PYSEC-2026-3592
Vulnerability from pysec - Published: 2026-08-04 11:34 - Updated: 2026-08-04 13:36Summary
An authenticated low-privilege user can execute arbitrary code-interpreter Python and tools inside another user's authenticated session. The Socket.IO event-caller (get_event_call) delivers execute:python / execute:tool events to a client-supplied session_id after only checking that the session is connected, never that it belongs to the requester. Combined with ydoc:document:join, which exposes the live socket ids of everyone in a shared note's collaboration room to any read-access participant, an attacker can target a victim's session and run attacker-chosen code/tools in the victim's browser context. When the victim is an administrator, that hijacked context reaches the admin-only Functions API, whose source is executed server-side, yielding remote code execution as the server process (root in the default container).
Affected component
backend/open_webui/socket/main.py—get_event_call()/__event_caller__backend/open_webui/main.py— chat-completion metadata (session_idtaken from the request body)
Root cause
The event-caller routes to a caller-controlled session id with no ownership check:
# backend/open_webui/socket/main.py — get_event_call()
async def __event_caller__(event_data):
session_id = request_info['session_id']
if session_id not in SESSION_POOL: # only checks the session is connected
return {'error': 'Client session disconnected.'}
return await sio.call('events', {...}, to=session_id, ...) # delivered to that sid
session_id originates from the request body and is never validated against the authenticated user:
# backend/open_webui/main.py
metadata = {
'user_id': user.id, # server-derived (trustworthy)
'session_id': form_data.pop('session_id', None), # client-controlled
...
}
SESSION_POOL[session_id] is the user record of whoever owns that socket. Because the caller checks only membership (in SESSION_POOL), a request carrying another user's session_id causes execute:python / execute:tool to be delivered to that other user's browser.
Reachability
execute:python/execute:toolare emitted from the code-interpreter and tool-call paths (utils/middleware.py,tools/builtin.py), all routed throughget_event_call.- The victim's live
session_idis disclosed to any read-access participant of a shared note viaydoc:document:join. POST /api/v1/chat/completionsrequires onlyget_verified_user(the default user role). The attacker uses their own account and a model / Direct Connection they control to choose the payload.
Impact
- Any victim: arbitrary code-interpreter Python and tool execution in the victim's authenticated session — the attacker acts with the victim's identity and origin (full session/account compromise).
- Admin victim: the hijacked admin context reaches
POST /api/v1/functions/create, whose source isexec()'d server-side → remote code execution as the server process (root in the default container).
The Functions API is intended administrator code-execution; the vulnerability here is the cross-user delivery that lets an attacker drive another user's session — including an admin's — into it. The primitive is a full session compromise even against non-admin victims.
Proof of Concept
The reporter's exploit.py reproduced on ghcr.io/open-webui/open-webui:0.9.6 and a build of the v0.9.6 tag, confirming blind server-side RCE out-of-band (callback returns uid=0(root)), using only a low-privilege user account that shared a note with an admin victim. Preconditions: code interpreter enabled; attacker shares a note with the victim; victim opens it while online; admin victim required for server RCE.
Fix
get_event_call must verify the target session belongs to the requesting user before delivering, not merely that it is connected:
session = SESSION_POOL.get(session_id)
if session is None or session.get('id') != request_info.get('user_id'):
return {'error': 'Client session disconnected.'}
user_id in the request metadata is server-derived from the authenticated user, so it is trustworthy. Restricting ydoc:document:join so it does not disclose other participants' socket ids is recommended as defence-in-depth.
Affected / Patched
- Affected:
< 0.10.0(last affected release 0.9.6) - Patched: v0.10.0.
get_event_callnow verifies the target session belongs to the requesting user before delivering (session is None or session.get('id') != request_info.get('user_id')), using the server-deriveduser_idfrom the request metadata. The recommendedydoc:document:joinsid-disclosure restriction is defence-in-depth and independent of this fix; the ownership check closes the cross-user delivery regardless of whether the victim's sid is known.
