GCVE Workshop - 22 September 2026 (14:00-18:00), Luxembourg Before The Vulnopticon Conference - Registration

OESA-2024-1298 (CVE-2021-46987)

Vulnerability from osv_openeuler – Published: 2024-03-22 11:06 – Updated: 2026-08-06 11:06 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
kernel security update
Details

The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.

Security Fix(es):

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

btrfs: fix deadlock when cloning inline extents and using qgroups

There are a few exceptional cases where cloning an inline extent needs to copy the inline extent data into a page of the destination inode.

When this happens, we end up starting a transaction while having a dirty page for the destination inode and while having the range locked in the destination's inode iotree too. Because when reserving metadata space for a transaction we may need to flush existing delalloc in case there is not enough free space, we have a mechanism in place to prevent a deadlock, which was introduced in commit 3d45f221ce627d ("btrfs: fix deadlock when cloning inline extent and low on free metadata space").

However when using qgroups, a transaction also reserves metadata qgroup space, which can also result in flushing delalloc in case there is not enough available space at the moment. When this happens we deadlock, since flushing delalloc requires locking the file range in the inode's iotree and the range was already locked at the very beginning of the clone operation, before attempting to start the transaction.

When this issue happens, stack traces like the following are reported:

[72747.556262] task:kworker/u81:9 state:D stack: 0 pid: 225 ppid: 2 flags:0x00004000 [72747.556268] Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-btrfs-1142) [72747.556271] Call Trace: [72747.556273] __schedule+0x296/0x760 [72747.556277] schedule+0x3c/0xa0 [72747.556279] io_schedule+0x12/0x40 [72747.556284] __lock_page+0x13c/0x280 [72747.556287] ? generic_file_readonly_mmap+0x70/0x70 [72747.556325] extent_write_cache_pages+0x22a/0x440 [btrfs] [72747.556331] ? __set_page_dirty_nobuffers+0xe7/0x160 [72747.556358] ? set_extent_buffer_dirty+0x5e/0x80 [btrfs] [72747.556362] ? update_group_capacity+0x25/0x210 [72747.556366] ? cpumask_next_and+0x1a/0x20 [72747.556391] extent_writepages+0x44/0xa0 [btrfs] [72747.556394] do_writepages+0x41/0xd0 [72747.556398] __writeback_single_inode+0x39/0x2a0 [72747.556403] writeback_sb_inodes+0x1ea/0x440 [72747.556407] __writeback_inodes_wb+0x5f/0xc0 [72747.556410] wb_writeback+0x235/0x2b0 [72747.556414] ? get_nr_inodes+0x35/0x50 [72747.556417] wb_workfn+0x354/0x490 [72747.556420] ? newidle_balance+0x2c5/0x3e0 [72747.556424] process_one_work+0x1aa/0x340 [72747.556426] worker_thread+0x30/0x390 [72747.556429] ? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0 [72747.556432] kthread+0x116/0x130 [72747.556435] ? kthread_park+0x80/0x80 [72747.556438] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

[72747.566958] Workqueue: btrfs-flush_delalloc btrfs_work_helper [btrfs] [72747.566961] Call Trace: [72747.566964] __schedule+0x296/0x760 [72747.566968] ? finish_wait+0x80/0x80 [72747.566970] schedule+0x3c/0xa0 [72747.566995] wait_extent_bit.constprop.68+0x13b/0x1c0 [btrfs] [72747.566999] ? finish_wait+0x80/0x80 [72747.567024] lock_extent_bits+0x37/0x90 [btrfs] [72747.567047] btrfs_invalidatepage+0x299/0x2c0 [btrfs] [72747.567051] ? find_get_pages_range_tag+0x2cd/0x380 [72747.567076] __extent_writepage+0x203/0x320 [btrfs] [72747.567102] extent_write_cache_pages+0x2bb/0x440 [btrfs] [72747.567106] ? update_load_avg+0x7e/0x5f0 [72747.567109] ? enqueue_entity+0xf4/0x6f0 [72747.567134] extent_writepages+0x44/0xa0 [btrfs] [72747.567137] ? enqueue_task_fair+0x93/0x6f0 [72747.567140] do_writepages+0x41/0xd0 [72747.567144] __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0xc7/0x100 [72747.567167] btrfs_run_delalloc_work+0x17/0x40 [btrfs] [72747.567195] btrfs_work_helper+0xc2/0x300 [btrfs] [72747.567200] process_one_work+0x1aa/0x340 [72747.567202] worker_thread+0x30/0x390 [72747.567205] ? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0 [72747.567208] kthread+0x116/0x130 [72747.567211] ? kthread_park+0x80/0x80 [72747.567214] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

