brew-openclaw-cli-cve-2026-22217
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew
Summary
shell-env fallback trusted prefix-based executable paths for $SHELL, allowing execution of attacker-controlled binaries in local/runtime-env influence scenarios.
Details
In affected versions, shell selection accepted either:
1. a shell listed in /etc/shells, or
2. any executable under hardcoded trusted prefixes (/bin, /usr/bin, /usr/local/bin, /opt/homebrew/bin, /run/current-system/sw/bin).
The selected shell was then executed as a login shell (-l -c 'env -0') for PATH/environment probing.
On systems where a trusted-prefix directory is writable (for example common Homebrew layouts under /opt/homebrew/bin) and runtime $SHELL can be influenced, this enabled attacker-controlled binary execution in OpenClaw process context.
The fix removes the trusted-prefix executable fallback and now trusts only shells explicitly registered in /etc/shells; otherwise it falls back to /bin/sh.
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclaw(npm) - Affected versions:
>= 2026.2.22, <= 2026.2.22-2 - Latest published vulnerable version:
2026.2.22-2 - Patched versions (released):
>= 2026.2.23
Fix Commit(s)
ff10fe8b91670044a6bb0cd85deb736a0ec8fb55
Release Process Note
This advisory sets patched_versions to the released version (2026.2.23).
This advisory now reflects released fix version 2026.2.23.
OpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": "bump",
"range_state": "fixed",
"upstream_fixed_in": "2026.2.23"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "openclaw-cli",
"purl": "pkg:brew/openclaw-cli"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.7.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "npm",
"key": "pkg:npm/openclaw@2026.9.4",
"name": "openclaw",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "2026.9.4"
}
]
},
"details": "### Summary\n`shell-env` fallback trusted prefix-based executable paths for `$SHELL`, allowing execution of attacker-controlled binaries in local/runtime-env influence scenarios.\n\n### Details\nIn affected versions, shell selection accepted either:\n1. a shell listed in `/etc/shells`, or\n2. any executable under hardcoded trusted prefixes (`/bin`, `/usr/bin`, `/usr/local/bin`, `/opt/homebrew/bin`, `/run/current-system/sw/bin`).\n\nThe selected shell was then executed as a login shell (`-l -c \u0027env -0\u0027`) for PATH/environment probing.\n\nOn systems where a trusted-prefix directory is writable (for example common Homebrew layouts under `/opt/homebrew/bin`) and runtime `$SHELL` can be influenced, this enabled attacker-controlled binary execution in OpenClaw process context.\n\nThe fix removes the trusted-prefix executable fallback and now trusts only shells explicitly registered in `/etc/shells`; otherwise it falls back to `/bin/sh`.\n\n### Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected versions: `\u003e= 2026.2.22, \u003c= 2026.2.22-2`\n- Latest published vulnerable version: `2026.2.22-2`\n- Patched versions (released): `\u003e= 2026.2.23`\n\n### Fix Commit(s)\n- `ff10fe8b91670044a6bb0cd85deb736a0ec8fb55`\n\n### Release Process Note\nThis advisory sets `patched_versions` to the released version (`2026.2.23`).\nThis advisory now reflects released fix version `2026.2.23`.\n\nOpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.",
"id": "BREW-openclaw-cli-CVE-2026-22217",
"modified": "2026-09-12T09:47:35Z",
"published": "2026-08-13T17:21:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-p4wh-cr8m-gm6c"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22217"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/ff10fe8b91670044a6bb0cd85deb736a0ec8fb55"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-arbitrary-binary-execution-via-shell-environment-variable-trusted-prefix-fallback"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw: shell-env trusted-prefix fallback allowed attacker-controlled binary execution via $SHELL",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-p4wh-cr8m-gm6c",
"CVE-2026-22217"
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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