OESA-2026-4078 (CVE-2026-59949)
Vulnerability from osv_openeuler – Published: 2026-09-25 01:28 – Updated: 2026-09-25 01:28 – Source websiteLZ4 compression for Java, based on Yann Collet's work. This library provides access to two compression methods that both generate a valid LZ4 stream: * fast scan (LZ4): ° low memory footprint (~ 16 KB), ° very fast (fast scan with skipping heuristics in case the input looks incompressible), ° reasonable compression ratio (depending on the redundancy of the input). * high compression (LZ4 HC): ° medium memory footprint (~ 256 KB), ° rather slow (~ 10 times slower than LZ4), ° good compression ratio (depending on the size and the redundancy of the input). The streams produced by those 2 compression algorithms use the same compression format, are very fast to decompress and can be decompressed by the same decompressor instance.
Security Fix(es):
yawkat LZ4 Java provides LZ4 compression for Java. Prior to 1.11.1, JNI-backed XXHash implementations fail to validate the byte array object and the off and len arguments in XXHashFactory.nativeInstance().hash32().hash(), XXHashFactory.nativeInstance().hash64().hash(), XXHashFactory.nativeInstance().newStreamingHash32().update(), and XXHashFactory.nativeInstance().newStreamingHash64().update(), allowing null arrays or oversized ranges to reach native code, read outside the Java array, and fatally terminate the JVM. This issue is fixed in version 1.11.1.(CVE-2026-59949)
| URL | Type | |
|---|---|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"aarch64": [
"lz4-java-1.8.0-3.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm"
],
"noarch": [
"lz4-java-javadoc-1.8.0-3.oe2403sp3.noarch.rpm"
],
"src": [
"lz4-java-1.8.0-3.oe2403sp3.src.rpm"
],
"x86_64": [
"lz4-java-1.8.0-3.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm"
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP3",
"name": "lz4-java",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/lz4-java\u0026distro=openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.8.0-3.oe2403sp3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"severity": "Medium"
},
"details": "LZ4 compression for Java, based on Yann Collet\u0026amp;apos;s work. This library provides access to two compression methods that both generate a valid LZ4 stream: * fast scan (LZ4): \u00b0 low memory footprint (~ 16 KB), \u00b0 very fast (fast scan with skipping heuristics in case the input looks incompressible), \u00b0 reasonable compression ratio (depending on the redundancy of the input). * high compression (LZ4 HC): \u00b0 medium memory footprint (~ 256 KB), \u00b0 rather slow (~ 10 times slower than LZ4), \u00b0 good compression ratio (depending on the size and the redundancy of the input). The streams produced by those 2 compression algorithms use the same compression format, are very fast to decompress and can be decompressed by the same decompressor instance.\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\n\nyawkat LZ4 Java provides LZ4 compression for Java. Prior to 1.11.1, JNI-backed XXHash implementations fail to validate the byte array object and the off and len arguments in XXHashFactory.nativeInstance().hash32().hash(), XXHashFactory.nativeInstance().hash64().hash(), XXHashFactory.nativeInstance().newStreamingHash32().update(), and XXHashFactory.nativeInstance().newStreamingHash64().update(), allowing null arrays or oversized ranges to reach native code, read outside the Java array, and fatally terminate the JVM. This issue is fixed in version 1.11.1.(CVE-2026-59949)",
"id": "OESA-2026-4078",
"modified": "2026-09-25T01:28:09Z",
"published": "2026-09-25T01:28:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-4078"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59949"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.2",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "lz4-java security update",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-59949"
]
}
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| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
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