[72747.569686] task:fsstress state:D stack:
---truncated---(CVE-2021-46987)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bpf: Defer the free of inner map when necessary

When updating or deleting an inner map in map array or map htab, the map may still be accessed by non-sleepable program or sleepable program. However bpf_map_fd_put_ptr() decreases the ref-counter of the inner map directly through bpf_map_put(), if the ref-counter is the last one (which is true for most cases), the inner map will be freed by ops->map_free() in a kworker. But for now, most .map_free() callbacks don't use synchronize_rcu() or its variants to wait for the elapse of a RCU grace period, so after the invocation of ops->map_free completes, the bpf program which is accessing the inner map may incur use-after-free problem.

Fix the free of inner map by invoking bpf_map_free_deferred() after both one RCU grace period and one tasks trace RCU grace period if the inner map has been removed from the outer map before. The deferment is accomplished by using call_rcu() or call_rcu_tasks_trace() when releasing the last ref-counter of bpf map. The newly-added rcu_head field in bpf_map shares the same storage space with work field to reduce the size of bpf_map.(CVE-2023-52447)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

gfs2: Fix kernel NULL pointer dereference in gfs2_rgrp_dump

Syzkaller has reported a NULL pointer dereference when accessing rgd->rd_rgl in gfs2_rgrp_dump(). This can happen when creating rgd->rd_gl fails in read_rindex_entry(). Add a NULL pointer check in gfs2_rgrp_dump() to prevent that.(CVE-2023-52448)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mtd: Fix gluebi NULL pointer dereference caused by ftl notifier

If both ftl.ko and gluebi.ko are loaded, the notifier of ftl triggers NULL pointer dereference when trying to access ‘gluebi->desc’ in gluebi_read().

ubi_gluebi_init ubi_register_volume_notifier ubi_enumerate_volumes ubi_notify_all gluebi_notify nb->notifier_call() gluebi_create mtd_device_register mtd_device_parse_register add_mtd_device blktrans_notify_add not->add() ftl_add_mtd tr->add_mtd() scan_header mtd_read mtd_read_oob mtd_read_oob_std gluebi_read mtd->read() gluebi->desc - NULL

Detailed reproduction information available at the Link [1],

In the normal case, obtain gluebi->desc in the gluebi_get_device(), and access gluebi->desc in the gluebi_read(). However, gluebi_get_device() is not executed in advance in the ftl_add_mtd() process, which leads to NULL pointer dereference.

The solution for the gluebi module is to run jffs2 on the UBI volume without considering working with ftl or mtdblock [2]. Therefore, this problem can be avoided by preventing gluebi from creating the mtdblock device after creating mtd partition of the type MTD_UBIVOLUME.(CVE-2023-52449)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bpf: Fix accesses to uninit stack slots

Privileged programs are supposed to be able to read uninitialized stack memory (ever since 6715df8d5) but, before this patch, these accesses were permitted inconsistently. In particular, accesses were permitted above state->allocated_stack, but not below it. In other words, if the stack was already "large enough", the access was permitted, but otherwise the access was rejected instead of being allowed to "grow the stack". This undesired rejection was happening in two places: - in check_stack_slot_within_bounds() - in check_stack_range_initialized() This patch arranges for these accesses to be permitted. A bunch of tests that were relying on the old rejection had to change; all of them were changed to add also run unprivileged, in which case the old behavior persists. One tests couldn't be updated - global_func16 - because it can't run unprivileged for other reasons.

