GHSA-6G59-GM2V-QHVQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-07 20:22 – Updated: 2026-10-07 20:22
VLAI
Summary
PraisonAI: Crawl4AI/Chromium backend is also affected by the `web_crawl` SSRF validation bypass
Details

Summary

The DNS-rebinding / redirect SSRF bypass in PRAI-05 is not limited to the httpx/urllib backend. When crawl4ai (headless Chromium via Playwright) is installed, web_crawl auto-selects provider=crawl4ai, and the headless browser re-resolves DNS and follows redirects on its own — with no per-connection SSRF guard. Runtime-confirmed read-back of the internal canary via both DNS rebinding and redirect (provider: "crawl4ai"). Status: runtime-confirmed addendum to PRAI-05.

Details

Affected component

  • Package praisonaiagents 4.6.63. Backend selected when crawl4ai+Playwright are installed.
  • Files: src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/web_crawl_tools.py (_crawl_with_crawl4ai) and src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/crawl4ai_tools.py (standalone crawl wrappers).

Vulnerable code / root cause

Path: src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/web_crawl_tools.py

Function: _crawl_with_crawl4ai

Snippet:

async with AsyncWebCrawler() as crawler:
    for url in urls:
        result = await crawler.arun(url=url)   # headless browser: re-resolves DNS, follows redirects

Path: src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/crawl4ai_tools.py

Function: Crawl4AITools.crawl / crawl4ai

Snippet:

result = await crawler.arun(url=url, config=config)   # no _is_safe_crawl_url / no per-connect validation

Issue: the only SSRF check is the single pre-fetch _is_safe_crawl_url() on the initial URL string in web_crawl() (see PRAI-05). The headless browser then resolves and connects independently and follows redirects in-browser — no resolved-IP pinning, no per-hop/per-connect validation. Input (urls) is attacker/agent-controlled; the sink is crawler.arun(url=...); the guard is bypassed by DNS rebinding (TOCTOU) and by redirects (followed in-browser).

Attack flow / Why bypassed / Security boundary

Identical to PRAI-05: TOCTOU between the guard's resolution and the browser's connection; redirects followed in-browser; internal response returned as crawl content. See PRAI-05.

Proof of Concept

Environment

crawl4ai + Playwright Chromium installed in a dedicated runtime container (127.0.0.1:18081), same controlled internal canary + rebinding DNS. Runnable assets: PraisonAI-Runtime-Repro\runtime-files\ (docker-compose.crawl.yml).

Steps to reproduce

  1. SSRF-04-01-Crawl4AI-DNS-Rebind-Trigger → 127.0.0.1:18081:
POST /tool/web_crawl HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:18081
Content-Type: application/json

{"url":"http://rebind.lab:8081/secret"}
  1. Redirect variant SSRF-04-03-Crawl4AI-Redirect-Readback: {"url":"http://redirector:8082/redirect-to-internal"}.

Expected result

The crawl backend refuses internal destinations regardless of DNS timing/redirects.

Actual result

HTTP 200, "provider":"crawl4ai", response content contains PRAISONAI_INTERNAL_SECRET_CANARY_7f3a91 + FAKE_INTERNAL_TOKEN_DO_NOT_USE_7f3a91 for both the DNS-rebinding and the redirect payload.

Screenshots

Crawl4AI DNS rebinding read-back

The attacker-controlled rebind.lab URL is accepted by the Crawl4AI-backed web_crawl endpoint. PraisonAI returns the internal canary response body containing PRAISONAI_INTERNAL_SECRET_CANARY_7f3a91.

01-Crawl4AI-Burp-Readback

Crawl4AI DNS rebinding runtime evidence

The runtime log shows the Crawl4AI/Chromium backend resolving rebind.lab to an internal Docker IP during the fetch phase. The internal canary receives GET /secret from a headless Chrome user agent.

02-Crawl4AI-DNS-Log-And-Internal-Hit

Crawl4AI redirect read-back

The attacker-controlled redirector URL is accepted by the Crawl4AI-backed endpoint. PraisonAI follows the redirect and returns the internal canary response body.

03-Crawl4AI-Redirect-Readback

Crawl4AI redirect runtime evidence

The controlled redirector returns 302 -> http://internal-canary:8081/secret, and the internal canary receives GET /secret from the Crawl4AI/Chromium backend.

04-Crawl4AI-Redirect-Internal-Hit-Log

Impact

Same class as PRAI-05: read-back SSRF to internal/metadata services, now on the crawl4ai backend. Broadens the affected surface (the flaw is in the shared validate-without-pinning design, not one backend).

Suggested remediation

Resolve-once + IP-pin + per-connect validation must also cover the crawl4ai backend (constrain the headless browser to the validated IP, or allowlist crawl destinations).

