oesa-2026-3538
Vulnerability from osv_openeuler
Fluentd is an open source data collector designed to scale and simplify log management. It can collect, process and ship many kinds of data in near real-time.
Security Fix(es):
Fluentd allows dynamically constructing file paths using the ${tag} placeholder.
It was discovered that validation for this placeholder was insufficient.
If a Fluentd instance is configured to receive logs from untrusted sources and uses the ${tag} placeholder in file configurations (such as the path parameter in the out_file plugin), an attacker can inject path traversal characters (e.g., ../).
When combined with certain formatting options, this vulnerability allows an attacker to write arbitrary files or overwrite existing files on the system with attacker-controlled content, bypassing intended directory restrictions.
Impact
This vulnerability allows for Arbitrary File Write, which can be directly escalated to full Remote Code Execution (RCE). An attacker could achieve RCE by overwriting critical system files, injecting executable plugins, or modifying configuration files. The impact is Critical as it can lead to full system compromise without any authentication, depending on the Fluentd configuration and the privileges of the Fluentd process.
Patches
v1.19.3
Workarounds
If an immediate upgrade is not possible, users are strongly advised to apply the following mitigations:
- Restrict Network Access
- Ensure that Fluentd input ports (such as
in_forwardon default port24224) are deployed within a closed, trusted network. Use firewall rules (e.g., iptables, AWS Security Groups) to block access from untrusted networks or instances. - Run Fluentd as a non-root user
- Dropping privileges prevents Fluentd from writing to sensitive system directories (e.g.,
/etc/), significantly mitigating the risk of system-wide RCE. - Revise configurations
- Do not use the
${tag}placeholder in thepathparameter of output plugins (likeout_file) if the tag originates from an untrusted source. - Filter incoming tags
- Strictly validate and filter incoming tags at the input layer (e.g., using
fluent-plugin-rewrite-tag-filter) to drop any tags containing.or/characters.(CVE-2026-44024)
Fluentd's Monitor Agent plugin (in_monitor_agent) exposes internal metrics and plugin information via a REST API. It was discovered that the API response (/api/plugins.json and related endpoints) unintentionally includes internal instance variables of loaded plugins. If any plugins store sensitive information—such as database passwords, API keys, or cloud credentials—in its instance variables, this information may be exposed in plain text to any user or system that has HTTP access to the Monitor Agent API.(CVE-2026-44025)
| URL | Type | |
|---|---|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"noarch": [
"rubygem-fluentd-1.16.2-2.oe2403sp3.noarch.rpm",
"rubygem-fluentd-help-1.16.2-2.oe2403sp3.noarch.rpm"
],
"src": [
"rubygem-fluentd-1.16.2-2.oe2403sp3.src.rpm"
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP3",
"name": "rubygem-fluentd",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/rubygem-fluentd\u0026distro=openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.16.2-2.oe2403sp3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"severity": "Critical"
},
"details": "Fluentd is an open source data collector designed to scale and simplify log management. It can collect, process and ship many kinds of data in near real-time.\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\n\nFluentd allows dynamically constructing file paths using the `${tag}` placeholder.\nIt was discovered that validation for this placeholder was insufficient.\n\nIf a Fluentd instance is configured to receive logs from untrusted sources and uses the `${tag}` placeholder in file configurations (such as the `path` parameter in the `out_file` plugin), an attacker can inject path traversal characters (e.g., `../`).\n\nWhen combined with certain formatting options, this vulnerability allows an attacker to write arbitrary files or overwrite existing files on the system with attacker-controlled content, bypassing intended directory restrictions.\n\n### Impact\nThis vulnerability allows for **Arbitrary File Write**, which can be directly escalated to full **Remote Code Execution (RCE)**.\nAn attacker could achieve RCE by overwriting critical system files, injecting executable plugins, or modifying configuration files.\nThe impact is Critical as it can lead to full system compromise without any authentication, depending on the Fluentd configuration and the privileges of the Fluentd process.\n\n### Patches\nv1.19.3\n\n### Workarounds\nIf an immediate upgrade is not possible, users are strongly advised to apply the following mitigations:\n\n1. Restrict Network Access\n * Ensure that Fluentd input ports (such as `in_forward` on default port `24224`) are deployed within a closed, trusted network. Use firewall rules (e.g., iptables, AWS Security Groups) to block access from untrusted networks or instances.\n2. Run Fluentd as a non-root user\n * Dropping privileges prevents Fluentd from writing to sensitive system directories (e.g., `/etc/`), significantly mitigating the risk of system-wide RCE.\n3. Revise configurations\n * Do not use the `${tag}` placeholder in the `path` parameter of output plugins (like `out_file`) if the tag originates from an untrusted source.\n4. Filter incoming tags\n * Strictly validate and filter incoming tags at the input layer (e.g., using `fluent-plugin-rewrite-tag-filter`) to drop any tags containing `.` or `/` characters.(CVE-2026-44024)\n\nFluentd\u0026apos;s Monitor Agent plugin (`in_monitor_agent`) exposes internal metrics and plugin information via a REST API. It was discovered that the API response (`/api/plugins.json` and related endpoints) unintentionally includes internal instance variables of loaded plugins. If any plugins store sensitive information\u2014such as database passwords, API keys, or cloud credentials\u2014in its instance variables, this information may be exposed in plain text to any user or system that has HTTP access to the Monitor Agent API.(CVE-2026-44025)",
"id": "OESA-2026-3538",
"modified": "2026-08-30T04:15:29Z",
"published": "2026-08-30T04:15:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-3538"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44024"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44025"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.2",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "rubygem-fluentd security update",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-44024",
"CVE-2026-44025"
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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