CVE-2026-32315 (GCVE-0-2026-32315)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-06-24 20:45 – Updated: 2026-06-25 12:36

Title

motionEye: World-Readable Configuration File Exposes Admin Password Hash

Summary

motionEye (mEye) is an online interface for motion software, a video surveillance program with motion detection. Versions prior to 0.44.0 create the configuration file /etc/motioneye/motion.conf with 644 permissions (-rw-r--r--), making it readable by any local user on the system. This file contains sensitive data including the admin password hash, which can be leveraged by other vulnerabilities to escalate privileges. Additionally, per-camera configuration files (camera-*.conf) are also created with the same 644 permissions, potentially exposing camera-specific credentials and settings. The exposed SHA1 admin password hash can be cracked offline to recover the plaintext password, used directly to forge authenticated admin API requests via the signature authentication weakness (GHSA-45h7-499j-7ww3), and chained with the OS command injection flaw (CVE-2025-60787) to escalate a local unprivileged user to the Motion daemon user (often root), enabling full system compromise. This issue has been fixed in version 0.44.0.

Severity

5.5 (Medium)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

SSVC

Exploitation: poc Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator (v2.0.3)

CWE

CWE-732 - Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource
CWE-522 - Insufficiently Protected Credentials
CWE-200 - Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor

Assigner

GitHub_M

References

2 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye/se…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye/re…	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
motioneye-project	motioneye	Affected: < 0.44.0