This patch also fixes the tracking of the stack size for variable-offset reads. This second fix is bundled in the same commit as the first one because they're inter-related. Before this patch, writes to the stack using registers containing a variable offset (as opposed to registers with fixed, known values) were not properly contributing to the function's needed stack size. As a result, it was possible for a program to verify, but then to attempt to read out-of-bounds data at runtime because a too small stack had been allocated for it.

Each function tracks the size of the stack it needs in bpf_subprog_info.stack_depth, which is maintained by update_stack_depth(). For regular memory accesses, check_mem_access() was calling update_state_depth() but it was passing in only the fixed part of the offset register, ignoring the variable offset. This was incorrect; the minimum possible value of that register should be used instead.

This tracking is now fixed by centralizing the tracking of stack size in grow_stack_state(), and by lifting the calls to grow_stack_state() to check_stack_access_within_bounds() as suggested by Andrii. The code is now simpler and more convincingly tracks the correct maximum stack size. check_stack_range_initialized() can now rely on enough stack having been allocated for the access; this helps with the fix for the first issue.

A few tests were changed to also check the stack depth computation. The one that fails without this patch is verifier_var_off:stack_write_priv_vs_unpriv.(CVE-2023-52452)

Severity
3.9 (Low)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
References
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "aarch64": [
          "kernel-tools-debuginfo-5.10.0-60.130.0.157.oe2203.aarch64.rpm",
          "python3-perf-5.10.0-60.130.0.157.oe2203.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-debuginfo-5.10.0-60.130.0.157.oe2203.aarch64.rpm",
          "python3-perf-debuginfo-5.10.0-60.130.0.157.oe2203.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-devel-5.10.0-60.130.0.157.oe2203.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-5.10.0-60.130.0.157.oe2203.aarch64.rpm",
          "perf-5.10.0-60.130.0.157.oe2203.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-5.10.0-60.130.0.157.oe2203.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-source-5.10.0-60.130.0.157.oe2203.aarch64.rpm",
          "perf-debuginfo-5.10.0-60.130.0.157.oe2203.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-headers-5.10.0-60.130.0.157.oe2203.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-debugsource-5.10.0-60.130.0.157.oe2203.aarch64.rpm",
          "bpftool-debuginfo-5.10.0-60.130.0.157.oe2203.aarch64.rpm",
          "bpftool-5.10.0-60.130.0.157.oe2203.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-devel-5.10.0-60.130.0.157.oe2203.aarch64.rpm"
        ],
        "src": [
          "kernel-5.10.0-60.130.0.157.oe2203.src.rpm"
        ],
        "x86_64": [
          "kernel-source-5.10.0-60.130.0.157.oe2203.x86_64.rpm",
          "python3-perf-5.10.0-60.130.0.157.oe2203.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-devel-5.10.0-60.130.0.157.oe2203.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-debugsource-5.10.0-60.130.0.157.oe2203.x86_64.rpm",
          "python3-perf-debuginfo-5.10.0-60.130.0.157.oe2203.x86_64.rpm",
          "bpftool-debuginfo-5.10.0-60.130.0.157.oe2203.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-debuginfo-5.10.0-60.130.0.157.oe2203.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-devel-5.10.0-60.130.0.157.oe2203.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-5.10.0-60.130.0.157.oe2203.x86_64.rpm",
          "perf-5.10.0-60.130.0.157.oe2203.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-5.10.0-60.130.0.157.oe2203.x86_64.rpm",
