Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-287

Discouraged

Improper Authentication

Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft

API response cwe.mitre.org

When an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct.

6146 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-5FHC-R7RJ-6CHF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:08 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:08
VLAI
Details

iDrive RemotePC before 7.6.48 on Windows allows authentication bypass. A remote and unauthenticated attacker can bypass cloud authentication to connect and control a system via TCP port 5970 and 5980.

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-34690"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-07-15T14:15:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "iDrive RemotePC before 7.6.48 on Windows allows authentication bypass. A remote and unauthenticated attacker can bypass cloud authentication to connect and control a system via TCP port 5970 and 5980.",
  "id": "GHSA-5fhc-r7rj-6chf",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T19:08:12Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T19:08:12Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34690"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/jacob-baines/vuln_disclosure/main/vuln_2021_01.txt"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.remotepc.com/release-info"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-5FHW-RC3X-VMXM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:30 – Updated: 2025-04-20 03:33
VLAI
Details

The "OpenID Connect Relying Party and OAuth 2.0 Resource Server" (aka mod_auth_openidc) module before 2.1.5 for the Apache HTTP Server does not skip OIDC_CLAIM_ and OIDCAuthNHeader headers in an "OIDCUnAuthAction pass" configuration, which allows remote attackers to bypass authentication via crafted HTTP traffic.

Severity
8.6 (High)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2017-6062"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2017-03-02T06:59:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The \"OpenID Connect Relying Party and OAuth 2.0 Resource Server\" (aka mod_auth_openidc) module before 2.1.5 for the Apache HTTP Server does not skip OIDC_CLAIM_ and OIDCAuthNHeader headers in an \"OIDCUnAuthAction pass\" configuration, which allows remote attackers to bypass authentication via crafted HTTP traffic.",
  "id": "GHSA-5fhw-rc3x-vmxm",
  "modified": "2025-04-20T03:33:32Z",
  "published": "2022-05-13T01:30:59Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-6062"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pingidentity/mod_auth_openidc/issues/222"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pingidentity/mod_auth_openidc/blob/master/ChangeLog"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pingidentity/mod_auth_openidc/releases/tag/v2.1.5"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/2V3HIGXMUKJGOBMAQAQPGC7G5YYWSUVA"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/EJXBG3DG2FUYFGTUTSJFMPIINVFKKB4Z"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/WTWUMQ46GZY3O4WU4JCF333LN53R2XQH"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/2V3HIGXMUKJGOBMAQAQPGC7G5YYWSUVA"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/EJXBG3DG2FUYFGTUTSJFMPIINVFKKB4Z"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/WTWUMQ46GZY3O4WU4JCF333LN53R2XQH"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-5FMM-QCG5-XXR7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-04-05 00:00 – Updated: 2022-04-12 00:00
VLAI
Details

Improper authorization in GitLab Pages included with GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions from 11.5 prior to 14.7.7, 14.8 prior to 14.8.5, and 14.9 prior to 14.9.2 allowed an attacker to steal a user's access token on an attacker-controlled private GitLab Pages website and reuse that token on the victim's other private websites

Severity
6.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-1148"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-04-04T20:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Improper authorization in GitLab Pages included with GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions from 11.5 prior to 14.7.7, 14.8 prior to 14.8.5, and 14.9 prior to 14.9.2 allowed an attacker to steal a user\u0027s access token on an attacker-controlled private GitLab Pages website and reuse that token on the victim\u0027s other private websites",
  "id": "GHSA-5fmm-qcg5-xxr7",
  "modified": "2022-04-12T00:00:52Z",
  "published": "2022-04-05T00:00:20Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-1148"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/1439552"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/cves/-/blob/master/2022/CVE-2022-1148.json"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/issues/350687"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-5FP7-G646-CCF4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-08 21:29 – Updated: 2026-01-11 14:54
VLAI
Summary
Ghost has Staff 2FA bypass
Details

Impact

A vulnerability in Ghost's 2FA mechanism allows staff users to skip email 2FA.

Vulnerable versions

This vulnerability is present in Ghost v5.105.0 to v5.130.5 to and Ghost v6.0.0 to v6.10.3.

Patches

v5.130.6 and v6.11.0 contain a fix for this issue.

References

Ghost thanks Sho Odagiri of GMO Cybersecurity by Ierae, Inc. for discovering and disclosing this vulnerability responsibly.

For more information

If there are any questions or comments about this advisory, email Ghost at security@ghost.org.