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-32315",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "poc"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-06-25T12:36:16.343159Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-06-25T12:36:19.974Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "references": [
          {
            "tags": [
              "exploit"
            ],
            "url": "https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye/security/advisories/GHSA-rhgp-6wq6-9j67"
          }
        ],
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "motioneye",
          "vendor": "motioneye-project",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 0.44.0"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "motionEye (mEye) is an online interface for motion software, a video surveillance program with motion detection. Versions prior to 0.44.0 create the configuration file /etc/motioneye/motion.conf with 644 permissions (-rw-r--r--), making it readable by any local user on the system. This file contains sensitive data including the admin password hash, which can be leveraged by other vulnerabilities to escalate privileges. Additionally, per-camera configuration files (camera-*.conf) are also created with the same 644 permissions, potentially exposing camera-specific credentials and settings. The exposed SHA1 admin password hash can be cracked offline to recover the plaintext password, used directly to forge authenticated admin API requests via the signature authentication weakness (GHSA-45h7-499j-7ww3), and chained with the OS command injection flaw (CVE-2025-60787) to escalate a local unprivileged user to the Motion daemon user (often root), enabling full system compromise. This issue has been fixed in version 0.44.0."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "LOCAL",
            "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "baseScore": 5.5,
            "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
            "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "integrityImpact": "NONE",
            "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
            "scope": "UNCHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
            "version": "3.1"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-732",
              "description": "CWE-732: Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-522",
              "description": "CWE-522: Insufficiently Protected Credentials",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-200",
              "description": "CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-06-24T20:45:34.326Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye/security/advisories/GHSA-rhgp-6wq6-9j67",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye/security/advisories/GHSA-rhgp-6wq6-9j67"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye/releases/tag/0.44.0",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye/releases/tag/0.44.0"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-rhgp-6wq6-9j67",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "motionEye: World-Readable Configuration File Exposes Admin Password Hash"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-32315",
    "datePublished": "2026-06-24T20:45:34.326Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-03-11T21:16:21.660Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-06-25T12:36:19.974Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2",
  "vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
    "epss": {
      "cve": "CVE-2026-32315",
      "date": "2026-06-25",
      "epss": "0.02902",
      "percentile": "0.85171"
    },
    "vulnrichment": {
      "containers": "{\"adp\": [{\"title\": \"CISA ADP Vulnrichment\", \"metrics\": [{\"other\": {\"type\": \"ssvc\", \"content\": {\"id\": \"CVE-2026-32315\", \"role\": \"CISA Coordinator\", \"options\": [{\"Exploitation\": \"poc\"}, {\"Automatable\": \"no\"}, {\"Technical Impact\": \"partial\"}], \"version\": \"2.0.3\", \"timestamp\": \"2026-06-25T12:36:16.343159Z\"}}}], \"references\": [{\"url\": \"https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye/security/advisories/GHSA-rhgp-6wq6-9j67\", \"tags\": [\"exploit\"]}], \"providerMetadata\": {\"orgId\": \"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0\", \"shortName\": \"CISA-ADP\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-06-25T12:35:58.281Z\"}}], \"cna\": {\"title\": \"motionEye: World-Readable Configuration File Exposes Admin Password Hash\", \"source\": {\"advisory\": \"GHSA-rhgp-6wq6-9j67\", \"discovery\": \"UNKNOWN\"}, \"metrics\": [{\"cvssV3_1\": {\"scope\": \"UNCHANGED\", \"version\": \"3.1\", \"baseScore\": 5.5, \"attackVector\": \"LOCAL\", \"baseSeverity\": \"MEDIUM\", \"vectorString\": \"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N\", \"integrityImpact\": \"NONE\", \"userInteraction\": \"NONE\", \"attackComplexity\": \"LOW\", \"availabilityImpact\": \"NONE\", \"privilegesRequired\": \"LOW\", \"confidentialityImpact\": \"HIGH\"}}], \"affected\": [{\"vendor\": \"motioneye-project\", \"product\": \"motioneye\", \"versions\": [{\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"\u003c 0.44.0\"}]}], \"references\": [{\"url\": \"https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye/security/advisories/GHSA-rhgp-6wq6-9j67\", \"name\": \"https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye/security/advisories/GHSA-rhgp-6wq6-9j67\", \"tags\": [\"x_refsource_CONFIRM\"]}, {\"url\": \"https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye/releases/tag/0.44.0\", \"name\": \"https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye/releases/tag/0.44.0\", \"tags\": [\"x_refsource_MISC\"]}], \"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"motionEye (mEye) is an online interface for motion software, a video surveillance program with motion detection. Versions prior to 0.44.0 create the configuration file /etc/motioneye/motion.conf with 644 permissions (-rw-r--r--), making it readable by any local user on the system. This file contains sensitive data including the admin password hash, which can be leveraged by other vulnerabilities to escalate privileges. Additionally, per-camera configuration files (camera-*.conf) are also created with the same 644 permissions, potentially exposing camera-specific credentials and settings. The exposed SHA1 admin password hash can be cracked offline to recover the plaintext password, used directly to forge authenticated admin API requests via the signature authentication weakness (GHSA-45h7-499j-7ww3), and chained with the OS command injection flaw (CVE-2025-60787) to escalate a local unprivileged user to the Motion daemon user (often root), enabling full system compromise. This issue has been fixed in version 0.44.0.\"}], \"problemTypes\": [{\"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"type\": \"CWE\", \"cweId\": \"CWE-732\", \"description\": \"CWE-732: Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource\"}]}, {\"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"type\": \"CWE\", \"cweId\": \"CWE-522\", \"description\": \"CWE-522: Insufficiently Protected Credentials\"}]}, {\"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"type\": \"CWE\", \"cweId\": \"CWE-200\", \"description\": \"CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor\"}]}], \"providerMetadata\": {\"orgId\": \"a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa\", \"shortName\": \"GitHub_M\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-06-24T20:45:34.326Z\"}}}",
      "cveMetadata": "{\"cveId\": \"CVE-2026-32315\", \"state\": \"PUBLISHED\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-06-25T12:36:19.974Z\", \"dateReserved\": \"2026-03-11T21:16:21.660Z\", \"assignerOrgId\": \"a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa\", \"datePublished\": \"2026-06-24T20:45:34.326Z\", \"assignerShortName\": \"GitHub_M\"}",
      "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
      "dataVersion": "5.2"
    }
  }
}

GHSA-RHGP-6WQ6-9J67

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-22 17:11 – Updated: 2026-06-22 17:11

Summary

motionEye's World-Readable Configuration File Exposes Admin Password Hash

Details

Security Advisory: World-Readable Configuration File Exposes Admin Password Hash in motionEye

Summary

motionEye v0.43.1 and prior versions create the configuration file /etc/motioneye/motion.conf with 644 permissions (-rw-r--r--), making it readable by any local user on the system. This file contains sensitive data including the admin password hash, which can be leveraged by other vulnerabilities to escalate privileges.