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.6.77"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "praisonaiagents"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.6.78"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-61429"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-367",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-07T20:22:17Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe DNS-rebinding / redirect SSRF bypass in PRAI-05 is **not limited to the httpx/urllib backend**. When `crawl4ai` (headless Chromium via Playwright) is installed, `web_crawl` auto-selects `provider=crawl4ai`, and the headless browser re-resolves DNS and follows redirects on its own \u2014 with no per-connection SSRF guard. Runtime-confirmed read-back of the internal canary via both DNS rebinding and redirect (`provider: \"crawl4ai\"`). Status: runtime-confirmed addendum to PRAI-05.\n\n## Details\n\n### Affected component\n- Package `praisonaiagents` 4.6.63. Backend selected when `crawl4ai`+Playwright are installed.\n- Files: `src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/web_crawl_tools.py` (`_crawl_with_crawl4ai`) and `src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/crawl4ai_tools.py` (standalone crawl wrappers).\n\n### Vulnerable code / root cause\n\nPath:\n`src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/web_crawl_tools.py`\n\nFunction:\n`_crawl_with_crawl4ai`\n\nSnippet:\n```python\nasync with AsyncWebCrawler() as crawler:\n    for url in urls:\n        result = await crawler.arun(url=url)   # headless browser: re-resolves DNS, follows redirects\n```\n\nPath:\n`src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/crawl4ai_tools.py`\n\nFunction:\n`Crawl4AITools.crawl` / `crawl4ai`\n\nSnippet:\n```python\nresult = await crawler.arun(url=url, config=config)   # no _is_safe_crawl_url / no per-connect validation\n```\n\nIssue: the only SSRF check is the single pre-fetch `_is_safe_crawl_url()` on the initial URL string in `web_crawl()` (see PRAI-05). The headless browser then resolves and connects independently and follows redirects in-browser \u2014 no resolved-IP pinning, no per-hop/per-connect validation. Input (`urls`) is attacker/agent-controlled; the sink is `crawler.arun(url=...)`; the guard is bypassed by DNS rebinding (TOCTOU) and by redirects (followed in-browser).\n\n### Attack flow / Why bypassed / Security boundary\nIdentical to PRAI-05: TOCTOU between the guard\u0027s resolution and the browser\u0027s connection; redirects followed in-browser; internal response returned as crawl `content`. See PRAI-05.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n### Environment\n`crawl4ai` + Playwright Chromium installed in a dedicated runtime container (`127.0.0.1:18081`), same controlled internal canary + rebinding DNS. Runnable assets: `PraisonAI-Runtime-Repro\\runtime-files\\` (`docker-compose.crawl.yml`).\n\n### Steps to reproduce\n1. `SSRF-04-01-Crawl4AI-DNS-Rebind-Trigger` \u2192 `127.0.0.1:18081`:\n```http\nPOST /tool/web_crawl HTTP/1.1\nHost: 127.0.0.1:18081\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{\"url\":\"http://rebind.lab:8081/secret\"}\n```\n2. Redirect variant `SSRF-04-03-Crawl4AI-Redirect-Readback`: `{\"url\":\"http://redirector:8082/redirect-to-internal\"}`.\n\n### Expected result\nThe crawl backend refuses internal destinations regardless of DNS timing/redirects.\n\n### Actual result\nHTTP 200, `\"provider\":\"crawl4ai\"`, response `content` contains `PRAISONAI_INTERNAL_SECRET_CANARY_7f3a91` + `FAKE_INTERNAL_TOKEN_DO_NOT_USE_7f3a91` for both the DNS-rebinding and the redirect payload.\n\n### Screenshots\n\n**Crawl4AI DNS rebinding read-back**\n\nThe attacker-controlled `rebind.lab` URL is accepted by the Crawl4AI-backed `web_crawl` endpoint. PraisonAI returns the internal canary response body containing `PRAISONAI_INTERNAL_SECRET_CANARY_7f3a91`.\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1542\" height=\"763\" alt=\"01-Crawl4AI-Burp-Readback\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a03b3a1c-e382-4f67-8ea6-b766dceb4a69\" /\u003e\n\n**Crawl4AI DNS rebinding runtime evidence**\n\nThe runtime log shows the Crawl4AI/Chromium backend resolving `rebind.lab` to an internal Docker IP during the fetch phase. The internal canary receives `GET /secret` from a headless Chrome user agent.\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1659\" height=\"946\" alt=\"02-Crawl4AI-DNS-Log-And-Internal-Hit\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/d93db090-3e39-43d0-af3b-5d1d8f614db8\" /\u003e\n\n**Crawl4AI redirect read-back**\n\nThe attacker-controlled redirector URL is accepted by the Crawl4AI-backed endpoint. PraisonAI follows the redirect and returns the internal canary response body.\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1544\" height=\"771\" alt=\"03-Crawl4AI-Redirect-Readback\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/7d05c8aa-5bda-45bc-b94c-bef0bdcf055c\" /\u003e\n\n**Crawl4AI redirect runtime evidence**\n\nThe controlled redirector returns `302 -\u003e http://internal-canary:8081/secret`, and the internal canary receives `GET /secret` from the Crawl4AI/Chromium backend.\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1590\" height=\"920\" alt=\"04-Crawl4AI-Redirect-Internal-Hit-Log\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/dd9c0fec-3583-43ab-b83c-4470fa6aa409\" /\u003e\n\n\n## Impact\nSame class as PRAI-05: read-back SSRF to internal/metadata services, now on the crawl4ai backend. Broadens the affected surface (the flaw is in the shared validate-without-pinning design, not one backend).\n\n## Suggested remediation\nResolve-once + IP-pin + per-connect validation must also cover the crawl4ai backend (constrain the headless browser to the validated IP, or allowlist crawl destinations).",
  "id": "GHSA-6g59-gm2v-qhvq",
  "modified": "2026-10-07T20:22:17Z",
  "published": "2026-10-07T20:22:17Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-6g59-gm2v-qhvq"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61429"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/praisonai-before-ssrf-via-crawl4ai-chromium-backend"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "PraisonAI: Crawl4AI/Chromium backend is also affected by the `web_crawl` SSRF validation bypass"
}



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