CVE-2026-16543 (GCVE-0-2026-16543)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-07-29 15:29 – Updated: 2026-07-29 17:57
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Kong Operator cluster-wide ingress configuration DoS via embedded KIC CA-certificate ID collision
Summary
Kong Operator's embedded Kong Kubernetes Ingress Controller (KIC) allows a user with namespace-scoped Secret creation privileges to cause a cluster-wide ingress configuration denial of service. The embedded KIC collects CA-certificate Secrets across all watched namespaces using a label selector alone, without ingress-class or namespace restrictions. The CA-certificate primary key is derived from a user-supplied field in the Secret. Duplicate CA-certificate IDs cause Kong Gateway to reject the entire configuration document and halting all ingress changes cluster-wide.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-07-29 17:57 UTC
Assigner
References
1 reference
Impacted products
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"vulnrichment": {
"containers": "{\"adp\": [{\"title\": \"CISA ADP Vulnrichment\", \"metrics\": [{\"other\": {\"type\": \"ssvc\", \"content\": {\"id\": \"CVE-2026-16543\", \"role\": \"CISA Coordinator\", \"options\": [{\"Exploitation\": \"none\"}, {\"Automatable\": \"no\"}, {\"Technical Impact\": \"partial\"}], \"version\": \"2.0.3\", \"timestamp\": \"2026-07-29T17:57:12.581830Z\"}}}], \"providerMetadata\": {\"orgId\": \"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0\", \"shortName\": \"CISA-ADP\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-07-29T17:57:15.827Z\"}}], \"cna\": {\"title\": \"Kong Operator cluster-wide ingress configuration DoS via embedded KIC CA-certificate ID collision\", \"source\": {\"discovery\": \"INTERNAL\"}, \"impacts\": [{\"capecId\": \"CAPEC-240\", \"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"CAPEC-240 Resource Injection\"}]}, {\"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"Denial of Service\"}]}], \"metrics\": [{\"format\": \"CVSS\", \"cvssV4_0\": {\"Safety\": \"NOT_DEFINED\", \"version\": \"4.0\", \"Recovery\": \"NOT_DEFINED\", \"baseScore\": 7.1, \"Automatable\": \"NOT_DEFINED\", \"attackVector\": \"NETWORK\", \"baseSeverity\": \"HIGH\", \"valueDensity\": \"NOT_DEFINED\", \"vectorString\": \"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N\", \"exploitMaturity\": \"NOT_DEFINED\", \"providerUrgency\": \"NOT_DEFINED\", \"userInteraction\": \"NONE\", \"attackComplexity\": \"LOW\", \"attackRequirements\": \"NONE\", \"privilegesRequired\": \"LOW\", \"subIntegrityImpact\": \"NONE\", \"vulnIntegrityImpact\": \"NONE\", \"subAvailabilityImpact\": \"NONE\", \"vulnAvailabilityImpact\": \"HIGH\", \"subConfidentialityImpact\": \"NONE\", \"vulnConfidentialityImpact\": \"NONE\", \"vulnerabilityResponseEffort\": \"NOT_DEFINED\"}, \"scenarios\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"GENERAL\"}]}], \"affected\": [{\"repo\": \"https://github.com/Kong/kong-operator\", \"versions\": [{\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"2.2.0\", \"lessThan\": \"2.2.3\", \"versionType\": \"semver\"}, {\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"2.1.0\", \"lessThan\": \"2.1.9\", \"versionType\": \"semver\"}, {\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"0\", \"lessThan\": \"2.0.11\", \"versionType\": \"semver\"}], \"packageName\": \"Kong/kong-operator\", \"collectionURL\": \"https://github.com\", \"defaultStatus\": \"unaffected\"}], \"solutions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"Upgrade to the patched version of Kong Operator: 2.2.3, 2.1.9 or 2.0.11.\", \"supportingMedia\": [{\"type\": \"text/html\", \"value\": \"\u003cspan\u003eUpgrade to the patched version of Kong Operator: 2.2.3, 2.1.9 or 2.0.11.\u003c/span\u003e\", \"base64\": false}]}], \"references\": [{\"url\": \"https://github.com/Kong/kong-operator/security/advisories/GHSA-h4fh-j7xg-vwcx\"}], \"workarounds\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"1. Restrict\\u00a0ControlPlane\\u00a0watch scope: Change\\u00a0spec.watchNamespaces.type\\u00a0from\\u00a0All\\u00a0to\\u00a0Own\\u00a0or a narrowly defined\\u00a0List\\u00a0that covers only namespaces whose users are trusted operators. This prevents the embedded KIC from ingesting Secrets from untrusted namespaces.2. Restrict Secret labeling via RBAC: Use Kubernetes RBAC to prevent untrusted users from creating or modifying Secrets with the labels\\u00a0konghq.com/secret=true\\u00a0and\\u00a0konghq.com/ca-cert=true. Consider using an admission webhook or OPA/Kyverno policy to enforce this label restriction.\\n\\n\\n3. Audit existing CA-cert Secrets: Inspect Secrets labeled\\u00a0konghq.com/ca-cert=true\\u00a0across all watched namespaces for unexpected or duplicate\\u00a0data.id\\u00a0values. Remove any that were not provisioned by a trusted operator.