          "perf-debuginfo-5.10.0-60.130.0.157.oe2203.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-headers-5.10.0-60.130.0.157.oe2203.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-debuginfo-5.10.0-60.130.0.157.oe2203.x86_64.rpm",
          "bpftool-5.10.0-60.130.0.157.oe2203.x86_64.rpm"
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "openEuler:22.03-LTS",
        "name": "kernel",
        "purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/kernel\u0026distro=openEuler-22.03-LTS"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.10.0-60.130.0.157.oe2203"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "severity": "High"
  },
  "details": "The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nbtrfs: fix deadlock when cloning inline extents and using qgroups\r\n\r\nThere are a few exceptional cases where cloning an inline extent needs to\ncopy the inline extent data into a page of the destination inode.\r\n\r\nWhen this happens, we end up starting a transaction while having a dirty\npage for the destination inode and while having the range locked in the\ndestination\u0026apos;s inode iotree too. Because when reserving metadata space\nfor a transaction we may need to flush existing delalloc in case there is\nnot enough free space, we have a mechanism in place to prevent a deadlock,\nwhich was introduced in commit 3d45f221ce627d (\u0026quot;btrfs: fix deadlock when\ncloning inline extent and low on free metadata space\u0026quot;).\r\n\r\nHowever when using qgroups, a transaction also reserves metadata qgroup\nspace, which can also result in flushing delalloc in case there is not\nenough available space at the moment. When this happens we deadlock, since\nflushing delalloc requires locking the file range in the inode\u0026apos;s iotree\nand the range was already locked at the very beginning of the clone\noperation, before attempting to start the transaction.\r\n\r\nWhen this issue happens, stack traces like the following are reported:\r\n\r\n  [72747.556262] task:kworker/u81:9   state:D stack:    0 pid:  225 ppid:     2 flags:0x00004000\n  [72747.556268] Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-btrfs-1142)\n  [72747.556271] Call Trace:\n  [72747.556273]  __schedule+0x296/0x760\n  [72747.556277]  schedule+0x3c/0xa0\n  [72747.556279]  io_schedule+0x12/0x40\n  [72747.556284]  __lock_page+0x13c/0x280\n  [72747.556287]  ? generic_file_readonly_mmap+0x70/0x70\n  [72747.556325]  extent_write_cache_pages+0x22a/0x440 [btrfs]\n  [72747.556331]  ? __set_page_dirty_nobuffers+0xe7/0x160\n  [72747.556358]  ? set_extent_buffer_dirty+0x5e/0x80 [btrfs]\n  [72747.556362]  ? update_group_capacity+0x25/0x210\n  [72747.556366]  ? cpumask_next_and+0x1a/0x20\n  [72747.556391]  extent_writepages+0x44/0xa0 [btrfs]\n  [72747.556394]  do_writepages+0x41/0xd0\n  [72747.556398]  __writeback_single_inode+0x39/0x2a0\n  [72747.556403]  writeback_sb_inodes+0x1ea/0x440\n  [72747.556407]  __writeback_inodes_wb+0x5f/0xc0\n  [72747.556410]  wb_writeback+0x235/0x2b0\n  [72747.556414]  ? get_nr_inodes+0x35/0x50\n  [72747.556417]  wb_workfn+0x354/0x490\n  [72747.556420]  ? newidle_balance+0x2c5/0x3e0\n  [72747.556424]  process_one_work+0x1aa/0x340\n  [72747.556426]  worker_thread+0x30/0x390\n  [72747.556429]  ? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0\n  [72747.556432]  kthread+0x116/0x130\n  [72747.556435]  ? kthread_park+0x80/0x80\n  [72747.556438]  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30\r\n\r\n  [72747.566958] Workqueue: btrfs-flush_delalloc btrfs_work_helper [btrfs]\n  [72747.566961] Call Trace:\n  [72747.566964]  __schedule+0x296/0x760\n  [72747.566968]  ? finish_wait+0x80/0x80\n  [72747.566970]  schedule+0x3c/0xa0\n  [72747.566995]  wait_extent_bit.constprop.68+0x13b/0x1c0 [btrfs]\n  [72747.566999]  ? finish_wait+0x80/0x80\n  [72747.567024]  lock_extent_bits+0x37/0x90 [btrfs]\n  [72747.567047]  btrfs_invalidatepage+0x299/0x2c0 [btrfs]\n  [72747.567051]  ? find_get_pages_range_tag+0x2cd/0x380\n  [72747.567076]  __extent_writepage+0x203/0x320 [btrfs]\n  [72747.567102]  extent_write_cache_pages+0x2bb/0x440 [btrfs]\n  [72747.567106]  ? update_load_avg+0x7e/0x5f0\n  [72747.567109]  ? enqueue_entity+0xf4/0x6f0\n  [72747.567134]  extent_writepages+0x44/0xa0 [btrfs]\n  [72747.567137]  ? enqueue_task_fair+0x93/0x6f0\n  [72747.567140]  do_writepages+0x41/0xd0\n  [72747.567144]  __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0xc7/0x100\n  [72747.567167]  btrfs_run_delalloc_work+0x17/0x40 [btrfs]\n  [72747.567195]  btrfs_work_helper+0xc2/0x300 [btrfs]\n  [72747.567200]  process_one_work+0x1aa/0x340\n  [72747.567202]  worker_thread+0x30/0x390\n  [72747.567205]  ? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0\n  [72747.567208]  kthread+0x116/0x130\n  [72747.567211]  ? kthread_park+0x80/0x80\n  [72747.567214]  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30\r\n\r\n  [72747.569686] task:fsstress        state:D stack:    \n---truncated---(CVE-2021-46987)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nbpf: Defer the free of inner map when necessary\r\n\r\nWhen updating or deleting an inner map in map array or map htab, the map\nmay still be accessed by non-sleepable program or sleepable program.\nHowever bpf_map_fd_put_ptr() decreases the ref-counter of the inner map\ndirectly through bpf_map_put(), if the ref-counter is the last one\n(which is true for most cases), the inner map will be freed by\nops-\u0026gt;map_free() in a kworker. But for now, most .map_free() callbacks\ndon\u0026apos;t use synchronize_rcu() or its variants to wait for the elapse of a\nRCU grace period, so after the invocation of ops-\u0026gt;map_free completes,\nthe bpf program which is accessing the inner map may incur\nuse-after-free problem.\r\n\r\nFix the free of inner map by invoking bpf_map_free_deferred() after both\none RCU grace period and one tasks trace RCU grace period if the inner\nmap has been removed from the outer map before. The deferment is\naccomplished by using call_rcu() or call_rcu_tasks_trace() when\nreleasing the last ref-counter of bpf map. The newly-added rcu_head\nfield in bpf_map shares the same storage space with work field to\nreduce the size of bpf_map.(CVE-2023-52447)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ngfs2: Fix kernel NULL pointer dereference in gfs2_rgrp_dump\r\n\r\nSyzkaller has reported a NULL pointer dereference when accessing\nrgd-\u0026gt;rd_rgl in gfs2_rgrp_dump().  This can happen when creating\nrgd-\u0026gt;rd_gl fails in read_rindex_entry().  Add a NULL pointer check in\ngfs2_rgrp_dump() to prevent that.(CVE-2023-52448)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nmtd: Fix gluebi NULL pointer dereference caused by ftl notifier\r\n\r\nIf both ftl.ko and gluebi.ko are loaded, the notifier of ftl\ntriggers NULL pointer dereference when trying to access\n\u2018gluebi-\u0026gt;desc\u2019 in gluebi_read().\r\n\r\nubi_gluebi_init\n  ubi_register_volume_notifier\n    ubi_enumerate_volumes\n      ubi_notify_all\n        gluebi_notify    nb-\u0026gt;notifier_call()\n          gluebi_create\n            mtd_device_register\n              mtd_device_parse_register\n                add_mtd_device\n                  blktrans_notify_add   not-\u0026gt;add()\n                    ftl_add_mtd         tr-\u0026gt;add_mtd()\n                      scan_header\n                        mtd_read\n                          mtd_read_oob\n                            mtd_read_oob_std\n                              gluebi_read   mtd-\u0026gt;read()\n                                gluebi-\u0026gt;desc - NULL\r\n\r\nDetailed reproduction information available at the Link [1],\r\n\r\nIn the normal case, obtain gluebi-\u0026gt;desc in the gluebi_get_device(),\nand access gluebi-\u0026gt;desc in the gluebi_read(). However,\ngluebi_get_device() is not executed in advance in the\nftl_add_mtd() process, which leads to NULL pointer dereference.