ubuntu-cve-2026-44359
Vulnerability from osv_ubuntu
Published
2026-07-20 00:16
Modified
2026-07-29 07:57
Summary
Details

Meshtastic is an open source mesh networking solution. Prior to version 2.7.21.1370b23, the Meshtastic GitHub repository's main_matrix.yml workflow is triggered by pull_request_target and multiple jobs check out the attacker's fork code and execute it with access to repository secrets and elevated GITHUB_TOKEN permissions. No approval gate exists. Pull requests from external users with author_association: "NONE" triggered the CI workflow automatically. The workflow directly executes attacker-controlled files from the fork checkout. This issue could have resulted in supply chain compromise, self-hosted runner compromise, and/or repository takeover for the repo. This issue is separate from GHSA-6mwm-v2vv-pp96, which addressed a command injection via github.head_ref in the setup job of the same workflow. That fix correctly moved to environment variables. However, the more critical fork checkout vulnerability across the check, build, and build-debian-src jobs was not addressed. Version 2.7.21.1370b23 contains a patch for thie issue.

Severity
10.0 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
N/A (UNKNOWN)
medium
References
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "python3-meshtastic",
            "binary_version": "2.7.7-1"
          }
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Ubuntu:26.04:LTS",
        "name": "meshtastic",
        "purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/meshtastic@2.7.7-1?arch=source\u0026distro=resolute"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "2.6.4-1",
        "2.7.3-1",
        "2.7.4-1",
        "2.7.5-1",
        "2.7.6-1",
        "2.7.7-1"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "details": "Meshtastic is an open source mesh networking solution. Prior to version 2.7.21.1370b23, the Meshtastic GitHub repository\u0027s main_matrix.yml workflow is triggered by pull_request_target  and multiple jobs check out the attacker\u0027s fork code and execute it with access to repository secrets and elevated GITHUB_TOKEN permissions. No approval gate exists. Pull requests from external users with author_association: \"NONE\" triggered the CI workflow automatically. The workflow directly executes attacker-controlled files from the fork checkout. This issue could have resulted in supply chain compromise, self-hosted runner compromise, and/or repository takeover for the repo. This issue is separate from GHSA-6mwm-v2vv-pp96, which addressed a command injection via github.head_ref in the setup job of the same workflow. That fix correctly moved to environment variables. However, the more critical fork checkout vulnerability across the check, build, and build-debian-src jobs was not addressed. Version 2.7.21.1370b23 contains a patch for thie issue.",
  "id": "UBUNTU-CVE-2026-44359",
  "modified": "2026-07-29T07:57:01Z",
  "published": "2026-07-20T00:16:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-44359"
    },
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-44359"
    }
  ],
  "related": [],
  "schema_version": "1.7.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "medium",
      "type": "Ubuntu"
    }
  ],
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-44359"
  ]
}



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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

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Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.