CVE-2026-84179 (GCVE-0-2026-84179)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-14 13:57 – Updated: 2026-09-14 19:49
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Apache Storm Nimbus, Apache Storm UI: Disclosure of Unredacted Merged Daemon Configuration via the Topology Page
Summary
Description
getTopologyPageInfo merged the Nimbus daemon configuration with the topology's own configuration and returned the result without redaction in the topology_conf field of TopologyPageInfo. The Storm UI copied that value verbatim into the configuration field of GET /api/v1/topology/{id} and of the corresponding metrics endpoint.
Where the cluster is configured with them, the merged map includes storm.zookeeper.auth.payload, which Storm's own documentation directs operators to keep in storm-cluster-auth.yaml under permissions that deny access from workers, together with the keystore and truststore passwords for the Thrift, Netty and ZooKeeper TLS configuration, and any plugin key whose name denotes a secret.
getTopologyPageInfo is a topology read-only operation. Under SimpleACLAuthorizer a principal listed in topology.readonly.users or topology.readonly.groups could therefore read daemon credentials that the dedicated cluster configuration API, getNimbusConf, redacts and that is gated on nimbus.users instead. The sibling operations that exist to serve configuration were masked; the topology page, which merges in strictly more daemon state, was not.
Mitigation
Upgrade to 3.1.0, where credential-bearing values are masked before any configuration is served over the Nimbus API.
Users who cannot upgrade immediately should remove any principal that is not trusted with cluster credentials from topology.readonly.users, topology.readonly.groups, topology.users and topology.groups, and should rotate the ZooKeeper authentication payload and any TLS keystore or truststore passwords that were reachable through the topology page.
Credit
Wanxin Yin (yaklang.io) reported this issue to the Apache Security Team.
Severity
6.5 (Medium)
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-09-14 19:48 UTC
CWE
Assigner
References
2 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://lists.apache.org/thread/3pj6tf6xq8l6f661k… | vendor-advisory |
| http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/0… |
Impacted products
2 products
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apache Software Foundation | Apache Storm Nimbus |
Affected:
3.0.0 , < 3.1.0
(semver)
|
guessed | |
| Apache Software Foundation | Apache Storm UI |
Affected:
3.0.0 , < 3.1.0
(semver)
|
guessed |
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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