{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://repo.hex.pm",
          "cpes": [
            "cpe:2.3:a:elixir-mint:mint:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
          ],
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "modules": [
            "\u0027Elixir.Mint.HTTP1.Parse\u0027",
            "\u0027Elixir.Mint.HTTP1\u0027"
          ],
          "packageName": "mint",
          "packageURL": "pkg:hex/mint",
          "product": "mint",
          "programFiles": [
            "lib/mint/http1/parse.ex",
            "lib/mint/http1.ex"
          ],
          "programRoutines": [
            {
              "name": "\u0027Elixir.Mint.HTTP1.Parse\u0027:chunk_size/1"
            },
            {
              "name": "\u0027Elixir.Mint.HTTP1.Parse\u0027:ignore_until_crlf/1"
            },
            {
              "name": "\u0027Elixir.Mint.HTTP1\u0027:decode_body/5"
            }
          ],
          "repo": "https://github.com/elixir-mint/mint",
          "vendor": "elixir-mint",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "1.10.1",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0.1.0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://github.com",
          "cpes": [
            "cpe:2.3:a:elixir-mint:mint:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
          ],
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "modules": [
            "\u0027Elixir.Mint.HTTP1.Parse\u0027",
            "\u0027Elixir.Mint.HTTP1\u0027"
          ],
          "packageName": "elixir-mint/mint",
          "packageURL": "pkg:github/elixir-mint/mint",
          "product": "mint",
          "programFiles": [
            "lib/mint/http1/parse.ex",
            "lib/mint/http1.ex"
          ],
          "programRoutines": [
            {
              "name": "\u0027Elixir.Mint.HTTP1.Parse\u0027:chunk_size/1"
            },
            {
              "name": "\u0027Elixir.Mint.HTTP1.Parse\u0027:ignore_until_crlf/1"
            },
            {
              "name": "\u0027Elixir.Mint.HTTP1\u0027:decode_body/5"
            }
          ],
          "repo": "https://github.com/elixir-mint/mint",
          "vendor": "elixir-mint",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "c82377838dc6e275ef40bafa664fbcdf50270c60",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "60089586ec7adc9fddb09f69a2f5919ba9ac7f33",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "configurations": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "supportingMedia": [
            {
              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/html",
              "value": "\u003cp\u003eExploitation requires a deployment topology in which an RFC-strict HTTP/1 intermediary (proxy, load balancer, or WAF) sits between the Mint client and the attacker-influenced origin, and HTTP/1 connections between the client and the intermediary are reused across requests (keep-alive with connection pooling). Mint clients that talk directly to an origin without an intermediary, or that do not reuse connections, are not exploitable for response-queue poisoning even if the vulnerable parsing behavior is present.\u003c/p\u003e"
            },
            {
              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/markdown",
              "value": "Exploitation requires a deployment topology in which an RFC-strict HTTP/1 intermediary (proxy, load balancer, or WAF) sits between the Mint client and the attacker-influenced origin, and HTTP/1 connections between the client and the intermediary are reused across requests (keep-alive with connection pooling). Mint clients that talk directly to an origin without an intermediary, or that do not reuse connections, are not exploitable for response-queue poisoning even if the vulnerable parsing behavior is present."
            }
          ],
          "value": "Exploitation requires a deployment topology in which an RFC-strict HTTP/1 intermediary (proxy, load balancer, or WAF) sits between the Mint client and the attacker-influenced origin, and HTTP/1 connections between the client and the intermediary are reused across requests (keep-alive with connection pooling). Mint clients that talk directly to an origin without an intermediary, or that do not reuse connections, are not exploitable for response-queue poisoning even if the vulnerable parsing behavior is present."
