FKIE_CVE-2025-65083
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2025-11-17 16:15 - Updated: 2026-10-07 21:10
Severity
Summary
GoSign Desktop through 2.4.1 disables TLS certificate validation when configured to use a proxy server. This can be problematic if the GoSign Desktop user selects an arbitrary proxy server without consideration of whether outbound HTTPS connections from the proxy server to Internet servers succeed even for untrusted or invalid server certificates. In this scenario (which is outside of the product's design objectives), integrity protection could be bypassed. In typical cases of a proxy server for outbound HTTPS traffic from an enterprise, those connections would not succeed. (Admittedly, the usual expectation is that a client application is configured to trust an enterprise CA and does not set SSL_VERIFY_NONE.) Also, it is of course unsafe to place ~/.gosign in the home directory of an untrusted user and then have other users execute downloaded files.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "GoSign Desktop",
"vendor": "Tinexta Infocert",
"versions": [
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "2.4.1",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "custom"
}
]
}
],
"source": "cve@mitre.org"
}
],
"cveTags": [
{
"sourceIdentifier": "cve@mitre.org",
"tags": [
"disputed"
]
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "GoSign Desktop through 2.4.1 disables TLS certificate validation when configured to use a proxy server. This can be problematic if the GoSign Desktop user selects an arbitrary proxy server without consideration of whether outbound HTTPS connections from the proxy server to Internet servers succeed even for untrusted or invalid server certificates. In this scenario (which is outside of the product\u0027s design objectives), integrity protection could be bypassed. In typical cases of a proxy server for outbound HTTPS traffic from an enterprise, those connections would not succeed. (Admittedly, the usual expectation is that a client application is configured to trust an enterprise CA and does not set SSL_VERIFY_NONE.) Also, it is of course unsafe to place ~/.gosign in the home directory of an untrusted user and then have other users execute downloaded files."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "GoSign Desktop hasta la versi\u00f3n 2.4.1 deshabilita la validaci\u00f3n de certificados TLS cuando est\u00e1 configurado para usar un servidor proxy. Esto puede ser problem\u00e1tico si el usuario de GoSign Desktop selecciona un servidor proxy arbitrario sin considerar si las conexiones HTTPS salientes desde el servidor proxy a los servidores de Internet tienen \u00e9xito incluso para certificados de servidor no confiables o inv\u00e1lidos. En este escenario (lo cual est\u00e1 fuera de los objetivos de dise\u00f1o del producto), la protecci\u00f3n de integridad podr\u00eda ser eludida. En casos t\u00edpicos de un servidor proxy para tr\u00e1fico HTTPS saliente desde una empresa, esas conexiones no tendr\u00edan \u00e9xito. (Es cierto que la expectativa habitual es que una aplicaci\u00f3n cliente est\u00e9 configurada para confiar en una CA empresarial y no establezca SSL_VERIFY_NONE.) Adem\u00e1s, es por supuesto inseguro colocar ~/.gosign en el directorio de inicio de un usuario no confiable y luego hacer que otros usuarios ejecuten archivos descargados."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2025-65083",
"lastModified": "2026-10-07T21:10:00.200",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 3.2,
"baseSeverity": "LOW",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "LOW",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "CHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.4,
"impactScore": 1.4,
"source": "cve@mitre.org",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2025-65083",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "poc"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2025-11-17T16:11:32.993514Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2025-11-17T16:15:51.007",
"references": [
{
"source": "cve@mitre.org",
"url": "https://securityaffairs.com/184672/hacking/multiple-vulnerabilities-in-gosign-desktop-lead-to-remote-code-execution.html"
},
{
"source": "cve@mitre.org",
"url": "https://www.firma.infocert.it/prodotti/gosign"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "cve@mitre.org",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-295"
}
],
"source": "cve@mitre.org",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
Loading…
Loading…
Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Loading…
Loading…
The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Loading…
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
Loading…