\", \"supportingMedia\": [{\"type\": \"text/html\", \"value\": \"\u003cstrong\u003e1. Restrict\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003eControlPlane\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;watch scope\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cspan\u003e: Change\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003ccode\u003espec.watchNamespaces.type\u003c/code\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003efrom\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003ccode\u003eAll\u003c/code\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003eto\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003ccode\u003eOwn\u003c/code\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003eor a narrowly defined\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003ccode\u003eList\u003c/code\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003ethat covers only namespaces whose users are trusted operators. This prevents the embedded KIC from ingesting Secrets from untrusted namespaces.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2. Restrict Secret labeling via RBAC\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cspan\u003e: Use Kubernetes RBAC to prevent untrusted users from creating or modifying Secrets with the labels\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003ccode\u003ekonghq.com/secret=true\u003c/code\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003eand\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003ccode\u003ekonghq.com/ca-cert=true\u003c/code\u003e\u003cspan\u003e. Consider using an admission webhook or OPA/Kyverno policy to enforce this label restriction.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e3. Audit existing CA-cert Secrets\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cspan\u003e: Inspect Secrets labeled\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003ccode\u003ekonghq.com/ca-cert=true\u003c/code\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003eacross all watched namespaces for unexpected or duplicate\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003ccode\u003edata.id\u003c/code\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan\u003evalues. Remove any that were not provisioned by a trusted operator.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\", \"base64\": false}]}], \"x_generator\": {\"engine\": \"Vulnogram 1.0.4\"}, \"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"Kong Operator\u0027s embedded Kong Kubernetes Ingress Controller (KIC) allows a user with namespace-scoped Secret creation privileges to cause a cluster-wide ingress configuration denial of service. The embedded KIC collects CA-certificate Secrets across all watched namespaces using a label selector alone, without ingress-class or namespace restrictions. The CA-certificate primary key is derived from a user-supplied field in the Secret. Duplicate CA-certificate IDs cause Kong Gateway to reject the entire configuration document and halting all ingress changes cluster-wide.\", \"supportingMedia\": [{\"type\": \"text/html\", \"value\": \"\u003cp\u003eKong Operator\u0027s embedded Kong Kubernetes Ingress Controller (KIC) allows a user with namespace-scoped Secret creation privileges to cause a cluster-wide ingress configuration denial of service. The embedded KIC collects CA-certificate Secrets across all watched namespaces using a label selector alone, without ingress-class or namespace restrictions. T\u003cspan\u003ehe CA-certificate primary key is derived from a user-supplied field in the Secret. Duplicate CA-certificate IDs cause Kong Gateway to reject the entire configuration document and halting all ingress changes cluster-wide.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\", \"base64\": false}]}], \"problemTypes\": [{\"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"type\": \"CWE\", \"cweId\": \"CWE-862\", \"description\": \"CWE-862\"}]}, {\"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"type\": \"CWE\", \"cweId\": \"CWE-400\", \"description\": \"CWE-400\"}]}], \"configurations\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"You are affected if\\u00a0all\\u00a0of the following hold:\\n\\n * You are running Kong Operator with an on-prem Gateway, managed via a\\u00a0ControlPlane\\u00a0resource that uses the embedded KIC.\\n * The\\u00a0ControlPlane\\u00a0is configured with\\u00a0spec.watchNamespaces.type: All, causing the embedded KIC to watch Secrets cluster-wide.\\n * Your cluster hosts\\u00a0multiple tenants\\u00a0where not all users are fully trusted operators.\\n * Untrusted users have RBAC permission to\\u00a0create Secrets\\u00a0in any namespace watched by the\\u00a0ControlPlane, and are not prevented from applying both the\\u00a0konghq.com/secret=true\\u00a0and\\u00a0konghq.com/ca-cert=true\\u00a0labels.