{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "lxml-html-clean",
        "purl": "pkg:pypi/lxml-html-clean"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.4.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "0.1.0",
        "0.1.1",
        "0.2.0",
        "0.2.1",
        "0.2.2",
        "0.3.0",
        "0.3.1",
        "0.4.0",
        "0.4.1",
        "0.4.2",
        "0.4.3",
        "0.4.4"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-49825",
    "GHSA-4jhm-jv67-739f"
  ],
  "details": "# `lxml_html_clean.Cleaner` does not strip `javascript:` URLs from namespaced URL attributes (`xlink:href`)\n\n**Reporter:** Guillem Lefait \u003cguillem@datamq.com\u003e \u00b7 **Date:** 2026-05-10\n**Affected:** `lxml` \u2264 6.1.0 and `lxml_html_clean` \u2264 0.4.4 (latest stable)\n**Confirmed against:** lxml 6.1.0 + lxml_html_clean 0.4.4 on Python 3.13.5, 3.14.4, and 3.15.0a8 (libxml2 2.14.6 / 2.9.14 \u2014 bug is in pure-Python sanitizer logic, independent of the libxml2 backend)\n**Root-cause class:** same as CVE-2021-28957 (`formaction` missing from `link_attrs`)\n\n## Summary\n\n`Cleaner` filters URL schemes (`javascript:`, `vbscript:`, \u2026) by walking links via `rewrite_links()`, which delegates to `iterlinks()`, which only yields attributes named in `lxml.html.defs.link_attrs`. That allow-list contains no prefixed names (`xlink:href`) and no `srcset`. As a result, when `Cleaner` is configured with `safe_attrs_only=False` \u2014 a documented option for callers that want lenient attribute handling but still expect URL-scheme scrubbing \u2014 `\u003ca xlink:href=\"javascript:\u2026\"\u003e` survives sanitization untouched, and any browser that follows the SVG-anchor specification will execute the JavaScript when the rendered link is clicked.\n\n**CWE:** CWE-79 (XSS), with CWE-184 (Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs) as the underlying defect class.\n\n## Affected components\n\n| Package            | Versions tested        | File / line                      |\n|--------------------|------------------------|----------------------------------|\n| `lxml`             | 4.9.x, 5.2.1, 6.1.0    | `src/lxml/html/defs.py:20`       |\n| `lxml`             | \"                      | `src/lxml/html/__init__.py:485-528` |\n| `lxml_html_clean`  | 0.4.0 \u2013 0.4.4          | `lxml_html_clean/clean.py:348,576` |\n\nThe legacy `lxml.html.clean` module \u2014 bundled in `lxml \u003c 5.2.0` and still installable on newer versions via the `lxml[html_clean]` extra \u2014 shares the same bug.\n\n## Root cause\n\n`defs.link_attrs` is a flat string set; the literal `xlink:href` is absent:\n\n```python\n# lxml/html/defs.py\nlink_attrs = frozenset([\n    \u0027action\u0027, \u0027archive\u0027, \u0027background\u0027, \u0027cite\u0027, \u0027classid\u0027,\n    \u0027codebase\u0027, \u0027data\u0027, \u0027href\u0027, \u0027longdesc\u0027, \u0027profile\u0027, \u0027src\u0027,\n    \u0027usemap\u0027, \u0027dynsrc\u0027, \u0027lowsrc\u0027, \u0027formaction\u0027,\n])\n```\n\n`HtmlMixin.iterlinks()` (`lxml/html/__init__.py:526-528`) only yields attributes whose key is in that set:\n\n```python\nfor attrib in link_attrs:\n    if attrib in attribs:\n        yield (el, attrib, attribs[attrib], 0)\n```\n\n`Cleaner.__call__` registers the URL-scheme filter via `rewrite_links` (`lxml_html_clean/clean.py:348`), which is a thin wrapper around `iterlinks()`. Because `xlink:href` is never yielded, `_remove_javascript_link` (`clean.py:576`) is never invoked for it.