctly refuses:**\n```\nPOST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/block/getBlockInfo\n{\"id\":\"BLOCK_ID\"}\n```\nBlocked by `checkBlockPublishAccess`.\n\n**Disclosure: the ungated siblings return the data anyway:**\n```\nPOST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/block/getBlockBreadcrumb\n{\"id\":\"BLOCK_ID\"}\n\u2192 ancestor chain including the forbidden document\u0027s title and ancestor block content snippets\n\nPOST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/block/getRefText\n{\"id\":\"BLOCK_ID\"}\n\u2192 the block\u0027s reference/anchor text (content of the forbidden document)\n\nPOST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/block/getBlockTreeInfos\n{\"ids\":[\"BLOCK_ID\"]}\n\u2192 root ID, title, and path for the forbidden document\n```\n\nVerified by code inspection at `origin/master` (`eef10568`): `getBlockInfo` contains the `checkBlockPublishAccess` call; `getBlockBreadcrumb`, `getRefText`, and `getBlockTreeInfos` contain no publish-access, publish-ignore, or readonly-role check in their bodies.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn anonymous reader (publish mode with auth disabled) or any publish `RoleReader` can read, for documents explicitly excluded from publishing or protected by a publish password:\n- the document title and full ancestor chain, including ancestor block content snippets (`getBlockBreadcrumb`);\n- block reference/anchor text, i.e. document content (`getRefText`);\n- root ID, title, and path metadata for arbitrary block IDs (`getBlockTreeInfos`).\n\nBecause `getBlockBreadcrumb` and `getRefText` accept a notebook argument routing to the `*InBox` variants, the same disclosure applies to encrypted notebooks while unlocked. Confidentiality-only; the precondition is a block ID, obtainable from other reader-reachable endpoints.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nCall `checkBlockPublishAccess` (as `getBlockInfo` does) in `getBlockBreadcrumb`, `getRefText`, and `getBlockTreeInfos` before returning data for `getBlockTreeInfos`, apply it per ID and drop unauthorized entries. Confirm the `*InBox` variants (`GetBlockRefTextInBox`, `BuildBlockBreadcrumbInBox`) enforce the same boundary so the notebook-argument path is covered.",
  "id": "GHSA-67x2-mq63-v9vm",
  "modified": "2026-09-03T22:52:12Z",
  "published": "2026-09-03T22:52:12Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-67x2-mq63-v9vm"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72805"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/commit/931ba693375ea9877b2ef74f9bfb632fad5bab3f"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/siyuan-before-information-disclosure-via-block-endpoints"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "SiYuan: Missing publish-access check on getBlockBreadcrumb, getRefText, and getBlockTreeInfos discloses content and metadata of protected/forbidden documents"
}



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