Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-88FW-V6X4-3F58

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-31 16:44 – Updated: 2026-07-31 16:44

Summary

Spring Data: Unbounded property-path cache keyed by externally-supplied path string

Details

src/main/java/org/springframework/data/mapping/context/PersistentPropertyPathFactory.java:175 · Unbounded Resource Allocation (Algorithmic DoS)

Impact

When a consuming module routes user-supplied dot-paths (sort parameters, projection paths, PATCH paths) through MappingContext.getPersistentPropertyPath(String, Class), each distinct string — including invalid ones — is cached forever. A remote attacker can send millions of requests with unique ?sort=aaaa<n> values and grow the heap until the service OOMs.

Description

PersistentPropertyPathFactory.propertyPaths (line 53) is a ConcurrentHashMap<TypeAndPath, PathResolution> populated by getPotentiallyCachedPath() (line 174-177) via computeIfAbsent. The key is (TypeInformation, rawPathString). Crucially, unresolvable paths are also cached (as PathResolution.unresolved, line 204) so that the same InvalidPersistentPropertyPath can be re-thrown — meaning every distinct garbage string an attacker sends creates a permanent entry. There is no eviction. This is reachable from AbstractMappingContext.getPersistentPropertyPath(String, Class) (AbstractMappingContext.java:345), which Spring Data REST and several store query mappers call with HTTP-request-derived sort/filter property names.

By contrast, the sibling SimplePropertyPath.cache was already hardened to use ConcurrentReferenceHashMap (soft refs); this cache was not given the same treatment.

Exploit scenario

Against a Spring Data REST endpoint, an attacker scripts GET /things?sort=<random-40-char-string> in a loop. Each request fails fast with InvalidPersistentPropertyPath, but each distinct random string leaves behind a TypeAndPath key, a PathResolution object holding the split segments list, and the source string in the map. After ~10M requests the JVM OOMs.

Preconditions

A downstream component (Spring Data REST, a store-specific QueryMapper, or application code) passes externally-supplied strings to MappingContext.getPersistentPropertyPath(String, ...)
No upstream rate-limiting or path-string validation

How to fix

A cache whose key can be derived from external input must be bounded. Replace propertyPaths (line 53) with a ConcurrentLruCache<TypeAndPath, PathResolution> of fixed capacity, or ConcurrentReferenceHashMap (matching the sibling SimplePropertyPath.cache). Additionally, do not cache PathResolution.unresolved results at all (line 204 in createPersistentPropertyPath) — re-computing a failed lookup is cheap, and caching negative results for arbitrary attacker strings is what makes this exploitable.

Adversarial verification

Verdict: TRUE_POSITIVE (confidence: 7/10) — unbounded hard-ref ConcurrentHashMap keyed by raw path string, caches unresolved entries (line 204), reachable via public MappingContext.getPersistentPropertyPath(String, ...); sibling PropertyPath cache was already converted to soft-refs but this one was missed. -3 confidence because the HTTP-input wiring lives in downstream modules (Spring Data REST / store mappers), not verifiable in this repo.

Code at the line — CONFIRMED - Line 53: private final Map<TypeAndPath, PathResolution> propertyPaths = new ConcurrentHashMap<>(); — plain CHM, hard refs, no eviction, no size bound. - Line 175: propertyPaths.computeIfAbsent(TypeAndPath.of(type, propertyPath), ...) — every distinct (type, string) pair is inserted. - Line 204: return PathResolution.unresolved(parts, segment, type, currentPath); — returned from inside computeIfAbsent's mapping function, so unresolvable paths are cached. The PathResolution retains the full attacker string (source = StringUtils.collectionToDelimitedString(parts, "."), line 452).

Callers within spring-data-commons - AbstractMappingContext.getPersistentPropertyPath(String, Class<?>) (line 345) and (String, TypeInformation<?>) (line 350) → persistentPropertyPathFactory.from(type, propertyPath) → straight into the unbounded cache. No validation, no PropertyPath.from gate. - This is the public MappingContext interface (MappingContext.java:174,186), documented to throw InvalidPersistentPropertyPath on bad input — i.e., the contract explicitly anticipates being called with possibly-invalid strings. - No in-repo caller routes HTTP input directly into the String overload. The Sort.Order.property → getPersistentPropertyPath(String, ...) bridge lives in store modules (Spring Data MongoDB QueryMapper, Spring Data REST sort translator). That wiring is out-of-repo as the finding states.