| Name | purl | open-webui | pkg:pypi/open-webui |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "open-webui",
"purl": "pkg:pypi/open-webui"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.10.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"0.1.124",
"0.1.125",
"0.2.0",
"0.2.1",
"0.2.2",
"0.2.3",
"0.2.4",
"0.2.5",
"0.3.0",
"0.3.1",
"0.3.10",
"0.3.12",
"0.3.13",
"0.3.14",
"0.3.15",
"0.3.16",
"0.3.17",
"0.3.17.dev2",
"0.3.17.dev3",
"0.3.17.dev4",
"0.3.17.dev5",
"0.3.18",
"0.3.19",
"0.3.2",
"0.3.20",
"0.3.21",
"0.3.22",
"0.3.23",
"0.3.24",
"0.3.25",
"0.3.26",
"0.3.27",
"0.3.27.dev1",
"0.3.27.dev2",
"0.3.27.dev3",
"0.3.28",
"0.3.29",
"0.3.3",
"0.3.30",
"0.3.30.dev1",
"0.3.30.dev2",
"0.3.31",
"0.3.31.dev1",
"0.3.32",
"0.3.33",
"0.3.33.dev1",
"0.3.34",
"0.3.35",
"0.3.4",
"0.3.5",
"0.3.6",
"0.3.7",
"0.3.8",
"0.3.9",
"0.4.0",
"0.4.0.dev1",
"0.4.0.dev2",
"0.4.1",
"0.4.2",
"0.4.3",
"0.4.4",
"0.4.5",
"0.4.6",
"0.4.6.dev1",
"0.4.7",
"0.4.8",
"0.5.0",
"0.5.0.dev1",
"0.5.0.dev2",
"0.5.1",
"0.5.10",
"0.5.11",
"0.5.12",
"0.5.13",
"0.5.14",
"0.5.15",
"0.5.16",
"0.5.17",
"0.5.18",
"0.5.19",
"0.5.2",
"0.5.20",
"0.5.3",
"0.5.3.dev1",
"0.5.4",
"0.5.5",
"0.5.6",
"0.5.7",
"0.5.8",
"0.5.9",
"0.6.0",
"0.6.1",
"0.6.10",
"0.6.11",
"0.6.12",
"0.6.13",
"0.6.14",
"0.6.15",
"0.6.16",
"0.6.18",
"0.6.19",
"0.6.2",
"0.6.20",
"0.6.21",
"0.6.22",
"0.6.23",
"0.6.24",
"0.6.25",
"0.6.26",
"0.6.26.dev1",
"0.6.27",
"0.6.28",
"0.6.29",
"0.6.3",
"0.6.30",
"0.6.31",
"0.6.32",
"0.6.33",
"0.6.34",
"0.6.35",
"0.6.36",
"0.6.37",
"0.6.38",
"0.6.39",
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"0.7.0",
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"0.7.2",
"0.8.0",
"0.8.1",
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"0.8.11",
"0.8.12",
"0.8.2",
"0.8.3",
"0.8.4",
"0.8.5",
"0.8.6",
"0.8.7",
"0.8.8",
"0.8.9",
"0.9.0",
"0.9.1",
"0.9.2",
"0.9.3",
"0.9.4",
"0.9.5",
"0.9.6"
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-59216",
"GHSA-74h3-cxq7-vc5q"
],
"details": "## Summary\n\nAn authenticated low-privilege user can execute arbitrary code-interpreter Python and tools inside **another** user\u0027s authenticated session. The Socket.IO event-caller (`get_event_call`) delivers `execute:python` / `execute:tool` events to a **client-supplied** `session_id` after only checking that the session is connected, never that it belongs to the requester. Combined with `ydoc:document:join`, which exposes the live socket ids of everyone in a shared note\u0027s collaboration room to any read-access participant, an attacker can target a victim\u0027s session and run attacker-chosen code/tools in the victim\u0027s browser context. When the victim is an administrator, that hijacked context reaches the admin-only Functions API, whose source is executed server-side, yielding remote code execution as the server process (root in the default container).\n\n## Affected component\n\n- `backend/open_webui/socket/main.py` \u2014 `get_event_call()` / `__event_caller__`\n- `backend/open_webui/main.py` \u2014 chat-completion metadata (`session_id` taken from the request body)\n\n## Root cause\n\nThe event-caller routes to a caller-controlled session id with no ownership check:\n\n```python\n# backend/open_webui/socket/main.py \u2014 get_event_call()\nasync def __event_caller__(event_data):\n session_id = request_info[\u0027session_id\u0027]\n if session_id not in SESSION_POOL: # only checks the session is connected\n return {\u0027error\u0027: \u0027Client session disconnected.\u0027}\n return await sio.call(\u0027events\u0027, {...}, to=session_id, ...) # delivered to that sid\n```\n\n`session_id` originates from the request body and is never validated against the authenticated user:\n\n```python\n# backend/open_webui/main.py\nmetadata = {\n \u0027user_id\u0027: user.id, # server-derived (trustworthy)\n \u0027session_id\u0027: form_data.pop(\u0027session_id\u0027, None), # client-controlled\n ...