\\n\\n\\nYou are\\u00a0not\\u00a0affected if:\\n\\n * The\\u00a0ControlPlane\\u00a0uses\\u00a0spec.watchNamespaces.type: Own\\u00a0or a tightly scoped\\u00a0spec.watchNamespaces.type: List\\u00a0covering only namespaces whose users are all fully trusted.\\n * RBAC policies prevent untrusted users from creating Secrets with the labels\\u00a0konghq.com/secret=true\\u00a0and\\u00a0konghq.com/ca-cert=true\\u00a0in any namespace watched by the\\u00a0ControlPlane.\\n * You are using Kong Operator exclusively with Konnect-managed control planes (the vulnerability is in the embedded on-prem KIC path only).\", \"supportingMedia\": [{\"type\": \"text/html\", \"value\": \"\u003cp\u003eYou are affected if\u003cspan\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eall\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003eof the following hold:\u003c/p\u003e\u003col\u003e\u003cli\u003eYou are running Kong Operator with an on-prem Gateway, managed via a\u003cspan\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u003ccode\u003eControlPlane\u003c/code\u003e\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003eresource that uses the embedded KIC.\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eThe\u003cspan\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003ccode\u003eControlPlane\u003c/code\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003eis configured with\u003cspan\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u003ccode\u003espec.watchNamespaces.type: All\u003c/code\u003e\u003c/strong\u003e, causing the embedded KIC to watch Secrets cluster-wide.\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eYour cluster hosts\u003cspan\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cstrong\u003emultiple tenants\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003ewhere not all users are fully trusted operators.\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eUntrusted users have RBAC permission to\u003cspan\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cstrong\u003ecreate Secrets\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003ein any namespace watched by the\u003cspan\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003ccode\u003eControlPlane\u003c/code\u003e, and are not prevented from applying both the\u003cspan\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003ccode\u003ekonghq.com/secret=true\u003c/code\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003eand\u003cspan\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003ccode\u003ekonghq.com/ca-cert=true\u003c/code\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003elabels.\u003c/li\u003e\u003c/ol\u003e\u003cp\u003eYou are\u003cspan\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cstrong\u003enot\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003eaffected if:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cul\u003e\u003cli\u003eThe\u003cspan\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003ccode\u003eControlPlane\u003c/code\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003euses\u003cspan\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003ccode\u003espec.watchNamespaces.type: Own\u003c/code\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003eor a tightly scoped\u003cspan\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003ccode\u003espec.watchNamespaces.type: List\u003c/code\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003ecovering only namespaces whose users are all fully trusted.\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eRBAC policies prevent untrusted users from creating Secrets with the labels\u003cspan\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003ccode\u003ekonghq.com/secret=true\u003c/code\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003eand\u003cspan\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003ccode\u003ekonghq.com/ca-cert=true\u003c/code\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003ein any namespace watched by the\u003cspan\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003e\u003ccode\u003eControlPlane\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003eYou are using Kong Operator exclusively with Konnect-managed control planes (the vulnerability is in the embedded on-prem KIC path only).\u003c/li\u003e\u003c/ul\u003e\", \"base64\": false}]}], \"providerMetadata\": {\"orgId\": \"02762ae7-200e-4b20-9b2b-a77d5b8fc4cb\", \"shortName\": \"Kong\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-07-29T15:29:03.485Z\"}}}",
"cveMetadata": "{\"cveId\": \"CVE-2026-16543\", \"state\": \"PUBLISHED\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-07-29T17:57:21.328Z\", \"dateReserved\": \"2026-07-22T09:53:31.062Z\", \"assignerOrgId\": \"02762ae7-200e-4b20-9b2b-a77d5b8fc4cb\", \"datePublished\": \"2026-07-29T15:29:03.485Z\", \"assignerShortName\": \"Kong\"}",
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
}
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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