GHSA-X5VX-C2C8-M3W9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-22 17:55 – Updated: 2026-07-22 17:55Impact
In n8n's AI Agents feature, a user with the read-only Project Viewer role could escalate their privileges by chatting with an agent that has node tools enabled. The agent's node-execution tool was authorized only by the agent:execute scope and ran nodes using the project's credentials, without verifying that the requesting user was permitted to execute nodes or to access those credentials.
As a result, a Project Viewer could execute arbitrary tool nodes on the server and use credential secrets they were not authorized to read, gaining execution capabilities their role is intended to deny. On instances where a command- or file-capable tool node (such as Execute Command or SSH) is enabled, this could be extended to arbitrary command execution on the n8n host.
Users of the AI Agents feature who share team projects with lower-privileged members are affected.
Patches
The issue has been fixed in n8n versions 2.29.8 and 2.30.1. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later to remediate the vulnerability.
Workarounds
If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations:
- Disable the AI Agents module by removing agents from the N8N_ENABLED_MODULES environment variable.
- Restrict project membership to fully trusted users only, and avoid granting Project Viewer access to untrusted users on projects containing agents with node tools enabled.
- Disable command-execution nodes (e.g. Execute Command, SSH) if they have been re-enabled, to limit the potential impact.
These workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "n8n"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.30.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.30.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "n8n"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.29.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-65015"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-22T17:55:55Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Impact\nIn n8n\u0027s AI Agents feature, a user with the read-only Project Viewer role could escalate their privileges by chatting with an agent that has node tools enabled. The agent\u0027s node-execution tool was authorized only by the `agent:execute` scope and ran nodes using the project\u0027s credentials, without verifying that the requesting user was permitted to execute nodes or to access those credentials.\n\nAs a result, a Project Viewer could execute arbitrary tool nodes on the server and use credential secrets they were not authorized to read, gaining execution capabilities their role is intended to deny. On instances where a command- or file-capable tool node (such as Execute Command or SSH) is enabled, this could be extended to arbitrary command execution on the n8n host.\n\nUsers of the AI Agents feature who share team projects with lower-privileged members are affected.\n\n## Patches\nThe issue has been fixed in n8n versions 2.29.8 and 2.30.1. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later to remediate the vulnerability.\n\n## Workarounds\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations:\n- Disable the AI Agents module by removing `agents` from the `N8N_ENABLED_MODULES` environment variable.\n- Restrict project membership to fully trusted users only, and avoid granting Project Viewer access to untrusted users on projects containing agents with node tools enabled.\n- Disable command-execution nodes (e.g. Execute Command, SSH) if they have been re-enabled, to limit the potential impact.\n\nThese workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.",
"id": "GHSA-x5vx-c2c8-m3w9",
"modified": "2026-07-22T17:55:55Z",
"published": "2026-07-22T17:55:55Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/security/advisories/GHSA-x5vx-c2c8-m3w9"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-65015"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/releases/tag/n8n@2.29.8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/releases/tag/n8n@2.30.1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/n8n-before-privilege-escalation-via-run-node-tool"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:L",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "n8n: AI Agents Project Viewer Privilege Escalation via run_node_tool"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.