CVE-2026-77866 (GCVE-0-2026-77866)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-15 15:38 – Updated: 2026-09-15 15:39
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
SSRF protection bypass in safeurl via IPv6 addresses and unresolvable hosts
Summary
Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Slab safeurl allows an attacker who controls a validated URL to reach internal network destinations the library is configured to block.
Only IPv4 addresses are matched against the reserved ranges and the blocklist. Every other address is treated as matching nothing, so a destination that is rejected in its IPv4 form is accepted when written as an IPv6 address, IPv6 entries in the blocklist never match, and a host that resolves to no IPv4 address is accepted regardless of where it points. Deployments that rely on the allowlist instead are unaffected, because there an unmatched address is rejected.
This issue affects safeurl: from 0.1.0 onward.
Severity
Assigner
References
3 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-77866.html | relatedthird-party-advisory |
| https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-77866 | related |
| https://github.com/slab/safeurl-elixir/commit/fea… | related |
Impacted products
Date Public
2026-09-15 15:38
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}
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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