Severity
8.1 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.10.3"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "ghost"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "6.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.11.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.130.5"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "ghost"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "5.105.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.130.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-22594"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-08T21:29:47Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-01-10T03:15:50Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nA vulnerability in Ghost\u0027s 2FA mechanism allows staff users to skip email 2FA.\n\n### Vulnerable versions\nThis vulnerability is present in Ghost v5.105.0 to v5.130.5 to and Ghost v6.0.0 to v6.10.3.\n\n### Patches\nv5.130.6 and v6.11.0 contain a fix for this issue.\n\n### References\nGhost thanks Sho Odagiri of GMO Cybersecurity by Ierae, Inc. for discovering and disclosing this vulnerability responsibly.\n\n### For more information\nIf there are any questions or comments about this advisory, email Ghost at [security@ghost.org](mailto:security@ghost.org).",
  "id": "GHSA-5fp7-g646-ccf4",
  "modified": "2026-01-11T14:54:23Z",
  "published": "2026-01-08T21:29:47Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/TryGhost/Ghost/security/advisories/GHSA-5fp7-g646-ccf4"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22594"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/TryGhost/Ghost/commit/b59f707f670e6f175b669977724ccf16c718430b"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/TryGhost/Ghost/commit/fc7bc2fb0888513498154ec5cb4b21eccb88de07"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/TryGhost/Ghost"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Ghost has Staff 2FA bypass"
}

GHSA-5FQ8-3Q2F-4M5G

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2020-01-24 19:56 – Updated: 2024-09-16 21:59
VLAI
Summary
Session key exposure through session list in Django User Sessions
Details

Impact

The views provided by django-user-sessions allow users to terminate specific sessions. The session key is used to identify sessions, and thus included in the rendered HTML. In itself this is not a problem. However if the website has an XSS vulnerability, the session key could be extracted by the attacker and a session takeover could happen.

Patches

Patch is under way.

Workarounds

Remove the session_key from the template.

References

None.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in Bouke/django-user-sessions * Email us at bouke@haarsma.eu

Severity
6.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N
4.8 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "django-user-sessions"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.7.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-5224"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2020-01-24T19:56:37Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nThe views provided by django-user-sessions allow users to terminate specific sessions. The session key is used to identify sessions, and thus included in the rendered HTML. In itself this is not a problem. However if the website has an XSS vulnerability, the session key could be extracted by the attacker and a session takeover could happen.\n\n### Patches\nPatch is under way.\n\n### Workarounds\nRemove the session_key from the template.\n\n### References\n_None._\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Open an issue in [Bouke/django-user-sessions](https://github.com/Bouke/django-user-sessions/issues)\n* Email us at [bouke@haarsma.eu](mailto:bouke@haarsma.eu)",
  "id": "GHSA-5fq8-3q2f-4m5g",
  "modified": "2024-09-16T21:59:21Z",
  "published": "2020-01-24T19:56:59Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Bouke/django-user-sessions/security/advisories/GHSA-5fq8-3q2f-4m5g"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-5224"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jazzband/django-user-sessions/commit/f0c4077e7d1436ba6d721af85cee89222ca5d2d9"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Bouke/django-user-sessions"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/django-user-sessions/PYSEC-2020-230.yaml"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Session key exposure through session list in Django User Sessions"
}

GHSA-5FQM-CC34-FCF5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-28 20:32 – Updated: 2026-07-28 20:32
VLAI
Summary
Cosmos-Server's constellation public-devices endpoint accepts arbitrary bearer tokens
Details

Summary

GET /cosmos/api/constellation/public-devices discloses Constellation device metadata to a requester that supplies any non-empty Authorization header. The handler strips the string Bearer from the header but never validates the resulting token and never uses it in the database query.

This was confirmed locally by routing a request through the real tokenMiddleware with Authorization: Bearer not-a-real-token. The request returned public Constellation device metadata from a disposable fixture. A missing-header negative control returned 401 Unauthorized, proving the bypass is specifically the acceptance of arbitrary bearer values.

Details

Source-to-sink path:

  • src/httpServer.go:690 registers /api/constellation/public-devices on the authenticated admin API router.
  • src/httpServer.go:815-817 applies SecureAPI(..., public=false, ...), which runs tokenMiddleware.
  • src/httpServer.go:231-237 only treats Authorization: Bearer cosmos_... as a Cosmos API token for validation. Other bearer strings are not validated by the middleware and fall through to the handler.
  • src/constellation/api_devices_public.go:42-47 checks only that the Authorization header is present.
  • src/constellation/api_devices_public.go:49-50 strips Bearer but does not verify the token or compare it with a device/API key.
  • src/constellation/api_devices_public.go:63-67 queries all non-blocked and non-invisible devices without including the stripped auth value in the filter.
  • src/constellation/api_devices_public.go:84-99 returns device names, user nicknames, cleaned VPN/internal IPs, role flags, public hostname, and port.

