BREW-OPENCLAW-CLI-CVE-20… (GHSA-QJPC-QF9M-XWMR)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 17:21 – Updated: 2026-09-17 17:24 – Source websiteSummary
In trusted-proxy Control UI mode, OpenClaw accepted a WebSocket client's declared operator scopes before those scopes were bound to a server-approved pairing or trusted-proxy authorization baseline.
This issue affects trusted-proxy Control UI deployments. It does not apply to shared-secret Control UI sessions, which are treated as trusted operator sessions by design.
Affected configurations
This affects deployments using gateway.auth.mode: "trusted-proxy" for Control UI access where a restricted trusted-proxy user could open a Control UI WebSocket and present a fresh, unpaired device identity with elevated requested scopes.
Impact
An unpaired or restricted trusted-proxy Control UI client could obtain cached operator.admin authority on its live WebSocket connection. That authority could then be used for admin-gated Gateway RPCs until the connection was closed or revalidated.
Patched Versions
The first stable patched version is 2026.5.18.
Mitigations
Upgrade to openclaw@2026.5.18 or later. Before upgrading, restrict trusted-proxy Control UI access to users who should have the scopes they can request, and restart the gateway after changing trusted-proxy authorization policy.
| URL | Type | |
|---|---|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": "bump",
"range_state": "fixed",
"upstream_fixed_in": "2026.5.18"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "openclaw-cli",
"purl": "pkg:brew/openclaw-cli"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2026.1.29"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.5.18"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "npm",
"key": "pkg:npm/openclaw@2026.9.4",
"name": "openclaw",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "2026.9.4"
}
]
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nIn trusted-proxy Control UI mode, OpenClaw accepted a WebSocket client\u0027s declared operator scopes before those scopes were bound to a server-approved pairing or trusted-proxy authorization baseline.\n\nThis issue affects trusted-proxy Control UI deployments. It does not apply to shared-secret Control UI sessions, which are treated as trusted operator sessions by design.\n\n### Affected configurations\n\nThis affects deployments using `gateway.auth.mode: \"trusted-proxy\"` for Control UI access where a restricted trusted-proxy user could open a Control UI WebSocket and present a fresh, unpaired device identity with elevated requested scopes.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn unpaired or restricted trusted-proxy Control UI client could obtain cached `operator.admin` authority on its live WebSocket connection. That authority could then be used for admin-gated Gateway RPCs until the connection was closed or revalidated.\n\n### Patched Versions\n\nThe first stable patched version is `2026.5.18`.\n\n### Mitigations\n\nUpgrade to `openclaw@2026.5.18` or later. Before upgrading, restrict trusted-proxy Control UI access to users who should have the scopes they can request, and restart the gateway after changing trusted-proxy authorization policy.",
"id": "BREW-openclaw-cli-CVE-2026-53821",
"modified": "2026-09-17T17:24:13Z",
"published": "2026-08-13T17:21:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-qjpc-qf9m-xwmr"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw: Trusted-proxy Control UI WebSocket accepted client-declared scopes before pairing",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-qjpc-qf9m-xwmr",
"CVE-2026-53821"
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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