\r\n\r\nThe solution for the gluebi module is to run jffs2 on the UBI\nvolume without considering working with ftl or mtdblock [2].\nTherefore, this problem can be avoided by preventing gluebi from\ncreating the mtdblock device after creating mtd partition of the\ntype MTD_UBIVOLUME.(CVE-2023-52449)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nbpf: Fix accesses to uninit stack slots\r\n\r\nPrivileged programs are supposed to be able to read uninitialized stack\nmemory (ever since 6715df8d5) but, before this patch, these accesses\nwere permitted inconsistently. In particular, accesses were permitted\nabove state-\u0026gt;allocated_stack, but not below it. In other words, if the\nstack was already \u0026quot;large enough\u0026quot;, the access was permitted, but\notherwise the access was rejected instead of being allowed to \u0026quot;grow the\nstack\u0026quot;. This undesired rejection was happening in two places:\n- in check_stack_slot_within_bounds()\n- in check_stack_range_initialized()\nThis patch arranges for these accesses to be permitted. A bunch of tests\nthat were relying on the old rejection had to change; all of them were\nchanged to add also run unprivileged, in which case the old behavior\npersists. One tests couldn\u0026apos;t be updated - global_func16 - because it\ncan\u0026apos;t run unprivileged for other reasons.\r\n\r\nThis patch also fixes the tracking of the stack size for variable-offset\nreads. This second fix is bundled in the same commit as the first one\nbecause they\u0026apos;re inter-related. Before this patch, writes to the stack\nusing registers containing a variable offset (as opposed to registers\nwith fixed, known values) were not properly contributing to the\nfunction\u0026apos;s needed stack size. As a result, it was possible for a program\nto verify, but then to attempt to read out-of-bounds data at runtime\nbecause a too small stack had been allocated for it.\r\n\r\nEach function tracks the size of the stack it needs in\nbpf_subprog_info.stack_depth, which is maintained by\nupdate_stack_depth(). For regular memory accesses, check_mem_access()\nwas calling update_state_depth() but it was passing in only the fixed\npart of the offset register, ignoring the variable offset. This was\nincorrect; the minimum possible value of that register should be used\ninstead.\r\n\r\nThis tracking is now fixed by centralizing the tracking of stack size in\ngrow_stack_state(), and by lifting the calls to grow_stack_state() to\ncheck_stack_access_within_bounds() as suggested by Andrii. The code is\nnow simpler and more convincingly tracks the correct maximum stack size.\ncheck_stack_range_initialized() can now rely on enough stack having been\nallocated for the access; this helps with the fix for the first issue.\r\n\r\nA few tests were changed to also check the stack depth computation. The\none that fails without this patch is verifier_var_off:stack_write_priv_vs_unpriv.(CVE-2023-52452)",
  "id": "OESA-2024-1298",
  "modified": "2026-08-06T11:06:44Z",
  "published": "2024-03-22T11:06:44Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/safety-bulletin/detail.html?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1298"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-46987"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-52447"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-52448"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-52449"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-52452"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.2",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "kernel security update",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2021-46987",
    "CVE-2023-52447",
    "CVE-2023-52448",
    "CVE-2023-52449",
    "CVE-2023-52452"
  ]
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.





Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.


Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.