The handler does not call utils.CheckPermissions, utils.CheckPermissionsOrSelf, the Cosmos API-token permission check, or any Constellation-token validation before returning the data.

Default/common exposure evidence:

  • The route is registered in the standard server setup (src/httpServer.go:690).
  • Constellation is a documented product feature described as the VPN used to securely access applications remotely (readme.md:49).
  • The default config ships Constellation disabled (src/utils/utils.go:104-105), so impact requires a deployment that enables the Constellation/VPN feature and has at least one non-blocked, non-invisible device.
  • The root package identifies the product as cosmos-server version 0.22.18 (package.json:1-2).
  • The Go module is github.com/azukaar/cosmos-server (go.mod:0).

False-positive screen:

  • The PoC wraps the handler in the same tokenMiddleware used by SecureAPI, so it tests the deployed middleware behavior rather than directly calling the handler alone.
  • A request with no Authorization header returns 401 Unauthorized.
  • A request with Authorization: Bearer not-a-real-token returns 200 OK and device metadata.
  • The fixture data is stored in a disposable embedded database under t.TempDir() and no external services are contacted.
  • The route is not protected by handler-level CheckPermissions, and the arbitrary bearer value is not used by the database query.

Candidate score: 13/18. Reachability 1, attacker control 2, privilege required 2, sink impact 1, mitigation weakness 2, default exposure 1, safe PoC feasibility 2, static certainty 2, false-positive resistance 2. The lower score reflects that Constellation is disabled in the shipped default config, but it is a documented/common product feature.

Exploitability gate: confirmed for deployments with Constellation enabled and populated with devices. The reachable source, arbitrary-token bypass, data-disclosure impact, safe local reproduction, and affected-version evidence are present. Default exposure is feature-dependent rather than enabled in a fresh default config.

PoC

Clean-checkout maintainer recipe:

  1. Check out commit 88de73dcca50172393a75de0e4dc3ab93622825c or version 0.22.18.
  2. Create src/zz_security_poc_test.go with the following test.
  3. Run go test ./src -run TestAuditPublicDevicesAllowsArbitraryBearer -count=1 -v.
  4. Delete src/zz_security_poc_test.go after confirming.
package main

import (
    "encoding/json"
    "net/http"
    "net/http/httptest"
    "testing"

    "github.com/azukaar/cosmos-server/src/constellation"
    "github.com/azukaar/cosmos-server/src/utils"
)

func TestAuditPublicDevicesAllowsArbitraryBearer(t *testing.T) {
    oldConfig := utils.MainConfig
    oldBaseConfig := utils.BaseMainConfig
    oldPush := utils.PushShieldMetrics
    oldConfigFolder := utils.CONFIGFOLDER
    defer func() {
        utils.MainConfig = oldConfig
        utils.BaseMainConfig = oldBaseConfig
        utils.PushShieldMetrics = oldPush
        utils.CONFIGFOLDER = oldConfigFolder
        utils.CloseEmbeddedDB()
    }()

    utils.PushShieldMetrics = func(string) {}
    utils.MainConfig = utils.DefaultConfig
    utils.MainConfig.NewInstall = false
    utils.MainConfig.HTTPConfig.Hostname = "example.test"
    utils.BaseMainConfig = utils.MainConfig
    tmp := t.TempDir()
    utils.CONFIGFOLDER = tmp + "/"
    utils.CloseEmbeddedDB()
    c, closeDb, err := utils.GetEmbeddedCollection(utils.GetRootAppId(), "devices")
    defer closeDb()
    if err != nil {
        t.Fatalf("embedded collection: %v", err)
    }
    _, err = c.InsertOne(nil, utils.ConstellationDevice{
        Nickname:       "victim-user",
        DeviceName:     "private-node",
        IP:             "10.8.0.42/24",
        IsLighthouse:   true,
        PublicHostname: "vpn.example.test",
        Port:           "4242",
        Blocked:        false,
        Invisible:      false,
    })
    if err != nil {
        t.Fatalf("insert device fixture: %v", err)
    }

