FKIE_CVE-2026-9058
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-05-25 14:16 - Updated: 2026-07-23 12:18
Severity
Summary
For untrusted certificates that contain the "Authority Information Access - caIssuers URI" extension, Szafir SDK will automatically download the parent CA certificate from the specified URL and will import it to its trust store as a "nonqualified" certificate. In such a case, Szafir SDK returns a success status code of 0 ("Positively verified") upon successful cryptographic verification and a certificate status of "nonqualified".
For other types of untrusted certificates, Szafir SDK returns a success status code of 0 ("Positively verified") upon successful cryptographic verification and a certificate status of "nondetermined".
This may lead integrating applications to incorrectly treat the digital signature as valid despite an untrusted certificate chain. This flaw enables authentication bypass and user impersonation:
(1) in use-cases other than qualified certificate authentication, or
(2) if the qualified certificate authentication use-case is not correctly implemented by the integrating application.
This issue was fixed in version 1.8.463.2.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Szafir SDK",
"vendor": "Krajowa Izba Rozliczeniowa",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "1.8.463.2",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"source": "cvd@cert.pl"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "For untrusted certificates that contain the \"Authority Information Access - caIssuers URI\" extension, Szafir SDK will automatically download the parent CA certificate from the specified URL and will import it to its trust store as a \"nonqualified\" certificate. In such a case, Szafir SDK returns a success status code of 0 (\"Positively verified\") upon successful cryptographic verification and a certificate status of \"nonqualified\".\n\nFor other types of untrusted certificates, Szafir SDK returns a success status code of 0 (\"Positively verified\") upon successful cryptographic verification and a certificate status of \"nondetermined\".\n\nThis may lead integrating applications to incorrectly treat the digital signature as valid despite an untrusted certificate chain. This flaw enables authentication bypass and user impersonation:\n(1) in use-cases other than qualified certificate authentication, or\n(2) if the qualified certificate authentication use-case is not correctly implemented by the integrating application.\n\nThis issue was fixed in version 1.8.463.2."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "El SDK de Szafir devuelve un c\u00f3digo de estado de \u00e9xito del proceso de verificaci\u00f3n de firma digital criptogr\u00e1fica (es decir, /VerifyingTaskItem/Signature/VerificationResult/Result/@code == 0, \u0027Verificado positivamente\u0027) incluso cuando el estado de confianza del certificado del firmante no pudo establecerse (es decir, /VerifyingTaskItem/Signature/VerificationResult/SigningCertificate/@certificateType == \u0027nondetermined\u0027). Esto provoca que las aplicaciones consumidoras traten incorrectamente la firma como v\u00e1lida a pesar de una cadena de certificados no verificada, lo que permite la omisi\u00f3n de autenticaci\u00f3n y la suplantaci\u00f3n de identidad de usuario.\n\nEste problema se solucion\u00f3 en la versi\u00f3n 463."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-9058",
"lastModified": "2026-07-23T12:18:52.540",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV40": [
{
"cvssData": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "NONE",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"baseScore": 9.3,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"source": "cvd@cert.pl",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-9058",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "yes"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-05-26T15:57:55.171237Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-05-25T14:16:27.977",
"references": [
{
"source": "cvd@cert.pl",
"url": "https://cert.pl/posts/2026/05/CVE-2026-9058"
},
{
"source": "cvd@cert.pl",
"url": "https://www.elektronicznypodpis.pl/"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "cvd@cert.pl",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-295"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-393"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-637"
}
],
"source": "cvd@cert.pl",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
}
Loading…
Loading…
Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Loading…
The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Loading…
Loading…