\n}\n```\n\n`SESSION_POOL[session_id]` is the user record of whoever owns that socket. Because the caller checks only membership (`in SESSION_POOL`), a request carrying another user\u0027s `session_id` causes `execute:python` / `execute:tool` to be delivered to that other user\u0027s browser.\n\n## Reachability\n\n- `execute:python` / `execute:tool` are emitted from the code-interpreter and tool-call paths (`utils/middleware.py`, `tools/builtin.py`), all routed through `get_event_call`.\n- The victim\u0027s live `session_id` is disclosed to any read-access participant of a shared note via `ydoc:document:join`.\n- `POST /api/v1/chat/completions` requires only `get_verified_user` (the default user role). The attacker uses their own account and a model / Direct Connection they control to choose the payload.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Any victim:** arbitrary code-interpreter Python and tool execution in the victim\u0027s authenticated session \u2014 the attacker acts with the victim\u0027s identity and origin (full session/account compromise).\n- **Admin victim:** the hijacked admin context reaches `POST /api/v1/functions/create`, whose source is `exec()`\u0027d server-side \u2192 remote code execution as the server process (root in the default container).\n\nThe Functions API is intended administrator code-execution; the vulnerability here is the cross-user delivery that lets an attacker drive another user\u0027s session \u2014 including an admin\u0027s \u2014 into it. The primitive is a full session compromise even against non-admin victims.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nThe reporter\u0027s `exploit.py` reproduced on `ghcr.io/open-webui/open-webui:0.9.6` and a build of the `v0.9.6` tag, confirming blind server-side RCE out-of-band (callback returns `uid=0(root)`), using only a low-privilege `user` account that shared a note with an admin victim. Preconditions: code interpreter enabled; attacker shares a note with the victim; victim opens it while online; admin victim required for server RCE.\n\n## Fix\n\n`get_event_call` must verify the target session belongs to the requesting user before delivering, not merely that it is connected:\n\n```python\nsession = SESSION_POOL.get(session_id)\nif session is None or session.get(\u0027id\u0027) != request_info.get(\u0027user_id\u0027):\n return {\u0027error\u0027: \u0027Client session disconnected.\u0027}\n```\n\n`user_id` in the request metadata is server-derived from the authenticated user, so it is trustworthy. Restricting `ydoc:document:join` so it does not disclose other participants\u0027 socket ids is recommended as defence-in-depth.\n\n## Affected / Patched\n\n- Affected: `\u003c 0.10.0` (last affected release 0.9.6)\n- Patched: v0.10.0. `get_event_call` now verifies the target session belongs to the requesting user before delivering (`session is None or session.get(\u0027id\u0027) != request_info.get(\u0027user_id\u0027)`), using the server-derived `user_id` from the request metadata. The recommended `ydoc:document:join` sid-disclosure restriction is defence-in-depth and independent of this fix; the ownership check closes the cross-user delivery regardless of whether the victim\u0027s sid is known.",
"id": "PYSEC-2026-3592",
"modified": "2026-08-04T13:36:25.703440Z",
"published": "2026-08-04T11:34:42.837663Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-74h3-cxq7-vc5q"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59216"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/pull/25763"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/commit/386ac958144dbbbf0aa6e268070d72b681a318aa"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/releases/tag/v0.10.0"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://pypi.org/project/open-webui"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-74h3-cxq7-vc5q"
}
],
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Open WebUI: Cross-user code-interpreter and tool execution via unvalidated Socket.IO event-caller session_id"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.