{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/juev/nebula-mesh"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.3.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-47724"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-08T23:09:02Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "The `/api/v1/*` route surface trusts the bearer token alone for authorisation on most endpoints. The codebase itself admits this at `internal/api/hosts.go:384`: *\"API trusts the bearer token for authorisation; per-CA ownership is enforced only in the Web layer.\"*\n\nThe Web UI gates state-changing routes through `loadAccessibleCA` (`internal/web/cas.go`); CA-management endpoints in `internal/api/cas.go` ALSO have proper `canAccessCA` gates. **The gap is on the host, network, firewall, mobile-bundle, and most operator endpoints.** Combined with the per-operator CA model from ADR 0002, this gives any non-admin operator API key broad cross-tenant access \u2014 instant privilege escalation in the worst case.\n\n## Affected\nAll released versions prior to v0.3.4.\n\n## Exploit chain\n\n### A) Mint admin API key from any operator key (instant privilege escalation)\n`internal/api/operators.go:118` \u2014 `handleCreateOperatorAPIKey` does no admin check and no actor/target-operator ownership check. Any operator key can call it for any operator (including admins) and receive a fresh bearer.\n\n```\ncurl -X POST -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u003clow-priv-key\u003e\" \\\n  https://server/api/v1/operators/\u003cadmin-id\u003e/api-keys \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 -d \u0027{\"name\":\"oops\"}\u0027\n# Returns: {\"key\":\"\u003c32-byte admin bearer\u003e\",\"entry\":{...}}\n```\n\nReuse the returned key for subsequent requests \u2192 full admin.\n\n### B) Cross-operator host takeover via reenroll\n`internal/api/hosts.go:321,330` \u2192 `mintEnrollmentTokenForHost`. Looks up host by URL param, mints a single-use enrollment token, returns it. No ownership check.\n\n```\ncurl -X POST -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u003clow-priv-key\u003e\" \\\n  https://server/api/v1/hosts/\u003cvictim-host-id\u003e/reenroll\n# Returns: {\"enrollment_token\":\"\u003cuuid\u003e\",...}\n```\n\nCaller POSTs `/api/v1/enroll` with their own X25519 + Ed25519 keypairs. `enroll.go:175` overwrites `signing_pub_pem`; `SaveCertificateAndEnrollHost` overwrites the cert. Legitimate agent\u0027s next signed poll fails `bad_signature`. Attacker now owns the victim\u0027s Nebula identity.\n\n### C) Cross-tenant CRUD on hosts, networks, firewall\nThe same gap applies across:\n- `/api/v1/hosts*` \u2014 create, list, get, update, delete, block, unblock\n- `/api/v1/networks*` \u2014 create, list, get\n- `/api/v1/networks/{id}/firewall` \u2014 get, PUT\n- `/api/v1/hosts/{id}/mobile-bundle` (already filed as public issue #119)\n\nAll trust bearer-auth alone. Any operator can read or mutate any other operator\u0027s resources.\n\n## Affected operator-management handlers (in addition to A)\nBeyond `handleCreateOperatorAPIKey` (covered by A), `internal/api/operators.go` is missing admin gates on:\n- `handleListOperators` (line 66) \u2014 operator roster info disclosure\n- `handleDisableOperator` (line 79) \u2014 DoS / sabotage\n- `handleEnableOperator` (line 94) \u2014 re-enable disabled operators\n- `handleRevokeOperatorAPIKey` (line 157) \u2014 invalidate any operator\u0027s API keys\n- `handleListOperatorAPIKeys` (line 173) \u2014 API-key metadata disclosure\n\n`handleCreateOperator` (line 26) IS properly gated (`actorIsAdmin` at line 27).\n\n## NOT affected (verified)\n`internal/api/cas.go` properly gates every CA endpoint via `canAccessCA` (calls at lines 70, 176, 216) and admin shortcuts at lines 39, 82. An earlier description draft mistakenly listed `/api/v1/cas/{id}/rotate` as affected \u2014 that endpoint is properly protected. CAs are not in this gap.\n\n## Impact\n- Any non-admin operator \u2192 admin via one curl (A).\n- Any non-admin operator \u2192 ownership of any victim\u0027s hosts with cert + identity transfer (B).\n- Mass cross-tenant CRUD including firewall-rule mutation (C).\n- Any operator \u2192 disable/enable other operators, revoke their API keys, enumerate the operator roster.\n\nCVSS 3.1: AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H \u2014 9.6.\n\n## Suggested fix\nShared helpers in a new `internal/api/authz.go`, mirroring the Web layer\u0027s `loadAccessibleCA`:\n\n```go\nfunc (s *Server) requireAdmin(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) bool\nfunc (s *Server) requireOperatorAccess(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, operatorID string) bool\nfunc (s *Server) requireHostAccess(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, hostID string) (*models.Host, bool)\nfunc (s *Server) requireNetworkAccess(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, networkID string) (*models.Network, bool)\n```\n\nEach loads the resource, resolves its CA via `*.CAID`, accepts if `actorIsAdmin(ctx)` OR actor owns the CA. Reject `403 forbidden`; audit-log `api.\u003cresource\u003e.forbidden` with the reason.\n\nThe operator-management endpoints take `requireAdmin` instead (operator ownership doesn\u0027t map to CA ownership).\n\nApply at the top of every host-, network-, firewall-, mobile-bundle-touching API handler, plus the 5 operator endpoints listed above. The legacy config-key path retains admin (preserves backward compatibility); the broader legacy-fallback question is tracked separately as issue #121.\n\n## Test matrix\n- admin \u2192 all operations permitted\n- owning non-admin \u2192 operations on owned hosts/networks permitted\n- non-owner non-admin \u2192 403 + audit entry\n- legacy config-key \u2192 preserved (admin)\n- unauthenticated \u2192 existing 401 from middleware\n\n## Coordinated context\nSubsumes public issue #119 (mobile-bundle authz). Issue #121 (actor.go:40 legacy-admin fallback) is a separate concern tracked independently.",
  "id": "GHSA-598g-h2vc-h5vg",
  "modified": "2026-06-08T23:09:02Z",
  "published": "2026-06-08T23:09:02Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/juev/nebula-mesh/security/advisories/GHSA-598g-h2vc-h5vg"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh/commit/9d8bcd7667ecd0c2975cc71fb35a02fe131f76f2"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/juev/nebula-mesh"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "nebula-mesh: API endpoints lack ownership checks, enabling cross-operator privilege escalation"
}