\n\n## Minimal reproducer\n\n```python\nfrom lxml import html\nfrom lxml_html_clean import Cleaner\n\nfor payload in (\n    \u0027\u003csvg\u003e\u003ca xlink:href=\"javascript:alert(1)\"\u003ex\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/svg\u003e\u0027,\n    \u0027\u003cmath\u003e\u003ca xlink:href=\"javascript:alert(2)\"\u003ey\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/math\u003e\u0027,\n):\n    tree = html.fromstring(payload)\n    Cleaner(safe_attrs_only=False)(tree)\n    print(html.tostring(tree).decode())\n    print(\u0027  iterlinks:\u0027, list(html.fromstring(payload).iterlinks()))\n# \u003csvg\u003e\u003ca xlink:href=\"javascript:alert(1)\"\u003ex\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/svg\u003e     \u2190 unchanged\n#   iterlinks: []                                          \u2190 link rewriter blind\n# \u003cmath\u003e\u003ca xlink:href=\"javascript:alert(2)\"\u003ey\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/math\u003e   \u2190 unchanged\n#   iterlinks: []                                          \u2190 link rewriter blind\n```\n\nBoth SVG and MathML scopes are vulnerable \u2014 same allow-list gap, both render anchors that browsers treat as navigable. Other lab-confirmed surviving variants (same scope, different scheme encoding): mixed-case (`JaVaScRiPt:`), HTML-entity (`java\u0026#x73;cript:`), embedded tab (`java\\tscript:`).\n\n## Impact\n\nA caller that uses `Cleaner` to neutralise untrusted HTML and chooses `safe_attrs_only=False` \u2014 typically because the application wants to allow custom data-/aria-/vendor attributes \u2014 will silently pass `javascript:` payloads carried on `xlink:href` through to victim renders. Stored XSS in any application that round-trips user-supplied HTML through this configuration. Reach is conditional on the `safe_attrs_only=False` toggle, but that is a documented public option; consumers reasonably expect URL-scheme scrubbing to be independent of attribute allow-listing.\n\n## Suggested fix\n\n**Extend `link_attrs`** to include `xlink:href`. In HTML mode, `lxml.html` keeps prefixed attribute names verbatim \u2014 the parsed key is the literal string `xlink:href`, not a Clark-notation form \u2014 so the existing allow-list lookup is a plain string match. Same shape as the CVE-2021-28957 fix:\n\n```diff\n # lxml/html/defs.py\n link_attrs = frozenset([\n     \u0027action\u0027, \u0027archive\u0027, \u0027background\u0027, \u0027cite\u0027, \u0027classid\u0027,\n     \u0027codebase\u0027, \u0027data\u0027, \u0027href\u0027, \u0027longdesc\u0027, \u0027profile\u0027, \u0027src\u0027,\n     \u0027usemap\u0027, \u0027dynsrc\u0027, \u0027lowsrc\u0027, \u0027formaction\u0027,\n+    \u0027xlink:href\u0027,\n ])\n```\n\nThis single change closes the reported XSS for both SVG `\u003ca xlink:href\u003e` and MathML `\u003ca xlink:href\u003e`. `lxml_html_clean` is the canonical home of the `Cleaner` code (881 lines); `lxml.html.clean` is a 21-line backward-compat shim (`from lxml_html_clean import *`) that picks up the fix automatically once `link_attrs` is updated upstream. Since the upstream change requires lxml maintainer action, see the alternative below if a self-contained patch in `lxml_html_clean` is preferred.\n\n**Alternative (in-package fix, no lxml coordination needed):** add a namespaced-URL-attribute walk inside `Cleaner.__call__` so the URL-scheme filter doesn\u0027t depend on `link_attrs`. Sketch:\n\n```python\n# lxml_html_clean/clean.py \u2014 supplements rewrite_links() in __call__\n_NS_URL_ATTRS = (\u0027xlink:href\u0027,)  # extend as needed\n_BAD_SCHEME = re.compile(r\u0027^\\s*(javascript|vbscript|data):\u0027, re.I)\n\nfor el in doc.iter():\n    for attr in _NS_URL_ATTRS:\n        if attr in el.attrib and _BAD_SCHEME.match(el.attrib[attr]):\n            del el.attrib[attr]\n```\n\nThis decouples the cleaner from the upstream `link_attrs` set and matches the security-ownership boundary established when the cleaner was extracted in lxml 5.2.0.