        }
      ],
      "cpeApplicability": [
        {
          "nodes": [
            {
              "cpeMatch": [
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:elixir-mint:mint:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "1.10.1",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "0.1.0",
                  "vulnerable": true
                }
              ],
              "negate": false,
              "operator": "OR"
            }
          ],
          "operator": "AND"
        }
      ],
      "credits": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "finder",
          "value": "Eurico Nicacio"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "reporter",
          "value": "Eurico Nicacio"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "remediation developer",
          "value": "Eric Meadows-J\u00f6nsson"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "remediation reviewer",
          "value": "Andrea Leopardi"
        }
      ],
      "dateAssigned": "2026-09-19T15:55:00.000Z",
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "supportingMedia": [
            {
              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/html",
              "value": "\u003cp\u003eInconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests (\u0027HTTP Request/Response Smuggling\u0027) vulnerability in elixir-mint mint allows a malicious HTTP/1 server to desynchronize a strict intermediary and the Mint client on a pooled connection, enabling response-queue poisoning against subsequent requests that share the connection.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ccode\u003eMint.HTTP1.Parse.chunk_size/1\u003c/code\u003e in \u003ccode\u003elib/mint/http1/parse.ex\u003c/code\u003e stops at the first non-hexadecimal byte of a chunked response\u0027s chunk-size line and returns the remainder unexamined. \u003ccode\u003eMint.HTTP1.decode_body/5\u003c/code\u003e in \u003ccode\u003elib/mint/http1.ex\u003c/code\u003e then discards every byte up to the CRLF with \u003ccode\u003eParse.ignore_until_crlf/1\u003c/code\u003e, so the accepted grammar is a run of hex digits followed by arbitrary bytes, where RFC 9112 permits only a \u003ccode\u003e;\u003c/code\u003e-introduced chunk extension. Lines such as \u003ccode\u003e5ZZZZZ\u003c/code\u003e and \u003ccode\u003e5 9\u003c/code\u003e are accepted as chunk size 5, and \u003ccode\u003e0ZZZZ\u003c/code\u003e is accepted as the terminating chunk that ends the message body. An RFC-strict intermediary rejects such a line while Mint accepts it, so the two disagree on chunk boundaries and on where the response ends.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis issue affects mint: from 0.1.0 before 1.10.1.\u003c/p\u003e"
            },
            {
              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/markdown",
              "value": "Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests (\u0027HTTP Request/Response Smuggling\u0027) vulnerability in elixir-mint mint allows a malicious HTTP/1 server to desynchronize a strict intermediary and the Mint client on a pooled connection, enabling response-queue poisoning against subsequent requests that share the connection.\n\n`Mint.HTTP1.Parse.chunk_size/1` in `lib/mint/http1/parse.ex` stops at the first non-hexadecimal byte of a chunked response\u0027s chunk-size line and returns the remainder unexamined. `Mint.HTTP1.decode_body/5` in `lib/mint/http1.ex` then discards every byte up to the CRLF with `Parse.ignore_until_crlf/1`, so the accepted grammar is a run of hex digits followed by arbitrary bytes, where RFC 9112 permits only a `;`-introduced chunk extension. Lines such as `5ZZZZZ` and `5 9` are accepted as chunk size 5, and `0ZZZZ` is accepted as the terminating chunk that ends the message body. An RFC-strict intermediary rejects such a line while Mint accepts it, so the two disagree on chunk boundaries and on where the response ends.\n\nThis issue affects mint: from 0.1.0 before 1.10.1."
            }
          ],
          "value": "Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests (\u0027HTTP Request/Response Smuggling\u0027) vulnerability in elixir-mint mint allows a malicious HTTP/1 server to desynchronize a strict intermediary and the Mint client on a pooled connection, enabling response-queue poisoning against subsequent requests that share the connection.\n\nMint.HTTP1.Parse.chunk_size/1 in lib/mint/http1/parse.ex stops at the first non-hexadecimal byte of a chunked response\u0027s chunk-size line and returns the remainder unexamined. Mint.HTTP1.decode_body/5 in lib/mint/http1.ex then discards every byte up to the CRLF with Parse.ignore_until_crlf/1, so the accepted grammar is a run of hex digits followed by arbitrary bytes, where RFC 9112 permits only a ;-introduced chunk extension. Lines such as 5ZZZZZ and 5 9 are accepted as chunk size 5, and 0ZZZZ is accepted as the terminating chunk that ends the message body. An RFC-strict intermediary rejects such a line while Mint accepts it, so the two disagree on chunk boundaries and on where the response ends.\n\nThis issue affects mint: from 0.1.0 before 1.10.1."
