GHSA-GCR7-HVF6-PH59
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-14 21:32 – Updated: 2025-04-14 21:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ceph: fix possible deadlock when holding Fwb to get inline_data
1, mount with wsync. 2, create a file with O_RDWR, and the request was sent to mds.0:
ceph_atomic_open()--> ceph_mdsc_do_request(openc) finish_open(file, dentry, ceph_open)--> ceph_open()--> ceph_init_file()--> ceph_init_file_info()--> ceph_uninline_data()--> { ... if (inline_version == 1 || / initial version, no data / inline_version == CEPH_INLINE_NONE) goto out_unlock; ... }
The inline_version will be 1, which is the initial version for the new create file. And here the ci->i_inline_version will keep with 1, it's buggy.
3, buffer write to the file immediately:
ceph_write_iter()--> ceph_get_caps(file, need=Fw, want=Fb, ...); generic_perform_write()--> a_ops->write_begin()--> ceph_write_begin()--> netfs_write_begin()--> netfs_begin_read()--> netfs_rreq_submit_slice()--> netfs_read_from_server()--> rreq->netfs_ops->issue_read()--> ceph_netfs_issue_read()--> { ... if (ci->i_inline_version != CEPH_INLINE_NONE && ceph_netfs_issue_op_inline(subreq)) return; ... } ceph_put_cap_refs(ci, Fwb);
The ceph_netfs_issue_op_inline() will send a getattr(Fsr) request to mds.1.
4, then the mds.1 will request the rd lock for CInode::filelock from the auth mds.0, the mds.0 will do the CInode::filelock state transation from excl --> sync, but it need to revoke the Fxwb caps back from the clients.
While the kernel client has aleady held the Fwb caps and waiting for the getattr(Fsr).
It's deadlock!
URL: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/55377
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-49296"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-667"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-02-26T07:01:06Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nceph: fix possible deadlock when holding Fwb to get inline_data\n\n1, mount with wsync.\n2, create a file with O_RDWR, and the request was sent to mds.0:\n\n ceph_atomic_open()--\u003e\n ceph_mdsc_do_request(openc)\n finish_open(file, dentry, ceph_open)--\u003e\n ceph_open()--\u003e\n ceph_init_file()--\u003e\n ceph_init_file_info()--\u003e\n ceph_uninline_data()--\u003e\n {\n ...\n if (inline_version == 1 || /* initial version, no data */\n inline_version == CEPH_INLINE_NONE)\n goto out_unlock;\n ...\n }\n\nThe inline_version will be 1, which is the initial version for the\nnew create file. And here the ci-\u003ei_inline_version will keep with 1,\nit\u0027s buggy.\n\n3, buffer write to the file immediately:\n\n ceph_write_iter()--\u003e\n ceph_get_caps(file, need=Fw, want=Fb, ...);\n generic_perform_write()--\u003e\n a_ops-\u003ewrite_begin()--\u003e\n ceph_write_begin()--\u003e\n netfs_write_begin()--\u003e\n netfs_begin_read()--\u003e\n netfs_rreq_submit_slice()--\u003e\n netfs_read_from_server()--\u003e\n rreq-\u003enetfs_ops-\u003eissue_read()--\u003e\n ceph_netfs_issue_read()--\u003e\n {\n ...\n if (ci-\u003ei_inline_version != CEPH_INLINE_NONE \u0026\u0026\n ceph_netfs_issue_op_inline(subreq))\n return;\n ...\n }\n ceph_put_cap_refs(ci, Fwb);\n\nThe ceph_netfs_issue_op_inline() will send a getattr(Fsr) request to\nmds.1.\n\n4, then the mds.1 will request the rd lock for CInode::filelock from\nthe auth mds.0, the mds.0 will do the CInode::filelock state transation\nfrom excl --\u003e sync, but it need to revoke the Fxwb caps back from the\nclients.\n\nWhile the kernel client has aleady held the Fwb caps and waiting for\nthe getattr(Fsr).\n\nIt\u0027s deadlock!\n\nURL: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/55377",
"id": "GHSA-gcr7-hvf6-ph59",
"modified": "2025-04-14T21:32:20Z",
"published": "2025-04-14T21:32:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-49296"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/292b7a7275ce535a1abfa4dd0b2e586162aaae1e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/825978fd6a0defc3c29d8a38b6cea76a0938d21e"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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