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GHSA-PGRG-WPFJ-73CQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-09 15:35 – Updated: 2026-09-09 15:35
VLAI
Details

Snipe-IT 8.6.3 and earlier do not check the return value of Storage::put() when writing the signature PNG and the generated acceptance PDF in Account\AcceptanceController::store(). On filesystem drivers that return false instead of throwing on a write failure (for example the local disk with restrictive permissions, S3 with expired credentials, or a storage backend that is out of quota), execution continues into $acceptance->accept(), which sets accepted_at and the signature_filename/eula_filename fields, creates the 'accepted' action-log entry, and dispatches completion notifications even though the evidence files were never stored. The result is an acceptance record marked complete whose supporting evidence files do not exist, yielding a materially incomplete compliance artifact for EULA acknowledgement or equipment-receipt workflows. The condition is triggered when an authenticated user completes an acceptance while the storage backend is silently failing writes; an attacker cannot directly force the storage backend into that state. Fixed in Snipe-IT 8.7.0.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-86739"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-252"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-09T14:17:22Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "Snipe-IT 8.6.3 and earlier do not check the return value of Storage::put() when writing the signature PNG and the generated acceptance PDF in Account\\AcceptanceController::store(). On filesystem drivers that return false instead of throwing on a write failure (for example the local disk with restrictive permissions, S3 with expired credentials, or a storage backend that is out of quota), execution continues into $acceptance-\u003eaccept(), which sets accepted_at and the signature_filename/eula_filename fields, creates the \u0027accepted\u0027 action-log entry, and dispatches completion notifications even though the evidence files were never stored. The result is an acceptance record marked complete whose supporting evidence files do not exist, yielding a materially incomplete compliance artifact for EULA acknowledgement or equipment-receipt workflows. The condition is triggered when an authenticated user completes an acceptance while the storage backend is silently failing writes; an attacker cannot directly force the storage backend into that state. Fixed in Snipe-IT 8.7.0.",
  "id": "GHSA-pgrg-wpfj-73cq",
  "modified": "2026-09-09T15:35:11Z",
  "published": "2026-09-09T15:35:11Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/grokability/snipe-it/security/advisories/GHSA-h543-58f9-v6mj"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86739"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/snipe-it-before-8.7.0-acceptance-finalization-without-stored-evidence"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}



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