\n\n**Defense in depth (optional, regardless of which fix path is taken):**\n- Also handle `srcset`: the value is a `url 1x, url 2x, \u2026` descriptor list, so split on commas and validate each candidate URL. Not directly executable in current browsers, but closes the same gap.\n- Also accept Clark-notation forms (`{http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink}href`) so XML-mode callers using `lxml.etree` get the same protection. HTML mode never produces this form, so not needed for the reported bug.\n\n## Severity\n\nCVSS 3.1 base score: **8.2 / High** \u2014 `AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N` (stored XSS; victim must click the SVG anchor; scope-changed because script executes in the rendering origin). PR:N reflects the common case where untrusted HTML enters the sanitizer from anonymous sources (comments, support tickets); deployments that gate writes behind authentication can score with PR:L (\u2192 7.6).\n\nSeverity is **CONDITIONAL** on the caller passing `safe_attrs_only=False`. With the class default (`True`), attribute allow-listing strips `xlink:href` before scheme scrubbing runs, and the bug does not fire \u2014 verified at HEAD: default-config `Cleaner()(\u003csvg\u003e\u003ca xlink:href=\"javascript:\u2026\"\u003ex\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/svg\u003e)` \u2192 `\u003csvg\u003e\u003ca\u003ex\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/svg\u003e`.\n\n## Prior art / novelty\n\n- **CVE-2021-28957 (lxml 4.6.3)** \u2014 same root cause, different attribute (`formaction`). Fix was a one-line extension of `link_attrs`. Direct precedent.\n- **CVE-2022-34473** (Mozilla Sanitizer API) \u2014 `xlink:href` URL bypass primitive in a different sanitizer.\n- **Bleach (Mozilla, Python)** explicitly handles the `xlink` namespace; `enshrined/svg-sanitize` (PHP) ships `cleanXlinkHrefs()`; DOMPurify scrubs `xlink:href` via `ALLOWED_URI_REGEXP`.\n- **`nh3`** (the alternative recommended in `lxml_html_clean`\u0027s own README for security-sensitive use) is **not vulnerable** to this primitive \u2014 verified 2026-05-10 on `nh3==0.3.5`: with `\u003csvg\u003e`/`\u003cmath\u003e`/`\u003ca\u003e` and `xlink:href` explicitly added to `tags`/`attributes`, both SVG and MathML payloads, all four scheme-encoding variants, are stripped (output e.g. `\u003csvg\u003e\u003ca rel=\"noopener noreferrer\"\u003ex\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/svg\u003e`).\n\n\n## Coordination\n\nFiling as a private GHSA at `fedora-python/lxml_html_clean` \u2014 `lxml_html_clean` is the canonical maintainer of the `Cleaner` code (881 lines) and the security-responsible team since the lxml 5.2.0 split, where the cleaner was extracted out of lxml precisely so cleaner-security reports could land on the right team. The lxml side cannot be filed via GHSA (`https://github.com/lxml/lxml/security/advisories/new` returns 404 \u2014 private reporting is not enabled), so a parallel report has been emailed directly to the lxml maintainer for the upstream `defs.link_attrs` patch path. You\u0027re welcome to coordinate with them directly if you\u0027d prefer the upstream fix over the in-package alternative above.\n\nHappy to provide a draft patch or PR on either path. No bounty expected.",
  "id": "PYSEC-2026-2614",
  "modified": "2026-07-13T16:04:44.674997Z",
  "published": "2026-07-13T15:46:29.614932Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/fedora-python/lxml_html_clean/security/advisories/GHSA-4jhm-jv67-739f"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/fedora-python/lxml_html_clean"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://pypi.org/project/lxml-html-clean"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4jhm-jv67-739f"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-49825"
    }
  ],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "`lxml_html_clean.Cleaner` does not strip `javascript:` URLs from namespaced URL attributes"
}