    handler := tokenMiddleware(http.HandlerFunc(constellation.DevicePublicList))
    noAuthReq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/cosmos/api/constellation/public-devices", nil)
    noAuthRec := httptest.NewRecorder()
    handler.ServeHTTP(noAuthRec, noAuthReq)
    if noAuthRec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
        t.Fatalf("missing Authorization status = %d body = %s", noAuthRec.Code, noAuthRec.Body.String())
    }

    req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/cosmos/api/constellation/public-devices", nil)
    req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer not-a-real-token")
    rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
    handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
    if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
        t.Fatalf("DevicePublicList status = %d body = %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
    }

    var body struct {
        Status string `json:"status"`
        Data []struct {
            Name string `json:"name"`
            User string `json:"user"`
            IP string `json:"ip"`
            PublicHostname string `json:"publicHostname"`
        } `json:"data"`
    }
    if err := json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &body); err != nil {
        t.Fatalf("response JSON: %v", err)
    }
    if body.Status != "OK" || len(body.Data) != 1 {
        t.Fatalf("unexpected response body: %s", rec.Body.String())
    }
    if body.Data[0].Name != "private-node" || body.Data[0].User != "victim-user" || body.Data[0].IP != "10.8.0.42" || body.Data[0].PublicHostname != "vpn.example.test" {
        t.Fatalf("unexpected device disclosure: %+v", body.Data[0])
    }
}

Observed output in this environment:

=== RUN   TestAuditPublicDevicesAllowsArbitraryBearer
2026/05/24 15:18:09 NOTICE: [INFO] DevicePublicList: Fetching devices with API key
--- PASS: TestAuditPublicDevicesAllowsArbitraryBearer (0.00s)
PASS
ok      github.com/azukaar/cosmos-server/src    0.057s

Control/negative case: the same test first sends the request without Authorization and expects 401 Unauthorized. The subsequent Authorization: Bearer not-a-real-token request succeeds and returns the fixture, proving the bypass is not an intentionally unauthenticated endpoint but an unvalidated-header check.

Impact

An unauthenticated network attacker can enumerate Constellation device metadata from deployments that enable the Constellation/VPN feature and have visible devices. The response exposes device names, user nicknames, internal/VPN IP addresses, node roles such as lighthouse/relay/exit-node flags, public hostnames, and ports. This information can reveal private network topology and user/device inventory and can support targeted follow-on attacks against the VPN or exposed nodes.

The issue does not require a valid Cosmos session, valid Cosmos API token, valid Constellation token, or user interaction; any arbitrary non-empty bearer string is accepted.

Suggested remediation

Replace the header-presence check with real authorization. Depending on the intended trust model, the handler should require one of:

  • a valid Cosmos user/API token with an appropriate permission such as PERM_RESOURCES_READ or PERM_CONFIGURATION_READ, or
  • a dedicated Constellation device/API token that is cryptographically verified and used to scope the query to devices the caller is allowed to see.

Also add regression tests for:

  • missing Authorization header returns 401,
  • malformed/arbitrary bearer token returns 401,
  • invalid cosmos_ API token returns 401 through middleware,
  • valid but underprivileged token is rejected,
  • valid authorized token returns only permitted devices.