Affected Versions

motionEye <= 0.43.1b4
Fixed in motionEye 0.44.0b1 (applies 0600 mode to motion.conf and camera-*.conf files)

Vulnerability Details

World-Readable Configuration File (CWE-732)

When motionEye writes its configuration, the file /etc/motioneye/motion.conf is created with 644 permissions regardless of the installation method. This file contains the admin password hash in the @admin_password field:

# @admin_username admin
# @admin_password c18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37

Any local user can read this hash without elevated privileges:

$ sudo -u testuser cat /etc/motioneye/motion.conf
# @admin_password c18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37

Additionally, per-camera configuration files (camera-*.conf) are also created with the same 644 permissions, potentially exposing camera-specific credentials and settings.

Impact

The exposed admin password hash enables several attack paths:

Offline password cracking: The SHA1 hash can be cracked to recover the plaintext admin password
Authentication bypass: When combined with the signature authentication weakness (see GHSA-45h7-499j-7ww3), the hash can be used directly to forge authenticated admin API requests
Full system compromise: When further chained with CVE-2025-60787 (OS command injection), a local unprivileged user can escalate to the Motion daemon user (often root)

Proof of Concept

The following demonstrates that an unprivileged user can read the admin password hash from the config file and verify it matches the admin's password:

# Verify the file permissions
$ ls -la /etc/motioneye/motion.conf
-rw-r--r-- 1 motion motion 255 Mar 11 15:42 /etc/motioneye/motion.conf

# Read the hash as an unprivileged user
$ sudo -u testuser cat /etc/motioneye/motion.conf | grep admin_password
# @admin_password c18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37

# Verify the hash matches the admin password (SHA1)
$ sudo -u testuser python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha1(b'testpassword123').hexdigest())"
c18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37

Verified Output

The following output was captured on a fresh motionEye v0.43.1b4 installation (official motioneye_init method, admin password set to testpassword123):

$ ls -la /etc/motioneye/motion.conf
-rw-r--r-- 1 motion motion 255 Mar 11 15:42 /etc/motioneye/motion.conf

$ sudo -u testuser cat /etc/motioneye/motion.conf | grep admin_password
# @admin_password c18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37

$ sudo -u testuser python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha1(b'testpassword123').hexdigest())"
c18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37

The hash extracted by the unprivileged testuser matches the SHA1 of the admin password, confirming full credential exposure.

Reproduction Steps

This vulnerability has been tested and confirmed with both installation methods described in the official motionEye documentation.

Method 1: Manual Installation

Install motionEye on a Linux system: bash sudo pip install motioneye mkdir -p /etc/motioneye /var/log/motioneye /var/lib/motioneye /run/motioneye cp /usr/local/lib/python3.12/dist-packages/motioneye/extra/motioneye.conf.sample /etc/motioneye/motioneye.conf sudo meyectl startserver -c /etc/motioneye/motioneye.conf
Set an admin password via the web UI at http://localhost:8765
Verify the config file is world-readable: bash ls -la /etc/motioneye/motion.conf # -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 255 ... /etc/motioneye/motion.conf
As an unprivileged user, read the hash: bash sudo -u testuser cat /etc/motioneye/motion.conf # @admin_password c18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37

Method 2: Official `motioneye_init` Installation

Install motionEye using the official init script: bash sudo pip install motioneye sudo motioneye_init
The motioneye_init script automatically creates the required directories, installs the systemd service, and starts motionEye. Set an admin password via the web UI at http://localhost:8765
Verify the config file is still world-readable: bash ls -la /etc/motioneye/motion.conf # -rw-r--r-- 1 motion motion 255 ... /etc/motioneye/motion.conf

Note that while the ownership changes to motion:motion (instead of root:root in the manual method), the permissions remain 644, meaning any local user can still read the file.

