{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.0.0-20260724091654-82e9ded423e4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-72804"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-03T22:52:58Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "**CVE:** This vulnerability corresponds to [CVE-2026-72804](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72804).\n\n### Summary\n\n`getGraph` and `getLocalGraph` filter reader sessions against the *visibility* tier only and never check the publish password. Password-protected documents are `Visible = true`, so their graph nodes survive the filter and graph nodes are block-level and carry the block\u0027s actual content. An anonymous reader who has never supplied a document\u0027s password can therefore retrieve that document\u0027s per-block content and its reference/backlink topology. Both endpoints are `CheckAuth`-only, so they are reachable by the publish `RoleReader` token and by the anonymous account when `Publish.Auth.Enable` is `false`.\n\n### Details\n\nBoth handlers filter with the invisible-tier set only:\n\n```go\npublishIgnore := model.GetInvisiblePublishAccess(publishAccess)   // Visible tier ONLY\nnodes, links = model.FilterGraphByPublishIgnore(publishIgnore, nodes, links)\n```\n\n`FilterGraphByPublishIgnore` (`kernel/model/publish_access.go:849`) drops a node only when `!CheckPathAccessableByPublishIgnore(node.Box, node.Path, publishIgnore)`. There is no password evaluation anywhere in the graph code grepping `graph.go` for `CheckPublishAuthCookie` or `password` returns nothing.\n\nBecause password-protected documents are `Visible = true`, their nodes pass the filter unchanged.\n\n**The nodes carry content, not just titles.** `genTreeNodes` emits one node per block, and `nodeTitleLabel` sets `node.Title = node.Label = block.Content` (`kernel/model/graph.go:673-678`). So each surviving node exposes the block\u0027s text.\n\nThis is materially broader than the by-design listing behaviour: `listDocsByPath` intentionally exposes protected document *titles* (protected means \"publicly visible, password required to access\"), but the graph endpoints expose per-block *content* and the full link/reference topology, which listing never does.\n\nVerified at `origin/master`: `FilterGraphByPublishIgnore` contains only the `CheckPathAccessableByPublishIgnore` call; `graph.go` contains no password check; both routes are registered `CheckAuth` without `CheckAdminRole`.\n\n### Proof of Concept\n\nPrecondition: publish mode enabled (default port 6808); anonymous when `Publish.Auth.Enable` is `false`, otherwise any publish reader account. A document is marked **protected** (visible, password set) and contains blocks with distinctive content. No password is supplied in any request below.\n\n**Targeted: one protected document\u0027s content and reference structure:**\n```\nPOST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/graph/getLocalGraph\n{\"id\":\"\u003cPROTECTED_DOC_ID\u003e\"}\n```\nReturns nodes whose `Title`/`Label` contain the protected document\u0027s per-block content, plus its links/backlinks.\n\n**Workspace-wide: every protected document:**\n```\nPOST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/graph/getGraph\n{}\n```\nReturns block-level nodes for every protected document in the workspace, together with the complete link graph.\n\n**Control:** requesting the same document through the normal content path returns the password placeholder confirming the password gate is enforced elsewhere and omitted here.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn anonymous reader (publish mode with auth disabled) or any publish `RoleReader` can read the block-level content of every password-protected document in the workspace, plus the full reference/backlink topology, without ever supplying a password. This defeats the publish-password control for the graph subsystem. Confidentiality-only, no modification.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nExtend the graph filter to evaluate the password tier in addition to visibility: in `FilterGraphByPublishIgnore`, drop a node unless the document\u0027s publish password is unset or the caller presents a valid publish-auth cookie for it (`password == \"\" || CheckPublishAuthCookie(...)`), matching the sibling filters that enforce both tiers. Consider also excluding block content from node `Title`/`Label` for reader sessions, so the graph conveys structure without document text.",
  "id": "GHSA-vpjw-wf5h-cgpq",
  "modified": "2026-09-03T22:52:58Z",
  "published": "2026-09-03T22:52:58Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-vpjw-wf5h-cgpq"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72804"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/commit/82e9ded423e45eabcc96010abd30c0f96bfe0323"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/siyuan-before-authentication-bypass-via-graph-endpoints"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "SiYuan: Graph endpoints omit the publish-password tier: anonymous readers receive block-level content of password-protected documents"
}