Credits

  • Thai Son Dinh from VinSOC Labs (R&D)
  • Nguyen Huy Vu Dung from VinSOC Labs (AppSec)
Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/azukaar/cosmos-server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.22.18"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.22.19"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "0.22.18"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-49447"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-28T20:32:34Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n`GET /cosmos/api/constellation/public-devices` discloses Constellation device metadata to a requester that supplies any non-empty `Authorization` header. The handler strips the string `Bearer ` from the header but never validates the resulting token and never uses it in the database query.\n\nThis was confirmed locally by routing a request through the real `tokenMiddleware` with `Authorization: Bearer not-a-real-token`. The request returned public Constellation device metadata from a disposable fixture. A missing-header negative control returned `401 Unauthorized`, proving the bypass is specifically the acceptance of arbitrary bearer values.\n\n### Details\nSource-to-sink path:\n\n- `src/httpServer.go:690` registers `/api/constellation/public-devices` on the authenticated admin API router.\n- `src/httpServer.go:815-817` applies `SecureAPI(..., public=false, ...)`, which runs `tokenMiddleware`.\n- `src/httpServer.go:231-237` only treats `Authorization: Bearer cosmos_...` as a Cosmos API token for validation. Other bearer strings are not validated by the middleware and fall through to the handler.\n- `src/constellation/api_devices_public.go:42-47` checks only that the `Authorization` header is present.\n- `src/constellation/api_devices_public.go:49-50` strips `Bearer ` but does not verify the token or compare it with a device/API key.\n- `src/constellation/api_devices_public.go:63-67` queries all non-blocked and non-invisible devices without including the stripped auth value in the filter.\n- `src/constellation/api_devices_public.go:84-99` returns device names, user nicknames, cleaned VPN/internal IPs, role flags, public hostname, and port.\n\nThe handler does not call `utils.CheckPermissions`, `utils.CheckPermissionsOrSelf`, the Cosmos API-token permission check, or any Constellation-token validation before returning the data.\n\nDefault/common exposure evidence:\n\n- The route is registered in the standard server setup (`src/httpServer.go:690`).\n- Constellation is a documented product feature described as the VPN used to securely access applications remotely (`readme.md:49`).\n- The default config ships Constellation disabled (`src/utils/utils.go:104-105`), so impact requires a deployment that enables the Constellation/VPN feature and has at least one non-blocked, non-invisible device.\n- The root package identifies the product as `cosmos-server` version `0.22.18` (`package.json:1-2`).\n- The Go module is `github.com/azukaar/cosmos-server` (`go.mod:0`).\n\nFalse-positive screen:\n\n- The PoC wraps the handler in the same `tokenMiddleware` used by `SecureAPI`, so it tests the deployed middleware behavior rather than directly calling the handler alone.\n- A request with no `Authorization` header returns `401 Unauthorized`.\n- A request with `Authorization: Bearer not-a-real-token` returns `200 OK` and device metadata.\n- The fixture data is stored in a disposable embedded database under `t.TempDir()` and no external services are contacted.\n- The route is not protected by handler-level `CheckPermissions`, and the arbitrary bearer value is not used by the database query.\n\nCandidate score: 13/18. Reachability 1, attacker control 2, privilege required 2, sink impact 1, mitigation weakness 2, default exposure 1, safe PoC feasibility 2, static certainty 2, false-positive resistance 2. The lower score reflects that Constellation is disabled in the shipped default config, but it is a documented/common product feature.\n\nExploitability gate: confirmed for deployments with Constellation enabled and populated with devices. The reachable source, arbitrary-token bypass, data-disclosure impact, safe local reproduction, and affected-version evidence are present. Default exposure is feature-dependent rather than enabled in a fresh default config.\n\n### PoC\nClean-checkout maintainer recipe:\n\n1. Check out commit `88de73dcca50172393a75de0e4dc3ab93622825c` or version `0.22.18`.\n2. Create `src/zz_security_poc_test.go` with the following test.\n3. Run `go test ./src -run TestAuditPublicDevicesAllowsArbitraryBearer -count=1 -v`.\n4. Delete `src/zz_security_poc_test.go` after confirming.\n\n```go\npackage main\n\nimport (\n\t\"encoding/json\"\n\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"net/http/httptest\"\n\t\"testing\"\n\n\t\"github.com/azukaar/cosmos-server/src/constellation\"\n\t\"github.com/azukaar/cosmos-server/src/utils\"\n)\n\nfunc TestAuditPublicDevicesAllowsArbitraryBearer(t *testing.T) {\n\toldConfig := utils.MainConfig\n\toldBaseConfig := utils.BaseMainConfig\n\toldPush := utils.PushShieldMetrics\n\toldConfigFolder := utils.CONFIGFOLDER\n\tdefer func() {\n\t\tutils.MainConfig = oldConfig\n\t\tutils.BaseMainConfig = oldBaseConfig\n\t\tutils.PushShieldMetrics = oldPush\n\t\tutils.CONFIGFOLDER = oldConfigFolder\n\t\tutils.CloseEmbeddedDB()\n\t}()\n\n\tutils.PushShieldMetrics = func(string) {}\n\tutils.MainConfig = utils.DefaultConfig\n\tutils.MainConfig.NewInstall = false\n\tutils.MainConfig.HTTPConfig.Hostname = \"example.test\"\n\tutils.BaseMainConfig = utils.MainConfig\n\ttmp := t.TempDir()\n\tutils.CONFIGFOLDER = tmp + \"/\"\n\tutils.CloseEmbeddedDB()\n\tc, closeDb, err := utils.GetEmbeddedCollection(utils.GetRootAppId(), \"devices\")\n\tdefer closeDb()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"embedded collection: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\t_, err = c.InsertOne(nil, utils.ConstellationDevice{\n\t\tNickname:       \"victim-user\",\n\t\tDeviceName:     \"private-node\",\n\t\tIP:             \"10.8.0.42/24\",\n\t\tIsLighthouse:   true,\n\t\tPublicHostname: \"vpn.example.test\",\n\t\tPort:           \"4242\",\n\t\tBlocked:        false,\n\t\tInvisible:      false,\n\t})\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"insert device fixture: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\thandler := tokenMiddleware(http.HandlerFunc(constellation.DevicePublicList))\n\tnoAuthReq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, \"/cosmos/api/constellation/public-devices\", nil)\n\tnoAuthRec := httptest.NewRecorder()\n\thandler.ServeHTTP(noAuthRec, noAuthReq)\n\tif noAuthRec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"missing Authorization status = %d body = %s\", noAuthRec.Code, noAuthRec.Body.String())\n\t}\n\n\treq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, \"/cosmos/api/constellation/public-devices\", nil)\n\treq.Header.Set(\"Authorization\", \"Bearer not-a-real-token\")\n\trec := httptest.NewRecorder()\n\thandler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)\n\tif rec.Code != http.StatusOK {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"DevicePublicList status = %d body = %s\", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())\n\t}\n\n\tvar body struct {\n\t\tStatus string `json:\"status\"`\n\t\tData []struct {\n\t\t\tName string `json:\"name\"`\n\t\t\tUser string `json:\"user\"`\n\t\t\tIP string `json:\"ip\"`\n\t\t\tPublicHostname string `json:\"publicHostname\"`\n\t\t} `json:\"data\"`\n\t}\n\tif err := json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), \u0026body); err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"response JSON: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tif body.Status != \"OK\" || len(body.Data) != 1 {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"unexpected response body: %s\", rec.Body.String())\n\t}\n\tif body.Data[0].Name != \"private-node\" || body.Data[0].User != \"victim-user\" || body.Data[0].IP != \"10.8.0.42\" || body.Data[0].PublicHostname != \"vpn.example.test\" {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"unexpected device disclosure: %+v\", body.Data[0])\n\t}\n}\n```\n\nObserved output in this environment:\n\n```text\n=== RUN   TestAuditPublicDevicesAllowsArbitraryBearer\n2026/05/24 15:18:09 NOTICE: [INFO] DevicePublicList: Fetching devices with API key\n--- PASS: TestAuditPublicDevicesAllowsArbitraryBearer (0.00s)\nPASS\nok  \tgithub.com/azukaar/cosmos-server/src\t0.057s\n```\n\nControl/negative case: the same test first sends the request without `Authorization` and expects `401 Unauthorized`. The subsequent `Authorization: Bearer not-a-real-token` request succeeds and returns the fixture, proving the bypass is not an intentionally unauthenticated endpoint but an unvalidated-header check.\n\n### Impact\nAn unauthenticated network attacker can enumerate Constellation device metadata from deployments that enable the Constellation/VPN feature and have visible devices. The response exposes device names, user nicknames, internal/VPN IP addresses, node roles such as lighthouse/relay/exit-node flags, public hostnames, and ports. This information can reveal private network topology and user/device inventory and can support targeted follow-on attacks against the VPN or exposed nodes.\n\nThe issue does not require a valid Cosmos session, valid Cosmos API token, valid Constellation token, or user interaction; any arbitrary non-empty bearer string is accepted.\n\n### Suggested remediation\nReplace the header-presence check with real authorization. Depending on the intended trust model, the handler should require one of:\n\n- a valid Cosmos user/API token with an appropriate permission such as `PERM_RESOURCES_READ` or `PERM_CONFIGURATION_READ`, or\n- a dedicated Constellation device/API token that is cryptographically verified and used to scope the query to devices the caller is allowed to see.\n\nAlso add regression tests for:\n\n- missing `Authorization` header returns 401,\n- malformed/arbitrary bearer token returns 401,\n- invalid `cosmos_` API token returns 401 through middleware,\n- valid but underprivileged token is rejected,\n- valid authorized token returns only permitted devices.\n\n### Credits\n- Thai Son Dinh from VinSOC Labs (R\u0026D)\n- Nguyen Huy Vu Dung from VinSOC Labs (AppSec)",
  "id": "GHSA-5fqm-cc34-fcf5",
  "modified": "2026-07-28T20:32:34Z",
  "published": "2026-07-28T20:32:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/azukaar/Cosmos-Server/security/advisories/GHSA-5fqm-cc34-fcf5"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/azukaar/Cosmos-Server/commit/59c561d686c8f9843b3e092b50f6346c481d8bbf"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/azukaar/Cosmos-Server"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/azukaar/Cosmos-Server/releases/tag/v0.22.19"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Cosmos-Server\u0027s constellation public-devices endpoint accepts arbitrary bearer tokens"
}