        }
      ],
      "impacts": [
        {
          "capecId": "CAPEC-273",
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "supportingMedia": [
                {
                  "base64": false,
                  "type": "text/html",
                  "value": "\u003cp\u003eA malicious or attacker-influenced HTTP/1 origin behind an RFC-strict intermediary can make the intermediary and the Mint client disagree on chunk boundaries and on where the response body ends. On a pooled keep-alive connection that disagreement lets bytes from one response be attributed to the next, poisoning the responses returned to unrelated requests that share the connection.\u003c/p\u003e"
                },
                {
                  "base64": false,
                  "type": "text/markdown",
                  "value": "A malicious or attacker-influenced HTTP/1 origin behind an RFC-strict intermediary can make the intermediary and the Mint client disagree on chunk boundaries and on where the response body ends. On a pooled keep-alive connection that disagreement lets bytes from one response be attributed to the next, poisoning the responses returned to unrelated requests that share the connection."
                }
              ],
              "value": "A malicious or attacker-influenced HTTP/1 origin behind an RFC-strict intermediary can make the intermediary and the Mint client disagree on chunk boundaries and on where the response body ends. On a pooled keep-alive connection that disagreement lets bytes from one response be attributed to the next, poisoning the responses returned to unrelated requests that share the connection."
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV4_0": {
            "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "baseScore": 6.3,
            "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
            "version": "4.0",
            "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "LOW",
            "vulnIntegrityImpact": "LOW",
            "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
          },
          "format": "CVSS",
          "scenarios": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "GENERAL"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-444",
              "description": "CWE-444 Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests (\u0027HTTP Request/Response Smuggling\u0027)",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-09-19T17:00:31.648Z",
        "orgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
        "shortName": "EEF"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "GitHub Advisory",
          "tags": [
            "related",
            "vendor-advisory"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/elixir-mint/mint/security/advisories/GHSA-rj5m-69wp-cxq9"
        },
        {
          "name": "EEF CNA record for CVE-2026-82672",
          "tags": [
            "related"
          ],
          "url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-82672.html"
        },
        {
          "name": "OSV record EEF-CVE-2026-82672",
          "tags": [
            "related"
          ],
          "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-82672"
        },
        {
          "name": "Introducing commit 6008958 in elixir-mint/mint",
          "tags": [
            "related"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/elixir-mint/mint/commit/60089586ec7adc9fddb09f69a2f5919ba9ac7f33"
        },
        {
          "name": "Fix commit c823778 in elixir-mint/mint",
          "tags": [
            "patch"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/elixir-mint/mint/commit/c82377838dc6e275ef40bafa664fbcdf50270c60"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "discovery": "EXTERNAL"
      },
      "title": "Unvalidated chunk-size line tail in Mint HTTP/1 client enables response smuggling against strict intermediaries on pooled connections",
      "x_proofOfConcept": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "supportingMedia": [
            {
              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/html",
              "value": "\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eStart a loopback TCP server that serves one \u003ccode\u003eHTTP/1.1 200 OK\u003c/code\u003e response with \u003ccode\u003etransfer-encoding: chunked\u003c/code\u003e and controls the chunk-size line byte for byte.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eConnect with \u003ccode\u003eMint.HTTP1\u003c/code\u003e (mint 1.10.0 from Hex), send a request and stream the response.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003ePositive controls: chunk-size lines \u003ccode\u003e+5\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003eZ5\u003c/code\u003e and \u003ccode\u003e00000000000000005\u003c/code\u003e are refused with \u003ccode\u003e:invalid_chunk_size\u003c/code\u003e, confirming the build carries the earlier chunk-size fixes.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eBaseline: \u003ccode\u003e5\u003c/code\u003e and \u003ccode\u003e5;name=value\u003c/code\u003e are accepted with body \u003ccode\u003ehello\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eFinding: \u003ccode\u003e5ZZZZZ\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003e5 anything at all\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003e5\u0026lt;TAB\u0026gt;foo\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003e5 9\u003c/code\u003e and \u003ccode\u003e5}~!