ubuntu-cve-2026-44310
Vulnerability from osv_ubuntu
Published
2026-05-15 17:16
Modified
2026-07-02 16:14
Summary
Details

Gitsign is a keyless Sigstore to signing tool for Git commits with your a GitHub / OIDC identity. From 0.4.0 to before 0.15.0, CertVerifier.Verify() in pkg/git/verifier.go unconditionally dereferences certs[0] after sd.GetCertificates() without checking the slice length. A CMS/PKCS7 signed message with an empty certificate set is a structurally valid DER payload; GetCertificates() returns an empty slice with no error, causing an immediate index-out-of-range panic. On the gitsign --verify code path (the GPG-compatible mode invoked by git verify-commit), the panic is silently recovered by internal/io/streams.go's Wrap() function, which returns nil instead of an error. main.go then exits with code 0, causing exit-code-only verification callers to interpret the failed verification as success. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.15.0.

Severity
5.4 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L
N/A (UNKNOWN)
medium
References
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "gitsign",
            "binary_version": "0.13.0-2"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "golang-github-sigstore-gitsign-dev",
            "binary_version": "0.13.0-2"
          }
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Ubuntu:25.10",
        "name": "gitsign",
        "purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/gitsign@0.13.0-2?arch=source\u0026distro=questing"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "0.12.0-4",
        "0.13.0-1",
        "0.13.0-2"
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "gitsign",
            "binary_version": "0.13.0-4ubuntu0.26.04.1~esm1"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "golang-github-sigstore-gitsign-dev",
            "binary_version": "0.13.0-4ubuntu0.26.04.1~esm1"
          }
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS",
        "name": "gitsign",
        "purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/gitsign@0.13.0-4ubuntu0.26.04.1~esm1?arch=source\u0026distro=esm-apps/resolute"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "0.13.0-2",
        "0.13.0-3",
        "0.13.0-4",
        "0.13.0-4ubuntu0.26.04.1~esm1"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "details": "Gitsign is a keyless Sigstore to signing tool for Git commits with your a GitHub / OIDC identity. From 0.4.0 to before 0.15.0, CertVerifier.Verify() in pkg/git/verifier.go unconditionally dereferences certs[0] after sd.GetCertificates() without checking the slice length. A CMS/PKCS7 signed message with an empty certificate set is a structurally valid DER payload; GetCertificates() returns an empty slice with no error, causing an immediate index-out-of-range panic. On the gitsign --verify code path (the GPG-compatible mode invoked by git verify-commit), the panic is silently recovered by internal/io/streams.go\u0027s Wrap() function, which returns nil instead of an error. main.go then exits with code 0, causing exit-code-only verification callers to interpret the failed verification as success. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.15.0.",
  "id": "UBUNTU-CVE-2026-44310",
  "modified": "2026-07-02T16:14:45Z",
  "published": "2026-05-15T17:16:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-44310"
    },
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-44310"
    },
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://github.com/sigstore/gitsign/security/advisories/GHSA-7c37-gx6w-8vc5"
    }
  ],
  "related": [],
  "schema_version": "1.7.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "medium",
      "type": "Ubuntu"
    }
  ],
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-44310"
  ]
}



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  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
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