BREW-OPENCLAW-CLI-CVE-20… (GHSA-RQPP-RJJ8-7WV8)

Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 17:21 – Updated: 2026-09-20 10:38 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
OpenClaw: WebSocket shared-auth connections could self-declare elevated scopes
Details

Summary

A logic flaw in the OpenClaw gateway WebSocket connect path allowed certain device-less shared-token or password-authenticated backend connections to keep client-declared scopes without server-side binding. A shared-authenticated client could present elevated scopes such as operator.admin even though those scopes were not tied to a device identity or an explicitly trusted Control UI path.

Impact

This crossed the intended authorization boundary and could let a shared-secret-authenticated backend client perform admin-only gateway operations.

Affected versions

openclaw <= 2026.3.11

Patch

Fixed in openclaw 2026.3.12. The gateway now clears unbound scopes for non-Control-UI shared-auth connections, and regression tests cover the device-less shared-auth path.

Severity
9.9 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
References
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "fix": "bump",
        "range_state": "fixed",
        "upstream_fixed_in": "2026.3.12"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
        "name": "openclaw-cli",
        "purl": "pkg:brew/openclaw-cli"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2026.1.29"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.3.12"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "confidence": "high",
    "source": "matched",
    "strategy": "registry",
    "upstream_evidence": [
      {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "key": "pkg:npm/openclaw@2026.9.5",
        "name": "openclaw",
        "strategy": "registry",
        "subject_version": "2026.9.5"
      }
    ]
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nA logic flaw in the OpenClaw gateway WebSocket connect path allowed certain device-less shared-token or password-authenticated backend connections to keep client-declared scopes without server-side binding. A shared-authenticated client could present elevated scopes such as `operator.admin` even though those scopes were not tied to a device identity or an explicitly trusted Control UI path.\n\n### Impact\n\nThis crossed the intended authorization boundary and could let a shared-secret-authenticated backend client perform admin-only gateway operations.\n\n### Affected versions\n\n`openclaw` `\u003c= 2026.3.11`\n\n### Patch\n\nFixed in `openclaw` `2026.3.12`. The gateway now clears unbound scopes for non-Control-UI shared-auth connections, and regression tests cover the device-less shared-auth path.",
  "id": "BREW-openclaw-cli-CVE-2026-22172",
  "modified": "2026-09-20T10:38:33Z",
  "published": "2026-08-13T17:21:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-rqpp-rjj8-7wv8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/pull/44306"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/5e389d5e7c9233ec91026ab2fea299ebaf3249f6"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.3.12"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.3",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw: WebSocket shared-auth connections could self-declare elevated scopes",
  "upstream": [
    "GHSA-rqpp-rjj8-7wv8",
    "CVE-2026-22172"
  ]
}



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