GHSA-5FRM-69J4-HGP7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 03:17 – Updated: 2022-05-14 03:17
VLAI
Details

** DISPUTED ** An issue was discovered in WildFly 10.1.2.Final. It is possible for an attacker to access the administration panel on TCP port 9990 without any authentication using "anonymous" access that is automatically created. Once logged in, a misconfiguration present by default (auto-deployment) permits an anonymous user to deploy a malicious .war file, leading to remote code execution. NOTE: the vendor indicates that anonymous access is not available in the default installation; however, it remains optional because there are several use cases for it, including development environments and network architectures that have a proxy server for access control to the WildFly server.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2018-10682"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2018-05-09T08:29:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "** DISPUTED ** An issue was discovered in WildFly 10.1.2.Final. It is possible for an attacker to access the administration panel on TCP port 9990 without any authentication using \"anonymous\" access that is automatically created. Once logged in, a misconfiguration present by default (auto-deployment) permits an anonymous user to deploy a malicious .war file, leading to remote code execution. NOTE: the vendor indicates that anonymous access is not available in the default installation; however, it remains optional because there are several use cases for it, including development environments and network architectures that have a proxy server for access control to the WildFly server.",
  "id": "GHSA-5frm-69j4-hgp7",
  "modified": "2022-05-14T03:17:41Z",
  "published": "2022-05-14T03:17:41Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-10682"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kmkz/exploit/blob/master/CVE-2018-10682-CVE-2018-10683.txt"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-5G3J-G6GX-XFCG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-03-29 00:01 – Updated: 2022-04-05 00:00
VLAI
Details

An authentication bypass vulnerability in the CGI program of Zyxel USG/ZyWALL series firmware versions 4.20 through 4.70, USG FLEX series firmware versions 4.50 through 5.20, ATP series firmware versions 4.32 through 5.20, VPN series firmware versions 4.30 through 5.20, and NSG series firmware versions V1.20 through V1.33 Patch 4, which could allow an attacker to bypass the web authentication and obtain administrative access of the device.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-0342"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-03-28T13:15:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "An authentication bypass vulnerability in the CGI program of Zyxel USG/ZyWALL series firmware versions 4.20 through 4.70, USG FLEX series firmware versions 4.50 through 5.20, ATP series firmware versions 4.32 through 5.20, VPN series firmware versions 4.30 through 5.20, and NSG series firmware versions V1.20 through V1.33 Patch 4, which could allow an attacker to bypass the web authentication and obtain administrative access of the device.",
  "id": "GHSA-5g3j-g6gx-xfcg",
  "modified": "2022-04-05T00:00:57Z",
  "published": "2022-03-29T00:01:14Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-0342"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.zyxel.com/support/Zyxel-security-advisory-for-authentication-bypass-vulnerability-of-firewalls.shtml"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-5G3M-GHQJ-8GWF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:28 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:28
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability was discovered in GitLab versions before 13.1.10, 13.2.8 and 13.3.4. When 2 factor authentication was enabled for groups, a malicious user could bypass that restriction by sending a specific query to the API endpoint.

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-13297"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2020-09-14T22:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability was discovered in GitLab versions before 13.1.10, 13.2.8 and 13.3.4. When 2 factor authentication was enabled for groups, a malicious user could bypass that restriction by sending a specific query to the API endpoint.",
  "id": "GHSA-5g3m-ghqj-8gwf",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T17:28:16Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T17:28:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-13297"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/691592"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/cves/-/blob/master/2020/CVE-2020-13297.json"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/issues/32215"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-5G4G-56FQ-MVWF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:50 – Updated: 2025-11-25 18:32
VLAI
Details

An earlier fix for an Inter-process Communication (IPC) vulnerability, CVE-2011-3079, added authentication to communication between IPC endpoints and server parents during IPC process creation. This authentication is insufficient for channels created after the IPC process is started, leading to the authentication not being correctly applied to later channels. This could allow for a sandbox escape through IPC channels due to lack of message validation in the listener process. This vulnerability affects Thunderbird < 60.5, Firefox ESR < 60.5, and Firefox < 65.

