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BREW-OPENCLAW-CLI-CVE-20… (GHSA-94PW-C6M8-P9P9)

Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 17:21 – Updated: 2026-09-17 17:24 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
OpenClaw: Gateway operator.write Can Reach Admin-Class Channel Allowlist Persistence via chat.send
Details

Fixed in OpenClaw 2026.3.24, the current shipping release.

Summary

The shared /allowlist command persists channel authorization config through writeConfigFile(...) but does not re-validate gateway client scopes for internal gateway callers. Because chat.send is intentionally reachable to operator.write callers and still creates a generic command-authorized internal context, an authenticated write-scoped gateway client can indirectly mutate channel allowFrom and groupAllowFrom policy that direct config.patch correctly reserves to operator.admin.

This is not just a generic code smell. The current code already shows the intended boundary by adding sink-side internal admin checks to shared /config and /plugins writes, but /allowlist was left behind.

Details

The gateway's documented scope split is clear:

  • chat.send is a write-scoped action.
  • direct config mutation is an admin-scoped action.

The vulnerable path is:

  1. A gateway client authenticates with operator.write.
  2. The client calls chat.send, which is intentionally allowed for that scope.
  3. chat.send builds an internal message context with CommandAuthorized: true and carries GatewayClientScopes into the reply pipeline.
  4. resolveCommandAuthorization(...) converts that internal message into isAuthorizedSender=true in the common case where no stricter commands.allowFrom override is configured.
  5. /allowlist add|remove accepts that generic command authorization and proceeds into its config-backed edit path.
  6. The handler clones the parsed config, calls plugin.allowlist.applyConfigEdit(...), validates the result, and persists it with writeConfigFile(validated.config).
  7. No sink-side check requires operator.admin before the persistent write occurs.

That creates a direct control-plane mismatch:

  • config.patch rejects the same caller with missing scope: operator.admin.
  • /allowlist add dm ... or /allowlist add group ... reached through chat.send can still rewrite channel authorization state.

Impact

  • A gateway client intentionally limited to operator.write can persist first-party channel authorization policy.
  • The caller can widen DM or group allowlists for channels using the shared /allowlist plumbing.
  • This weakens the repo's documented control-plane privilege split between ordinary write actions and admin-only persistent authorization mutation.

Remediation

1) Add the Missing Sink-Side Internal Admin Check to /allowlist

Mirror the existing hardened pattern from /config and /plugins.

Before any config-backed /allowlist add|remove write, require:

  • operator.admin for internal gateway channels

This should happen before plugin.allowlist.applyConfigEdit(...) and before writeConfigFile(...).

2) Keep Pairing-Store and Config-Write Policy Checks, but Do Not Treat Them as Scope Enforcement

configWrites policy and pairing-store behavior are useful secondary controls, but they do not replace the missing privilege check between operator.write and operator.admin.

References
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "fix": "bump",
        "range_state": "fixed",
        "upstream_fixed_in": "2026.3.24"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
        "name": "openclaw-cli",
        "purl": "pkg:brew/openclaw-cli"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2026.1.29"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.3.24"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "confidence": "high",
    "source": "matched",
    "strategy": "registry",
    "upstream_evidence": [
      {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "key": "pkg:npm/openclaw@2026.9.4",
        "name": "openclaw",
        "strategy": "registry",
        "subject_version": "2026.9.4"
      }
    ]
  },
  "details": "\u003e Fixed in OpenClaw 2026.3.24, the current shipping release.\n\n## Summary\n\nThe shared `/allowlist` command persists channel authorization config through `writeConfigFile(...)` but does not re-validate gateway client scopes for internal gateway callers. Because `chat.send` is intentionally reachable to `operator.write` callers and still creates a generic command-authorized internal context, an authenticated write-scoped gateway client can indirectly mutate channel `allowFrom` and `groupAllowFrom` policy that direct `config.patch` correctly reserves to `operator.admin`.\n\nThis is not just a generic code smell. The current code already shows the intended boundary by adding sink-side internal admin checks to shared `/config` and `/plugins` writes, but `/allowlist` was left behind.\n\n## Details\n\nThe gateway\u0027s documented scope split is clear:\n\n- `chat.send` is a write-scoped action.\n- direct config mutation is an admin-scoped action.\n\nThe vulnerable path is:\n\n1. A gateway client authenticates with `operator.write`.\n2. The client calls `chat.send`, which is intentionally allowed for that scope.\n3. `chat.send` builds an internal message context with `CommandAuthorized: true` and carries `GatewayClientScopes` into the reply pipeline.\n4. `resolveCommandAuthorization(...)` converts that internal message into `isAuthorizedSender=true` in the common case where no stricter `commands.allowFrom` override is configured.\n5. `/allowlist add|remove` accepts that generic command authorization and proceeds into its config-backed edit path.\n6. The handler clones the parsed config, calls `plugin.allowlist.applyConfigEdit(...)`, validates the result, and persists it with `writeConfigFile(validated.config)`.\n7. No sink-side check requires `operator.admin` before the persistent write occurs.\n\nThat creates a direct control-plane mismatch:\n\n- `config.patch` rejects the same caller with `missing scope: operator.admin`.\n- `/allowlist add dm ...` or `/allowlist add group ...` reached through `chat.send` can still rewrite channel authorization state.\n\n## Impact\n\n- A gateway client intentionally limited to `operator.write` can persist first-party channel authorization policy.\n- The caller can widen DM or group allowlists for channels using the shared `/allowlist` plumbing.\n- This weakens the repo\u0027s documented control-plane privilege split between ordinary write actions and admin-only persistent authorization mutation.\n\n## Remediation\n\n### 1) Add the Missing Sink-Side Internal Admin Check to `/allowlist`\n\nMirror the existing hardened pattern from `/config` and `/plugins`.\n\nBefore any config-backed `/allowlist add|remove` write, require:\n\n- `operator.admin` for internal gateway channels\n\nThis should happen before `plugin.allowlist.applyConfigEdit(...)` and before `writeConfigFile(...)`.\n\n### 2) Keep Pairing-Store and Config-Write Policy Checks, but Do Not Treat Them as Scope Enforcement\n\n`configWrites` policy and pairing-store behavior are useful secondary controls, but they do not replace the missing privilege check between `operator.write` and `operator.admin`.",
  "id": "BREW-openclaw-cli-CVE-2026-35621",
  "modified": "2026-09-17T17:24:13Z",
  "published": "2026-08-13T17:21:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-94pw-c6m8-p9p9"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.3",
  "summary": "OpenClaw: Gateway operator.write Can Reach Admin-Class Channel Allowlist Persistence via chat.send",
  "upstream": [
    "GHSA-94pw-c6m8-p9p9",
    "CVE-2026-35621"
  ]
}



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