FKIE_CVE-2025-9785
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2025-09-03 05:15 - Updated: 2026-09-26 00:10
Severity
Summary
PaperCut Print Deploy is an optional component that integrates with PaperCut NG/MF which simplifies printer deployment and management. When the component is deployed to an environment, the customer has an option to configure the system to use a self-signed certificate. If the customer does not fully configure the system to leverage the trust database on the clients, it opens up the communication between clients and the server to man-in-the-middle attacks.
It was discovered that certain parts of the documentation related to the configuration of SSL in Print Deploy were lacking, which could potentially contribute to a misconfiguration of the Print Deploy client installation. PaperCut strongly recommends to use valid certificates to secure installations and to follow the updated documentation to ensure the correct SSL configuration. Those who use private CAs and/or self-signed certificates should make sure to copy their Certification Authority certificate, or their self signed certificate if using only one, to the trust store of their operating system and to the Java key store
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"Print Deploy"
],
"platforms": [
"Windows",
"MacOS"
],
"product": "Print Deploy",
"vendor": "PaperCut",
"versions": [
{
"changes": [
{
"at": "1.9.2917",
"status": "unaffected"
}
],
"lessThan": "1.9.2917",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "custom"
}
]
}
],
"source": "eb41dac7-0af8-4f84-9f6d-0272772514f4"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "PaperCut Print Deploy is an optional component that integrates with PaperCut NG/MF which simplifies printer deployment and management. When the component is deployed to an environment, the customer has an option to configure the system to use a self-signed certificate. If the customer does not fully configure the system to leverage the trust database on the clients, it opens up the communication between clients and the server to man-in-the-middle attacks.\u00a0\n\nIt was discovered that certain parts of the documentation related to the configuration of SSL in Print Deploy were lacking, which could potentially contribute to a misconfiguration of the Print Deploy client installation. PaperCut strongly recommends to use valid certificates to secure installations and to follow the updated documentation to ensure the correct SSL configuration. Those who use private CAs and/or self-signed certificates should make sure to copy their Certification Authority certificate, or their self signed certificate if using only one, to the trust store of their operating system and to the Java key store"
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "PaperCut Print Deploy es un componente opcional que se integra con PaperCut NG/MF, lo que simplifica la implementaci\u00f3n y gesti\u00f3n de impresoras. Cuando el componente se implementa en un entorno, el cliente tiene la opci\u00f3n de configurar el sistema para usar un certificado autofirmado. Si el cliente no configura completamente el sistema para aprovechar la base de datos de confianza en los clientes, esto abre la comunicaci\u00f3n entre los clientes y el servidor a ataques man-in-the-middle.\n\nSe descubri\u00f3 que ciertas partes de la documentaci\u00f3n relacionada con la configuraci\u00f3n de SSL en Print Deploy eran deficientes, lo que podr\u00eda contribuir a una configuraci\u00f3n incorrecta de la instalaci\u00f3n del cliente de Print Deploy. PaperCut recomienda encarecidamente usar certificados v\u00e1lidos para proteger las instalaciones y seguir la documentaci\u00f3n actualizada para asegurar la configuraci\u00f3n SSL correcta. Aquellos que usan CA privadas y/o certificados autofirmados deben asegurarse de copiar su certificado de Autoridad de Certificaci\u00f3n, o su certificado autofirmado si usan solo uno, al almac\u00e9n de confianza de su sistema operativo y al almac\u00e9n de claves de Java."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2025-9785",
"lastModified": "2026-09-26T00:10:00.127",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV40": [
{
"cvssData": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
"attackVector": "ADJACENT",
"availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"baseScore": 7.7,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"source": "eb41dac7-0af8-4f84-9f6d-0272772514f4",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2025-9785",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2025-09-04T03:55:27.125442Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2025-09-03T05:15:30.910",
"references": [
{
"source": "eb41dac7-0af8-4f84-9f6d-0272772514f4",
"url": "https://www.papercut.com/kb/Main/papercut-ng-mf-security-bulletin-september-2025/"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "eb41dac7-0af8-4f84-9f6d-0272772514f4",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-295"
}
],
"source": "eb41dac7-0af8-4f84-9f6d-0272772514f4",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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