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GHSA-G2FM-8HR4-J82H

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-02 14:39 – Updated: 2026-09-02 14:39
VLAI
Summary
EasyAdmin custom-action dispatcher bypasses access_control on other routes
Details

Summary

EasyAdmin serves all backend requests through a single dashboard route and, for custom actions (Action::linkToRoute() / MenuItem::linkToRoute()), swaps the executed controller based on the routeName query parameter on the kernel.controller event.

That swap happens after Symfony's security firewall has already evaluated access_control against the original dashboard URL, and the routeName value was not validated. As a result, a path-based access_control rule protecting the target route was never evaluated, so a low-privilege backend user could reach a more restricted route by name.

Impact

Any application where access_control (or another path-based Symfony security rule) protects some routes more strictly than the dashboard URL used to reach EasyAdmin. An attacker who can reach a single EasyAdmin URL and knows a target route's name can execute that route's controller, bypassing the path-based rule.

Only path-based protections are bypassed. Routes whose controller enforces its own authorization with #[IsGranted] / denyAccessUnlessGranted() remain protected, because those checks are recomputed against the swapped-in controller.

Patches

Fixed in 4.29.16 and 5.5.1. Before dispatching a custom-action route, EasyAdmin now re-evaluates the target route's access_control rule and denies the request if the current user is not granted access.

Workarounds

Add controller-level authorization (#[IsGranted] / denyAccessUnlessGranted()) to any sensitive route, since controller-level checks are still enforced. Upgrading is the recommended fix.

Credits

Reported by @TungNGo02.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "easycorp/easyadmin-bundle"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.29.16"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "easycorp/easyadmin-bundle"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "5.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.5.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-81892"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639",
      "CWE-862",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-02T14:39:11Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-31T21:17:52Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nEasyAdmin serves all backend requests through a single dashboard route and, for custom actions (`Action::linkToRoute()` / `MenuItem::linkToRoute()`), swaps the executed controller based on the `routeName` query parameter on the `kernel.controller` event.\n\nThat swap happens **after** Symfony\u0027s security firewall has already evaluated `access_control` against the original dashboard URL, and the `routeName` value was not validated. As a result, a path-based `access_control` rule protecting the *target* route was never evaluated, so a low-privilege backend user could reach a more restricted route by name.\n\n## Impact\n\nAny application where `access_control` (or another path-based Symfony security rule) protects some routes more strictly than the dashboard URL used to reach EasyAdmin. An attacker who can reach a single EasyAdmin URL and knows a target route\u0027s **name** can execute that route\u0027s controller, bypassing the path-based rule.\n\nOnly **path-based** protections are bypassed. Routes whose controller enforces its own authorization with `#[IsGranted]` / `denyAccessUnlessGranted()` remain protected, because those checks are recomputed against the swapped-in controller.\n\n## Patches\n\nFixed in **4.29.16** and **5.5.1**. Before dispatching a custom-action route, EasyAdmin now re-evaluates the target route\u0027s `access_control` rule and denies the request if the current user is not granted access.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nAdd controller-level authorization (`#[IsGranted]` / `denyAccessUnlessGranted()`) to any sensitive route, since controller-level checks are still enforced. Upgrading is the recommended fix.\n\n## Credits\n\nReported by @TungNGo02.",
  "id": "GHSA-g2fm-8hr4-j82h",
  "modified": "2026-09-02T14:39:11Z",
  "published": "2026-09-02T14:39:11Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/EasyCorp/EasyAdminBundle/security/advisories/GHSA-g2fm-8hr4-j82h"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-81892"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/EasyCorp/EasyAdminBundle/commit/03be45c6b7213c4c984a1d0542b7ec60359329f8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/EasyCorp/EasyAdminBundle/commit/6228dfef598d81eeb0baa35625e50812f3c77699"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/EasyCorp/EasyAdminBundle"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/EasyCorp/EasyAdminBundle/releases/tag/v4.29.16"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/EasyCorp/EasyAdminBundle/releases/tag/v5.5.1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/easycorp/easyadmin-bundle/CVE-2026-81892.yaml"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "EasyAdmin custom-action dispatcher bypasses access_control on other routes"
}



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