\u003c/code\u003e are each accepted as chunk size 5 with body \u003ccode\u003ehello\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eTerminator: \u003ccode\u003e0ZZZZ\u003c/code\u003e and \u003ccode\u003e0 9\u003c/code\u003e in place of the final \u003ccode\u003e0\u003c/code\u003e chunk are accepted and end the body.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eContrast: \u003ccode\u003eContent-Length: +5\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003eContent-Length: 5ZZZ\u003c/code\u003e and \u003ccode\u003eContent-Length: 5 9\u003c/code\u003e are refused with \u003ccode\u003e:invalid_content_length_header\u003c/code\u003e in the same run.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe reporter ran this on Elixir 1.18 / OTP 27 and Elixir 1.18.4 / OTP 28 with identical results.\u003c/p\u003e"
            },
            {
              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/markdown",
              "value": "1. Start a loopback TCP server that serves one `HTTP/1.1 200 OK` response with `transfer-encoding: chunked` and controls the chunk-size line byte for byte.\n2. Connect with `Mint.HTTP1` (mint 1.10.0 from Hex), send a request and stream the response.\n3. Positive controls: chunk-size lines `+5`, `Z5` and `00000000000000005` are refused with `:invalid_chunk_size`, confirming the build carries the earlier chunk-size fixes.\n4. Baseline: `5` and `5;name=value` are accepted with body `hello`.\n5. Finding: `5ZZZZZ`, `5 anything at all`, `5\u003cTAB\u003efoo`, `5 9` and `5}~!` are each accepted as chunk size 5 with body `hello`.\n6. Terminator: `0ZZZZ` and `0 9` in place of the final `0` chunk are accepted and end the body.\n7. Contrast: `Content-Length: +5`, `Content-Length: 5ZZZ` and `Content-Length: 5 9` are refused with `:invalid_content_length_header` in the same run.\n\nThe reporter ran this on Elixir 1.18 / OTP 27 and Elixir 1.18.4 / OTP 28 with identical results."
            }
          ],
          "value": "* Start a loopback TCP server that serves one HTTP/1.1 200 OK response with transfer-encoding: chunked and controls the chunk-size line byte for byte.\n* Connect with Mint.HTTP1 (mint 1.10.0 from Hex), send a request and stream the response.\n* Positive controls: chunk-size lines +5, Z5 and 00000000000000005 are refused with :invalid_chunk_size, confirming the build carries the earlier chunk-size fixes.\n* Baseline: 5 and 5;name=value are accepted with body hello.\n* Finding: 5ZZZZZ, 5 anything at all, 5\u003cTAB\u003efoo, 5 9 and 5}~! are each accepted as chunk size 5 with body hello.\n* Terminator: 0ZZZZ and 0 9 in place of the final 0 chunk are accepted and end the body.\n* Contrast: Content-Length: +5, Content-Length: 5ZZZ and Content-Length: 5 9 are refused with :invalid_content_length_header in the same run.\n\nThe reporter ran this on Elixir 1.18 / OTP 27 and Elixir 1.18.4 / OTP 28 with identical results."
        }
      ],
      "x_technicalAnalysis": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "supportingMedia": [
            {
              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/html",
              "value": "\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e1. Chunk-size parsing.\u003c/strong\u003e \u003ccode\u003eMint.HTTP1.Parse.chunk_size/1\u003c/code\u003e in \u003ccode\u003elib/mint/http1/parse.ex\u003c/code\u003e folds leading hexadecimal digits into an accumulator through \u003ccode\u003eparse_hex_prefix/3\u003c/code\u003e and, on the first byte that is not a hex digit, returns \u003ccode\u003e{:ok, size, rest}\u003c/code\u003e with \u003ccode\u003erest\u003c/code\u003e unexamined. The sign and digit-count checks added by earlier fixes constrain only the digits.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2. Tail skipping.\u003c/strong\u003e The caller, \u003ccode\u003eMint.HTTP1.decode_body/5\u003c/code\u003e in \u003ccode\u003elib/mint/http1.ex\u003c/code\u003e, hands \u003ccode\u003erest\u003c/code\u003e to \u003ccode\u003eParse.ignore_until_crlf/1\u003c/code\u003e, which advances over any byte until it finds CRLF. Nothing between the last hex digit and the CRLF is validated, so the accepted grammar is \u003ccode\u003e1*HEXDIG *OCTET CRLF\u003c/code\u003e, where RFC 9112 section 7.1 allows only an optional \u003ccode\u003e;\u003c/code\u003e-introduced \u003ccode\u003echunk-ext\u003c/code\u003e. The same tolerance applies to the terminating zero-length chunk, which is the token that ends the message body.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e3. Parser disagreement.\u003c/strong\u003e The sibling \u003ccode\u003eContent-Length\u003c/code\u003e parser, \u003ccode\u003eMint.HTTP1.Parse.content_length_header/1\u003c/code\u003e, trims trailing whitespace and requires the whole remaining value to be digits, rejecting anything else. An RFC-strict intermediary that rejects or reframes a chunk-size line with a non-extension tail, on a connection where Mint accepts it, yields a framing disagreement about chunk length and, through the terminating chunk, about where the message ends.\u003c/p\u003e"