Protections — NONE on this cache Contrast: SimplePropertyPath.java:52 (the PropertyPath.from cache) uses ConcurrentReferenceHashMap (soft refs, GC-evictable). Spring already hardened the sibling cache against exactly this pattern. PersistentPropertyPathFactory.propertyPaths was not given the same treatment.

Stress-test Is this exclusion #3 (intended design)? The PathResolution javadoc (line 426-430) says caching unresolved paths is deliberate — to make repeated lookups of the same bad path cheap. But unbounded hard-ref caching of arbitrary attacker-chosen keys is not the intent; the sibling fix proves Spring considers this a bug class.

Severity

7.5 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.0.5"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.springframework.data:spring-data-commons"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.0.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.5.11"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.springframework.data:spring-data-commons"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.5.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.5.12"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.springframework.data:spring-data-commons"
      },
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        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.4.0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "3.4.13"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-41695"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-31T16:44:15Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-10T00:16:50Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "`src/main/java/org/springframework/data/mapping/context/PersistentPropertyPathFactory.java:175` \u00b7 Unbounded Resource Allocation (Algorithmic DoS)\n\n### Impact\n\nWhen a consuming module routes user-supplied dot-paths (sort parameters, projection paths, PATCH paths) through `MappingContext.getPersistentPropertyPath(String, Class)`, each distinct string \u2014 including invalid ones \u2014 is cached forever. A remote attacker can send millions of requests with unique `?sort=aaaa\u003cn\u003e` values and grow the heap until the service OOMs.\n\n### Description\n\n`PersistentPropertyPathFactory.propertyPaths` (line 53) is a `ConcurrentHashMap\u003cTypeAndPath, PathResolution\u003e` populated by `getPotentiallyCachedPath()` (line 174-177) via `computeIfAbsent`. The key is `(TypeInformation, rawPathString)`. Crucially, unresolvable paths are also cached (as `PathResolution.unresolved`, line 204) so that the same `InvalidPersistentPropertyPath` can be re-thrown \u2014 meaning every distinct garbage string an attacker sends creates a permanent entry. There is no eviction. This is reachable from `AbstractMappingContext.getPersistentPropertyPath(String, Class)` (`AbstractMappingContext.java:345`), which Spring Data REST and several store query mappers call with HTTP-request-derived sort/filter property names.\n\nBy contrast, the sibling `SimplePropertyPath.cache` was already hardened to use `ConcurrentReferenceHashMap` (soft refs); this cache was not given the same treatment.\n\n### Exploit scenario\n\nAgainst a Spring Data REST endpoint, an attacker scripts `GET /things?sort=\u003crandom-40-char-string\u003e` in a loop. Each request fails fast with `InvalidPersistentPropertyPath`, but each distinct random string leaves behind a `TypeAndPath` key, a `PathResolution` object holding the split segments list, and the source string in the map. After ~10M requests the JVM OOMs.\n\n### Preconditions\n\n- A downstream component (Spring Data REST, a store-specific `QueryMapper`, or application code) passes externally-supplied strings to `MappingContext.getPersistentPropertyPath(String, ...)`\n- No upstream rate-limiting or path-string validation\n\n### How to fix\n\nA cache whose key can be derived from external input must be bounded. Replace `propertyPaths` (line 53) with a `ConcurrentLruCache\u003cTypeAndPath, PathResolution\u003e` of fixed capacity, or `ConcurrentReferenceHashMap` (matching the sibling `SimplePropertyPath.cache`). Additionally, do not cache `PathResolution.unresolved` results at all (line 204 in `createPersistentPropertyPath`) \u2014 re-computing a failed lookup is cheap, and caching negative results for arbitrary attacker strings is what makes this exploitable.\n\n### Adversarial verification\n\n**Verdict:** TRUE_POSITIVE (confidence: 7/10) \u2014 unbounded hard-ref `ConcurrentHashMap` keyed by raw path string, caches unresolved entries (line 204), reachable via public `MappingContext.getPersistentPropertyPath(String, ...)