GHSA-3C8X-FP36-75XV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-21 09:31 – Updated: 2026-09-21 09:31
VLAI
Details

The CompressionFilter class uses ZLib to deflate and inflate data sent and received. When we inflate incoming data, the filter does not control the resulting size, and create a buffer no matter what.

Some compressed data may have a compression ration greater than 1 thousand, leading to an exhaustion of the application memory, as we don't control the deflated size.

The fix adds such a control by allowing the application developer to provide a fixed size limit, which when reached throws an exception. It also allows the user to provide a compression ratio that should not be exceeded, protected the application from small inflated files that inflate in gigantic files, but with a grace limit for the resulting size (1Mb) to avoid false positive (like a very small file inflating with a high ratio, but resulting with a acceptable size, like a few thousands bytes)

For application using this feature, it is highly recommended to create the CompressionFilter and to pass the maximum limit as a forth constructor parameter, maxDecompressedSize:

public CompressionFilter(final boolean compressInbound, final boolean compressOutbound, final int compressionLevel, final int maxDecompressedSize)Optionally one can also provide a maxDecompressRatio fifth parameter, and a decompressRatioMinSize sixth parameter to allow small inflated files with a high compression ratio to still be accepted.

Here are the additional constructor:

public CompressionFilter(final boolean compressInbound, final boolean compressOutbound,

        final int compressionLevel, final int maxDecompressedSize,



        final long maxDecompressRatio, final long decompressRatioMinSize)

Also note that a fluent API has been added to spare the users the pain to call a constructor with that many parameters:

CompressionFilter compressionFilter = new CompressionFilter()

.setCompressionLevel(Zlib.COMPRESSION_MAX)

.setMaxDecompressedSize(1_000_000)

.setMaxDecompressRatio(100).

.setDecompressRatioMinSize(100_000); 

Applications using Apache MINA are advised to upgrade and configure their CompressionFilter instance.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-47321"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-409"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-21T08:16:37Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The CompressionFilter class uses ZLib to deflate and inflate data sent and received. When we inflate incoming data, the filter does not control the resulting size, and create a buffer no matter what.\n\nSome compressed data may have a compression ration greater than 1 thousand, leading to an exhaustion of the application memory, as we don\u0027t control the deflated size.\n\n\n\n\nThe fix adds such a control by allowing the application developer to provide a fixed size limit, which when reached throws an exception. It also allows the user to provide a compression ratio that should not be exceeded, protected the application from small inflated files that inflate in gigantic files, but with a grace limit for the resulting size (1Mb) to avoid false positive (like a very small file inflating with a high ratio, but resulting with a acceptable size, like a few thousands bytes)\n\n\n\n\nFor application using this feature, it is highly recommended to create the\u00a0CompressionFilter and to pass the maximum limit as a forth constructor parameter, maxDecompressedSize:\n\n\n\n\npublic CompressionFilter(final boolean compressInbound, final boolean compressOutbound, final int compressionLevel, final int maxDecompressedSize)Optionally one can also provide a\u00a0maxDecompressRatio\u00a0fifth parameter, and a decompressRatioMinSize\u00a0sixth parameter to allow small inflated files with a high compression ratio to still be accepted.\n\n\n\n\nHere are the additional constructor:\n\n\n\n\n\n\npublic CompressionFilter(final boolean compressInbound, final boolean compressOutbound,\n\n\n\n            final int compressionLevel, final int maxDecompressedSize,\n\n\n\n            final long maxDecompressRatio, final long decompressRatioMinSize)\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nAlso note that a fluent API has been added to spare the users the pain to call a constructor with that many parameters:\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\u2003CompressionFilter compressionFilter = new CompressionFilter()\n\n\u2003\u2003\u2003                                             .setCompressionLevel(Zlib.COMPRESSION_MAX)\n\n\u00a0                                               .setMaxDecompressedSize(1_000_000)\n\n\u00a0                                               .setMaxDecompressRatio(100).\n\n\u00a0                                               .setDecompressRatioMinSize(100_000);\u00a0\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nApplications using Apache MINA are advised to upgrade and configure their CompressionFilter instance.",
  "id": "GHSA-3c8x-fp36-75xv",
  "modified": "2026-09-21T09:31:08Z",
  "published": "2026-09-21T09:31:08Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-47321"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/y7xj1bl8qo47p9bktb11hg5v6k1d4dyj"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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