            },
            {
              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/markdown",
              "value": "**1. Chunk-size parsing.** `Mint.HTTP1.Parse.chunk_size/1` in `lib/mint/http1/parse.ex` folds leading hexadecimal digits into an accumulator through `parse_hex_prefix/3` and, on the first byte that is not a hex digit, returns `{:ok, size, rest}` with `rest` unexamined. The sign and digit-count checks added by earlier fixes constrain only the digits.\n\n**2. Tail skipping.** The caller, `Mint.HTTP1.decode_body/5` in `lib/mint/http1.ex`, hands `rest` to `Parse.ignore_until_crlf/1`, which advances over any byte until it finds CRLF. Nothing between the last hex digit and the CRLF is validated, so the accepted grammar is `1*HEXDIG *OCTET CRLF`, where RFC 9112 section 7.1 allows only an optional `;`-introduced `chunk-ext`. The same tolerance applies to the terminating zero-length chunk, which is the token that ends the message body.\n\n**3. Parser disagreement.** The sibling `Content-Length` parser, `Mint.HTTP1.Parse.content_length_header/1`, trims trailing whitespace and requires the whole remaining value to be digits, rejecting anything else. An RFC-strict intermediary that rejects or reframes a chunk-size line with a non-extension tail, on a connection where Mint accepts it, yields a framing disagreement about chunk length and, through the terminating chunk, about where the message ends."
            }
          ],
          "value": "1. Chunk-size parsing. Mint.HTTP1.Parse.chunk_size/1 in lib/mint/http1/parse.ex folds leading hexadecimal digits into an accumulator through parse_hex_prefix/3 and, on the first byte that is not a hex digit, returns {:ok, size, rest} with rest unexamined. The sign and digit-count checks added by earlier fixes constrain only the digits.\n\n2. Tail skipping. The caller, Mint.HTTP1.decode_body/5 in lib/mint/http1.ex, hands rest to Parse.ignore_until_crlf/1, which advances over any byte until it finds CRLF. Nothing between the last hex digit and the CRLF is validated, so the accepted grammar is 1*HEXDIG *OCTET CRLF, where RFC 9112 section 7.1 allows only an optional ;-introduced chunk-ext. The same tolerance applies to the terminating zero-length chunk, which is the token that ends the message body.\n\n3. Parser disagreement. The sibling Content-Length parser, Mint.HTTP1.Parse.content_length_header/1, trims trailing whitespace and requires the whole remaining value to be digits, rejecting anything else. An RFC-strict intermediary that rejects or reframes a chunk-size line with a non-extension tail, on a connection where Mint accepts it, yields a framing disagreement about chunk length and, through the terminating chunk, about where the message ends."
        }
      ]
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
    "assignerShortName": "EEF",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-82672",
    "datePublished": "2026-09-19T17:00:31.648Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-09-17T05:30:01.748Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-09-19T17:00:31.648Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2",
  "vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
    "nvd": {
      "cve": {
        "affected": [
          {
            "affectedData": [
              {
                "collectionURL": "https://repo.hex.pm",
                "cpes": [
                  "cpe:2.3:a:elixir-mint:mint:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
                ],
                "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
                "modules": [
                  "\u0027Elixir.Mint.HTTP1.Parse\u0027",
                  "\u0027Elixir.Mint.HTTP1\u0027"
                ],
                "packageName": "mint",
                "packageURL": "pkg:hex/mint",
                "product": "mint",
                "programFiles": [
                  "lib/mint/http1/parse.ex",
                  "lib/mint/http1.ex"
                ],
                "programRoutines": [
                  {
                    "name": "\u0027Elixir.Mint.HTTP1.Parse\u0027:chunk_size/1"
                  },
                  {
                    "name": "\u0027Elixir.Mint.HTTP1.Parse\u0027:ignore_until_crlf/1"
                  },
                  {
                    "name": "\u0027Elixir.Mint.HTTP1\u0027:decode_body/5"
                  }
                ],
                "repo": "https://github.com/elixir-mint/mint",
                "vendor": "elixir-mint",
                "versions": [
                  {
                    "lessThan": "1.10.1",
                    "status": "affected",
                    "version": "0.1.0",
                    "versionType": "semver"
                  }
                ]
              },
              {
                "collectionURL": "https://github.com",
                "cpes": [
                  "cpe:2.3:a:elixir-mint:mint:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
                ],
                "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
                "modules": [
                  "\u0027Elixir.Mint.HTTP1.Parse\u0027",
                  "\u0027Elixir.Mint.HTTP1\u0027"
                ],
                "packageName": "elixir-mint/mint",