`; sibling `PropertyPath` cache was already converted to soft-refs but this one was missed. -3 confidence because the HTTP-input wiring lives in downstream modules (Spring Data REST / store mappers), not verifiable in this repo.\n\n**Code at the line \u2014 CONFIRMED**\n- Line 53: `private final Map\u003cTypeAndPath, PathResolution\u003e propertyPaths = new ConcurrentHashMap\u003c\u003e();` \u2014 plain CHM, hard refs, no eviction, no size bound.\n- Line 175: `propertyPaths.computeIfAbsent(TypeAndPath.of(type, propertyPath), ...)` \u2014 every distinct `(type, string)` pair is inserted.\n- Line 204: `return PathResolution.unresolved(parts, segment, type, currentPath);` \u2014 returned from inside `computeIfAbsent`\u0027s mapping function, so unresolvable paths are cached. The `PathResolution` retains the full attacker string (`source = StringUtils.collectionToDelimitedString(parts, \".\")`, line 452).\n\n**Callers within spring-data-commons**\n- `AbstractMappingContext.getPersistentPropertyPath(String, Class\u003c?\u003e)` (line 345) and `(String, TypeInformation\u003c?\u003e)` (line 350) \u2192 `persistentPropertyPathFactory.from(type, propertyPath)` \u2192 straight into the unbounded cache. No validation, no `PropertyPath.from` gate.\n- This is the public `MappingContext` interface (`MappingContext.java:174,186`), documented to throw `InvalidPersistentPropertyPath` on bad input \u2014 i.e., the contract explicitly anticipates being called with possibly-invalid strings.\n- No in-repo caller routes HTTP input directly into the `String` overload. The `Sort.Order.property` \u2192 `getPersistentPropertyPath(String, ...)` bridge lives in store modules (Spring Data MongoDB `QueryMapper`, Spring Data REST sort translator). That wiring is out-of-repo as the finding states.\n\n**Protections \u2014 NONE on this cache**\nContrast: `SimplePropertyPath.java:52` (the `PropertyPath.from` cache) uses `ConcurrentReferenceHashMap` (soft refs, GC-evictable). Spring already hardened the sibling cache against exactly this pattern. `PersistentPropertyPathFactory.propertyPaths` was not given the same treatment.\n\n**Stress-test**\nIs this exclusion #3 (intended design)? The `PathResolution` javadoc (line 426-430) says caching unresolved paths is deliberate \u2014 to make repeated lookups of the *same* bad path cheap. But unbounded hard-ref caching of *arbitrary attacker-chosen* keys is not the intent; the sibling fix proves Spring considers this a bug class.",
  "id": "GHSA-88fw-v6x4-3f58",
  "modified": "2026-07-31T16:44:15Z",
  "published": "2026-07-31T16:44:15Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/spring-projects/security-advisories/security/advisories/GHSA-88fw-v6x4-3f58"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41695"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/spring-projects/spring-data-commons/commit/96e9475b963218bb702959524187342671f6b080"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/spring-projects/spring-data-commons/commit/a4f893b66c18c70f2b22f29a2b55097b73c89941"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/spring-projects/security-advisories"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/spring-projects/spring-data-commons/releases/tag/3.5.12"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/spring-projects/spring-data-commons/releases/tag/4.0.6"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://spring.io/security/cve-2026-41695"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Spring Data: Unbounded property-path cache keyed by externally-supplied path string"
}

CVE-2026-41695 (GCVE-0-2026-41695)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-06-09 23:47 – Updated: 2026-06-27 21:31

Title

Denial of Service in Spring Data Commons Property Path Resolution

Summary

Spring Data Commons applications may be vulnerable to denial of service through resource exhaustion when attacker-controlled property path strings are passed to MappingContext property path resolution. Affected versions: Spring Data Commons 4.0.0 through 4.0.5; 3.5.0 through 3.5.11; 3.4.0 through 3.4.14.

Severity

7.5 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

SSVC

Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator (v2.0.3)

CWE

CWE-400 - Uncontrolled Resource Consumption

Assigner

vmware

References

1 reference

URL	Tags
https://spring.io/security/cve-2026-41695

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
Spring	Spring Data Commons	Affected: 4.0.0 , < 4.0.5.1 (custom) Affected: 3.5.0 , < 3.5.11.1 (custom) Affected: 3.4.0 , < 3.4.15 (custom)

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Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.

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