Severity
10.0 (Critical)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2018-18505"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2019-02-05T21:29:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "An earlier fix for an Inter-process Communication (IPC) vulnerability, CVE-2011-3079, added authentication to communication between IPC endpoints and server parents during IPC process creation. This authentication is insufficient for channels created after the IPC process is started, leading to the authentication not being correctly applied to later channels. This could allow for a sandbox escape through IPC channels due to lack of message validation in the listener process. This vulnerability affects Thunderbird \u003c 60.5, Firefox ESR \u003c 60.5, and Firefox \u003c 65.",
  "id": "GHSA-5g4g-56fq-mvwf",
  "modified": "2025-11-25T18:32:15Z",
  "published": "2022-05-13T01:50:42Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-18505"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2019-03"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2019-02"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2019-01"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.debian.org/security/2019/dsa-4392"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.debian.org/security/2019/dsa-4376"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://usn.ubuntu.com/3897-1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://usn.ubuntu.com/3874-1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201904-07"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201903-04"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2019/02/msg00024.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2019/01/msg00025.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1087565"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2019:0270"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2019:0269"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2019:0219"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2019:0218"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2019-07/msg00021.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/106781"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

Use an authentication framework or library such as the OWASP ESAPI Authentication feature.

CAPEC-114: Authentication Abuse

An attacker obtains unauthorized access to an application, service or device either through knowledge of the inherent weaknesses of an authentication mechanism, or by exploiting a flaw in the authentication scheme's implementation. In such an attack an authentication mechanism is functioning but a carefully controlled sequence of events causes the mechanism to grant access to the attacker.

CAPEC-115: Authentication Bypass

An attacker gains access to application, service, or device with the privileges of an authorized or privileged user by evading or circumventing an authentication mechanism. The attacker is therefore able to access protected data without authentication ever having taken place.

CAPEC-151: Identity Spoofing

Identity Spoofing refers to the action of assuming (i.e., taking on) the identity of some other entity (human or non-human) and then using that identity to accomplish a goal. An adversary may craft messages that appear to come from a different principle or use stolen / spoofed authentication credentials.

CAPEC-194: Fake the Source of Data

An adversary takes advantage of improper authentication to provide data or services under a falsified identity. The purpose of using the falsified identity may be to prevent traceability of the provided data or to assume the rights granted to another individual. One of the simplest forms of this attack would be the creation of an email message with a modified "From" field in order to appear that the message was sent from someone other than the actual sender. The root of the attack (in this case the email system) fails to properly authenticate the source and this results in the reader incorrectly performing the instructed action. Results of the attack vary depending on the details of the attack, but common results include privilege escalation, obfuscation of other attacks, and data corruption/manipulation.

CAPEC-22: Exploiting Trust in Client

An attack of this type exploits vulnerabilities in client/server communication channel authentication and data integrity. It leverages the implicit trust a server places in the client, or more importantly, that which the server believes is the client. An attacker executes this type of attack by communicating directly with the server where the server believes it is communicating only with a valid client. There are numerous variations of this type of attack.

CAPEC-57: Utilizing REST's Trust in the System Resource to Obtain Sensitive Data

This attack utilizes a REST(REpresentational State Transfer)-style applications' trust in the system resources and environment to obtain sensitive data once SSL is terminated.

CAPEC-593: Session Hijacking

This type of attack involves an adversary that exploits weaknesses in an application's use of sessions in performing authentication. The adversary is able to steal or manipulate an active session and use it to gain unathorized access to the application.

CAPEC-633: Token Impersonation

An adversary exploits a weakness in authentication to create an access token (or equivalent) that impersonates a different entity, and then associates a process/thread to that that impersonated token. This action causes a downstream user to make a decision or take action that is based on the assumed identity, and not the response that blocks the adversary.

CAPEC-650: Upload a Web Shell to a Web Server

By exploiting insufficient permissions, it is possible to upload a web shell to a web server in such a way that it can be executed remotely. This shell can have various capabilities, thereby acting as a "gateway" to the underlying web server. The shell might execute at the higher permission level of the web server, providing the ability the execute malicious code at elevated levels.

CAPEC-94: Adversary in the Middle (AiTM)

An adversary targets the communication between two components (typically client and server), in order to alter or obtain data from transactions. A general approach entails the adversary placing themself within the communication channel between the two components.

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