                "packageURL": "pkg:github/elixir-mint/mint",
                "product": "mint",
                "programFiles": [
                  "lib/mint/http1/parse.ex",
                  "lib/mint/http1.ex"
                ],
                "programRoutines": [
                  {
                    "name": "\u0027Elixir.Mint.HTTP1.Parse\u0027:chunk_size/1"
                  },
                  {
                    "name": "\u0027Elixir.Mint.HTTP1.Parse\u0027:ignore_until_crlf/1"
                  },
                  {
                    "name": "\u0027Elixir.Mint.HTTP1\u0027:decode_body/5"
                  }
                ],
                "repo": "https://github.com/elixir-mint/mint",
                "vendor": "elixir-mint",
                "versions": [
                  {
                    "lessThan": "c82377838dc6e275ef40bafa664fbcdf50270c60",
                    "status": "affected",
                    "version": "60089586ec7adc9fddb09f69a2f5919ba9ac7f33",
                    "versionType": "git"
                  }
                ]
              }
            ],
            "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db"
          }
        ],
        "cveTags": [],
        "descriptions": [
          {
            "lang": "en",
            "value": "Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests (\u0027HTTP Request/Response Smuggling\u0027) vulnerability in elixir-mint mint allows a malicious HTTP/1 server to desynchronize a strict intermediary and the Mint client on a pooled connection, enabling response-queue poisoning against subsequent requests that share the connection.\n\nMint.HTTP1.Parse.chunk_size/1 in lib/mint/http1/parse.ex stops at the first non-hexadecimal byte of a chunked response\u0027s chunk-size line and returns the remainder unexamined. Mint.HTTP1.decode_body/5 in lib/mint/http1.ex then discards every byte up to the CRLF with Parse.ignore_until_crlf/1, so the accepted grammar is a run of hex digits followed by arbitrary bytes, where RFC 9112 permits only a ;-introduced chunk extension. Lines such as 5ZZZZZ and 5 9 are accepted as chunk size 5, and 0ZZZZ is accepted as the terminating chunk that ends the message body. An RFC-strict intermediary rejects such a line while Mint accepts it, so the two disagree on chunk boundaries and on where the response ends.\n\nThis issue affects mint: from 0.1.0 before 1.10.1."
          }
        ],
        "id": "CVE-2026-82672",
        "lastModified": "2026-09-19T17:16:35.710",
        "metrics": {
          "cvssMetricV40": [
            {
              "cvssData": {
                "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "attackComplexity": "LOW",
                "attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
                "attackVector": "NETWORK",
                "availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "baseScore": 6.3,
                "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
                "confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
                "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
                "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
                "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
                "userInteraction": "NONE",
                "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
                "version": "4.0",
                "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
                "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "LOW",
                "vulnIntegrityImpact": "LOW",
                "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
              },
              "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
              "type": "Secondary"
            }
          ]
        },
        "published": "2026-09-19T17:16:35.710",
        "references": [
          {
            "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
            "url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-82672.html"
          },
          {
            "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
            "url": "https://github.com/elixir-mint/mint/commit/60089586ec7adc9fddb09f69a2f5919ba9ac7f33"
          },
          {
            "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
            "url": "https://github.com/elixir-mint/mint/commit/c82377838dc6e275ef40bafa664fbcdf50270c60"
          },
          {
            "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
            "url": "https://github.com/elixir-mint/mint/security/advisories/GHSA-rj5m-69wp-cxq9"
          },
          {
            "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
            "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-82672"
          }
        ],
        "sourceIdentifier": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
        "vulnStatus": "Received",
        "weaknesses": [
          {
            "description": [
              {
                "lang": "en",
                "value": "CWE-444"
              }
            ],
            "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
            "type": "Secondary"
          }
        ]
      }
    }
  }
}