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GHSA-HJ85-PH9Q-78JG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-05 16:20 – Updated: 2026-07-20 21:19
VLAI
Summary
NocoDB: Stored Cross-Site Scripting via Form View Redirect URL
Details

Summary

The shared form-view submit handler in NocoDB writes the form's redirect_url to window.location.href after a same-host check that does not validate the URL scheme. A user with editor role (or above) on any base can plant a javascript: URL in the form's redirect_url; when an authenticated viewer opens the share-link and submits the form, the payload executes in the NocoDB origin and can read the session token from localStorage["nocodb-gui-v2"].

Details

The vulnerable sink is in packages/nc-gui/composables/useSharedFormViewStore.ts:

  • isValidRedirectUrl validated only typeof === 'string' and non-empty trim — no scheme check.
  • The submit branch built an anchor element, compared anchor.host to window.location.host, and either pushState-reloaded (same host) or assigned window.location.href = redirectUrl (otherwise).
  • For non-network schemes such as javascript:, data:, vbscript:, and file:, anchor.host is the empty string, so the same-host check is false and the code falls into the external-redirect branch — executing the URL same-origin in the NocoDB tab.

The redirect_url field is writable by any user with editor role on the base via the form-view PATCH endpoint, and the value is returned verbatim by the public shared-view meta endpoint, so no further privilege is required to weaponize a public form share.

Impact

  • Same-origin script execution in the viewer's NocoDB tab. The payload runs in the NocoDB origin and can read the session token at localStorage["nocodb-gui-v2"].token.
  • Action under the viewer's identity. With the token, an attacker can call authenticated APIs as the viewer, scoped to whatever workspaces, bases, and operations that viewer is permitted to use.
  • Single-click viewer flow. Form share-links are the intended distribution channel for forms, so the phishing surface is on-brand; the form can be configured with a single hidden pre-filled required field to reduce the viewer flow to one click.

Credit

This issue was reported by @kah-ja (turingpoint.de).

Severity
8.4 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2026.05.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "nocodb"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.05.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-47387"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-05T16:20:44Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-23T21:17:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe shared form-view submit handler in NocoDB writes the form\u0027s `redirect_url` to `window.location.href` after a same-host check that does not validate the URL scheme. A user with `editor` role (or above) on any base can plant a `javascript:` URL in the form\u0027s `redirect_url`; when an authenticated viewer opens the share-link and submits the form, the payload executes in the NocoDB origin and can read the session token from `localStorage[\"nocodb-gui-v2\"]`.\n\n### Details\n\nThe vulnerable sink is in `packages/nc-gui/composables/useSharedFormViewStore.ts`:\n\n- `isValidRedirectUrl` validated only `typeof === \u0027string\u0027` and non-empty trim \u2014 no scheme check.\n- The submit branch built an anchor element, compared `anchor.host` to `window.location.host`, and either pushState-reloaded (same host) or assigned `window.location.href = redirectUrl` (otherwise).\n- For non-network schemes such as `javascript:`, `data:`, `vbscript:`, and `file:`, `anchor.host` is the empty string, so the same-host check is false and the code falls into the external-redirect branch \u2014 executing the URL same-origin in the NocoDB tab.\n\nThe `redirect_url` field is writable by any user with `editor` role on the base via the form-view PATCH endpoint, and the value is returned verbatim by the public shared-view meta endpoint, so no further privilege is required to weaponize a public form share.\n\n### Impact\n\n- **Same-origin script execution in the viewer\u0027s NocoDB tab.** The payload runs in the NocoDB origin and can read the session token at `localStorage[\"nocodb-gui-v2\"].token`.\n- **Action under the viewer\u0027s identity.** With the token, an attacker can call authenticated APIs as the viewer, scoped to whatever workspaces, bases, and operations that viewer is permitted to use.\n- **Single-click viewer flow.** Form share-links are the intended distribution channel for forms, so the phishing surface is on-brand; the form can be configured with a single hidden pre-filled required field to reduce the viewer flow to one click.\n\n### Credit\n\nThis issue was reported by [@kah-ja](https://github.com/kah-ja) ([turingpoint.de](https://turingpoint.de)).",
  "id": "GHSA-hj85-ph9q-78jg",
  "modified": "2026-07-20T21:19:06Z",
  "published": "2026-06-05T16:20:44Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nocodb/nocodb/security/advisories/GHSA-hj85-ph9q-78jg"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-47387"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nocodb/nocodb"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nocodb/nocodb/releases/tag/2026.05.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "NocoDB: Stored Cross-Site Scripting via Form View Redirect URL"
}



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