GHSA-HW2H-QF3M-2R8V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-21 00:31 – Updated: 2026-08-21 00:31Lightdash stores the webhook URL supplied with a scheduled delivery and later posts to it from sendWebhook in packages/backend/src/clients/GoogleChat/GoogleChatClient.ts and in packages/backend/src/clients/MicrosoftTeams/MicrosoftTeamsClient.ts. In affected versions both call fetch on the stored URL directly. The validatePublicHttpUrl helper in packages/backend/src/utils/ssrfProtection.ts, used for MCP server URLs, is not applied on either path, and the webhook fields carry no server-side URL constraint. A user able to create or trigger a scheduled delivery can therefore direct the server to issue POST requests to private, loopback and link-local addresses, including cloud metadata endpoints, and can distinguish reachable internal services from unreachable ones through the resulting errors. The upstream response is never returned to the requester; on a failure status its body is written to the server log instead. Version 1.146.4 routes both clients through postSchedulerWebhook from packages/backend/src/utils/schedulerWebhookValidation rather than calling fetch directly.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-72846"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-20T22:18:05Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Lightdash stores the webhook URL supplied with a scheduled delivery and later posts to it from sendWebhook in packages/backend/src/clients/GoogleChat/GoogleChatClient.ts and in packages/backend/src/clients/MicrosoftTeams/MicrosoftTeamsClient.ts. In affected versions both call fetch on the stored URL directly. The validatePublicHttpUrl helper in packages/backend/src/utils/ssrfProtection.ts, used for MCP server URLs, is not applied on either path, and the webhook fields carry no server-side URL constraint. A user able to create or trigger a scheduled delivery can therefore direct the server to issue POST requests to private, loopback and link-local addresses, including cloud metadata endpoints, and can distinguish reachable internal services from unreachable ones through the resulting errors. The upstream response is never returned to the requester; on a failure status its body is written to the server log instead. Version 1.146.4 routes both clients through postSchedulerWebhook from packages/backend/src/utils/schedulerWebhookValidation rather than calling fetch directly.",
"id": "GHSA-hw2h-qf3m-2r8v",
"modified": "2026-08-21T00:31:23Z",
"published": "2026-08-21T00:31:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72846"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/lightdash/lightdash/issues/24389"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/lightdash/lightdash"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/lightdash/lightdash/blob/1.146.3/packages/backend/src/clients/GoogleChat/GoogleChatClient.ts"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/lightdash/lightdash/blob/1.146.3/packages/backend/src/clients/MicrosoftTeams/MicrosoftTeamsClient.ts"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/lightdash/lightdash/releases/tag/1.146.4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/lightdash-scheduled-delivery-webhook-urls-are-not-validated-allowing-server-side-request-forgery"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.