Confirm as an unprivileged user: bash sudo -u testuser cat /etc/motioneye/motion.conf # @admin_password c18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37

Both installation methods produce the same vulnerable state, confirming this is the default behavior of the software and not a user misconfiguration.

Related Vulnerabilities

GHSA-45h7-499j-7ww3: Password hash accepted as API signing key (CWE-836), which allows the hash exposed by this vulnerability to be used for forging authenticated admin API requests
CVE-2025-60787: OS command injection via image_file_name, which requires admin authentication. When chained with both this vulnerability and GHSA-45h7-499j-7ww3, enables local privilege escalation to root

Suggested Remediation

Fix file permissions: Create motion.conf and camera-*.conf with 600 permissions (-rw-------), readable only by the motionEye service user (addressed in motionEye 0.44.0b1)

Timeline

2026-03-11: Vulnerability discovered during security research
2026-03-11: Vendor notified via GitHub Security Advisory
2026-03-12: Vendor acknowledged, confirmed fix in motionEye 0.44.0b1

Severity

5.5 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "motioneye"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.44.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-32315"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-732"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-22T17:11:36Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "# Security Advisory: World-Readable Configuration File Exposes Admin Password Hash in motionEye\n\n## Summary\n\nmotionEye v0.43.1 and prior versions create the configuration file `/etc/motioneye/motion.conf` with `644` permissions (`-rw-r--r--`), making it readable by any local user on the system. This file contains sensitive data including the admin password hash, which can be leveraged by other vulnerabilities to escalate privileges.\n\n## Affected Versions\n\n- motionEye \u003c= 0.43.1b4\n- Fixed in motionEye 0.44.0b1 (applies `0600` mode to `motion.conf` and `camera-*.conf` files)\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n### World-Readable Configuration File (CWE-732)\n\nWhen motionEye writes its configuration, the file `/etc/motioneye/motion.conf` is created with `644` permissions regardless of the installation method. This file contains the admin password hash in the `@admin_password` field:\n\n```\n# @admin_username admin\n# @admin_password c18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37\n```\n\nAny local user can read this hash without elevated privileges:\n\n```bash\n$ sudo -u testuser cat /etc/motioneye/motion.conf\n# @admin_password c18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37\n```\n\nAdditionally, per-camera configuration files (`camera-*.conf`) are also created with the same `644` permissions, potentially exposing camera-specific credentials and settings.\n\n## Impact\n\nThe exposed admin password hash enables several attack paths:\n\n- **Offline password cracking:** The SHA1 hash can be cracked to recover the plaintext admin password\n- **Authentication bypass:** When combined with the signature authentication weakness (see GHSA-45h7-499j-7ww3), the hash can be used directly to forge authenticated admin API requests\n- **Full system compromise:** When further chained with CVE-2025-60787 (OS command injection), a local unprivileged user can escalate to the Motion daemon user (often root)\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nThe following demonstrates that an unprivileged user can read the admin password hash from the config file and verify it matches the admin\u0027s password:\n\n```bash\n# Verify the file permissions\n$ ls -la /etc/motioneye/motion.conf\n-rw-r--r-- 1 motion motion 255 Mar 11 15:42 /etc/motioneye/motion.conf\n\n# Read the hash as an unprivileged user\n$ sudo -u testuser cat /etc/motioneye/motion.conf | grep admin_password\n# @admin_password c18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37\n\n# Verify the hash matches the admin password (SHA1)\n$ sudo -u testuser python3 -c \"import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha1(b\u0027testpassword123\u0027).hexdigest())\"\nc18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37\n```\n\n### Verified Output\n\nThe following output was captured on a fresh motionEye v0.43.1b4 installation (official `motioneye_init` method, admin password set to `testpassword123`):\n\n```\n$ ls -la /etc/motioneye/motion.conf\n-rw-r--r-- 1 motion motion 255 Mar 11 15:42 /etc/motioneye/motion.conf\n\n$ sudo -u testuser cat /etc/motioneye/motion.conf | grep admin_password\n# @admin_password c18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37\n\n$ sudo -u testuser python3 -c \"import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha1(b\u0027testpassword123\u0027).hexdigest())\"\nc18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37\n```\n\nThe hash extracted by the unprivileged `testuser` matches the SHA1 of the admin password, confirming full credential exposure.