GHSA-PHJ3-59PF-CP83

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-31 19:00 – Updated: 2026-07-31 19:00
VLAI
Summary
Thumbor proportion filter allows unbounded post-transform resize leading to remote DoS
Details

Summary

Thumbor's filters:proportion(<value>) filter does not enforce an upper bound on <value> and runs in the post-transform phase. An attacker can trigger extremely large resizes (CPU/memory exhaustion) and cause denial of service.

Details

  • Filter implementation: thumbor/filters/proportion.py
  • value is parsed as a float (BaseFilter.DecimalNumber) with no maximum.
  • The filter computes new_width = source_width * value and new_height = source_height * value and then calls engine.resize(new_width, new_height).
  • Execution phase: proportion runs in the default POST_TRANSFORM phase (after the main transform pipeline). This means it can effectively bypass request-level size clamping that happens earlier in the request lifecycle (e.g., MAX_WIDTH/MAX_HEIGHT applied to req.width/req.height).

Documentation states the percentage argument should be 0.0 to 1.0 (docs/proportion.rst), but the implementation does not enforce this constraint.

PoC

Preconditions

  • The proportion filter is enabled (it is enabled by default via BUILTIN_FILTERS).
  • Either:
  • /unsafe/ URLs are allowed (ALLOW_UNSAFE_URL=True, common default in some deployments), OR
  • /unsafe/ is disabled, and the attacker has a valid signed URL (i.e., the attacker is an authorized user/partner, or otherwise can obtain signed URLs issued by a trusted signing service).

Example request 1 (signed URL)

The following request was used to reproduce the issue and causes severe resource exhaustion:

http://<host>:<port>/<url-sign>/100x100/filters:proportion(10000)/example.jpg

Example request 2 (/unsafe/)

If /unsafe/ is enabled:

http://<host>:<port>/unsafe/100x100/filters:proportion(10000)/example.jpg

Impact

  • Remote Denial of Service via CPU and/or memory exhaustion (and potentially process crash / OOM kill).
  • Exploitability depends on deployment:
  • If /unsafe/ is enabled: unauthenticated remote DoS.
  • If /unsafe/ is disabled: the attacker needs a valid signed URL (i.e., the attacker can legitimately request signed URLs, or has access to signed URLs issued for other users/partners). If signed URLs are not exposed to untrusted parties, exploitability is reduced but the risk still applies to any party who can generate/use signed URLs.

Suggested remediation

  • Enforce a strict bound on the proportion parameter (e.g., 0.0 < value <= 1.0 as documented), or define a safe maximum based on intended semantics.
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 7.7.7"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "thumbor"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.8.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-53505"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-31T19:00:44Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nThumbor\u0027s `filters:proportion(\u003cvalue\u003e)` filter does not enforce an upper bound on `\u003cvalue\u003e` and runs in the post-transform phase. An attacker can trigger extremely large resizes (CPU/memory exhaustion) and cause denial of service.\n\n### Details\n- Filter implementation: `thumbor/filters/proportion.py`\n  - `value` is parsed as a float (`BaseFilter.DecimalNumber`) with no maximum.\n  - The filter computes `new_width = source_width * value` and `new_height = source_height * value` and then calls `engine.resize(new_width, new_height)`.\n- Execution phase: `proportion` runs in the default POST_TRANSFORM phase (after the main transform pipeline). This means it can effectively bypass request-level size clamping that happens earlier in the request lifecycle (e.g., `MAX_WIDTH`/`MAX_HEIGHT` applied to `req.width/req.height`).\n\nDocumentation states the `percentage` argument should be `0.0 to 1.0` (`docs/proportion.rst`), but the implementation does not enforce this constraint.\n\n### PoC\n#### Preconditions\n- The `proportion` filter is enabled (it is enabled by default via `BUILTIN_FILTERS`).\n- Either:\n  - `/unsafe/` URLs are allowed (`ALLOW_UNSAFE_URL=True`, common default in some deployments), OR\n  - `/unsafe/` is disabled, and the attacker has a valid signed URL (i.e., the attacker is an authorized user/partner, or otherwise can obtain signed URLs issued by a trusted signing service).\n\n#### Example request 1 (signed URL)\nThe following request was used to reproduce the issue and causes severe resource exhaustion:\n\n`http://\u003chost\u003e:\u003cport\u003e/\u003curl-sign\u003e/100x100/filters:proportion(10000)/example.jpg`\n\n#### Example request 2 (/unsafe/)\nIf `/unsafe/` is enabled:\n\n`http://\u003chost\u003e:\u003cport\u003e/unsafe/100x100/filters:proportion(10000)/example.jpg`\n\n### Impact\n- Remote Denial of Service via CPU and/or memory exhaustion (and potentially process crash / OOM kill).\n- Exploitability depends on deployment:\n  - If `/unsafe/` is enabled: unauthenticated remote DoS.\n  - If `/unsafe/` is disabled: the attacker needs a valid signed URL (i.e., the attacker can legitimately request signed URLs, or has access to signed URLs issued for other users/partners). If signed URLs are not exposed to untrusted parties, exploitability is reduced but the risk still applies to any party who can generate/use signed URLs.\n\n### Suggested remediation\n- Enforce a strict bound on the `proportion` parameter (e.g., `0.0 \u003c value \u003c= 1.0` as documented), or define a safe maximum based on intended semantics.",
  "id": "GHSA-phj3-59pf-cp83",
  "modified": "2026-07-31T19:00:44Z",
  "published": "2026-07-31T19:00:44Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/thumbor/thumbor/security/advisories/GHSA-phj3-59pf-cp83"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/thumbor/thumbor/commit/2c716119de986cfc68c7071af52a98187e006023"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/thumbor/thumbor"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/thumbor/thumbor/releases/tag/7.8.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Thumbor proportion filter allows unbounded post-transform resize leading to remote DoS"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Loading…

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Loading…

Loading…

Loading…