GHSA-36MM-W85J-3Q2J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-29 15:08 – Updated: 2026-07-29 15:08Summary
Description An XML External Entity Injection (CWE-611) vulnerability in veraPDF allows a remote attacker to read arbitrary files on the server file system and perform Server-Side Request Forgery by submitting a crafted PDF containing a malicious XFA stream. This affects all current versions of veraPDF-validation.
Details
The vulnerability resides in veraPDF-validation validation-model/src/main/java/org/verapdf/gf/model/impl/pd/GFPDAcroForm.java within the getdynamicRender() method. This method retrieves the /XFA entry from the PDF's /AcroForm dictionary, decodes the embedded XML stream, and parses it to extract the <dynamicRender> element value.
The vulnerability stems from the use of a default-configured DocumentBuilderFactory to parse fully attacker-controlled XML:
- The factory is created via DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance() with no security features enabled. disallow-doctype-decl, external-general-entities, external-parameter-entities, and FEATURE_SECURE_PROCESSING are all left at their insecure defaults.
- The input passed to builder.parse() is the decoded /XFA stream taken directly from the untrusted PDF.
- The text content of the <dynamicRender> node is returned to the validation model. Note that the shipped PDF/UA-1 rule (dynamicRender != 'required') consumes this value but does not echo it into the report output, so reliable exfiltration requires the out-of-band parameter-entity technique described under Impact rather than in-band reflection.
Impact
This impacts all current releases of the veraPDF validation-model module.
Successful exploitation requires only that the target validate an attacker-supplied PDF against the PDF/UA-1 profile (or via flavour auto-detection on a PDF that declares PDF/UA-1 conformance), since getdynamicRender() is invoked by the dynamicRender != 'required' rule in the bundled PDF/UA-1 profile. No additional configuration or operator action is required.
Proposed Patch
Harden the DocumentBuilderFactory in validation-model/src/main/java/org/verapdf/gf/model/impl/pd/GFPDAcroForm.java per the OWASP XXE Prevention Cheat Sheet to disallow DOCTYPE outright.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.30.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.verapdf:validation-model"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.17.35"
},
{
"fixed": "1.30.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.31.70"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.verapdf:validation-model"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.31.1"
},
{
"fixed": "1.31.71"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.30.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.verapdf:validation-model-jakarta"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.17.35"
},
{
"fixed": "1.30.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.31.70"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.verapdf:validation-model-jakarta"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.31.1"
},
{
"fixed": "1.31.71"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-54079"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-611"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-29T15:08:17Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary \n \n**Description**\nAn XML External Entity Injection (CWE-611) vulnerability in veraPDF allows a remote attacker to read arbitrary files on the server file system and perform Server-Side Request Forgery by submitting a crafted PDF containing a malicious XFA stream. This affects all current versions of veraPDF-validation. \n \n## Details \nThe vulnerability resides in veraPDF-validation `validation-model/src/main/java/org/verapdf/gf/model/impl/pd/GFPDAcroForm.java` within the `getdynamicRender()` method. This method retrieves the /XFA entry from the PDF\u0027s /AcroForm dictionary, decodes the embedded XML stream, and parses it to extract the `\u003cdynamicRender\u003e` element value. \n \nThe vulnerability stems from the use of a default-configured `DocumentBuilderFactory` to parse fully attacker-controlled XML: \n- The factory is created via `DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance()` with no security features enabled. disallow-doctype-decl, external-general-entities, external-parameter-entities, and FEATURE_SECURE_PROCESSING are all left at their insecure defaults. \n- The input passed to `builder.parse()` is the decoded /XFA stream taken directly from the untrusted PDF. \n- The text content of the `\u003cdynamicRender\u003e` node is returned to the validation model. Note that the shipped PDF/UA-1 rule (`dynamicRender != \u0027required\u0027`) consumes this value but does not echo it into the report output, so reliable exfiltration requires the out-of-band parameter-entity technique described under Impact rather than in-band reflection. \n \n## Impact \n \nThis impacts all current releases of the veraPDF validation-model module. \n \nSuccessful exploitation requires only that the target validate an attacker-supplied PDF against the PDF/UA-1 profile (or via flavour auto-detection on a PDF that declares PDF/UA-1 conformance), since `getdynamicRender()` is invoked by the `dynamicRender != \u0027required\u0027` rule in the bundled PDF/UA-1 profile. No additional configuration or operator action is required. \n \n## Proposed Patch \n \nHarden the `DocumentBuilderFactory` in `validation-model/src/main/java/org/verapdf/gf/model/impl/pd/GFPDAcroForm.java` per the OWASP XXE Prevention Cheat Sheet to disallow DOCTYPE outright.",
"id": "GHSA-36mm-w85j-3q2j",
"modified": "2026-07-29T15:08:17Z",
"published": "2026-07-29T15:08:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/veraPDF/veraPDF-validation/security/advisories/GHSA-36mm-w85j-3q2j"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/veraPDF/veraPDF-validation/pull/730"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/veraPDF/veraPDF-validation/commit/94caa46c1a594512247fbd46c808edae39469542"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/veraPDF/veraPDF-validation/commit/cacd9436d0de40b0e58cc7d2dbb06451619e61ec"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/veraPDF/veraPDF-validation"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "veraPDF Validation XXE via XFA"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.