\n\n## Reproduction Steps\n\nThis vulnerability has been tested and confirmed with both installation methods described in the official motionEye documentation.\n\n### Method 1: Manual Installation\n\n1. Install motionEye on a Linux system:\n   ```bash\n   sudo pip install motioneye\n   mkdir -p /etc/motioneye /var/log/motioneye /var/lib/motioneye /run/motioneye\n   cp /usr/local/lib/python3.12/dist-packages/motioneye/extra/motioneye.conf.sample /etc/motioneye/motioneye.conf\n   sudo meyectl startserver -c /etc/motioneye/motioneye.conf\n   ```\n\n2. Set an admin password via the web UI at `http://localhost:8765`\n\n3. Verify the config file is world-readable:\n   ```bash\n   ls -la /etc/motioneye/motion.conf\n   # -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 255 ... /etc/motioneye/motion.conf\n   ```\n\n4. As an unprivileged user, read the hash:\n   ```bash\n   sudo -u testuser cat /etc/motioneye/motion.conf\n   # @admin_password c18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37\n   ```\n\n### Method 2: Official `motioneye_init` Installation\n\n1. Install motionEye using the official init script:\n   ```bash\n   sudo pip install motioneye\n   sudo motioneye_init\n   ```\n\n2. The `motioneye_init` script automatically creates the required directories, installs the systemd service, and starts motionEye. Set an admin password via the web UI at `http://localhost:8765`\n\n3. Verify the config file is still world-readable:\n   ```bash\n   ls -la /etc/motioneye/motion.conf\n   # -rw-r--r-- 1 motion motion 255 ... /etc/motioneye/motion.conf\n   ```\n\n   Note that while the ownership changes to `motion:motion` (instead of `root:root` in the manual method), the permissions remain `644`, meaning any local user can still read the file.\n\n4. Confirm as an unprivileged user:\n   ```bash\n   sudo -u testuser cat /etc/motioneye/motion.conf\n   # @admin_password c18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37\n   ```\n\nBoth installation methods produce the same vulnerable state, confirming this is the default behavior of the software and not a user misconfiguration.\n\n## Related Vulnerabilities\n\n- **GHSA-45h7-499j-7ww3:** Password hash accepted as API signing key (CWE-836), which allows the hash exposed by this vulnerability to be used for forging authenticated admin API requests\n- **CVE-2025-60787:** OS command injection via `image_file_name`, which requires admin authentication. When chained with both this vulnerability and GHSA-45h7-499j-7ww3, enables local privilege escalation to root\n\n## Suggested Remediation\n\n1. **Fix file permissions:** Create `motion.conf` and `camera-*.conf` with `600` permissions (`-rw-------`), readable only by the motionEye service user (addressed in motionEye 0.44.0b1)\n\n## Timeline\n\n- **2026-03-11:** Vulnerability discovered during security research\n- **2026-03-11:** Vendor notified via GitHub Security Advisory\n- **2026-03-12:** Vendor acknowledged, confirmed fix in motionEye 0.44.0b1",
  "id": "GHSA-rhgp-6wq6-9j67",
  "modified": "2026-06-22T17:11:37Z",
  "published": "2026-06-22T17:11:36Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye/security/advisories/GHSA-rhgp-6wq6-9j67"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "motionEye\u0027s World-Readable Configuration File Exposes Admin Password Hash"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Action not permitted

CVE-2026-32315 (GCVE-0-2026-32315)

GHSA-RHGP-6WQ6-9J67

Security Advisory: World-Readable Configuration File Exposes Admin Password Hash in motionEye

Summary

Affected Versions

Vulnerability Details

World-Readable Configuration File (CWE-732)

Impact

Proof of Concept

Verified Output

Reproduction Steps

Method 1: Manual Installation

Method 2: Official motioneye_init Installation

Related Vulnerabilities

Suggested Remediation

Timeline

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature

Method 2: Official `motioneye_init` Installation